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SUMMARY
The central question posed in this thesis is as follows: why did the apartheid
urban system change over time and in space during the 1980s? Based on a case
study of Langa Uitenhage, the changes in this local urban system are
explained in terms of the complex and irreducible relations of power that
exist within the urban system between three primary sub-systems that
interacted at the local level, namely the state agencies (especially local
governments and the security forces), community- and workplace-based
social movements, and formal business sector, particularly the local branches
of large-scale national and multi-national corporations.
The primary findings of the thesis are as follows:
(i) Uitenhage's urban system changed over time and in space as a result of
the complex interactions and transactions between the elements of this
local urban system and as a result of the dynamic interplay between this
local urban system and the wider non-local urban, socio-economic and
political systems within which Uitenhage's local urban system was
embedded.
(ii) Local urban politics can be explained as the organised expression of those
interactions and transactions that resulted from conflicting conceptions of
urban meaning and the corresponding urban functions and urban forms
that flowed from different urban meanings.
(iii) The dynamics of local urban politics cannot be explained as the
epiphenomena of underlying structural contradictions. There were key
moments when certain interactions occurred that decisively changed the
qualitative nature of the relationships between the elements of the local
urban system as a whole. Herein lies the importance of such occurances as
police massacres of peaceful demonstrators, violent crowd attacks on
representatives of the state, local-level negotiations and mass detentions.
(iv) This local case study contributes to an explanation of urban system change
and the dynamics of urban politics. However, the case study has not been
designed to generate another general theory of urban sysem change or
urban politics. It only demonstrated the usefulness of systems theory as a
guide for case study research.
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INTRODUCTION: THESIS, CONTTXT AND METHODOLOGY
THE PRIMARY THESIS
The central question posed in this thesis is as follows: why did the apartheid
urban system change over time and in space during the 1980s? The secondary
questions that flow from this relate to the following: What was the connection
between changes in the urban system and local urban politics? What were the
dynamics of local urban political conflicts and why did they following the
patterns that they did? Finally, what were the linkages between local urban
politics and non-local political dynamics?
It is argued in this thesis that the rapidly changing dynamics of the South African
urban system during the 1980s can best be grasped via a case study of the local
urban political dynamics that shaped systemic changes in the urban system. In
the case study of Langa, Uitenhage, the changes in this local urban system are
explained in terms of the complex and irreducible relations of power that exist
within the urban system between three primary sub-systems that interacted at
the local level, namely the state agencies (especially local governments and the
security forces), community- and workplace-based social movements, and
formal business sector, particularly the local branches of large-scale national and
multi-national corporations. Using open systems theory as an alternative to the
mainstream largely structuralist paradigms that predominate in contemporary
urban studies, it is argued that the dynamics and outcomes of ongoing and ever-
changing conflicts over the nature and meaning of the urban system cannot be
explained in terms of a single or dominant group of factors that are deemed a
priori to possess the necessary explanatory capacity for accounting for the nature
of the system as a whole. Instead of being the sum of its parts, the localised urban
system is a product of their interaction and these interactions, in turn, are
profoundly influenced by the dynamics of the non-local systems within which
local systems are embedded and which often define the terrain of local power
relations that determine the nature of the interactions between the component
parts of the urban system.
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Social actions are embedded in meanings and contextualised relations of power
that require forms of explanation that are far more complex than structuralist
and reductionist explanations have been able to offer. This is why this thesis
attempts to examine the changing dynamics of the urban system via an in-depth
study of a particularly significant local context, namely Uitenhage. This is not,
however, a "case study" of non-local processes from which it is possible to
somehow derive the logic of the local context. Nor does it set out to prove a pre-
determined theory. Instead, it is an open systems examination of a local context
at three levels: (i) the local material interests of those directly involved in state
agencies, social movements and businesses who found themselves having to
respond to political and systemic processes in ways that changed the way they
realised their respective interests in the way the form and function of
Uitenhage's urban system was constituted and managed; (ii) the impact of
national (and where possible even international) systems and processes (within
which local interests were embedded) on the dynamics of the local context,
paying particular attention to how the interests and actions of local actors were
influenced and re-defined by these ever-changing non-local processes and, in
turn, how local processes affected non-local dynamics; (iii) the micro-level
dynamics of conflict in situations such as massacres, crowd violence and
negotiations where subjective choices of action had more to do with the way
meaning was constructed and interpreted through symbols and language
mediated by the spatial imperatives of the local context than with the 'dull
compulsion' l of wider structural contradictions.
The primary findings of the thesis are as follows:
(i) Uitenhage's urban system changed over time and in space as a result of
the complex interactions and transactions between the elements of this
local urban system and as a result of the dynamic interplay between this
local urban system and the wider non-local urban, socio-economic and
political systems within which Uitenhage's local urban system was
embedded.
(ii) Local urban politics can be explained as the organised expression of those
interactions and transactions that resulted from conflicting conceptions of
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urban meaning and the corresponding urban functions and urban forms
that flowed from different urban meanings.
(iii) The dynamics of local urban politics cannot be explained as the
epiphenomena of underlying structural contradictions. The cut and thrust
of local urban politics is contingent and dependent on a myriad of
subjective choices. However, it is possible to identify key moments when
certain interactions occurred that decisively changed the qualitative nature
of the relationships between the elements of the urban system as a whole.
Herein lies the importance of such occurances as police massacres of
peaceful demonstrators, violent crowd attacks on representatives of the
state, local-level negotiations and mass detentions.
(iv) This local case study contributes to an explanation of urban system change
and the dynamics of urban politics. However, the case study has not been
designed to generate another general theory of urban sysem change or
urban politics. It only demonstrated the usefulness of systems theory as a
guide for case study research.
Each chapter of the thesis exemplifies the above abstract findings via an
analytical discussion of a concrete set of local and non-local processes that directly
affected the dynamic of the urban system at distinct points in time and space.
This is done in each chapter by way of an introductory discussion of the relevant
literature. Key literary interventions are surveyed to glean perspectives on the
process that the chapter deals with. Critical questions are posed and a central
problematic extracted that situates the chapter in the literature as a whole. This is
then followed by an analysis of the relevant non-local processes and dynamics,
followed by an in-depth examination of the local context at particular points in
time and space. Each of these issues is then related back to the primary findings
referred to above, namely the non-derivative but necessarily interactive nature
of the local context from the wider (inter-)national context, and the contingent
nature of the choices made by interests located within their respective local
urban sub-systems.
3
All the elements that have been used to construct the above articulation of the
primary thesis are unpacked and developed in the sections that make up the rest
of this introduction.
WHY LIITE1VHAGE AND ITS CONTEXT
By the mid-1980s, Uitenhage was a still a relatively small town of just below 200
000 people. Broken down into the official racial categories, there were 26 000
whites, 30 000 coloureds and anything between 110 and 150 000 Africans.
Located in-land beyond the 'rust belt' some 35 Kilometres north of Port
Elizabeth, it formed part of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan economy
(see map 1.1). In many ways it resembled the classic apartheid urban form: a
white controlled Central Business District surrounded by well serviced, leafy
white suburbs comprised of solid working and middle class housing. About 10
Kilometres south west of the centre of the town, there was a large black township
that was consciously created behind a hill to replicate the familiar apartheid
illusion of non-existent black people. And then a distinct coloured area to the
north that was supposed to be separated by a buffer strip from the white suburbs.
It was this buffer strip, however, that had been intensely contested by the town's
population groups at least since the 1920s. By the mid-1980s the ferocious Group
Area laws that were passed in the 1950s had still not been applied in a way that
'cleansed' this little patch of land sandwiched between the white suburbs, the
coloured area and the CBD of the african community that lived there. This was
the community called Kabah or Langa, 2 and it is this community that is the
focus of this thesis (see map 1.2).
Although Port Elizabeth was the Eastern Cape's largest city and a key Cape port,
Uitenhage was not simply a dormitory town that served Port Elizabeth. It had its
own distinct economy, polity and urban system that were, in turn, a product of
their own historical processes. It is the distinctive features of Uitenhage's urban
history that forms the basis for the argument developed in the chapters that
follow. These local processes and dynamics, however, were constituted within
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(and partly by) a national context of dramatic socio-economic and political
transition.
The great historical forces that shaped the dynamics of South African politics
during the 1980s were comprised of a set of inter-linked processes that can be
described as follows:
* the crisis of an essentially capitalist economic system that had hitherto
been racially structured to meet the needs of a largely white consumer
market and was premised on import-substitution, foreign exchange
earnings from raw material exports, cheap black labour and high levels of
regulation;3
* the dynamics of regime-driven constitutional and political reform coupled
to a militaristic security strategy both of which had, since the Soweto
Uprisings of 1976, attempted to respond to popular demands for
democracy, redistribution and justice without fundamentally
compromising the form and function of the apartheid state;4
* the birth in the early 1970s and subsequent maturation throughout the
1980s of a set of community and workplace-based social movements in
civil society that connected up with underground and exile-based
liberation movements in a way that systematically deepened the economic
crisis and delegitimised the state's reform initiatives;5
* the urbanisation processes that relentlessly re-shaped the nature of urban
living for everyone, 6 from the super-rich that had ensconced themselves
in remarkable luxury, to sprawling white suburbia that housed the white
middle and working classes, to the upwardly mobile black middle class
and employed workers that lived in peripheralised and standardised
dormitory townships, to the masses of urban poor who migrated to
wherever they could find a patch of land to erect their shacks;
5


the internationalisation of the South African conflict to the point where
its pariah status began to affect the economic foundations of apartheid as
multi-national companies either reformed the workplace or withdrew or
both, and the international political and social system collaborated to
ensure that the apartheid state never enjoyed the kind legitimation that
many other second and third world authoritarian regimes have enjoyed
over the decades.7
By the time the transition to democracy began in 1990, all these historical forces
had intersected and combined in particular ways at different points in time and
space throughout the previous two decades. The onset of the transition did not
represent the "resolution" of the multiple contradictions inherent in the social
formation created by apartheid, but it did mark the beginning of a new political
process that brought actors into political society that the regime had hitherto
insisted on excluding.8
All of these processes and their various manifestations at different spatial scales
have been extensively studied and written up by scholars and writers whose
intellectual traditions and methods span the disciplines and paradigms. This is
not the place to review the entire gamut of contemporary South African studies
because the purpose of this thesis is not to further the debate about these
processes in their generalityper se. Instead, the purpose is to try and integrate an
understanding of these national (and indeed global) processes by threading them
through the eye of a local context. The problem with much of the general
writing is that although in practice it was the constant reformation and
recomposition of the intersections and interdependencies of different processes
that actually shaped the history of the 1980s, they were often dealt with as distinct
and disconnected dynamics by the different disciplines that 'owned' their
respective fields. Economists dealt with the economic crisis, political scientists
"did the state", industrial sociologists and management experts studied the
unions and the labour process, sociologists and urbanologists dealt with urban
social movements, urban planners dominated the spatial analysis of .
urbanisation, and so on. It was only in some of the rich case studies of
contemporary processes that have evolved over the last decade and a half that
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some disciplinary and paradigmatic integration has occurred. It is in this
unselfconscious and largely unexamined tradition (if it is possible to call it that
now) that this study is located.9 Put another way, it may well be that this post-
modern moment of paradigmatic agnosticism is opportune for going back to
local processes and dynamics in order to explore what I think may be an
emerging systems approach to phenomena that are now regarded as
interdependent and therefore irreducible to any one variable that is deemed a
priori to have greater explanatory weight than any of the other variables. 10 This
post-mechanistic systems way of thinking clears away the debris of reductionism
so that the integrity of the complexity of each context can be more adequately
grasped and analysed. 11 (More on this below.)
However, before elucidating the methodology and methods used during the
research process, it is necessary to situate this thesis in a review of two (related)
bodies of knowledge, namely the South African literature on township politics,
and the international theoretical literature on the nature of urban dynamics and
political processes.
SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON URBAN POLITICS: A BRIEF REVIEW
For the purposes of this review, a selection of South African academic writings
have been selected that relate in one way or another to the main focus of this
thesis, namely the politics of the apartheid urban system with particular
reference to the black townships. In other words, only that literature that has the
urban system as its subject matter has been addressed in this review. To
demonstrate the various approaches used and subject matter tackled, distinct and
related trends in the literature will be reviewed.
Given the dominance of the state in the making of apartheid via law, regulation
and coercive enforcement, it is not surprising that there is a significant body of
writing that is focussed on the strategies, tactics and manipulative power of the
various state agencies involved in the planning, control and management of the
urban system. 12 On the whole this literature has assumed that the Apartheid
state had a high degree of control over the urban system and therefore it was the
policies and strategies of the state that were the dominant determinant of urban
development processes. Both Marxist and institutional (in the structural
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functionalist sense) analyses have tended to focus on the coercive or reformist
(or both) components of state strategy and have either explained these as
functional to the needs of capital (in the case of Marxists) or in the interests of an
Afrikaner Nationalist hegemonic interest (in the case of liberals). From the point
of view of the subject matter of this thesis, a state-centric approach is less than
helpful because the evidence points quite decisively to the fact that the urban
system and its sub-systems are shaped by a multiplicity of non-state forces that
are at least as significant as the regime-driven dynamics. Furthermore there are
contradictions and competing interests within the state system that state-centric
analyses often ignore.
Closely related to the state-centric analyses are those analyses that have focussed
on the role played by the security forces in managing urban-based resistance,
conflict and violence. 13 While yielding a rich and subtle literature on the
institutional dynamics of policing strategies and (to a much lesser extent) the role
played by the Defense Force in backing up the police during periods of
heightened township conflict, the underlying purpose of much of this writing
has been to reinforce the state-centric analysis of urban control. In other words,
after accepting uncritically that the logic of state urban controls was to simply
maintain the oppression of black township dwellers , these analyses were largely
about demonstrating the inherent functionality of the security forces in the
enforcement of these urban controls. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the
relationship between security force action and urban management cannot be
simplistically reduced to their shared origins in apartheid policy. The interaction
between the two means of control changed at different points in time and space
for reasons that were not always related to policy choices at Central Government
level. In fact, as will be shown, the policy choices of those responsible for urban
management in Uitenhage at central and local level were at crucial moments
contradicted by security force action. Herein lies the importance of the 'local-
level negotiations' literature referred to below.
Since about the mid-1980s a rapidly growing literature that was self-consciously
focussed on 'urban development'/'urban policy'/'urban processes' began to
emerge. 14 In recent years this literature has begun to emerge in the form of
edited collections with specifically urban titles 15 and in 1990 a new academic
journal called Urban Forum began to be published by the University of the
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Witwatersrand Press. While substantial portions of this literature addressed the
policy and structural context of urban politics, there was also literature that
addressed the urban policy framework that local governments and other sub-
national state agencies established and maintained. 16 Since the transition began
in 1990, the production of normative urban policy literature has escalated
enormously with institutions like the Urban Foundation, NGOs linked to the
democratic movement and state agencies generating position papers for the
negotiation process. While the prodigious output of self-conscious urban
literature has contributed significantly to our understanding of South Africa's
urban system, it has tended to suffer on the whole from two problems. Firstly, it
is largely descriptive - a point that Seekings observed in his review. Secondly,
when describing the urban system, the approach has been to describe the
component parts of the system (racially segregated townships, pass laws, Black
Local Authorities, separate legal systems, demographics, socio-economic
conditions, social movements, etc) on the assumption that the urban system is
the sum of these parts. While being spatially textured, this approach has
inadequately explained the dynamics of urban processes over time. As the next
section will show, until a system is seen as the product of the interaction between
its component parts as opposed to merely the sum of these parts, then it becomes
difficult to comprehend the complex and changing rhythms of meaning,
structure and power.
Local Government is probably the most well researched and written about area
within the burgeoning urban studies field. 17 It is also a rich and diverse
literature that is generated by scholars from disciplines that range from classical
public administration through to avante garde public management, from
political science through to urban planners, from sociologists through to social
historians. To classify this literature, Atkinson and Swilling reviewed 170 of the
key articles on local government in terms of five categories. 18 These categories
were the 'public administration approach', the 'radical/progressive' approach,
the 'institutional dynamics' approach, the 'transition literature' and the
'partisan political' literature.
The 'public administration' approach has contributed a huge quantity of
scrupulously technicist writings on the formal institutions of local government.
This literature focussed on law, structure and procedure and ignored politics,
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power and process. Up until the transition began in 1990 it was the dominant
intellectual tradition within the formal state system. The 'radical/progressive'
approach was normatively committed to the interests of the oppressed majority
and was concerned to demonstrate the linkage between local government
institutions and the relations of production (in the case of Marxists) and the
relations of political power (in the case of radical liberals) or both (in the case of
those using the 'Colonialism of a Special Type' theory). It is this tradition that
has had the most profound impact on policy making during the transition.
The 'institutional dynamics' approach has been overwhelmingly interested in
the relations of power within local government institutions and less interested
in the external impact on local government institutions of economic or even
political forces. Influenced by phenomenological methodologies, researchers
using this approach focussed on the categories of players within the institutions,
differentiated interests and intra-institutional conflicts.
The 'transition approach' began to take shape after 1990 (but with roots in the
late 1980s) when the search for post-apartheid local government alternatives
began. Thus the subject matter was international comparative examples, model
building, policy prescriptions and proposed transition processes for how South
African towns and cities could get from an apartheid form of local governance to
a post-apartheid alternative.
Finally there was the 'partisan political' literature that was turned out by the
various players as part of their respective hegemonic projects during the
negotiations processes that have driven the transition.
On the whole the local government literature is overwhelmingly focussed on
institutions. Either it is descriptive about what these institutions are (public
administration approach), or it analyses what functions these institutions
perform in terms of the relations of production and/or power
('radical/progressive' approach), or it is about the internal dynamics of these
institutions ('institutional dynamics' approach), or the literature is searching for
alternative institutional models (transition literature). It is quite remarkable how
tenuous the link is between the local government literature and the urban
studies literature really is. (A notable exception is provided by Morris who
_
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consciously tried to explore the complex non-reducible relations between local
government officials and the responses of the communities they had
administrative jurisdiction over 19.) From the point of view of the analysis
provided in the rest of the chapters that follow, the institutional fixation
impedes a systems view that would locate institutions and the people operating
within these institutions in a larger and more complex conception of the urban
system of which local government institutions are an essential part.
In order to bridge the gap between urban systems and local government
institutions, a number of writers have attempted to explain urban political
dynamics in terms of the ideological predispositions and political strategies of
leadership elites.20 Whether they were dealing with community struggles,
liberation movements, state agencies or business, the focus tended to be on the
ideological mind-set of the players as the key determinant of political action,
policy choice and tactical decision-making. While offering a degree of subtlety
and insight that is often missing in state-centric structuralist analyses, a focus on
the ideological and strategic choices of leadership elites tends to abstract out the
complex system of relations within which these leadership formations are
embedded. This becomes particularly apparent when urban processes occur that
none of the formal leadership formations propagated, e.g. intra-communal
crowd violence or land invasions. This is more than a case of the 'common
man' making 'his' world as the social historians have argued in relation to elite
analyses, it is also about how these kinds of developments shape and impinge on
leadership choices and vice versa - i.e. it is about interactions rather than the
causality of one or other component.
In contrast to much of the literature reviewed thus far in this section, probably
one of the most creative fields of urban research over the last ten years has been
the numerous studies of local social movements that have waged extended
struggles over the nature and terms of urban living. 21 With some notable
exceptions,22 this literature has on the whole been structuralist in nature because
it has derived explanations of social movements and community protest from
the logic of the structure of the urban system. The classical format has been to
analyse spatial location, urban management structures, socio-economic
conditions and the build-up of oppositional organisation as the antecedents of
the movements of protest that followed. Leadership formation, strategic
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decision-making, the relations of power between the movement and the
structures of urban management and even the internal contradictions within the
movement were often ignored. Even those analyses that focussed on specific
relations of power such as gender23 and youth24 never really went much beyond
providing a more textured version of the structuralist analysis. From the point of
view of this thesis, it is questionable whether it is possible to provide an adequate
explanation for social movement formation without taking into account the
effects of the two-way interactions between the movement and the formal state
structures, the interactions within the movement itself, and how the former
influenced the later and vice versa.
The growth of studies of local struggles and social movements had two
significant spin-offs. Motivated by a desire to look below the imagery of heroic
undifferentiated communities pitted against a monolithic police/racist state,
researchers began to look into the nooks and crannies of the social movements
themselves and into the relationships between these movements and the
monolithic state they were supposedly completely opposed to. Those who looked
into the movements themselves began to generate a rich literature on what was
called the 'organs of people's power'. 25 The 'people's power' researchers were
particularly interested in the forms of popular justice that emerged in various
places around the country. While hotly debated, this research rapidly revealed
the connections between 'people's justice' and the state criminal justice system
because quite often the two supposedly competing systems were found to be
inter-dependent. As far as those who chose to ask questions about the
relationships between social movements and the state, they soon discovered
surprisingly complex interactions that belied the popular notion of a
revolutionary rupture between the 'power bloc' and the 'the people'. I am
referring here to what has become known as the 'local-level negotiations'
literature.26
 Although quantitatively limited and theoretically undeveloped, it
was this literature that first began to define the need for a theoretical approach to
the changing spatial and temporal dynamics of power. The reason for this rather
bold claim is that the literature on local-level negotiations was focussed on the
discussions and negotiations that took place between the leaders of powerful
local township-based social movements and the established white leadership of
local business associations and local governments. Why this occurred, what
actually happened and the effects of these interactions on the nature and
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management of the urban system were the questions that began to generate
answers that were at odds with the conventional wisdom about what drove
South African politics. It is no coincidence that this thesis is about one of the
most well known of these instances of local-level negotiations.
While the 'local-level negotiations' literature emerged to explore integrative
processes that began re-shaping urban dynamics and processes, another body of
literature emerged to explain the disintegrative processes that resulted from
escalating levels of urban violence. 27 While local-level negotiations is a key
element of the drama of this thesis, so is violence in its various manifestations.
The violence literature has provided useful overviews of violent processes, the
effects of violence on particular sectors of society, the socio-psychological
determinants of violence and the structural context of violent conflict. It is
lacking, however, in two respects. Firstly, violence may have reached extreme
levels in the South African conflict, but violence still did not affect every urban
community. Why did violence occur in the form that it occurred where it
occurred and not in similar spatial and temporal locations despite the fact that in
both locations the same structural conditions existed? Although Thornton was
one of the few that actually asked this question, 28 he evaded the answer by
focusing only on what was specific about the symbolic effects of the Langa
massacre. This opens the way for the kind of detailed reconstruction of what
specifically triggers violent conflict in particular contexts. This is what this thesis
attempts to do. Secondly, the violence literature is lacking with respect to the
analysis of violent behavior by sections of the community. Once again, this is
addressed in this thesis. In both instances - the spatial and temporal specificity of
violence and the dynamics of community-based violence - a structural approach
is found wanting.
The analysis of urban political dynamics has also emerged in writings that have
focussed on national-level organisations such as the United Democratic Front as
well as on national-level trends and strategic/ideological dynamics. 29 In a
similar vein, workplace-based social movements that have impacted on the
nature and political dynamics of the urban system have also been analysed.30
These two related bodies of literature played an exceptionally important role in
the process of constructing a national picture of an organised political alternative
representative of the oppressed black majority. While this literature has been
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used in this thesis to contextualise the formation, ideology and strategic choices
of Uitenhage's political and trade union organisations that represented this
town's oppressed communities in the 1980s, this literature is limited to national
generalisations despite the (often implicit) claims of some writers that local
trends were merely derivatives of national processes. This view is explicit in the
conspiratorial literature that emanated from the state-linked security analysts
and implicit in the writings of those sympathetic to the liberation movement
who conceptualised every element of resistance as moments in the unraveling
of a 'National Democratic Revolution' that was, in turn, constructed
teleologically as an inevitable process with a singular end-point. Obviously
between these two poles there were more subtle analyses that were much were
modest in their claims. The best of these simply sought to set the stage of
national political contestation rather than assume universality.31 However, I
would like to conclude by agreeing with Seekings who argued that "[a] full
account of protests and conflict needs to locate the choices regarding political
action made by individuals at the local level - leaders, activists, and other
township residents - within the context of constraints, pressures, and
opportunities set by both the political economy and the actions of national
political organisations."32
In conclusion, the 'township politics' literature has contributed significantly to
both a general and localised understanding of community-based political
dynamics. In particular, it has provided a valuable analysis of the relationship
between apartheid urban systems, community leadership formation, ideology
and internal community processes as resistance to urban apartheid built up. It
has, however, largely failed to connect the dynamics of resistance to changing
urban policies at national and local level. The more generalised analyses of
urban structures and urban policies contained in the urbanisation literature does
provide some understanding of these changes, but tends to neglect an analysis of
the interface between resistance and structure. Unfortunately, the South African
literature on the local state does not help to transcend this dualist perspective
that ably depicts the complexity of resistance, but against the backdrop of a
homogenous state/ruling bloc on the one hand, or else the complexity of policy
and structural change is provided without linking this to the impact of
resistance.
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By focusing on relationships in a local context, it is possible to begin to ask and
answer two questions. Firstly, how did the local officials interpret and
implement the central state's urban policy? By state urban policy is meant the
set of administrative practices, planning procedures and regulatory controls that
officials were empowered to use to determine the form and function of the
urban system. Marxist and Weberian analyses have tended to assume that state
systems are homogeneous rational entities free of internal contradictions
and hence capable of implementing the central state's policies in a uniform
and mechanical manner. This view tends to ignore two processes. Firstly, the
specificity of the economic, social, political and ideological nature of the
circumstances which local officials have to deal with, and how this influences
the content and limits the scope of their actions. Secondly, the peculiarities of
the ideological mind-set of the local officials and their perceptions of their
social roles - a factor which has had a major influence on the nature of local
administrative systems.
If the impact of these two processes is taken into account, it will be possible to
identify the social character of local administrative structures and the role
that particular officials played in constructing these structures. This approach
avoids the assumption that the local forms of urban control are the mechanical
expressions of a monolithic undifferentiated state policy. It also helps to unravel
the empirical connections between local interests (e.g. business and
communities) and the views and actions of officialdom.
The second question is how do different classes and social strata within urban
communities respond to the way their urban existence is controlled and
managed by local officials? How do these responses, in turn, affect the local
officials?
These questions address issues related to the sociological composition of the
community, the specific way in which the local forms of control affected the
community, and the complex linkages between different segments of the
community and the local officials. The object of this exercise is to disaggregate
and bring into relief the social agents whose experiences shaped and molded
the character of the community instead of assuming that it is culturally
homogeneous and socially undifferentiated.
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Before proceeding, the approach outlined above that has been located in the
context of the South African literature needs to be contextualised in the
international literature on urban theory, particularly that literature that has
attempted to provide a theory of local urban politics.
REVIEW OF IIVTERNATIONAL URBAN THEORY AND ELEMENTS OF A
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO URBAN ANALYSIS
International urban theory has emerged out of the need to theorise relations of
power and production that increasingly appeared to be distinct from what were
assumed to be general relations of power and production. This section will
review a selection of the key urban theorists that have attempted to theorise the
spatial dimensions of these relations. Given the centrality of urban/local politics
in this thesis, the inquiry will be around the way international urban theory has
attempted to conceptualise local urban politics.
The spatial relations between the location of home, work and urban facilities has
often occupied the minds of urban theorists. In particular, the relationship
between spatial and social inequalities became important in the 1970s. Williams
argued that "Necause objects are not randomly distributed, neither is the value
and meaning of places."33 Williams argues from this that given that the spatial
location of homes, workplaces and urban facilities is the result of specific
decisions by a defined set of decision-makers located within particular structures,
and given that location determines access, it follows that it is these decisions that
are the stuff of urban politics.
Williams argues that urban communities use various strategies to determine the
value of the spaces they occupy. These range from defensive strategies such as
zoning, through to offensive strategies such as private or public investment
schemes in urban facilities, and also 'purification' strategies aimed at rooting out
incompatible urban elements through urban renewal or slum clearance. No
matter what strategy is required, Williams refers to the way urban coalitions
form around particular strategies. Urban politics is then about the competition
between these urban coalitions. This competition is present in the institutions of
urban governance, particularly in local government.
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The spatial access analysis provided by Williams succeeds in highlighting the
spatial determinants of urban politics, but it can be criticised for reducing urban
political conflicts to spatial relations when, in certain instances, non-spatial social
relations may be where the explanation lies. In addition, the emphasis on
competition between urban coalitions may be pertinent to a democratic pluralist
environment as understood via elite competition theory, but where there are
structural obstacles to urban political competition (like in South Africa before
democratisation), it may be preferable to refer to conflict rather than competition.
Finally, Williams' assumption that spatial access is specific to the local level
ignores the impact of non-local political decisions about the spatial structure of
the urban system. Given the dramatic and intrusive impact of Central
Government urban policies on South Africa's towns and cities, this aspect of
Williams' analysis seems particularly unhelpful.
Cox also attempts to find a connection between spatial location in the urban
system and urban political dynamics.34 However, instead of doing this via
Williams' concept of spatial access, he does it via his notion of 'externality
effects'. An externality effect is the effect of the activities of
individuals/communities/companies/public agencies etc on other
individuals/communities/companies/public agencies etc that experience the
external effects of these activities. These externality effects can be positive or
negative. The explanation for urban politics lies in the way urban subjects either
move close to positive externality effects or away from negative externality
effects; or they try to alter their existing environment by bargaining with those
who can improve their living environment by diminishing negative externality
effects or promoting positive externality effects.
Applied to an explanation of the politics of inequality and the measures to
address inequalities in American cities, Cox's analysis makes it possible to
explain numerous urban political dynamics. He shows, for example, how
middle-class suburbs protect themselves from the negative externality effects of
having to subsidise the urban poor by keeping the urban poor out via zoning
mechanisms. Or he shows how Local Governments with large impoverished
inner city populations may try to attract the middle class back into the inner city
by taking steps to diminish negative externality effects. He can also explain inter-
locality conflict in terms of how certain stakeholders become territorially
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organised to diminish the negative externality effects generated by stakeholders
that are territorially organised elsewhere in the city. His analysis also makes it
possible to explain the locational decisions of capital as it pursues lower labour
costs or improved infrastructural services. Or, alternatively, his analysis can
explain the strategies of local governments to promote positive externality effects
to promote the movement of certain kinds of citizens and investments from one
locality to another.
Like Williams' analysis, Cox's analysis runs the danger of reducing politics to the
dynamic of spatial relations when in fact the explanation for certain political
processes may lie in non-spatial dynamics. More importantly, it is unclear why
political processes triggered by spatial conflict over externality effects can be
limited to the types of interactions that take place within the urban system. Put
another way, this explanation of political dynamics can be applied at numerous
levels (local and non-local) and beyond the urban system.
Whereas Williams and Cox share the notion that local government gets used by
the urban coalition that gets control of it to service the spatial interests of that
urban coalition, writers influenced by managerialist conceptions of the state have
provided a very different conception of local government. Pahl, for example, is a
leading proponent of the 'urban managerialism' thesis which posits that the
spatial distribution of urban inequality is the result of manipulative decisions by
a wide range of independently positioned (or 'relatively autonomous' in a
different lexicon) 'urban managers' located in the public and private sectors who
are involved in the allocation of scarce urban resources.35
 These 'urban
managers' are largely professionals who are located somewhere between the
urban poor and the economic and political elites. It is assumed that they share a
common interest, have similar views on what needs to be done and have equal
access to resources across localities. It is the empirical impossibility of this last
statement that has brought Pahl's 'urban managerialism' thesis into question.
His later writings removed the crudity from the argument and in so doing paved
the way for an important more nuanced focus on the role of private and public
sector professionals in the 'management' of the urban system and, in particular,
in the role they play in the allocation of scarce resources. 36 This theoretical point
is taken up in this thesis in various chapters, but without the bias towards
managerial autonomy that tends to permeate Pahl's work.
20
While Williams, Cox, Pahl and others were trying to find explanations for urban
political dynamics in the way scarce urban resources were allocated or accessed by
spatially defined interest groups, urban theorists from the Marxist tradition were
trying to define 'urban politics' in terms of the processes of 'collective
consumption' that were required to reproduce labour power in capitalist
societies. The leading exponent of this tradition was, of course, Manuel
Castells.37
Caste11's point of departure was that all relations between social agents are also
always spatial relations. This means that any relation of production (in the
Marxist sense) must have a spatial location. Given that for Castells every space in
capitalist society has a meaning and purpose, it follows that it is the nature of the
relations of production that are spatially manifested that determine the nature of
these spatial relations. In other words, the explanation for why a certain space is
structured in the way that it is can be found in the logic of the economic
processes that require that space to be configured in the way that it is. In
particular, it is those economic processes that relate to the reproduction of labour
power via the collective consumption patterns of urban households that most
directly shapes and structures urban space. 38 It is this theorisation of the
relationship between space and capitalist production that allows CasteIls to
conclude that the city (or urban system) is equivalent to the spatial location of
the means of collective reproduction of labour power. It follows from this that
urban politics is about the contestation over the way in which the means of
collective consumption is organised.
The two central 'urban actors' involved in urban politics are 'urban planning'
and 'urban social movements'. As far as Castells is concerned, the role of urban
planning is to ensure the extended reproduction of labour power, regulate non-
antagonistic contradictions and to organise the urban system in a way that
reproduces the conditions for capital accumulation.
As far as urban social movements are concerned, Castells defines these as
structurally determined by urban contradictions that have the effect of
substantially shifting the balance of political power in an anti-capitalist
direction.39
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For the purposes of this review, the wide-ranging critique of Castells' early work
(including by himself) will be left aside for the moment. What is important here
is whether his concepts are useful for an analysis of South African urban politics.
Although the entire Althuserian project (of which Caste11's early writings was a
part) is intrinsically hostile to empirical 'testing', it needs to be said that the
reduction of urban politics to the politics of collective consumption poses a very
serious problem for empirical research. If operationalised, it would drive the
researcher into the structure and workings of the means of collective
consumption. The first finding is that this would not have any specific spatial
parameter. Each means of collective consumption (water, electricity, education,
welfare, etc) has a different spatial context and are organised at different levels.
This would pose a problem for determining these means as the material basis for
urban political conflicts and struggles. Secondly, urban planning is not an activity
that is spatially bound. As the history of urbanisation and urban development in
Uitenhage will reveal, decisions about this urban system were taken at
numerous different levels at different points in time. And finally, to judge
Uitenhage's social movements purely in terms of their effects would result in
an explanation of urban change that leaves out the relations of power that
determined what actually happened at every point in the process.
It would, however, be unfortunate to lose the concept of collective consumption.
It has penetrated everyday thinking about the urban system and has informed a
wide range of international studies. Dunleavy tried to rescue the concept by
retaining the link between urban politics and the politics of collective
consumption, but he avoided theoretical confusion by demonstrating that this
link is not automatically manifested at the level of the urban/local level but is
rather manifested at many levels. 40 This local/non-local urban political analysis
is a pragmatic way out of the problem. It remains, however, essentially
reductionist in nature. As the analysis of Uitenhage's urban political dynamics
reiTeal, urban political conflict originates from a multiplicity of sources that
cannot easily be reduced to the structure and workings of the means of collective
consumption. Nevertheless, it was the complex conflicts over one particular
means of collective consumption - namely housing and urban services - that
played a particularly important role in the politics of Uitenhage.
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In contrast to the economistic explanations of local urban politics reviewed thus
far, two influential theories provided by Fischer and CasteIls have emphasised
the cultural determinants of urban political conflict.41
Fischer argues that urban society clusters groups together in ways that creates the
necessary 'critical mass' for urban sub-cultures to form. Each critical mass of
specifically clustered urbanites generates urban sub-cultures that define behavior,
norms and practices in the urban society. Different sub-cultures, however, come
into conflict with one another as some become innovators and others become
deviants. Political dynamics emerge out of these conflicts.
While Fischer's theory provides a useful counter-balance to economistic
explanations of urban politics, his theory provides an inadequate explanation for
why certain sub-cultures form in particular contexts. There is no necessary
connection between the nature of urban society and the sub-cultures it generates.
By referring to the process of building up 'critical mass' via 'urbanism' as the
basis for urban political conflict, Fischer has possibly tried to explain much too
much in terms of what is only one component of the process of urban political
formation. It is the 'late' Castells that provides a more rooted theory of cultural
determination of urban politics.
In direct contrast to his earlier work, Caste11's The City and Grassroots is
consciously set up to provide a series of "theorised histories" of specific urban
systems rather than a general theory of what the urban system is. He does this
via his notion of "urban meaning" --a cultural concept that attempts to grasp the
historical evolution of what urban systems mean to the historical actors that
"make" them at specific points in time and space. Because this concept has deeply
influenced the approach adopted in the rest of this thesis, it needs substantial
elaboration.
Castells defines the city as follows:
"Cities, like all social reality, are historical products, not only in their
physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in
the social organisation, and in people's lives. The basic dimension in
urban change is the conflictive debate between social classes and historical
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actors over the meaning of urban, the significance of spatial forms in the
social structure, and the content, hierarchy, and destiny of cities in
relationship to the entire social structure. A city (and each type of city) is
what a historical society decides the city (and each city) will be. Urban is the
social meaning assigned to a particular spatial form by a historically
defined society."42
For Castells urban meaning determines the function and form of the urban
system. So, example, if the meaning assigned to a particular urban system is that
it is the centre of colonial control, its function will be to assemble in space the
instruments of military and territorial force that will be required to realise this
meaning. The urban form that will emerge will reflect this function, i.e.
fortresses or protected laagers of colonial settlers. Another example would be the
medieval city where the meaning of the urban system was determined largely by
the requirements of the priesthood to subordinate peasant production in the
interests of feudal lords. These cities assembled the necessary religious
institutions in a way that gave functional expression to this meaning and the
urban form was an architectural replication of the cosmological order that the
priesthood's ideology attempted reproduce. Capitalist cities can be explained in
similar terms: their meaning is capitalist surplus value extraction and so their
form is the result of how factories, offices and homes are assembled in space to
realise the basic laws of capitalism. Their architecture is only partly functional to
these requirements because this architecture is also about the construction of a
skyscraper urban landscape that is representative of the dominance of wealth in
the urban system.
When applied to the South African urban system, obviously racial control and
reproduction of cheap and differentiated labour power is what urban meaning
was all about. The functional spatial organisation of the apartheid city followed
from this urban meaning which, in turn, gave rise to an urban form that
symbolised racial oppression through homogenised peripheralised black
settlements surrounding a skyscraper Central Business District where capital
accumulation was defined as the abode of white ownership.
Based on the conceptual building blocks of urban meaning, urban function and
urban form, Castells argued that urban politics arises out three inter-related
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processes: conflicts over the definition of urban meaning, conflicts over the
effects of urban function, and conflicts over the cultural forms that express urban
meaning and/or form. In other words, unlike his earlier work and the work of
Williams or Cox, he is not arguing that urban politics must a priori be seen as the
expression of purely material contradictions. Rather urban politics should be
seen as the product of conflicts that will have historically specific (or
'conjunctural' - to use the old Althusserian language) determinants, some of
which may well be symbolic forms rather than material urban functions.
In practical terms, urban political conflict can have numerous outcomes. For
CasteIls, 'urban social change' is when urban meaning is redefined. However,
when urban functions are adapted or recomposed, this is what urban planning is
about; while urban design is about the process of constructing urban form.
The main operational problem with Caste11's cross-cultural theory of urban
systems is that his central concept of 'urban meaning' tends to be used in the
singular rather than the plural. By this I am referring to the fact that he has
assumed that it is possible to identify what the urban meaning of a particular
urban system is and then identify what conflicts arise out of this. An alternative
would have been to accept that the function and form of a particular urban
system can be generated by more than one urban meaning that is operative
within that urban system. This means that urban political conflict could either be
between one set of urban actors who want to defend a particularly dominant
urban meaning against another that wants to oppose this urban meaning. Or
else, urban political conflict could be between one set of urban actors that have an
alternative urban meaning that they would like to see become hegemonic and
another set that would like their conception of urban meaning to be dominant.
In the latter case, urban politics is about competing urban meanings, rather
conflicts about a singular dominant urban meaning.
While South African urban systems were at a superficial level the product of a
singular urban meaning as defined by national policy, in reality local urban
politics was about a multiplicity of urban meanings that shaped urban functions
and forms at different points in time and space. As the last chapter of the thesis
reveals, one of these urban meanings replaced another after the apartheid urban
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meaning was displaced from its dominant position in the local government
system.
CasteIls' conception of urban social "movements does, in fact, capture the
dynamic of competing urban meanings. He argues that when a particular social
group consciously and collectively mobilises against the institutionalised urban
meaning and replaces it with a new urban meaning, then this is what he would
call an urban social movement. He elaborates this by arguing that in trans-
historical terms, urban social movements of this nature have mobilised around
one or more of the following three aspects of the urban system, namely:
collective consumption demands that relate to the nature of the 'city' (or
urban system to use the language of this thesis);
cultural identities that relate to the nature of 'community'; and
the nature of local governance or local political power.
While these are useful indicators as to what kinds of issues urban social
movements 'take up', Castells relapses into his erstwhile structuralism when he
goes too far by arguing that urban social movements only deserve to termed
'urban social movements' when they mobilise around all three aspects of the
urban system and when this mobilisation has the "effect" of changing urban
meaning.43 Without making the same mistake, it is possible to use Caste11's
framework of terms as a basis for empirical analysis.
Although the thesis chapters that follow are influenced by the work of the 'late'
Castells, this framework needs to be understood in comparative perspective with
other urban theories that have focussed specifically on themes that CasteIls does
not address directly, namely urban planning per se and the local state or (to avoid
the conceptual dilemmas) the politics of local government.
The connection between urban planning decisions about land-use and urban
politics are starkly clear in the South African context where this connection has
been racially structured. Internationally, however, urban theorists have tried to
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understand this connection as it manifests itself in capitalist urban systems. One
such theorist is Scott.44
Scott derives his conception of the 'urban land nexus' from a general theory of
the capitalist economy. The 'urban land nexus' he argues, is the spatial
distribution of capitalist property relations into a dense pattern of differentiated
"locational advantages". Due to the way these property relations are spatially
distributed through the urban system, different spaces acquire different values
that are determined by the transport costs, rents and capital/labour
inputs/outputs that flow from the spatial manifestation of the capitalist system.
This then gives him the basis for developing a theory of land-use change. So, for
example, he argues that intensive land-use changes at the centre of the urban
system are determined by increased capital and labour inputs that are designed to
increase the productive output of the inner cities. Extensive land-use changes
take place on the periphery of the system where the emphasis is not on
increasing inputs/outputs per unit of space, but increasing the units of space to
accommodate greater input/output requirements that develop on the
peripheries (especially residential requirements).
On the basis of the above theory, Scott advances the notion that industrial firms
that can replace labour with capital -equipment will tend to move outwards in
search of lower land rents, while labour intensive industries will gravitate
towards the inner areas where labour is cheaper. This simple logic, however, is
overdetermined by the multiple logics of non-productive speculator capital,
residential patterns and changes in the capitalist economy. In short, at base level
the capitalist system creates multiple spatial movements of households and
firms which if left to themselves will create an urban system that will become
unworkable. The role, therefore, of public sector urban planning is to impose
social order on a set of market transactions that have the potential of creating
urban disorder. The resultant interactions between the market-driven
movement of households and firms and the land-use decisions made by urban
planners is, for Scott, what explains the changing 'urban land nexus' in capitalist
urban systems. Although Scott does not go this far, it is also possible to say that it
is these interactions that are the stuff of urban politics.
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Although Scott's work is useful because it provides the tools for developing an
understanding of the workings of the urban economy, it is a structuralist and
functionalist argument that suffers from all the problems that flow from seeing
state intervention (in the form of urban planning) as the necessary response of
the capitalist state to the disfunctionalities of the capitalist land market. More
importantly for the South African context, it becomes extremely difficult to
explain urban planning purely in terms of the spatial requirements of the
capitalist mode of production. The obvious politically determined racial
prescriptions that urban planning had to impose on urban systems in South
African localities requires a far more nuanced theoretical explanation than
Scott's can provide.
Whereas Scott was concerned with explaining state intervention via urban
planning in terms of the logic of the capitalist land market, Marxists like
Lamarche and Harvey have tried to explain the role played by financial and
property capital in the urban system. 45 In order to resolve the problem of why
capitalism has tolerated rents as deductions from surplus value, Lamarche
argued that property capital assists in the circulation of capital in the interests of
capitalism as whole by investments in fixed property that have the overall effect
of reducing time and labour costs for productive capital. This is done by property
development in new spaces, or the redevelopment of existing spaces. For their
efforts, they obtain a share of surplus value from productive capital via rents.
Where owners speculate by withholding land from the market until they can sell
for a huge profit, Lamarche calls this absolute rent. It is this search for absolute
rent that Lamarche uses to explain episodic incoherencies in the patterns of
urban development.
For Harvey it is the lending decisions of financial institutions that determine the
rate of investment in the built environment. These lending decisions are
designed to reproduce a particular model of urbanisation, namely single family
dwellings, suburban sprawl, private motor transportation to link home places
and workplaces and centralised centres of employment. This kind of urban
system was seen to be necessary for boosting consumerism, stimulating
economic growth and ensuring stability.
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For both Lamarche and Harvey, urban politics is merely a derivative of the laws
of motion of the capitalist urban economy. Thus urban planning serves the
interests of property capital (Lamarche) and the interests of financial capital
(Harvey). Where urban social movements do arise, these are largely reactive in
the sense that they can be explained away as forms of protest against the human
and community consequences of the spatial manifestations of the logic of capital
accumulation. Their only interest to the researcher would be as effects that can be
used to reveal the underlying structural causes. It therefore follows that for this
kind of Marxist structuralist analysis, local urban politics is largely irrelevant as a
field of study. This is not surprising given that the subjects of analysis are
structures, institutions and capital flows rather than people, processes and
culture.
To conclude this brief review of urban theory, we need to consider the writings
of those who have focussed on political institutions, in particular local
government institutions as the central state actor in the urban system.
Duncan and Goodwin's theory of the 'local state' 46 takes the Marxist theory of
uneven development as its point of departure.47 In essence, the theory of
uneven development as applied in an urban context argues that the
valorization, revalorisation and devalorisation of the built environment as a
result of the changing nature and flow of capital explains the growth, change and
decay of the cities (or parts thereof). The role of the state system is, according to
Duncan and Goodwin, to manage the process of uneven development.
However, because this process manifests itself in different spaces in different
ways, it is not possible for a single central state to respond appropriately to each
local context. Thus sub-national state systems were created to manage the local
context in a way that was relatively autonomous from the policies of the central
state. However, because liberal democracy necessitated that these different levels
of the state came under electoral control, contradictions opened up when local
states came under the control of interests that were reacting to the negative
consequences of uneven urban development and sought to use the state to
redress these imbalances. Out of this conceptual framework, Duncan and
Goodwin proceed to develop a theory of the 'spatial division of the state system'
and 'spatial division of civil society' that complements the theory of the spatial
uneven development of labour and capital. They open a space for local urban
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politics by acknowledging that the effects of uneven development are mediated
by the practices of local communities ("local civil society") and the relatively
autonomous local states that they have access to and/or control over.
Duncan and Goodwin's strongest point is their acknowledgment that the
dynamic and nature of local urban politics cannot be read off from a general
theory, but needs to be analysed in each local context. This effectively theorises
the notion that the politics of the local context cannot be derived from national-
level politics. Instead, the local state is the point of intersection between national
political dynamics and the local urban system. This represents an important
theoretical stepping stone for the development of this thesis and complements
Caste11's notion that local government/local political power is a key focus for
mobilisation of urban social movements.
Without adopting the uneven development paradigm as her point of departure,
Cockburn also attempts to develop a theory of the local state under capitalism.48
In essence, her rather crude argument (that is quite often contradicted by the rich
empirical evidence on Lambeth's local government) is that the role of the local
state is structurally determined by the logic of capitalism. This logic is such that
to survive capitalism needs to reproduce the labour force and contain class
conflict. The local state does both by providing services that reproduce the labour
force and by incorporating the working class into the political system via
community participation programmes. Even if radical socialists manage to gain
control of the local state via the electoral process, Cockburn argues, there is little
they can change by using the instrument of the local state because this
instrument exists only as long as it does not challenge capitalist relations of
production and reproduction. This extremely functionalist and structuralist
theory of the local state effectively marginalises local urban politics into a
meaningless waste of energy. Contrary to the trends analysed in the chapters of
this thesis, it is assumed that localised political actions can never change the
urban system in any way.
Besides the enormously productive output of Marxist analyses of the local
state/local politics, the 'community power studies' literature has also been
interested in analysing local politics. Unlike much of the literature reviewed up
until now, this tradition has not addressed local urban politics in order to reveal
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the way in which general societal processes impact on and manifest in the local
political context. Instead, in the tradition of empiricist studies, these are local case
studies that were used as a basis for drawing conclusions about the nature of
politics in general. There are several tendencies within this overall tradition.
Local elite studies attempted to identify which individual elites hold actual
political power and why. Hunter's study of Atlanta Georgia focussed on the key
decision-makers in the city. 49 His main aim was to identify which leaders were
by reputation the most influential and then to assess their inter-relations and
social location/movements. This provided the basis for assertions about the
nature of local politics as a function of the quantifiable power possessed by key
individuals.
Pluralist analyses rejected Hunter's reputational methodology and
corresponding individualism by arguing instead for an analysis of power
structures via 'decisional analysis'. The most well known exponent of the
pluralist school was Robert Dahl and his book Who Governs? 50In essence, Dahl
and Polsby set out to operationalise their theory of power which posited the
notion that the power of an individual is defined in terms of that individual's
capacity to act in a way that gets another individual to do what that individual
would not otherwise have done. For the analysis of local politics, this entails
finding out who was responsible for determining the outcomes of political
decision-making processes. If this can be ascertained, then it follows that these
were the most influential political actors in the system.
Because the pluralists studied actual decision-making processes to determine the
nature of power, they were by definition looking at concrete acts of political
"conflict" between specific empirical "interests" who had different policy
preferences with regard to a defined and understood set of political 'issues'.
Bachrach and Baratz criticised the pluralists for ignoring the fact that power is
not only about actual conflict between established interests over defined issues,
but it is also about the manipulation of the decision-making process itself in such
a way as to ensure that certain interests are kept out of decision-making and
certain issues are kept off the agenda. 51 In short, those with power have the
capacity to get their way through both decision-making (that works in their
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favour) and by ensuring that nondecision-making also occurs in their favour. In
both instances there is still actual observable conflict - the only difference is how
this conflict is resolved. Where there is no conflict, Bachrach and Baratz argued,
it must be assumed that there is consensus.
Steven Lukes has argued that while Bachrach and Baratz have taken the study of
local politics much further than Dahl and Polsby by acknowledging that power is
not just about actual decision-making but also about nondecision-making, he
criticises them for hanging onto the behavioral assumptions of the pluralists.52
This behavioral assumption lies in the fact that Bachrach and Baratz argued that
observable conflict must exist for power to be exercised. But as Lukes argued,
these authors "suppose that because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows
up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power.
But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of
power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place." 53 As far as the
claim that in the absence of conflict one must assume consensus, Lukes argues
that this ignores "the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by
definitional fiat". 54 To break from the empiricist behaviorism of the elitists and
pluralists, Lukes essentially moves away from the notion that interests are
reducible to observable actions and adopts what he calls the "radical" view that
accepts that nondecision-making about issues that affect certain interests may
take place without observable actions simply because the overall structure of
power may be such that these interests have been unable to act in their own
interests for various coercive and/or non-coercive reasons. (This theoretical
framework was operationalised in a brilliant case study of local politics in the
Appalachian Valley.55)
The importance of the community power literature as developed by Lukes and
operationalised by Gaventa is that it attempted to develop a conception of the
power relations that underpin local politics. This perspective on the nature of
local power adds to the notion of local political power as a basis for urban social
movement formation as conceived by Castells or the derivative notions of local
state found in the work of Duncan and Goodwin. In fact, it comes closest to an
explanation of politics in terms of the complex interactions between local
political actors that make up the local urban system and as such paves the way
for the systems approach to local urban politics outlined below.
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Systems theory cannot be said to originate in a single theory or school of thought.
Tiiis is partly due to the way this way of thinking and seeing has gathered
international momentum from the early decades of the c.20th when it began to
be used by natural science (particularly physicists) to comprehend natural
phenomena in a way that old Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy
were incapable of grasping. 56 Since then, systems theory has begun to penetrate
the social sciences with grand philosophical texts providing the founding ideas
for this ever-widening circle of influence.57 Out of all the social science
branches, management and organisational studies have probably been most
comprehensively transformed by systems thinking. 58 However, development
management has also begun to be consciously influenced by systems theory. One
of the leading elder statesmen of development management theory recently
appealed for quite a fundamental break from old pyramidal conceptions of
development administration - an appeal that he consciously based on systems
theory or, as he put it, "the insights of a pluralistic universe that underlie the
bottom-up notion of self-organising structures and processes." 59 Although still
too influenced by closed systems thinking from the days when Parsonian
structural functionalism was influential in political science, David Easton has
nevertheless consciously advocated a more open systems theory as a basis for
political analysis. 60 In a search for a marriage between developmental
functionalism and structural dependency theory as a basis for a new "systems
theory of Third World development politics", White and Kabashima also predict
in their introduction to their edited collection on the subject that
"developmental systems theory will be with us for a long time".61 Finally, in
the arena of development planning, it is clear that systems theory is making a
very serious impact.62
What then is the essence of systems theory and how is it relevant to the subject
under analysis in this thesis? First and foremost it is an attempt to break from
reductionism. Reductionism, as originated by Isaac Newton for the natural
sciences and Descartes for philosophy, rests on the assumption that all aspects of
complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent
parts in order to identify those few parts that determine the behavior of the rest
of the parts. In physics, scientists studying the atom in the early decades of the
c.20th were forced to develop the theories of quantum mechanics to make sense
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of the atom not only in terms of the sum of its parts, but more importantly as the
product of the interactions between these parts. Reductionism told them what
the atom consisted of, but not why the atom behaved the way that it did. The
result was systems theory or, if you like, a theory of the system in its wholeness
as defined by the interactions between its parts and, further, between the atomic
system and the wider sets of natural external systems within which the atomic
system is embedded.
Quantum physics has seriously challenged the Cartesian world view which so
powerfully legitimised Newtonian science and underpinned the intellectual
traditions of western philosophy and (subsequently) social science. Originating in
Descarte's awesome image of the clock as the archetype of natural and social
phenomena,63 it was left to subsequent generations to equate the workings of
society to the workings of machines. The job of the scientist was simply to
dismantle the machine to identify the parts; and then to put it all back together
again armed with the "knowledge" of what made it all work. Having grasped the
limited determining variables that made the whole "machine" work, it was left
to social scientists to analyse how those with power competed to control those
variables. Unfortunately, they never fundamentally questioned the mechanistic
assumptions of the paradigm and so in the process provided the social scientific
rationale for organising society and its individual persons like the machines on
the factory floors of the industrial revolution. All that Marx did by providing a
"critique" of this structure was to expose the "crippled monstrosities" that were
created in the process.
Like the pioneering physicists of the early c.20th, social scientists have willy nilly
gone beyond trying to understand society as the sum of self-contained parts.
Instead of focusing on the basic building blocks of the social system, there is now
a concern to understand the basic principles of organisation that penetrate, cross-
cut and integrate all the different parts of the system. Five basic propositions
often flow from this founding objective: the component elements of systems are
pluralistic rather than unitary in nature; the behavior of each element affects the
behavior of all the other elements and the behavior of the system as a whole;
interactions and transactions between the elements of the system are more
important than the internal logic and nature of each individual element; the
system's overall nature and performance is more than the sum of the outputs
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and behavior of its elements; and every system is embedded within and inter-
dependent with every other system outside of itself.
Instead of dissecting social systems to determine what they comprise of, the
research focus that flows from systems theory is above all else the interactions
and transaction between the elements (which are themselves sub-systems) that
make up the whole. Given that the performance of the whole is more than the
sun.), product of the elements, it follows that the research focus must be
simultaneously focussed on the interactions and transactions between the
elements and on the performance and changing dynamic of the whole.
This thesis is essentially about the urban system. However, the urban system is a
nationally organised system that is embedded in a larger national (and indeed
international) societal and natural set of systems. Given the constraints of this
work, a particular local manifestation of the urban system has been selected as
the focus of study, i.e. a particular sub-system of the national urban system. This
can be defined as Uitenhage's local urban system. I want to know why and how
this local urban system changed in space and over time. In particular, following
CasteIls, I want to know why and how urban meanings were defined and
changed, and how urban functions and urban forms were transformed. To do
this, I have tried to identify in each chapter a set of interactions and transactions
between the elements of the local urban system that directly affected urban
meaning, urban function and urban form in ways that impacted on the nature
and dynamics of the local urban system as a whole. This, however, has been
done by constantly locating the local urban system and its elements in the larger
non-local set of systems within which the local urban system was embedded. In
this way it was possible to traverse multiple levels of analysis all of which
directly affected the overall dynamic of the local urban system. This is why it is
justifiable to develop microscopic analyses of massacres and crowd violence
because present within these interactions and transactions were the elements of
the larger system as a whole while, simultaneously, these were interactions and
transactions that may not have been structurally determinant (in the
reductionist paradigm sense), but did directly change the overall dynamic and
performance of the local urban system.
-
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It is on the basis of the above conceptual framework that a clearer conception of
local urban politics becomes possible. Local urban politics can be defined as the
organised manifestation of the interactions and transactions between the
elements of the local urban system. The central focus of local urban political
dynamics are conflicting urban meanings each of which have implications for
urban functions and urban forms. Urban social movements as one powerful
local urban political force articulate popular urban meanings in opposition to the
dominant institutionalised urban meaning and organise around consumption,
community and local power. Urban social movements, however, are only one
local urban political force. The others that are examined in this thesis are the
various elements involved the local and non-local governmental system and
the elements of the formal business sector involved in the contestations over
urban meaning, function and form. In essence, the primary interactions and
transactions that are examined in this thesis are those that took place at the local
level between the urban social movements, local government and formal
business and how these local-level interactions and transactions were embedded
in a larger set of non-local processes that impinged upon the local urban political
terrain at specific points in time and space.
In short, once the strictures of reductionism are thrown off, a much more
fruitful and promising line of inquiry becomes possible than what is possible if
the mainstream South African and international literature on urban studies is
used as guide. This does not, however, represent a fundamental break from this
literature. It actually helps to "theorise" what some are already beginning to
point to when they urge researchers to go back to local empirical studies to find
reasons for contingent complexity.
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS
The trajectory of the South African urban studies literature and international
urban theory literature is such that a general theory of the urban system is both
deemed to be unnecessary and/or impossible to achieve via theoretical
elaboration. This is why there is a distinct move towards empirical analysis in a
bid to understand the specificity of local urban political dynamics. However, as
the trajectory of the community power studies literature reveals, if this leads to
empiricism, the result may well be a form of analysis that depends exclusively on
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the existence of observable behavior. This effectively obliterates any analysis of
political power outside empirically observable action.
It follows from the above that in order to gain a better understanding of urban
systems and the local urban political dynamics that shapes the urban system, an
analytically informed empirical case study is required. This does not necessarily
mean a case study that is designed to "test" a general theory, nor does it
necessarily mean a case study of how general social trends manifest themselves
in a particular local context. But rather it is a case study using qualitative
methods that is designed to contribute to the literature a detailed nuanced
approach to the study of the urban system that takes into account a set of
interactions that have hitherto been structurally derived or defined out of the
circle of sociological importance. This may shed light on similar dynamics in
similar contexts, but this will depend on comparative studies of cases that
attempt to achieve similar objectives. The rest of the chapters in this thesis
constitute this case study. However, to establish the methodological framework
of these chapters, it is necessary to justify the research strategy (i.e. the case study
approach) and the choice of research methods utilised within the case study.
The traditional range of research strategies are experiments, surveys, histories
(archival or otherwise), field studies and contemporary case studies. Admittedly
it is probably inaccurate to say that the case study is seen as part of the traditional
repertoire of textbook methodologies. This is because the case study is usually
defined as one of the sub-strategies of field research alongside participant
observation, ethriographies, etc. Whereas these latter terms refer to research
methods, the case study is in fact at a higher level - a level that I have called
research strategy. Within the research strategy it is possible to use a range of
methods - this is particularly the case with the case study method.
The choice of the case study research strategy (which is defined in greater detail
below) is based largely on the inappropriateness of the other strategies. Research
experiments require the researcher to be able to control the events involved in
the experiment so that s/he can manipulate various variables to determine a
given outcome. This is obviously inappropriate for a research project that is
trying to find out how a particular system of relations operates on its own terms.
As far as surveys are concerned, these are useful for ascertaining generalised
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quantitative data such as household size and household incomes, and for
determining aggregated attitudes. However, they are less than useful when it
comes to understanding collectivities in action. Touraine has argued forcefully
that survey methodologies are premised on methodological individualism
because it is assumed by those who use the survey method to study social
movements that the reasons for individual participation in social movements
are individual attitudes and motivations. Instead, Touraine argues, social
movements are collectivities in action and therefore can only be studied by
observing participants (not just participant observers) who are in a position to
structure collective discussions about their involvement in the movement. The
movement, therefore, is studied 'in motion', so to speak. 64 I will return to this
theme further down.
As far as the historical method's reliance on archival records or individual
interviews with survivors of the historical period being studied is concerned,
this suffers from the same critique that Touraine uses against survey methods
because archival records in particular are often records of leadership statements
rather than a record of popular discourse. As far as the project of this thesis is
concerned, the selection of an historical case study would have severely limited
the range of information sources needed to demonstrate complex social actor
interactions.
Yin argues that the choice of research strategy is dependent on the form of
questions posed, the degree of control that the researcher has over the events
studied, and whether or not the events being studied are contemporary or not.65
Out of the traditional "who", "what", "where", "how" and "why" questions, a
case study research strategy is required when qualitative "how" and "why"
questions are posed about contemporary events that the researcher has no actual
control over.
Following Yin, a case study research strategy is an empirical inquiry that
"investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in
which multiple sources of evidence [read: methods] are used."66
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This thesis poses qualitative "how" and "why" questions about contemporary
events that this researcher had no direct control over. As outlined in previous
sections, the questions are essentially about why various actors in a particular
urban system acted in the way that they did and how they tried to achieve what
they wanted to achieve. The events studied were contemporary and although the
author played a certain role in shaping these events, this role cannot be
construed as approximating the role that would need to be played by social
scientists using experimental methods. In addition, the study of the subjects of
the research took place within the context of the phenomena that were studied
and multiple sources of evidence were used (more on this below).
As far as the rationale for the particular case study selected is concerned, the
methodological literature usually require researchers to refer to a combination of
indicators that can be used to test whether the use of a single case is justifiable.
Although expressed in different ways, these indicators can be categorised as
follows: whether the case study is acritical case for testing the validity of a general
theory; or whether it is an extreme or unique case that serves to disprove
generally accepted assumptions and is therefore helpful in building a new
general framework of analysis; or whether it is revelatory in that the case serves
to reveal how general processes that have shaped the social formation as a
whole are manifested within a particular set of circumstances. As far as the
Uitenhage case is concerned, it is more revelatory than critical or unique. The
Uitenhage case is not being used to prove a general theory of urban political
change, nor can it be said that the dynamics and features of Uitenhage are
particularly unique given the self-evident existence of similar dynamics in many
other towns and cities across South Africa in the 1980s. Rather the Uitenhage
case has been analysed to deepen our knowledge of one context as a contribution
to the deepening of a general comparative knowledge of similar processes and
dynamics that occured in numerous other contexts. To this extent, the case may
be contributing to the gradual build-up of a general theory of urban political
change over time. This, however, is very different to starting with a general
theory that needs to be proven via the case study. In short, the use of the
Uitenhage case study as a single case study is justified in the first instance on the
grounds that it is revelatory rather than critical or unique. However, it is
arguable that every case is revelatory and therefore there is no compelling
reason why one case should be selected over and above another. I would argue
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1that cases that possess certain unique features are the most useful revelatory
cases. This is especially true if these unique characteristics of the case are unique
not because they do not exist in other contexts, but rather because their
uniqueness lies in the fact that they are particularly pronounced or well
developed examples of processes and dynamics that self-evidently existed in
other contexts.
Listed below are a set of processes and dynamics that are the focus of the rest of
the analysis in each chapter of the thesis. They are listed here to demonstrate that
while they are nothing new to South African society (i.e. they are not unique in
themselves), they were manifest in Uitenhage in ways that made them
particularly visible for the case study researcher. To this extent, therefore, the
Uitenhage case does not possess unique features per se but rather a unique
combination of researchable features that if analysed in a certain they can serve
to reveal the complexities involved in the dynamics and processes of urban
political change. With this methodological framework in mind, it is possible to
refer to the following features of the Uitenhage case:
* it was the only major urban area known to the author where a century-old
african community still inhabited by the 1980s an area at the centre of the
town that it had originally occupied when african urbanisation began
(chapters 1 and 3);
* it was a leading centre for the growth of a manufacturing sector that, in
turn, employed a white and a black labour force that were heavily
unionised and developed completely opposed political ideologies
(chapters 1 and 2);
* the close alliances that developed between coloured and african workers
was the basis for the first great general strike of the 1980s that, in turn,
initiated the nation-wide "living wage campaign" in 1980 (chapter 2);
* the conflicts between the community and the state during 1984-85 that lead
up to the Langa Massacre on 21st March 1985 made Uitenhage the first
area to witness a large-scale police massacre of peaceful demonstrators
40
during the 1980s - dozens more were to follow over the next 8 years
(chapters 4 and 5);
* on the 23rd March 1985 South Africa witnessed with horror the first
'necklacing' when the violent crowd turned on Councillor Kinikini
killing him and his sons67(chapter 6);
* subsequent to the massacre and the 'necklacing', Uitenhage gained
sustained national attention for two things: the threatened forced removal
of a self-built settlement of 50 000 people living in Kabah, and the first
local-level negotiations around urban development plans generated by the
community - a phenomenon in 1986 that ran counter to the dominant
trend of state-planned private sector-driven apartheid-based urban
development (chapters 7 and 8);
* the implementation of a textbook counter-revolutionary warfare strategy
after the national State of Emergency was declared in mid-1986 that led to
mass detentions of the leaders who were negotiating, one of the largest
urban forced removals ever, and a system of managed terror that
replicated the vision of control that the newly empowered "securocrats"
concocted (chapter 9);
* finally, after the political transition began in 1990 and Kabah was
acknowledged as a non-racial area after being incorporated fully into
Uitenhage, one of the country's first community-based urban
development schemes was initiated with the social movement leadership
of the 1980s as the development coordinators and the state providing
subsidies and a planning framework (chapter 10).
Finally, the Uitenhage case is revelatory because the public nature of some of the
key sources of information (e.g. court records, records of a commission of inquiry
and information available to the author as observer-participant) made it possible
to describe interactions thaf have hitherto been largely inaccessible to researchers.
The five sources of evidence that are traditionally used in case study research are
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, and participant
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observation. Before commenting on each source and the corresponding research
method used, it is necessary to emphasise three principles that guided the overall
deployment of evidence. Following Yin, these are (i) the need to utilise multiple
sources of evidence in a case study approach, (ii) the need to create a case study
data base, and (iii) the need to maintain a chain of evidence.68
As far as multiple sources of evidence is concerned, this thesis has been
consciously constructed out of multiple sources of information. While social
historical and contemporary urban studies have used multiple sources of
information, very few have managed to use the wide array of sources that have
been used in this thesis. As the discussion of specific sources of information will
reveal below, the cross-referencing across different sources of information that
has been used in this thesis greatly enhances the objective validity of the factual
information that was used to develop the analysis. The fact that I was involved
in a particular capacity in the events studied helped to gain access to these
multiple sources of information.
The case study data base that was built up over the period March 1986 through to
January 1994 consisted of three related components. These are as follows:
A set of research notes drawn from all the sources of evidence referred to
below. These research notes were indexed onto a computerised database
that cross-referenced all the evidence according to the chapter headings
and sub-headings of each chapter. In some cases special databases for a
specific set of events were developed, e.g. for the Chapters on the Langa
Massacre and the Necklacing of Kinikini. The database indexed the entries
over time which meant it was possible to track the evolution of particular
themes over time (e.g. the ebb and flow of particular ideological
discourses). This cross-referenced set of entries over time is, in effect, a
kind of research diary that has standardised the trajectory of the
information gathering process.
A filing system for primary documentation was developed. This has
stored primary documents such as court records, newspaper clippings, tape
cassettes and photocopied archival material in a systematic way. In
addition, the tabulated survey findings and survey materials that were
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used to write up a section of Chapter 3 have been filed in this system. The
filing codes were then linked to the computerised database to ensure
proper cross-referencing.
* A written up or tape recorded set of narratives drawn from interviews,
political rallies and small discussions. These narratives are referred to in
the text of each chapter both as sources of information and as sources for
attitudinal perspectives on specified issues.
The three components of the database are available as referenced primary data.
Finally, a chain of evidence was built up that operates in two ways. Firstly, there
is a chain of evidence that links the different chapters together leading in the end
to the concluding chapter. Secondly, each chapter is based on a relatively self-
contained chain of evidence that ensures that the narrative of the chapter is
sustained by a body of evidence that is captured in the footnotes. This means,
therefore, that the chapters are in effect the chain of evidence for the thesis; the
chapters have their own contained chains of evidence embodied in the
footnotes; and the footnotes are traceable to the case study data base.
The case study data base was constructed over a period of seven years starting in
1986. On average I visited Uitenhage twice to thrice annually to collect specific
documentary material and conduct interviews. I was not, however, engaged full-
time in the research.
The specific sources of information that were used are listed below. They are
referred to here in general terms rather than in terms of each specific chapter and
the corresponding procedures and methods used are also spelt out under each
heading. In addition, the problems encountered in data collection and the impact
on the thesis are also discussed.
Documentation
The following documentation was use:
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* local and national newspapers, in particular the Eastern Province Herald
that was read on a daily basis and the relevant news clippings extracted
and stored in the case study database;
* letters of communication between various persons involved in the
events;
* minutes of meetings that took place between social movement leaders on
the one hand, and government and business representatives on the other;
* a wide range of unpublished reports compiled by research organisations,
University Departments, businesses, professionals, government agencies
and non-governmental organisations;
* - unpublished speeches or records of speeches compiled by others made by
prominent leaders;
* articles and reports published in magazines and journals.
The documentary material was used in the following ways:
* to check dates and attendees at meetings that had been referred to in
interviews but which interviews were not specific about enough;
* to contribute to the development of a chronology of events - newspapers
and minutes of meetings were especially useful in getting a proper order
of events;
* to provide empirical data that human informants do not carry in their
'	 heads;
* and, in the case of certain chapters, to reconstruct the detailed events that
makes up the main narrative of the chapter in the absence of live
informants.
-
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Due to the reliance placed on court records in chapters 5 and 6, a special mention
needs to be made here on this evidence and research method used. As far as
Chapter 5 is concerned, this is about a massacre that resulted from police firing
on an unarmed march. This event prompted the state to appoint a Commission
of Inquiry into these events. The detailed verbatim proceedings of this Inquiry
have been used to reconstruct the massacre. The beauty of these proceedings is
that they reflect the language, discourse and perspectives of the protagonists as
they were engaged in the process of reconstructing their version of what
happened. Out of this it is possible for the researcher to extract both a chronology
of events (via computerised cross-referencing) and the lived experiences of those
involved. This provides a remarkable database for reconstructing the
interactions that brought the massacre about.
The same applied to chapter 6 which is a reconstruction of violent crowd action
directed against local government representatives. Here the court proceedings of
the co-accused were used to reconstruct these events. I was disinterested in what
the court was mainly interested in, namely the guilt of the individual accused.
My main interest was the chronology of events that were uncontested by the
prosecution and the defense. This was possible to extract, along with the
perceptions and language of the participants.
All documentation was read and research notes taken down. These research
notes were fed into the case study data base for cross-referencing and storage until
the actual writing up took place.
Archival Records
The primary archival material used was records of proceedings of the meetings
of the Kwallobuhle Town Council - the local authority responsible for the black
townships in Uitenhage. Although public access to this kind of contemporary
archival material was (and still is) restricted to the public, I managed to secure
access mainly because the officials in possession of these documents were either
unaware of or disregarded these regulations. However, I was not allowed to take
them off the premises. This information was therefore translated into research
notes that were then deposited in the case study database. These archival records
were particularly valuable for two things. Firstly, they provided monthly
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updated demographic information. Secondly, the minutes of meetings recorded
more than decisions which meant that the actual discourse could be picked up.
The archival records were used mainly to corroborate interview information
about intra-governmental tensions.
The obvious problem with regard to obtaining further archival evidence is that it
was not possible to get the same access to the white Uitenhage Municipality as it
was in the case of the Kwallobuhle Town Council. This means that evidence on
Uitenhage's official perspectives on key issues over time are largely absent.
Interviews
Interviews of various kinds have played a central role in the generation of
information for the chapters of the thesis. The following kinds of interviews
were conducted:
Unstructured open-ended one-on-one interviews with leading figures in
government, business and the social movements. In some cases, persons
were repeatedly interviewed. One person in particular is worth
mentioning here. He was Weza Made, the leading figure of the Langa-
based anti-removal movement. The multiple interviews with Weza Made
provided a rich source of information on leadership tactics, community
feelings, events and his own personal dilemmas. These interviews were
used for three things:
to develop chronologies of events that were then cross-tabulated,
checked (against documents or other informants) and standardised;
to obtain descriptions of events that were then also cross-tabulated,
checked and standardised;
to obtain perceptions which were then used to contrast how
different interests perceived certain events or issues;
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to unpack and understand the complex inner workings of the social
movements.
Unstructured interviews with selected groups within the social
movements over a period of about four years. The aim of these group
interviews was as follows:
to obtain qualitative socio-economic and demographic profiles of
sections of the support base and constituency of the social
movement;
to obtain attitudinal and perceptual information across
constituencies about particular events, leadership strategies,
prevailing political crises and issues of the day - in short, about how
these people understood their social movement;
to obtain data for reconstructing events and chronologies.
It should be emphasised that like Touraine I found that these small group
discussions of ordinary rank-and-file members of the movement revealed more
about the nature of the movement than leadership speeches and documents.
The reason for this is that it was possible to facilitate discussion in these small
groups about the 'moral economy' of the everyday life of movement
participants. In general, these discussions were not group interviews by an
outside researcher, but were literally facilitated discussions that I would structure
around three basic themes, namely the issues that the group thought were
important for the movement to be addressing, their perceptions of what they
called the "enemy" (i.e. government, vigilantes, and business), and their
leadership. When it was possible, these discussions were tape recorded.
However, when this was not possible, either I took notes or if even this was not
possible because it made people nervous, I would write down all I could
remember after the meeting. In all these discussions it was understood that I was
part of the movement. This, in my view, substantially changed the degree to
which participants in the group discussions were open and frank. What they said
to me and what they said to other outside reseachers differed considerably
because it should be remembered that most of these discussions took place
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during a State of Emergency and in 'underground' conditions. The notes and
cassette recordings of these discussions were fed into the case study data base and
cross-referenced to the themes across the chapters. It is only now that the ancien
regime has passed away that this material can be so openly used for research
purposes.
The most obvious and serious limitation with respect to the interviews is that
whereas sufficient interviews with government and business were conducted,
much more could have been done with respect to interviewing a wider range of
community leaders. This weakness is reflected in the fact that there is possibly an
over-reliance on the interviews with Weza Made which, in turn, could mean
there is a bias in the thesis in favour of his perspectives on the complexities of
Uitenhage's political alignments.
As far as the group discussions are concerned, due to the State of Emergency and
underground operating conditions, it was not possibly to set these up in
sufficient numbers or in a satisfactorily systematic way. Because it was a serious
security risk to bring too many key people together at any one time, there was
always a general reluctance to pre-plan proper meetings where I would come
prepared with tape recorder and so on. Instead, it was quite often on-the-spot
discussions that took place after political meetings, or negotiations or social
gatherings that generated much of the output of these group discussions.
Surveys
Surveys have not constituted a primary source of information for this thesis as a
whole. However, a socio-economic and demographic survey was conducted and
its findings used to develop Chapter 3. This is the chapter that analyses the
history of Langa and what its characteristics were by the mid-1980s. The best way
to get aggregated quantitative and (to a more limited extent) qualitative data on
Langa's contemporary characteristics was to conduct a survey. This survey was
devised by a team of professionals that included the author and administered by
members of the Langa community who had been trained for this purpose. A
random sample was selected by the professional team from maps of the
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settlement. The results were analysed by the professional team using
computerised survey analysis packages. The results were then used as a basis for
policy proposals that became the focus of an extended campaign against forced
removals. The fact that this survey was used for this purpose does not detract
from the factual validity of the data itself because it is not the policy proposals
that have been used to develop Chapter 3, but the raw survey results.
Furthermore, the fact that the author was merely one member of the
professional team rather than the sole manager of the survey is irrelevant
because the survey does not constitute the central piece of research activity for
the thesis as a whole. The main point is that survey results were used to develop
Chapter 3 and the methodology was a conventional survey approach.
Direct Observations
Although related to the participant observation methods that are discussed next,
there is a need to refer to the evidence gleaned from direct observations. The
reason is that whereas participant observation is useful for researchers because
they obtain qualitative information about the social movement they get
involved in, the problem is that this can quite often cut them off from observing
the behavior/actions of those parties that the researcher is not involved with.
This could be particularly problematic if the researcher is trying to analyse the
interactions between social actors.
As far as direct observations were concerned, the following are given by way of
examples to illustrate the case:
meetings of white ratepayers to provide me with data on their discourse,
perceptions and politics;
judicial proceedings such as inquiries, political cases, hearings, etc - these
events provided one of the few arenas for structured interaction between
the leading participants;
seminars and workshops organised by liberal human rights groups where
the different leadership groups put their respective cases to the public;
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walkabouts through Langa talking to individual households or simply
making observations about everyday practices such as where women did
their washing, where refuse was deposited, how shacks were built, and
how the "comrades" staffed "people's roadblocks".
In all these kinds of direct observation opportunities, I would compile research
notes and feed the notes into the database.
Participant-Observation or Observing Participation
Reseachers wanting to understand and write about the dynamics of conflict in
South Africa's seething black townships found themselves in a very difficult
position during the 1980s for essentially three reasons. Firstly, societies going
through convulsive (and even revolutionary) change do not create the kinds of
informants who can be sufficiently dispassionate about the truth. This makes it
almost impossible for researchers to rely exclusively on the disengaged
individual interview for reliable information. Secondly, even if researchers did
manage to get reliable information, writing about these events was a
fundamentally political act. The struggle waged by the regime and its opponents
for the moral high ground placed an enormous burden on the researcher to take
sides.69 Thirdly, traditional methodologies premised on documentary evidence
or survey techniques were effective in obtaining leadership perspectives and
individual opinions, but they were inadequate when it came to grasping the
dynamic of collectivities in action (which is what social movements are about),
or the interface between regime representatives and regime opponents.
There were two ways out of these problems. The first was to retreat back into
historical work about events that preceded contemporary processes. This lead to a
flOwering of social historical studies that played an important part in
reconstructing a recorded memory that contemporary struggles were able to call
upon and refer to in the process of myth-making and ideological development.70
The second was to take Alain Touraine's route into direct participation in
movements as a way of getting close up to the subject to be able to see the
dynamics of collectivities in motion and the interface between these collectivities
and their opponents. 71 It is the latter course of action that this author has
favoured.
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Although my relationship with the Eastern Cape began in 1980 when I assisted
Mkhuseli Jack in various ways during the school boycotts, it began in earnest in
May 1985 when the South African Labour Bulletin commissioned myself and
Marcel Golding to go to the Eastern Cape in order to write up an account of what
happened during the stayaway actions that took place in the week 16 -22 March
1985. 72 It was during this time that I met the Uitenhage activists who later
requested my assistance when they began to look for ways to counter the forced
removal of Kabah/Langa. It was this request that triggered an eight year long
relationship with this community. My role was to coordinate technical assistance
for the movement that converted a struggle against removal into a struggle for
the first community-based urban upgrading plan in the country. 73 It was this
role that gave me an insight into collectivities in motion and the interface with
the regime. Like Touraine, I think getting up close to the subject by being a
participant in the social movement does not compromise 'objectivity', it simply
enhances one's understanding of the texture and dynamic of what actually
happened - or, as Touraine has argued, it brings one closer to the 'subject' than
so-called 'objective' methods are capable of achieving. However, to avoid
becoming a propagandist that covers up weaknesses, the researcher-participant
(or reflective activist) needs to retain the right to make judgments in terms of the
highest ideals of the movement.74
In practice, and to summarise, my structured relationship to the social
movement began in late-1986 when I was requested to coordinate a team of
professionals who provided the Langa Coordinating Committee led by Weza
Made with technical, policy and media assistance. In effect this meant conducting
extensive research into the problems faced by the Langa community and to assist
in the formulation of policy alternatives. Over the years I got drawn ever deeper
into the inner leadership grouping where strategies and tactics were discussed. It
was from this vantage point that I was able to see the complex interactions
between the movement on the one hand and government and business on the
other. In addition, I began to gain an insight into the complex inner workings of
the movement.
As my socio-economic research for the movement began to extend outwards into
research for this thesis, it became clear that I had access to multiple sources of
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information that combine traditional research methods with the more
innovative participant observation methods. In fact, following Earl Babbie (who
draws on the work of Raymond Gold), there are actually four different types of
roles that are possible: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-
participant, and complete observer. 75 In terms of these typologies, my role
probably comes closest to the participant-as-observer role. According to Babbie,
"[i]n this role, you would participate fully with the group under study, but you
would make it clear that you were also undertaking research." 76 It is a role,
however, that is the subject of extensive debate in social research methods
literature. Babbie sums up the skepticism when he says: "Compared with surveys
and experiments, field research measurements generally have more validity but
less reliability, and field research results cannot be generalised as safely as those
based on rigorous sampling and standardised questionnaires."77
The key types of information that I was able to collect which would not have
been possible without adopting the participant-as-observer role are as follows:
* the self-expression of values, ideology and perceptions by collectivities
involved in the movement itself;
* how the strategies and tactics of the players that the social movement was
engaging were understood, interpreted and responded at different
moments in time;
* the internal dilemmas and choices that the leadership faced as they
responded to changing conditions;
* the tensions between different personalities and constituency interests
within the social movement, especially at those points when strategies
were changed;
* the process of learning within the movement that eventually changed the
way the relations of power between the social movement and those it was
engaging in the state and business sectors were perceived;
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the process of language and discourse construction that created the
symbols and meanings that were used to justify strategies and explain
conditions at different points in time.
Through observing meetings, recording speeches and rallied, interviewing
leaders, holding small group discussions and engaging the process of strategic
formulation, it was possible to take copious notes that were systematically fed
into the case study database for cross-referencing through the chapters.
As already indicated above, this method also had at least three limitations.
Firstly, due to time and resource constraints (which were partly related to the fact
that I lived some 1400 Kms away from the study area), I was unable to use my
advantageous position to the greatest possible advantage. I could have conducted
more group discussions and networked more widely with community leaders
who were not directly involved in the Langa struggle. Secondly, although I was
able to overcome some of the problems associated with the State of Emergency
and underground conditions, this must have still affected the scope of what was
discussed with me. In particular, although some material on the military
strategies of the social movements was collected, much of this was surely
withheld for fear that this kind of information could compromise both
themselves and myself. Thirdly, in chapters where I relied entirely on
documentary evidence, it is clear that more in-depth work with the participants
could have enriched the final product.
The obvious criticism will be that the resulting analysis will tend to justify the
strategic choices of the social movement rather than explain why it did what it
did and how it failed or succeeded. Like Touraine, my defense would be twofold.
Firstly, being a participant-as-observer, I got closer to the social movement
subject that I was studying under very difficult conditions than would have been
possible if I had adopted the more conventional objective social scientist model.
Secondly, I reserved the right to make judgments and criticism on the grounds
that my research judgment was not based on what was tactically useful to score
immediate advantages, but rather my research judgment would be normatively
based on the highest ideals that the social movement itself was committed to.
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Finally, as far as mobilising the evidence derived from all the sources referred to
above is concerned, this has been done on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Each
chapter, therefore, is in fact an exercise in iterative explanation building. 78 This
is why each chapter opens by positioning the central research question via a brief
review of specialist literature, followed by the narrative that assembles the
evidence in a way that attempts to explain the events under discussion. All the
chapters put together provide an overview of how Uitenhage's urban system
changed in space and over time.
This thesis proceeds from the need for an integrated understanding via the
complexity of local dynamics; but it has been constructed in a way that avoids the
problems with the case study method. It is not a case study of national and global
processes, nor is it a case that is located outside the context of these processes. At
most, it helps us understand how these national processes impacted on the lives
of a particular set of communities, and how the responses of those affected
impacted back on these national (and in this case in only a limited way on
international) processes. It is for this reason that the analysis of local processes is
often preceded by a brief analytical overview of the non-local political and
economic context that directly affected the choices made by actors that shaped the
history of Uitenhage. This inter-relationship, however, is not the primary
concern of the study. Instead, to be faithful to the subject, there is a concern to
accept the contingent integrity of the local dynamics by getting as close to them
as _possible. This is why the golden thread that runs through this whole study is
the question of subjective choice and, inevitably, the contingent rather than
reducible nature of choice. This is not, however, a bid to leap out of the
materiality of the social context of subjective choices into some kind of
voluntaristic void; it is, rather, a bid to understand the choices that subjects make
as they experience the impact of complex and contradictory local and non-local
processes that they comprehend via a language and mental map that are, in turn,
historically constituted at a personal and societal leve1. 79 It this interplay
between causal determination and backward loops between effects and causes
that has influenced the methods used in this thesis to "get as close up" to the
subject as possible.
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Taking the above general conceptual and methodological framework as a point
of departure, each chapter is located in a particular body of literature that is
relevant to the events analysed.
After sketching out a general socio-economic and organisational background in
Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 attempts to grasp the unique features of Uitenhage's
urban system by linking the evolution of urban form to the political interests of
local elites. This analysis is positioned in terms of the literature on South
African urbanisation that has tended to move from concerns with generalised
historical processes, to specific localised dynamics and how these have
influenced non-local policies and processes.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the numerous political conflicts that tore apart
the black townships during the period September 1984 to March 1985. Whereas a
huge and rich literature on the politics of township conflict has emerged to
explain this and subsequent periods of intensified and open conflict between the
state and urban communities, this chapter takes up the challenge laid down by
the main reviewer of this literature who concluded that this literature suffers
from assumptions that are either too structuralist or too conspiratoria1.80 The
challenge is to identify the non-structural determinants of conflict, determinants
that have a lot to do with subjective choices that are best grasped by a localised
analysis.
Remaining within the general problematic articulated at the outset of Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 takes the analysis to a microscopic level by explaining why police shot
at peaceful marchers on their way to a political funeral. Such violent
confrontations are usually used as dramatic events upon which an analysis of
structural causes and political effects can be pegged. This kind of analysis,
however, runs the danger of being much too functionalist: why, for example,
was there a massacre in one township and not in another when the exact same
structural conditions pertained in both instances? A structural analysis cannot
answer this question. Nevertheless, a simple description of why it happened is
also unsatisfactory. Chapter 5 tries to understand the "moral economy" of the
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crowd and the institutionally determined role of the police in a way that explains
why the event actually happened at a particular time in a particular place.
Besides judicial inquiries, this has not been done before by academic researchers.
Chapter 6 continues the microscopic focus developed in Chapter 5, but instead of
looking at violent police action directed at the non-violent crowd, this chapter
sets out to explain violent crowd action directed at agents of the state. Given the
almost absolute silence on violent crowd action in the sociological and political
science literature (mainly because such subjects were not convenient for authors
wanting to depict crowds as essentially on the side of good, peace and justice), it is
the social psychology literature on the nature and effects of political violence that
frames this chapter.
Like Chapters 4 and 5, Chapters 7 and 8 are linked together because these both
address the community-state dynamic in a way that attempts to understand how
social movement strategies changed in response to changes in local state
strategies, and how local officials changed their strategies in response to changes
in social movement strategies. Both, however, were operating within a national
context that overdetermined the local causes of strategic choices at critical
junctures. These chapters, therefore, address both the 'local' - 'non-local' debate
and the assumptions in the literature about the nature of state-community
relations. These assumptions were either that this relationship was inherently
contradictory and therefore only resolvable through a revolutionary rupture, or
structurally determined by the logic of capital's interests. These chapters describe
and analyse processes that lead to the conclusion that the emerging literature on
the dynamic of negotiating relations of power is possibly more useful when it
comes to understanding community-state dynamics than the revolutionary
theory or state-capital logic literature.
Chapter 9 changes tack once again by focusing almost entirely on the 'local'-'non-
local' relationship. Whereas local dynamics had hitherto played a central role in
shaping the nature of conflict and strategy, the declaration of the 1986 State of
Emergency was imposed by the central state as an aggressive security framework
that obliterated the locally generated dynamics of negotiation described in the
previous two chapters. The illusory assumptions of this security framework are
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revealed and analysed in this chapter in a way that takes forward the debate on
this intriguing period of pre-transition history.
Finally, Chapter 10 serves as an conclusion that locates an analysis of a
community-based urban development process in the context of two trends in the
literature, namely the nature of transition and the dynamics of community-
based development strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE PORT ELIZABETH-LEITENHAGE
REGION
INTRODUCTION
This first chapter provides a profile of the socio-economic and urban
structure of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region. Primary markers such as
the historical development of industrial activities, demographic trends,
housing, education and urbanisation processes have been used to build up
this profile. This, in turn, provides a background context for the socio-
political dynamics that are the primary focus of the chapters that follow.
ORIGINS OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMY
The origins of industrial economic activity in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage
(PEU) region date back to the 1820s when a permanent white settlement
was established at Algoa Bay. One of the first industries was a whaling
factory founded by Frederick Korsten. In 1851 a wool washing factory was
established by Frames. Port Elizabeth's main function, however, revolved
around the export of agricultural commodities, particularly wool which
was the Cape Colony's main export. 1
 With the founding of the Standard
Bank by John Paterson in Port Elizabeth in 1862 and the take-off of the
import/export trade through her pOrt that exceeded Cape Town in volume
by the late 1950s, Port Elizabeth began its transition from a settler entrepot
to one of the colony's must important centres of mercantile capita1.2
By the turn of the century, Port Elizabeth had a population of 33 000. The
city's transport links with the interior made the port a crucial link in the
chain between the Transvaal mines and the colonial metropole. The
service sector activities this stimulated, plus the small-scale manufacturing
centred largely around wool washing and leather tanning, provided the
foundations for Port Elizabeth's c.20th industrial base.
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The Landrostdy of Uitenhage was proclaimed in 1804 after General J.A.
Uitenhage de Mist toured the Eastern Cape on behalf of the Batavian
Government in search of an administrative headquarters for the
expanding white settler communities. For many decades it was merely the
small centre of a large agricultural community. By the mid-1800s, it had
concerns engaged in craft production, tanning, wool washing and the
manufacture of hats and saddles. However, it was only during the 1940s
with the establishment of a tyre and rubber concern that Uitenhage became
an industrial centre.3
In 1946 a firm called South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors
Limited (SAMAD) was established in Uitenhage to produce Studebakers. In
1951 SAMAD signed an agreement with Volkswagen (Germany) to
produce Beetles. In 1956 Volkswagen acquired a controlling interest in
SAMAD and in 1961 the company changed its name to Volkswagen of
South Africa Limited. By 1974, Volkswagen (Germany) had bought all the
shares of the company thus turning it into a wholly owned subsidiary.4
The urban population of PEU grew from 68 000 in 1921 to 350 000 in 1960.
Approximately half this population was black by the end of the period.5
The number of industrial establishments increased at an average rate of
2,3% per annum, from 186 in 1920/21 to 469 in 1961/62. These
establishments employed just under 5000 people in 1920/21 and nearly
53000 in 1963/64. This was a 5,4% rate of increase, the highest rate of
employment growth in the country. 6 After WW I, PEU's industrial base
was limited. Measured in terms of numbers of employees per enterprise,
textiles and footwear were by far the most dominant sector that supplied
both local and non-local markets. Whereas this sector employed 34% of the
total workforce, food and beverages employed 28%, metals and machinery
8%, furniture 8% and the rest was divided fairly equally into the other
sectors. The picture had changed slightly by the 1930s because although
textiles and footwear were still dominant (employing 43%), the
establishment of two motor vehicle assemblers in the 1920s meant that
15% of the workforce, found employment in the transport sector. 7 By the
1960s, the industrial base of PEU in order of size of employer was as
follows: transport, 29%; textiles and footwear, 27%; food and beverages,
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13%; metals and machinery, 13%; non-metals, 5%; wood, 4%; printing, 4%;
chemicals, 3%; and furniture, 1%.8
In general, the PEU regional economy underwent the classic transition
from mercantile colonial capitalism, through intermediate processing
coupled to service sector growth, and finally, with the help of import tariffs
and later local content legislation, the establishment of a secondary
industry. As the metropolitan heartland of the Eastern Cape, it inevitably
became the focus of black urbanisation.
THE REGIONAL ECONOMY
The PEU regional economy was unique in the South African context
because by the late 1970s the manufacturing sector produced the highest
percentage of this region's geographic product compared to other regions,
i.e. 38,4% as compared to 30,5% in the PWV, 24,1% in Durban/Pinetown
and 22,7% in the Western Cape. 9
 The manufacturing sector was followed
by transport and communication (15,1%), wholesale/retail (13,2%), finance
(11%), government (9,4%) and then a few smaller sectors.10
The largest industrial concerns in Uitenhage are related to the motor and
transport industry. They were Volkswagen; Good Year Tyre and Rubber
Company (established in 1945); Guestro Industries (Dorbyl subsidiary) that
produced crank-shafts and other forged components; Cam TRW
(established 1970), an Australian company that produced steering gear
mechanisms; Bosal Afrika (established 1964) produced exhaust systems;
SIG, the giant Swedish firm that produced ball bearings; Borg-Warner
South Africa produced rear axles; Hella, a German linked producer of
lighting and signaling equipment for motor vehicles; Veasey and Sharples,
machine builders; National Standard produced steel wire for the tyre
industry and copper wire for the Post Office; finally the South African
Railways Workshops which manufactured spares and repaired rolling
stock for the country's entire railway system. Although the motor and
transport industry dominated Uitenhage's economy by the 1980s, the roots
of this economy lay in the wool and mohair processing plants. The main
companies still involved in these activities were Gubb and Inggs, Cape of
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Good Hope Woolcombers, Veldspun, Union Cotton Mills, and Llama
Fashion Techniques (Feltex). In general, all these establishments employed
huge labour forces of between 1500 and 6000 people, were controlled by
large national monopolies or multi-nationals and had capital investments
of between R20 million and R300 million. 11 This well serviced area located
beyond the "rust belt" but close enough to a fully-serviced port, probably
contained the highest concentration of large-scale modernised
manufacturing industry per geographical head of population in the
country.
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Wood products
LOCAL
MANUFACTURING
SECTOR
Food
Textiles
Clothing
Footwear
Furniture
Paper and products
Printing @ Publishng
Leather and Products
Rubber
Non-metals
Metal Products
Machinery
Electrical Machinery
Transport Equipment
Miscellaneous
Beverages
Chemicals
Basic lion and Steel
TOTAL VALUE OF
PRODUCT
R'000	 %
AREA OF SALE
Local `)/0	 Non-
Local %
108 164 9,6 44,5 55,5
22 000 1,9 54,1 45,9
50 184 4,5 42,2 57,8
16 583 1,5 7,5 92,5
29 569 2,6 3,3 96,7
8 862 0,8 19,0 81,0
4 225 0,4 30,6 69,4
29 799 2,6 29,4 70,6
5 290 0,5 46,7 53,3
13 812 1,2 13,3 86,7
75 182 6,6 12,5 87,5
.11
56 988 5,0 30,7 69,3
44 799 3,9 29,9 70,1
3 238 0,3 91,9 8,1
14 723 1,3 44,9 55,1
3 499 0,3 29,3 70,7
50 252 4,5 3,7 96,3
589 848 52,1 7,1 92,9
4 464 0,4 5,8 94,2
1 131 481 100,0	 17,2 82,8
inNfi
The manufacturing sector in PEU was dominated by the motor industry
and its various feeder sectors. Table 1.1 presents the data:
(Source: Wait and Renders, Table 2, p.8.)
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Wait and Renders have calculated that in 1978 "the motor and motor
related manufacturing activities in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage [amounted]
to R694 million or 61,3% of the total locally manufactured product." 12 The
table also shows that 70,4% of the manufactured product were
consumption goods and the nature of the production processes involved
were such that there were very weak backward and forward linkages
within the regional economy. Furthermore, 74% of the locally
manufactured product was sold to non-local markets (including a few
exports). To make matters worse, 75% of the manufacturing sector's
material inputs came from outside the region.13 In short, the PEU regional
economy was structurally very weak indeed: it had weak internal linkages,
most of its product was sold externally and most of its inputs were
imported from non-local markets.
Although the motor industry was important for PEU as a whole, it was far
more central to Uitenhage's economy than Port Elizabeth's. The original
SAMAD factory produced 32 cars per day with a workforce of 320.
Although the original Beetle was the mainstay of production, this changed
as the Combi was introduced in 1955, the Audi in 1967, the Passat in 1974
and the Golf in 1978. By 1980 250 vehicles were being produced per day by
6000 workers. Volkswagen investment has been nothing short of massive.
In 1956 R1 million was spent on plant expansion, in 1963 R8 million was
invested in expanded premises and facilities, another R800 000 was spent
on plant in 1966 and then in 1980 it was announced that R100 million
would be spent over the following three years to expand production
facilities, increase local content, add to the vehicle range, establish a new
car engine plant and improve welfare and training facilities for staff.
Volkswagen claimed it spent R100 million per year to purchase locally
made components.14
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The dominance of the motor industry justifies further discussion of the
problems faced by this sector. The following list 15 presents the number of
new cars sold per month between 1975 and 1986:
1975 - 19 086
1976 - 15 428
1977 - 13 897
1978 - 17 061
1979 - 17 773
1980 -23 088
1981 -25127
1982 - 23 619
1983 - 22 735
1984 - 22 396
1985 - 17 027
1986 - 13 955
After the 1981 peak, "[t]here has since been a downward trend in annual
sales which has accelerated in 1985 and 1986. This has plunged the motor
industry into a crisis which is worse than that faced by any other major
manufacturing sector in the economy.-16
There are a number of cyclical and structural reasons for the decline of the
motor industry.17 One market-related reason for the decline in vehicle
sales relates to motor vehicle price increases. Whereas motor vehicle prices
increased by 37,3% between 1984 and 1986, the Consumer Price Index and
incomes only rose 18,9% and 12,1% respectively. The underlying cause of
this price hike was the falling exchange rate. Between mid-1984 and
December 1985 the Rand value of the US$, German Deutchmark and
Japanese Yen increased by 105,6%, 124,7% and 133,7% respectively. This
adversely affected the motor industry because no less than 50% of the
value of vehicles sold in South Africa were imported.
Coupled to the effects of the falling exchange rate was the effect of rising
taxes. Since January 1984 GST rose from 6% to 12% and an import
surcharge of 10% was imposed. Volkswagen calculated that R2628 tax was
paid on a R15000 car in January 1986. The decline in sales this produced
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was exacerbated by the introduction of a fringe benefit tax in 1985 that
undercut fleet sales, a traditionally stable segment of the market.
Although these cyclical problems could have been resolved if the
government had the will to do so, there were structural weaknesses in
the industry for which there were few remedies. Firstly, given that there
was a small domestic market of 350 080 units per year, and given the
relatively competitive nature of the industry, no manufacturer could
realise the economies of scale attained by overseas producers. Secondly, as
a result of the local content programme, manufacturers had to purchase
materials from local suppliers even though these could be imported at
cheaper rates. Thirdly, although the white market was saturated, the black
market remained too constrained to facilitate major expansion in this
area. Fourthly, although the port was the original reason for locating
assembly-based motor manufacturers in PEU, with the shift away from
assembly to direct manufacture as a result of the local content
programme, the Reef-based competitors were closer to material input
supplies. Fifthly, the PEU firms were located comparatively greater
distances away from the main consumer markets in Natal and southern
Transvaal. Sixthly, motor manufacturers complained that because the
PEU motor industry experienced the longest period of unionisation of
the workforce, wages had risen faster than productivity increases. Finally,
the more attractive industrial decentralisation incentives in Industrial
Decentralisation Points located elsewhere in the Eastern Cape/Border
Region diverted potential investors away from the high-wage zones of
PEU areas close to the apartheid-created bantustans.
Given these problems, the share of the national market accruing to PEU
manufacturers fell from 58% in 1965 to 46% in 1970 to 41% in 1980 and
finally to 32% in 1985.
"In 1986, PEU manufacturers have for the first time, received a
smaller share of the market (23%) than either Durban (28%) or
Reef (39%) based manufacturers."18
The growth of PEU manufacturing as a whole was -0,09% during
1970-1979. 19 Black et al conclude their assessment of the PEU regional
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economy by arguing:
"There are many reasons why the [PEU] industries are unlikely
to expand in the absence of an appropriate regional policy.
These include the current economic recession coupled with the
high cost of imported materials; several locational
disadvantages (e.g. distance from the PWV market and
inadequate industrial incentives vis-a-vis other regions); and
various restrictions on the export of manufactures (including
trade barriers imposed by foreign governments and the
artificial restriction of international markets by multinational
companies)."20
As far as the PEU workforce was concerned, it was relatively well paid,
fairly productive, relatively well educated and skilled.
The average annual wage and salary per worker in 1979 was R3811.80, the
highest after the PWV where workers earned R4588.30. This corresponded
to high productivity levels with the PEU workers producing the second
highest output per worker in the country. 21 As far as the racial
composition of the workforce was concerned, in 1979 26,4% were white,
34,3% coloured/Asian and 39,3% african.22
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HIGH % MEDIUM %	 I LOW %
P W V 46,7 42,8 10,5
Durban- 27,1 26,2 46,7
Pinetown
Cape 18,1 23,8 58,0
Peninsula
PEU 57,0 17,8 25,2
East London & 18,6 35,8 45,6
Hinterland
EVELS OF PEU LABOUR IN mrAgA
.PERSP
The dominance of the motor industry resulted in the creation of one of the
most skilled regional proletariats in the country. After categorising
different industries according to "high", "medium" and "low" skill levels,
Black et. al. provide the information contained in Table 1.2:23
( Source: calculated from Black, P.A., et. al., p.29)
This relatively high skill level in PEU and the consequent bargaining
power through trade unions it afforded semi-skilled and skilled workers,
helps explain the relatively high wage levels in this region and the depth
of union organisation.
The problems of labour 'control' and productivity were of primary
concern to the dominant capitalist interests in the region. These interests
were rooted in the manufacturing sector and to a lesser extent the
commercial sector. The Midlands Chamber of Industries (MCI) that
represented the former and the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage Chambers of
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Commerce that represent the latter were totally dominated by white
english and Afrikaans business interests. The multinational corporations
that controlled the motor industry were clearly the dominant interest in
the MCI. Small-scale largely english-speaking commerce in Port Elizabeth
and Afrikaans traders in Uitenhage dominated the chambers of commerce.
How these interests understood the economic problems of the region was
reflected in a survey of opinions conducted amongst leading local business
and public representatives. They identified the following causes of the
problem: (i) under utilization of infrastructure (e.g. the harbour operated at
under 50% capacity); (ii) rising unemployment; (iii) local authorities had
insufficient income to provide all essential services; (iv) contracting
industrial base because of more attractive investment opportunities in
other regions; (v) PEU-based industries losing their competitive
advantage; (vi) slow industrial growth relative to the PWV and the
country as a whole; (vii) "labour unrest and poor black/white relations
resulting from this"; (viii) slow job creation coupled to 3% annual growth
of the "labour force"; (ix) shrinking pool of skills and talent in the
region.24
This survey also revealed that business regarded "labour unrest" as the
second most important "barrier to economic growth" in PEU after
"distance from major markets". 25 When asked which organisations "do
you feel hindered local economic development", labour and political
organisations that organised "unrest" were regarded as the primary
culprits.26 Nevertheless, when asked what were the PEU region's "most
important assets", "unskilled labour" was rated most highly. The second
"most important asset" was the harbour facility. When asked what
"improvements are required" to solve some of these problems, the list in
order of priority was not surprising: "improvement of general business
attitude; provision of low income housing; improved public transport;
improved training facilities; industrial parks for small [black]
entrepreneurs; improvement of recreational facilities; more serviced
industrial land; development of irrigation potential; improved hotel
accommodation; expansion of water/sewerage systems." 27 In short, except
for the demand for improved hotels and business attitudes, the primary
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demands of PEU's capitalist interests were for substantial upgrading of the
main reproductive facilities (housing, transport, water and sanitation,
training and recreation). One typical comment from the respondents was:
"Adequate labour force although untrained and unhoused."28
In a special research report into black living conditions commissioned by
the Urban Foundation's Eastern Cape division, one of the key conclusions
was:
"A major education programme is required to develop home
ownership desires leading to increased home purchases and
ultimate social security.
The growing importance and influence of the youth group must be
recognised and maximum attention given to providing needed
acceptable education, recreational and entertainment facilities. These
facilities are fundamental to quality of life and neighbourhood
awareness and pride."29
This pre-occupation with reproductive facilities was directly related to the
general perception amongst employers that workplace resistance and
township unrest were an important obstacle to economic growth. Their
response to black protest was to argue that living and related reproductive
facilities needed to be improved. This perception legitimised and
supported popular black demands for housing and better urban services.
However, in light of the state's failure to address these problems in any
meaningful way (especially housing), these issues were to become the foci
of sustained popular rebellion and protest amongst the popular classes
during the mid-1980s. These classes, however, were to attach meanings to
these community needs that contradicted the "social security" and "quality
of life" concerns of the private sector.
In short, by the 1980s the PELT regional economy was moving rapidly into a
severe structural recession with little relief from the state. The rapidly
contracting regional economy and the drastic limits this placed on
occupational mobility and income distribution was incapable of meeting
the needs of the increasingly well educated, relatively highly skilled and
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relatively well paid working class. Given that all this was overdetermined
by rapid urbanisation and population growth rates without simultaneous
expansion of housing stock (as the next section will show), it is
unsurprising that community-based struggles over the terms of labour
power reproduction became the focus of political conflict in this region and
in Uitenhage in particular during the 1980s.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRENDS
The total population of PEU for 1984 was conservatively estimated to be
727 580. Of this, nearly 400 000 or over 50% were african. 30 The total growth
rates of this population were 33% during the two decades 1960-1980.
However, african growth rates increased from 37,9% in 1960-1970 to 44,3%
in 1970-1980.31 A more reliable population estimate put the figure at 450
000 in the range 420 000 to 470 000 32. This source also argued that the most
reliable population growth rate since 1970 was 4,7% in a range 4,5% to
5,0%.33
Although specific figures on the age and gender of the PEU population are
unavailable, these do exist for Region D as a whole. 34 According to Kruger
and Potgieter, there were 1 041 760 african males and 1 337 120 african
females in Region D in 1970 or, in other words, a 78 "masculinity ratio"
(i.e. number of males per female). By 1980, the masculinity ratio had
shifted to 81 with 1 474 424 males and 1 815 925 females.35
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The age profile of Africans living in Region D is reflected in Table 1.3:
(Source: calculated from Kruger and Potgieter, Table 3.2.)
This table is important because it shows that no less that 53% of the
african population were younger than twenty and that 76% were younger
than thirty-five. The first figure in particular is revealing because it points
to the demographic centrality of what came to be known in everyday
language as "the youth". Given the conditions of poverty and economic
recession they lived under, this was one reason why this group came to
play such an important political role in the struggles of the 1980s. Also,
given that most of this group were school-going age, it becomes easier to
understand why education grievances rapidly affected the community as
a whole.
Using a "dependency ratio" calculation, Kruger and Potgieter demonstrate
from these figures that there were 135,2 dependents (young and aged) per
100 economically productive people (aged between 20 and 64) in the •
african community. This compared with 82,5 for whites, 88,9 for Asians
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1970
Number 94040 109340 29600 7960 1320 242260
38,8 45.1 12,2 3,3 0,3 100
1980
Number 105940 162240 64580 26180 6840 365780
29,0 44,4 17,7 7,2 1,9 100
< Std. 6&7 I < Std. 8&9 I <Std. 10
	 I TotalNone < Std. 6
and 128,5 for coloureds.36 If a 50% unemployment rate is included, then
this dependency ratio must be doubled to approximately 270 or 2,7
dependents per earner.
As far as african education is concerned, similar crucial sociological
implications emerge. Table 1.4 presents the basic data:
(Source: calculated from Kruger and Potgieter, Table 4.2(d))
Like the age profile, the sociological implications of this table shed
invaluable light on current township tensions. In the short space of a
decade the number of Africans who achieved some sort of education up to
standard 5 increased by over 50 000. The number that achieved standards 6
and 7 more than doubled while, most dramatically of all, those who
obtained standard 8 and 9 more than trebled and those who achieved
standard 10 (and higher) increased almost five times. This rate of
educational advancement continued into the 1980s as the state increased
its expenditure on black education. Given the politicised nature of black
education and given that the PEU regional economy entered a deep
structural recession from the later 1970s, the educational system was
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producing politicised young people with diminishing chances of using
their qualifications to obtain economic positions to satisfy rising
expectations. Adding fuel to the fire, rising state expenditures were aimed
at increasing the quantity of people going through the educational system
without a concomitant improvement in the quality of the system itself.
This trend towards rapid educational advancement is reflected in increases
in the number of diplomas and degrees achieved by Africans in the PEU
area. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of diplomas awarded to Africans
in this area increased from 1080 to 2100 and the number of degrees awarded
increased from 40 to 200.38
It was reliably estimated in 1985 that the unemployment rate in PEU was
between 50 and 60 per cent.39 Rising unemployment was the product of
slow employment creation and high urbanisation and population
expansion rates. Whereas 41 980 new jobs became available for Africans
during the decade 1970-1980, the size of the african population increased by
123520 from 242260 in 1970 to 365780 in 1980. 40 With the population
growing at three times the rate of employment growth, it is unsurprising
that unemployment rose. It also explains why there was a significant
decline in the number of economically active Africans (defined as those
with actual employment) in PEU. Whereas 90,1% of the total population in
the 20-64 year age bracket were economically active in 1970, this dropped to
71,3% in 198041 and it is safe to assume that this downward trend
accelerated with the onset of the recession during the first quarter of 1982. If
these trends are seen against the backdrop of relative educational
advancement, a clear picture of a context conducive for severe social
tension begins to emerge.
Despite relative declines in employment growth and economic activity
ratios reflected in the above percentage shares, there were crucial economic
changes that, if measured in absolute terms, reflect the extent to which
shifts in the industrial base affected the occupational structure of african
employees. Table 1.4 presents the basic data:
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cruRE.
CAN.	 YEE
Profe-
ssional
Admn Cleri-
cal
Sales Ser-
vice
Far-
ming
Prod-
uction
Not
class-
ified
1970
No. 2000 40 2980 3160 27360 7100 37380 1802
2,0 0,0 3,0 3,2 27,9 7,2 38,1 18,4
1980
No. 4840 100 5520 4160 34 400 9140 53540 2946
3,5 0,1 3,9 2,9 24,4 6,5 37,9 20,9
0/0 (*) 9,2 9,6 6,4 2,8 2,3 2,6 3,7 5,0
(* This refers to the percentage increase from 1970-1980 for each
category.)(Source: calculated from Kruger and Potgieter, Table 7.1 (d))
If we assume that the production, service and farming categories refer to
employees broadly located in unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour,
then this table reveals that about two thirds of all african employees can
be defined as falling within wage-based labour, or what could be
categorised as the working class. However, during the decade 1970-1980,
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the number of working class employees increased negligibly. The most
important shifts were significant increases in the number of employees in
professional, administrative and clerical employment. This, if seen in the
context of relative educational advancement, suggests the emergence of
an important upwardly mobile middle class. These professional and
white collar employees complemented and re-inforced the growth of
another crucial segment of the black middle class, namely the
entrepreneurs. A study of Port Elizabeth's small business sector arrived
at this conclusion:
"[There is little doubt that a significant Black entrepreneurial class
does exist in the city. ... They consist of a relatively small group of
entrepreneurs, predominantly middle-aged males who probably
constitute less than half of one percent of the total black population
of some 400 000.'12
In short, the PEU's regional political economy had a productive
base that grew, transformed itself and then began declining as structural
constraints reinforced cyclical downturns. When the impact of these
economic trends are located in their social context, a picture emerges of a
severe set of dislocations between employment growth, population
expansion, demographic transformation and occupational restructuring.
The crisis in production that these dislocations reflected were reinforced by
state urban policies that were responsible for creating a crisis in
reproduction by the 1980s.
HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOWNSHIP SERVICES
The black townships of the PEU region, like those built in the rest of South
Africa's "urban areas", are the product of apartheid urban policy (see
chapter 3 for a detailed analysis). Although designed to maximise state
control of the labour force, townships became the bases for a popular
movement that emerged as a direct threat to state power in the 1980s.
Although an important mix of ideological currents gave shape to this
movement, urban contradictions were the underlying structural
determinants that led to the formation of networks of local community
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organisations that underpinned the movement.
No less that 85% of all african housing in the PEU region was built prior to
1970 (63% prior to 1960). 43 The state's failure to provide housing despite
high urbanisation and population growth rates forced poor and working
people to resort to illegal land invasions to build their own shelter, i.e.
shacks. This is why over 40% of all african dwellings in the PEU region in
1985 were shacks.44
 Table 1.5 sums up the state of african shelter by 1985:
-
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TABLE 1.5: NO. OF UNITS/SITES PER TOWNSHIP PER DECADE
Township
•
•
Date
Estabi
-ished
Units
built
prior
to
1950s
Units
built in
1950s
Units
built in
1960s
Units
built
in
1970s -
i
Units
built
in
1980s
'
Total
No. of
formal
built
units
No. of
shacks
per
town-
ship
No. of
served
sites
per
town-
ship
Total
no. of
resi-
dent al
units/
sites
lbhayi: 1926 300 300 300
New
Brighton -
Red
Location
lbhayi: 1906 869 869 869
New s
Brighton -
McNamee
Village
lbhayi: 1934- 3506 3506 3506
New 1943
Brighton -
Elundini
lbhayi: 1948- 372 372 372
New 1949
Brighton -
Thembale-
tu
lbhayi: 1951- 2577 2577 2577
New 1954
Brighton -
Kwaford
1963 99 99 99
lbhayi: 1975- 298 298 554 852
New 1978
Brighton -
North East
Area
Total:
lbhayi -
5047 2577 99 298 8021 554 8575
New
Brighton
townships
lbhayi: 1924 150 50 16 216 527 743
VValmer 1
lbhayi: 1953- 11727 11727 11727
KwaZakhel
e
1961
lbhayi: 1965& 3351 2824 1	 760	 I	 6935 6935
Zwide 1970s
lbhayi: 1980s 16064 16064
Soweto-
by-the-Sea
.
Total for
lbhayi
5197 14354 3466	 2824	 1058 26899 17661 44560
% of total
per
decade
19% 54% 12% 11%	 I	 4% 100%
ECDB: 1984 3004 3004
Kwadwesi
ECDB: 1984 186	 186 1997 2183
KwaMa- I
gxaki 1	 '	 1
ECDB: 1984 I	 3447	 3447 17000 20447Motherwell
Total for I II	 3633	 3633I 22001 25634ECDB I	 I
KNB:
Despatch
1950 297 297 241 n 538
KNB:
Lanqa
1943 1032 1032 6116 7148
KNB:
Kwallobu-
hle
1967 2500 2000 2356 6856 1993 6000 14849
Total
number
for KNB
% of total
per
decade
1329
16%
2500
31%
2000
25%
2356
' 28%
8185
100%
8350 6000 22535
TOTAL
NUMBER
FOR PEU
5197 15683 5966 4824 7047 38717 26011 28001 92729
Key: lbhayi was the name of the local authority that was responsible for the administration of townships in Port
Elizabeth. ECDB refers to those township that feel directly under the ECDB. KNB = Kwallobuhle which refers to the
local authority that was responsible for the administration of townships in Uitenhage.
(Source: calculated from Expro, p.UF6/004 & p.UF7/005-1)
Table 1.5 reveals that in 1985 there were 38717 houses, 28001
serviced sites and 26011 shacks. It would be incorrect to assume that the
serviced sites would have been able to cater for the shack dwellers because
too many of the latter could not afford the rates in any formal or controlled
settlement schemes (more on this later). The two highest shack
concentrations were Soweto-by-the-Sea in Port Elizabeth and Langa in
Uitenhage. It is significant, though, that in Uitenhage as a whole, there
were more shacks (8350) than formal houses (8185). Furthermore, between
1983 and 1985, the number of shacks erected in Port Elizabeth only
increased by 1,5% (from 17397 to 17661), whereas in Uitenhage the number
increased by 29,7% (from 6439 to 8350). Although the number of service
sites increased substantially in Uitenhage, they were located in a very
different place to where the squatters erected their shacks, i.e. the serviced
sites were in the planned township of Kwallobuhle located some distance
from the town, and the shacks were in Langa, an illegal settlement close to
town. The resultant struggles over the spatial mismatching of where
people settled and where investment in serviced sites took place
underpinned the dynamic of political conflict and resistance in the PEU
townships in the 1980s and forms the key focus of the chapters that follow.
Using the findings of two studies of squatter settlements in the PEU
region45, a profile emerges of stable communities whose incomes were
relatively high compared to other similar communities. 56% of the
squatters surveyed said they moved to the settlement because they wanted
shelter. This was high compared to the 9% response obtained from the
same question in Durban. This suggests that the reason for moving into
squatter settlements in PEU were primarily related to the housing shortage
rather than employment or relocation reasons. This was reflected in the
relatively low importance of other reasons given for moving into the
settlement, namely because they had recently moved to the PEU area (18%;
Durban - 26%), they had been displaced from previous lodging (11%;
Durban - 9%), they wanted a congenial environment (12%; Durban - 4%)
and, most important of all, the need to be close to employment (3%;
Durban - 52%).
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The stability of the squatter communities was largely facilitated by the fact
that no major forced removals or evictions of squatters had taken place in
PEU since 1979. The Jardine survey revealed that of those in the
communities she surveyed, 74% had resided there for five years or more.
The largest number (44%) had resided there for between 8 and 11 years.
Unlike in the Western Cape where the state acted heavily against squatters,
the East Cape Development Board (ECDB) never followed this example.
This had much to do with the fact that the "coloured labour preference"
regulations were applicable to the Western Cape, but not to the Eastern
Cape. This effectively "protected" african squatters in the PEU settlements.
However, given the above figures which show that squatters were not
recent migrant arrivals (as in the Western Cape), it is safe to assume that
most of the squatters qualified as 'urban insiders' in terms of Section 10 of
the Urban Areas Act which meant they could not be evicted from the
urban areas. They were forced to live in shacks because although they
qualified to be in the urban areas, the housing shortage defined them as
urban marginals. Ironically, influx control actually protected these
communities from being defined as rural marginals because the
implementation of influx control meant they were defended from
authorities who would have liked to "resolve" the squatter problem by
simply dumping the homeless in the bantustans. This anomalous
situation provided the material basis for housing struggles in squatter
communities which, in the absence of meaningful state and capitalist
initiatives, were forced to build their own shelter.
It has been reliably estimated that the population density of african
households in the PEU region in 1985 was 6,9 persons per dwelling. This
was 0,9 higher than the optimum density of 6,0 persons per dwelling
which is used to determine Household Subsistence Level (HSL) estimates.
Based on an estimated 450 000 Africans in PEU, a further 10600 dwellings
would have been required to reduce this density down to the normal 6,0
persons per dwelling.46 This meant that the housing shortage equaled
26011 shacks plus 10600 additional dwellings resulting in a total shortage of
36611 houses or a number nearly equal to the existing regional housing
stock.
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Urban services in the PEU townships were totally inadequate. A 1984
HSRC survey found that 98% of its respondents had no running water,
91% had no electricity, 96,2% had no bathroom in their houses, 91,4% had
no kitchen sinks, 36,4% had no ceilings, and 19,3% had no interior doors.
The report concluded that the conditions in which 76% of its respondents
lived were "poor or very poor".47
The severe shortage of basic services within the household was reproduced
in the community as a whole. For a population of nearly 600 000, a large
percentage of whom were under 18 years of age (38% in Port Elizabeth and
25% in Uitenhage), there were very few recreational and community
facilities. In the area as a whole, there were 34 recreational facilities (e.g.
sports facilities, swimming pools, etc), 37 entertainment venues, 123
educational institutions, 41 health and welfare agencies (e.g. crèches, legal
aid, social workers, etc), 144 religious institutions and 201 commercial
outlets (supermarkets, service stations, bottle stores, etc). 48 In short, few
institutionalised recreational or communal facilities existed for the youth
in these communities.
The cost structure of african housing in PEU reflected the complexities that
face an administration that had to deliver houses to extremely poor
communities. In Port Elizabeth there were four rental schemes, namely
sub-economic housing, economic housing, subsidised housing and shacks.
91
_ - -
SUB-ECON ECONOMIC SUBSIDISED SHACKS
R' per month R' per month R' per month R' per month
Monthly
household
income level as
determined by
means test:
*below R150 1.54 not qualified 11.99 none
_
*above R150 2.62 3.81 graduated up
to R54.06*
*above R450 2.62 3.81
SERVICE
.-- ...-
CHARGES:
Flush
sanitation 21.11 21.11 21.11 N/A
Night Soil,
i.e. bucket
system
22.56 22.56 22.56 10.00
(* There were no less than 16 different graduations calculated on the basis
of a means test.)(Source: Expro, p.0018/15)
It is important to note that these service charges and rentals were not
increased between 1982 and 1985. This probably reflected a reluctance on
the part of the state to risk increases during a period of heightened
politicisation.
Uitenhage had a different set of schemes with a bureaucratically more
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complex means grading system.
T	 §T§:i	 Cti.0.W.§„ N,.:PTgNif
SUB-
ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC "NEW"
ECONOMIC
SHACKS
R' per R' per R' per R' per
month month month month
RENT:
Langa 3.17 none
Langa 3.60 none
Kwallob. 3.88,
graduating
thro' 100
gradations
to 33.60
12.45,
graduating
thro' 21
gradations
to 80.76
none
SERVICE
CHARGES:
Kwallo-
buhle.
19.90 19.90 19.90 18.62
Langa:
*std rate 19.90
*comm.
taps/no
night soil
17.29
*commun
al taps +
night soil
removal
18.29
*tap on
site/no
night soil
20.61
*tap on site 18.89
+ night
soil
(Source: Expro, p.14/7/2 and p.0018/21)
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In addition to rental schemes, by 1985 houses could be purchased on the
basis of a 99-leasehold scheme and an "indefinite occupation" scheme
based on a 30 year residential occupation contract. As far as 99-year
leasehold was concerned, the houses were valued at between R2500.00 and
R3000.00 and the land cost between R435.00 and R475.00. Depending on
income status and time of purchase, various discounts and incentives
could be obtained including free deposit, 3% interest on loans and low
house prices. In the end, the resident got security of tenure for monthly
rates of (a) R64.00 for a house purchased that cost below R2500.00, (b) R21.00
for a house that cost above R2500.00 but was purchased by someone with a
monthly income of below R450.00 per month; and (c) R45.00 for a house
that cost above R2500.00 per month but was purchased by someone who
earned above a monthly salary of R450.00. (The initial outlays in each case
were R6.00, R156.00 and R156.00 respectively.) It is important to note that
these monthly costs excluded the monthly service charge that still needed
to be paid.
The Great Sale of State-owned housing that was initiated by the state in the
early 1980s as a reformist measure, was not very successful in the PEU
region. Of the 26899 houses available for sale in Ibhayi, 20% were
purchased. And in Uitenhage, out of a total of 8185 houses available, only
5% were sold. 49 The reasons for the failure of the Great Sale have never
been systematically studied. The Executive Projects (Expro) report asserts
that the clumsy half-baked nature of the 99-year leasehold scheme was to
blame because it did not make leasehold more attractive than rental in
financial terms.50 Another explanation is that housing was a relatively
low priority for township dwellers compared to problems related to
transport, criminality, services and education.51
Although failures in the delivery of housing was clearly one cause of the
housing crisis, another was the economy's wage structure which effectively
excluded large sectors of the african community from the housing market.
If we take into account the fact that the HSL was about R325.00 per month
in PEU in 1985, that the average wage rate for Africans in 1985 was
R352.0052 and that each breadwinner had an extended family to support
because of high unemployment, then it is not surprising that the Expro
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report could come to the conclusion that "the shack community
effectively represents a financially attractive accommodation area".53 This
crisis of affordability was reflected in the fact that over 20% of all township
residents were in permanent arrears because they could not afford normal
housing costs.54
The Expro report, on the basis of three independent surveys and census
data, concluded that total household income (i.e. not just head of
household income) in the PEU region was as follows: 40% earned below
R300, 15% between R300 and R400, 15% between R400 and R500, 20%
between R500 and R600, 5% between R600 and R700 and 5% above R700.
Furthermore, 39% earned below the HSL. 55 If we assume that a household
could only buy into the formal housing market at the very lowest level
(i.e. a R5000.00 house with a loan at 12% interest) if it earned R400 or
more, then it meant that no less than 55% of all PEU households had
incomes below what was required to meet the costs of the most basic
housing structure. This exclusion level rose dramatically when it came to
the number who could purchase newly built houses, the cheapest of which
cost about R20 000.
State and capital responded differently, albeit equally inadequately, to the
PEU region's housing crisis. The Minister of Co-operation and
Development, Dr. P. Koornhof, appointed the Metropolitan Black
Planning Council (MBPC) - the so-called Rive Commission - in October
1982 to investigate problems in the supply of housing and infrastructure in
the PEU region.56 Organised business, through the Urban Foundation,
commissioned its own investigation in May 1985.57
The MBPC was chaired by Louis Rive and Dr. J. Wessels was the vice-
chairperson. Its members comprised the chairpersons of the Uitenhage
Community Council and Port Elizabeth Community Council, as well as
the Chief Director of the East Cape Administration Board and the Chief
Commissioner. The personnel drawn into the panel of experts that helped
the MBPC came from ECDB, Greater Algoa Bay Planning Authority, Port
Elizabeth Municipality, Uitenhage Municipality, SA Association of
Consulting Engineers, SA Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors,
CSIR, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning,
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Department of Community Development, Department of Cooperation and
Development and the Department of Posts and Telecommunications.
In short, the MBPC was a central state initiative that drew its personnel
from the heart of the political, professional and bureaucratic establishment.
The MBPC's brief was restricted to infrastructure and how the backlogs
could be remedied. Its stated commitment to formulate proposals in
consultation with the black communities never went further than
coopting two community councillors. In any event, the full MBPC only
met on three occasions during which the councillors made no
contribution.58
 All the work and thinking took place in the technical sub-
committees. The final recommendation of the MBPC boiled down to
minimal upgrading of services in existing townships and provision of
"sub-minimum" services for 29187 new sites in new township areas.
The recommendations were as follows:
(i) A distinction was made between "minimum" infrastructural
standards (running water, flush sanitation, roads, stormwater
drainage and electricity) and "sub-minimum" standards (running
water and sanitation). It was calculated that the former would cost
R296,5 million (at 1983 prices) and the latter R203,2 million.
(ii) Given government's constraints, upgrading to "sub-minimum"
standards would be acceptable. Not surprisingly, the state accepted
the "sub-minimum" rate.
The glaring omissions and failures in the final report were as follows:
*	 because only estimates of costs were calculated and not affordability
estimates, there was no way the community could know how much
it would have to pay after the upgrading was completed;
*	 no growth predictions were given and therefore the community had
no idea whether the quality and quantity of services would be
adequate by the time the programme was completed;
*	 all 'black spots" designated for removal were excluded from the
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plan despite vigorous anti-removal struggles in Walmer, Langa and
Red Location;
*	 the management structure proposed by the MBPC to run the
upgrading project was totally dominated by technocrats controlled by
ECDB - the community councils were given the status of an
"advisory panel".
In short, there were no recommendations for substantial upgrading of
infrastructure nor were there proposals on how the housing shortage
could be resolved. It was essentially a programme to facilitate the servicing
of sites for squatters so that these communities could be brought into a
"controlled squatting" system rather than allowing them to continue as
illegal uncontrolled settlements with all the security risks that this
implied.
The Greater Algoa Bay Affordable Housing Research Project report 59 was
commissioned by the Urban Foundation's Eastern Cape office. The steering
committee comprised the managing director of the Urban Foundation,
Robin Lee; the Director of the Urban Foundation Eastern Cape, Roger
Matlock; Peter Arton-Powell, Chief Executive Officer of Unifound - a
construction utility company; Derek Cleary, ex-director of Housing in the
Port Elizabeth Municipality and managing director of Urban Villages; Stan
Anderson, managing director of Maybaker - a multinational chemical
company based in Port Elizabeth; Rod Philip, prominent Port Elizabeth
architect and board member of Urban Villages; and Lindi Tshume,
personnel manager of British United Shoe Machinery.
The report focussed essentially on the problem of how to facilitate housing
development following the preparation of serviced sites in line with the
Rive Plan. It concluded that "unco-ordinated efforts by government
agencies and independent enterprises" and the absence of "home
ownership desires" necessary for "increased home purchases and ultimate
social stability" were the main problems in the housing market. 60 Its
recommendations were:61
*	 the acceleration of infrastructural upgrading proposed by the Rive
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Plan;
* in sutu upgrading and retention of squatter settlements "which
must be recognised as a practical, realistic and necessary part of the
accommodation cycle";
* the granting of freehold title to ensure that the "Great Sale" scheme
is a success;
* the provision of "affordable housing and land prices" which will
necessarily include the need for subsidisation;
* the initiation of "employment generating ventures";
* the rationalisation of administration of urban development under
the auspices of the Regional Services Council;
* the privatisation of construction programmes;
* decentralisation of property and bond registration to the local level
of government;
* the scrapping of the "means test" for establishing affordability and
the gradual transition to a "rates and taxes system".
In short, the focus of this report was on the housing delivery system rather
than on infrastructure. Although its aim was "to determine the range of
affordable housing options potentially available to low income groups"
and which are "acceptable to the total community", the report never
questioned the two underlying determinants of inequities in housing
provision, namely the Group Areas Act and the low wage structure in the
economy62. Nevertheless, by accepting the need for subsidisation and
opposing removals of squatter camps, it deviated in these important
respects from government policy.
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CONCLUSION
The picture that emerges from the analytical overview of housing and
urban services in the PEU region points to the existence of a deep crisis of
reproduction. By the 1980s household and community structures were
experiencing the combined pressures of population growth, urbanisation,
housing shortages, low absolute incomes, unemployment, relative
educational advancement and expanding size of the youthful age groups.
In their struggle to survive, at least 40% of all the households were forced
to move into the squatter settlements. When the Port Elizabeth camps
became too congested, Uitenhage became the major growth point during
the 1982-85 period.
With many returning to an old residential area close to Uitenhage's CBD
that still existed in the memories of at least three generations despite
successive forced removals, Langa was to become the focus of PEU's urban
social movement. Langa emerged as a symbol of many struggles: the
struggle for shelter, for land, for the right to build a community and
eventually, the right to control social and political destiny. It is to this
struggle and to the social movement it generated that we can now turn.
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CHAPTER 2
POPULAR ORGANISATION IN THE PORT ELIZABETH-UITENHAGE
REGION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO UITENHAGE
INTRODUCTION
Popular organisation in Uitenhage's black communities was, in many ways,
unique. The actors, ideas and social conditions that shaped the patterns of
mobilisation and organisation in the these communities gave rise to atypical
formations. The distinguishing feature about Uitenhage is that it was
probably the only "union town" in South Africa. With Volkswagen
employing nearly two thirds of Uitenhage's economically active population
and with the rest of the labour force concentrated in large private and public
sector establishments, it is not surprising that the unionisation of Uitenhage's
black working class made a substantial impact on the organisational form and
ideological content of community-based movements during the 1980s.
Although popular organisation in Uitenhage's black community probably
stretches back to colonial penetration, direct contemporary linkages can be
traced back to Communist Party agitation during the 1940s and 1950s and,
more importantly, widespread ANC organisation during the 19500- A
number of old-timers from the fifties that did time on Robben Island could
still be found speaking or in the audience at political meetings during the
1980s in Uitenhage. They told heroic stories of how they worked with Mbeki,
how they held mass meetings in the veld and how they organised ANC
branches and campaigns in Uitenhage. The leading Uitenhage organiser, Mr.
Mfazwa, recounts in some detail how he organised Freedom Volunteers to
collect demands for the Congress of the People in 1955 that drew up the
Freedom Charter. Many of today's leading youth congress activists in
Uitenhage had parents who participated in the Defiance Campaign. Although
no mention is made of Uitenhage in the accounts of the 1950s, we can safely
assume that popular struggles in Uitenhage's black communities developed
along similar lines to those which emerged in Port Elizabeth.2
Unlike in Port Elizabeth where the re-emerging popular organisations in the
1980s were rooted in student and community protests, 3 the re-emergence of
popular organisation in Uitenhage was shaped largely by trade union
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organisation. As I described in chapter 1, the massive impact large-scale
industrial manufacturing had on Uitenhage's economy not only explains the
formation of an advanced industrial proletariat, but also why trade unions
were to play such an important role in the establishment of contemporary
social movements.4 This is why this chapter will start with an account of the
Uitenhage trade union movement. Like the East Rand, the remarkable
feature about Uitenhage's trade unions is how they entered the 1980s as fairly
conservative economistic trade unions opposed to community involvement,
but ended up as strong allies of radical politicised community organisations
by the mid-1980s.
The period October 10th 1979 to June 16th 1980 saw the birth of mass
organisation in the Eastern Cape's factories, communities and schools. The
form, content and pattern of these struggles were not only distinctly different
from previous phases of resistance, but they generated conceptions of struggle
that were to shape national strategies and tactics in the years ahead. This is
because at root they raised, for the first time, the critical question of how
home and workplace struggles could be combined to create a new and
effective social movement. It was from this crucible that leaders, activists and
analysts would draw lessons, precedents and arguments during the rest of the
1980s.
It would be a mistake, however, to comprehend the emerging politics of
resistance in the PEU region simply as an outgrowth of unionisation in the
workplace. The communities had their own dynamics that led to forms of
community organisation in the region that quite often had conflictual
relations with the unions.
The key moments in October 1979-June 1980 period were as follows:
* October 10th: proposal to form the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation
(PEBCO) which was officially inaugurated on the 30th October;
* October 23rd: founding of the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBC0);
* October 31st: commencement of Ford Strikes;
* April 30th: commencement of East Cape schools boycott;
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* June 16: the Uitenhage General Strike.
THE UNION MOVEMENT
Right-wing racist unions and politicised black trade unionism are two sides of
the same coin. And in the Eastern Cape, this irony was to be overdetermined
by social conditions and a political culture that eventually spawned the most
militant union movement in the country.
The form and structure of contemporary Eastern Cape unionism goes back to
the decision by the conservative white union Yster en Staal to organise white
workers in 1964, and the formation in 1967 of the mainly coloured National
Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa
(NUMARWOSA).
Yster en Staal, a conservative union whose membership was drawn largely
from Afrikaans speaking artisans in the Transvaal, began organising in the
Eastern Cape motor firms in the 1960s. It won recognition from General
Motors (Port Elizabeth) in 1966 and subsequently at Ford (Port Elizabeth) and
Volkswagen in Uitenhage. The basic strategy of the right-wing white artisan
unions during the 1960s was to use their race as a bargaining too1. 5 As
mechanisation and job fragmentation steadily diluted the bargaining power
of white workers after WW II, and given that this increasingly privileged
stratum was attached to a racist ideology that prohibited cross-race class
alliances, it followed that a key form of pressure available to white workers
was their ability to pressurise the state into job reservation. 6 This is exactly
what Yster en Staal did in the Eastern Cape motor firms.
In 1967 Yster en Shull asked the Minister of Labour to appoint an industrial
tribunal to establish whether white workers were unfairly losing jobs to
cheaper black workers. Based on the findings of this tribunal, the Minister
promulgated Job Reservation Determination Number 16 which stipulated
that all supervisory and control work in the motor industry must be reserved
for whites; that 65% of all jobs must be occupied by whites and that all existing
jobs occupied by whites were reserved for whites. Furthermore, if an
employer wanted to employ a black in a job reserved for whites, an
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application for a special exemption had to be forwarded to the Department of
Labour which in turn referred the application to Yster en Staid for
sanctioning. 7 The severe constraints this imposed on the labour market not
only caused tension between white workers and employers, but was to
eventually lead to the formation of an Industrial Council in 1970 that would,
due to pressure from black workers, steadily undermine the only bargaining
power white workers had, namely their race.
Fred Sauls, a 27 year old "cycle checker" at Ford, decided to join the embryonic
union of coloured motor workers in 1967. After formally registering in June
1967, NUMARWOSA was to grow into a significant force. After becoming
general secretary of the union in 1971, Fred Sauls led NUMARWOSA into
the Industrial Council (IC) for the Eastern Cape Motor Industry in the same
year. At the same time, the union leadership decided to organise african
workers into a "parallel" union called the United Automobile Rubber and
Allied Workers Union (that used "UAW" as its acronym). It was "parallel"
because Africans were not allowed to join registered trade unions at this
point. NUMARWOSA believed this was important because "it was in our
direct interests to unite workers to prevent management from dividing them.
... We made it clear from the start to management and the Industrial Council
that separate representation for coloureds and Africans was completely
against our principles." 8 The NUMARWOSA and UAW worked closely
together and caucused positions prior to IC negotiations. The UAW applied
for and won de facto recognition from employers in 1977 claiming it had 50%
representation at Ford and Volkswagen and 20% at General Motors.9
Responding to the unionisation of black workers in the Eastern Cape and
elsewhere, the state adjusted the Labour Relations Act in 1973 to provide for
the formation of "Liaison Committees". These in-house committees that
gave Africans a very limited voice were given representation on the IC but
under the supervision of the Department of Labour's regional Bantu Labour
Officer. Although intended to make unions redundant, the NUMARWOSA-
UAW succeeded in organising the liaison committee members which meant
that the key african liaison committee representatives on the IC were in fact
UAW members. One of them, John Mke, was the UAW President and well
connected to international auto and metal federations. The other was John
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Gomomo, the skillful leader of Volkswagen's black workers. 10 Finnemore
captured the underlying reasons for the success of african unionisation in the
Eastern Cape when she commented:
"The dominance of white workers, differing structures of
industrial relations, fears of repression and general recession in
the auto industry all contributed to the relatively powerless
position of black workers during the 1970s. The negotiated
minimum wage still fell below the Household Subsistence
Level, and where wage increases were granted above this, it
was at management's discretion."11
The emerging strength of UAW solidified its relationship with
NUMARWOSA. It was this relationship that led to NUMARWOSA's
resignation from the moderate Trade Union Council of South Africa
(TUCSA) because of this federation's reluctance to seriously apply itself to the
unionisation of african workers. The NUMARWOSA and UAW were thus
freed to participate in the movement that culminated in the founding of the
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979.12
The failure of the liaison committee system, the growing power of the
"independent" trade union movement that the formation of FOSATU
symbolised and the pressures emanating from employers to review the
industrial relations system culminated in the findings of the 1979 Wiehahn
Commission and subsequent amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act
on December 1st 1979. These amendments not only legalised the registration
of black trade unions, but by providing for the phasing out of job reservation
the infamous Job Reservation Determination Number 16 of 1968 was
summarily scrapped. White workers now had nothing except their racism to
defend themselves, and this they were to use to support the growth of right
wing political parties in Uitenhage - a political process that undermined the
hegemony of the National Party during the 1980s and pressurised local
National Party politicians into adopting aggressively racist and authoritarian
approaches towards black urbanisation.
The East Cape unions entered the new labour relations era with an advantage
most other unions were only to achieve by 1982, namely a base on the factory
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floor. 13 Because this was achieved by using a combination of strict workplace
bargaining, tight disciplined shop-floor organisation, strategic participation in
ICs and caution when it came to community politics, the NUMARWOSA-
UAW unions (that later merged to form the National Automobile and Allied
Workers Union [NAAWUD underpinned a strong "workerist" current in
FOSATU that stressed similar principles. 14 With its roots in moderate
"parallel unionism" during the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of the East Cape
motor unions were acutely aware of how much their organisational power
depended on adherence to these tactical principles. What they remained
unaware of, however, was how much the conditions of struggle had changed
by 1980. Instead of recognising the contingent nature of these tactics and
devising new ones to cope with new conditions, the old tactics were retained
and defended. In Uitenhage during 1979-80, this tendency translated itself into
a radical workerism where workplace and community struggles were
funneled through trade union organisations. However, in Port Elizabeth
during the same period, these unions were simply marginalised as mass
protest action and resistance took place under the leadership of community-
based organisations.
PORT ELIZABETH: FACTORIES, COMMUNITIES AND THE SCHOOLS
THE COMMUNITIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF PEBCO
Although a distinct break between the 1976 protests and the re-emergence of
generalised resistance in 1980 can be identified in most areas, this is
inapplicable in Port Elizabeth. Starting in 1976 with very badly organised
student-led demonstrations that targeted the "symbols of apartheid" for
extremely voluntaristic violent action, 15 a pattern of generalised unrest
continued well into 1978 that centred around the schools but soon spread as
township residents began organising around housing conditions. By 1979
local residents associations had formed in Zwide, Kwaford, and Thembalethu
and the beginnings of organisation were apparent in New Brighton,
Kwazakhele and Walmer. 16 These organisations provided the sub-structure
for what later became an umbrella body called the Port Elizabeth Black Civic
Organisation (PEBCO).
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Although the general housing shortage and apartheid planning affected all
residents, local residents associations formed around township specific
grievances. In Zwide grievances arose amongst residents who could not
afford the rentals for houses they had been moved into after their old houses
were demolished because they were too close to the white areas. 17 This forced
ECAB to lower the rentals and helped demonstrate that collective action
could yield improvements. In Kwazakhele organisation coalesced around the
fact that piped water had not been provided to the houses despite an eight
year old official promise to this effect. Other grievances were the threatened
demolition of 350 houses, high rentals and the fact that 3-4000 families were
forced to live in single men's hostels.18 In Kwaford - named after the
company that subsidised the construction of the township - the residents
association protested against abnormally high rent bills and electricity charges.
Once again this resulted in a lowering of the rent. In Walmer, organisation
developed around resistance to the threatened removal of the township
which had been designated a "black spot" since the 1960s. In Tembalethu,
high water accounts triggered protest action resulting in the withdrawal of
these accounts.19
In short, urban grievances related to specific administrative policies carried
out by the local state resulted in the formation of well organised residents
associations. Leading activists built these organisations on a door-to-door
basis thus linking "civic" grievances to long-term political demands. 20 This
new method of organisation was personified in the person of Thozamile
Botha, chairperson of the Zwide Residents Association (ZRA). Born into a
poor working class family from "White Location" in 1948, Botha attended
school in Port Elizabeth and then went to Fort Hare University to study the
arts in 1975. He left when the university closed down during the 1976 protests
and was detained in 1977. After his release he was employed by Ford as a
trainee draughtsman and became active in "civic politics". A man with
tremendous charisma and substantial intellectual abilities, Botha emerged as
Port Elizabeth's leader.21 He succeeded in combining through his own person
four critical elements: grassroots organisation amongst the urban poor, the
Black Consciousness persuasions of his generation, a working alliance with
the old ANC stalwarts and unionisation of the militant working class at Ford.
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Upon its formation in September, the ZRA executive decided to call a
meeting with Louis Koch, director of ECAB. Before doing so it met with the
Kwaford Residents Association to discuss strategy. After the meeting with
Koch where the demand for lower water bills was rejected, a public meeting
of all the residents organisations was called on October 10 and a decision was
reached to call a boycott of water charges. It was also decided to form an
umbrella organisation for all the residents associations and a "committee of
ten" was elected to draft a constitution. On October 30 a mass meeting of 9000
people met in the New Brighton Centenary Hall to adopt a constitution and
elect an executive. Port Elizabeth's social movement now had its organisation
and in Thozamile Botha, its charismatic leader.22
PEBCO leaders were careful to define their organisation as a "civic" and not a
political body, i.e. a body concerned with local township [read: "urban"] rather
than national political issues. This did not mean PEBCO did not lend its
support to national political issues - which it did, but referred to the fact that it
organised people around urban problems and negotiated with authorities on
these issues. Reflecting these commitments, PEBCO played a role in
formalising resistance in New Brighton, Kwazakhele and Walmer by
establishing residents associations in these townships.
The aims and objectives of PEBCO were outlined in the constitution as
follows:
"1) to fight for equal civic rights for all the people of Port Elizabeth;
2) to fight all discriminatory legislation enacted by the government and local
authorities;
3) to seek participation in decision-making on all matters affecting the people
of South Africa;
4) to fight for the granting of the right to blacks to buy land under freehold
title at any place of their choice; and
5) to resist any attempt, direct or indirect, to deprive blacks of their South
African citizenship."
Besides the workplace struggles which will be dealt with later, PEBCO's main
campaigns were resistance to the removal of Walmer, the Zwide rent's issue,
the housing shortage, educational grievances and the detention and banning
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of leaders. It also played a role in initiating organisation elsewhere in the
Eastern Cape, namely Uitenhage, Graaf Reinet, Cradock, Queenstown, East
London and Grahamstown. These initiatives planted the seeds of the Eastern
Cape civic movement that took off during 1983-86.
The complexity of PEBCO's ideology and the interests it represented reflects
the fluidity and shifts within black resistance at the time. As the general shift
from Black Consciousness to "charterism" was only just beginning to take
place during this period, new discourses and actors were emerging and
jostling for power with old. The PEBCO executive represented both
conservative middle class township interests and the radicalised working
class. Botha attempted to unite these forces under the rubric of militant
populism that emphasised common "civic" grievances. His language and
discourse borrowed heavily from the Black Consciousness lexicon and his
younger support-base was clearly influenced by this ideology. However, there
were also old ANC stalwarts and "charterist" oriented Congress of South
African Students members active in the upper echelons of PEBCO. As early as
1980 it was clear that this emerging highly capable congress-oriented
leadership was steadily consolidating a very different discourse in township
politics to that which had prevailed during the 1970s.23 In the end, it was the
personality of Botha that kept the movement together and this is why it
collapsed when Botha was detained in January. He was subsequently banned
and then forced into exile in May where he joined the ANC and got a
position on that organisation's National Executive Committee. This bears
testimony to the fact that he was by no means a Black Consciousness operator
while in Port Elizabeth and explains why he opposed the formation of an
AZAPO branch in the city in 1979.
Evans' sound assessment of PEBCO concludes that "events began to overtake
it [PEBCO] and problems had to be tackled by a leadership still relatively
immature."24 Nevertheless, PEBCO left its mark on black political culture. It
became identified with a new process of organisation: mass-based, oriented
around "civic" problems, non-racial, radical, participative and premised on
class alliances.
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THE FACTORIES: A CONTESTED TERRAIN
The Ford Strikes marked the turning point for industrial relations: for
community organisations, they pointed to the need to take workplace issues
seriously; for the unions they were a bitter lesson in how not to deal with the
militant working class; and for management and the state they were the birth
pangs of the new labour dispensation and a grim sign of things to come.
The story of the Ford Strikes revolves around events that took place in 1979 at
two of Ford's Port Elizabeth plants, the Cortina plant and the engine plant.
Both were located across the road from New Brighton township. The course
of events can be summarised as follows:25
* 31st October: 700 workers at the Cortina plant strike in
protest against the dismissal of Thozamile Botha and joint efforts by UAW
president Johnny Mke and Ford management to convince workers to
return to work fail;
* November 1st: Botha reinstated and strike continues;
* November 2nd: strike ends and all workers reinstated with full
pay;
* November 13th: most Cortina workers strike for one day in
protest against racist remarks from white foremen;
* November 14th: 300 workers at the engine plant down tools for
a while to discuss grievances;
* November 20th: 60 Cortina plant workers down tools in protest
against overtime requirements;
* November 21st: 700 Cortina workers plus 3 engine plant workers
(including Botha) strike in support of overtime demands;
* November 22nd: strikers pledge to continue the strike until
all demands have been met;
* November 23rd: Ford dismisses and pays off all 700 Cortina
plant workers;
* November 23rd: as a direct challenge to UAW, PEBCO forms an
affiliate to represent the Ford workers that becomes known as the Ford
Workers Committee (FWC);
* November 26th: Ford begins hiring new labour force while PEBCO
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organises employment boycott of Ford;
* November 28th onwards: the Ford dispute is
internationalised including action by Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson,
FWC-UAW conflict mount, key worker activists detained, Ford continues
re-employing workers;
* November 14th: Ford plants close down for Christmas season;
* January 7th: Ford opens with 357 workers, 244 being former
employees;
* January 9th: at a meeting attended by Ford management, FWC,
UAW and the United States Consul General from Cape Town, an
agreement was reached to reinstate all former employees;
* January 10th: PEBCO leadership detained signaling the
beginning of its demise.
These strikes are significant for one reason only: they were led by a
community-based leadership and resulted in the formation of a rival to the
FOSATU affiliates. Why this came about and how it happened had
important organisational and ideological ramifications for the national
oppositional movement as a whole. The irony is that worker
disillusionment with UAW was caused precisely by the strategy that had
made it one of the largest unregistered unions, namely careful workplace
organisation and strategic intervention in liaison committees and ICs.
Ford built the Cortina plant in 1973 and consciously decided to employ
exclusively african labour in contrast to the mixed-race workforce it employed
at other plants.26 The result was the employment of relatively young african
workers who had experienced the politicisation of education and township
life during the 1970s. 27 They brought with them an adherence to the Black
Consciousness ideology and in some cases Pan Africanist loyalties. A
generation younger than their counterparts at the engine plant and
unfamiliar with the difficulties union organisers had had to overcome
during the 1960s and 1970s, this new politicised workforce was extremely
intolerant of the stately, collaborative and legalistic style of the UAW
leadership.28 They rejected the need to participate in liaison committees and
ICs and showed no enthusiasm when the UAW organisers tried to organise
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the Cortina plant. Instead of establishing shop floor structures to deal with
this problem in creative and democratic ways, the UAW organisers were only
interested in signing up enough members to convince Ford management to
recognise the union. 29 The real leaders of the Cortina workers did not
participate in union elections or meetings. Their power-base and identity only
emerged much later in the decade when they emerged as activists in the local
residents associations, in PEBCO and then in the FWC. It was this leadership
that turned the FWC into the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers
Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) in September 1980 and it was around
MACWUSA that a militant community-linked union leadership in
Uitenhage emerged.
After NUMARWOSA and UAW merged to form NAAWU, the NAAWU -
MACWUSA "split" in East Cape unionism set the tone for national debates
between what became known as the conflict between "community-based
unionism" allied to the mainstream political movements and "industrial
unionism" that emphasised "workerist" concerns. 30 In reality, the roots of
the division in East Cape unionism lay in the racially divided working class
that had unique consequences in Port Elizabeth.31 Hoping to exploit this
division to hamper unionisation, Ford management unintentionally
imported politicised workers whose consciousness was shaped by township
grievances, political rightlessness and an aggressive psycho-iconoclastic
ideology that did indeed hamper unionisation, but not in the way Ford
management ever imagined.
Despite attempts by some FWC elements to make a case for entering
NAAWU,32 and despite criticism of UAW from within the labour
movement,33 the dye had been cast in Port Elizabeth. Political identities and
loyalties in many other centres were to determined accordingly. Labels such as
"populists" who do not care about workplace struggles and "workerists" who
ignore community problems abounded and shaped choices and conceptions
of strategy and tactics. Subsequent struggles in Cape Town, East London,
Durban and the East Rand reinforced the dichotomy. The organisational and
ideological consequences of the Ford Strikes directly affected alignments and
alliances in Uitenhage. But before we come to this, an account of the schools
boycotts is needed to complete the picture of protest in Port Elizabeth in 1980.
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THE SCHOOLS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW ALLIANCES
The pupils of Mountview High School, Cape Town, began boycotting classes
in March 1980. This started a schools boycott in 81 coloured schools that
subsequently triggered solidarity action in schools around the country,
including the coloured schools of Uitenhage. 34 The spread of the boycott to
the Eastern Cape's african schools not only linked educational struggles to
general community struggles, but created a movement whose leaders were
solidly within the "charterist" fold of the Congress of South African Students
(COSAS). The East Cape schools boycott, therefore, consolidated the
ascendance of "charterism" that PEBCO and Thozamile Botha began.
Particularly poor educational standards in the Eastern Cape explains the
commencement and subsequent persistence of the East Cape boycott for a
longer period than elsewhere in the country. These poor standards were
reflected in the fact that 60% of all matriculants in Port Elizabeth failed in
1979, compared to a 74,4% pass rate in the rest of the country. Only 26 of the
322 matriculants scored university exemption passes. This was a drastic
decline given that in 1978 only 21,6% of all matriculants failed and 40%
achieved university passes. 35 Educational authorities explained this declining
standard of education in terms of (1) a 50% increase in student enrollment
without a corresponding increase in educational expenditure; (2) township
unrest; and (3) the fact, to quote a Department of Education and Training
Official, that "effective instruction in classrooms appeared more the exception
than the rule". 36 Syllabi were only completed in 4 out of 11 Port Elizabeth
schools by the end of 1979.
The East Cape boycott in african schools began at Grahamstown's Nyaluza
High School on April 30th and soon spread to other schools in the area. By
the end of the first week in May, most of Grahamstown was out and had been
joined by Fort Hare. It was clear that tensions in many East Cape schools were
high and that it was a matter of time before the educational powder keg
exploded once again.37 By May 14 it looked as if the Grahamstown boycott
was over as a result of intensive lobbying and negotiations between parents,
teachers, education officials and student leaders. However, the short fuse of
discontent was re-kindled when a vigilante squad called the Peacemakers laid
into school boycotters leading ultimately to one of them being killed and
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mass arrests of pupils. As news of these events spread, student leaders met
over the next week and formulated a strategy. The schools boycott re-
commenced on May 19th in Port Elizabeth and as one observer put it,
"Eastern Cape black pupils were on the path to their long and bitter
confrontation with the authorities."38 Once again, despite repeated attempts
by parents committees to negotiate solutions, by July all schools in Port
Elizabeth-Uitenhage were deserted. This happened after police units entered
the schools and beat up pupils, killing one of them. Although student leaders
and parents agreed on a temporary suspension of the boycott in September,
police brutality and an official decision to close the schools rather than
negotiate prevented this from materialising. By the end of 1980, East Cape
pupils had lost another year of education.
The Committee of 41 was a committee of 41 representatives elected directly
by pupils in the 41. schools in the Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage area engaged in
the boycott. Its chairperson was Mkuseli Jack, a capable, charismatic, 20 year
old student leader from New Brighton. An impressive group of university
students - back in Port Elizabeth after the official closure of Fort Hare on May
20th - surrounded Jack. Devoting their attention to organising the schools
boycott while simultaneously working to build parents committees and
school committees to ensure close student-parent collaboration, this new
generation of young leaders were laying the foundations for sustained
grassroots organisation in their communities. Critical of the one-man
populism of Thozamile Botha and outside the internecine squabbling that
wracked the remains of PEBCO after Botha "skipped" in early May, these new
leaders were well placed to establish mass-based organisations that eventually
provided the United Democratic Front39 (UDF) with one its most sturdy
pillars of support. However, to do this they needed to survive the 1980
schools boycott which meant finding ways to end the boycott with dignity and
with the support of the parents. Although they had lost control of the boycott
by the end of 1980 because many were in detention or hiding, by February 1981
they were able to engineer through intermediaries an end to the boycott in
return for the release of some detainees.
In short, dismal educational standards, deteriorating township conditions and
mounting tensions in the factories as the new union movement flexed its
115
muscles, combined to turn Port Elizabeth into the epicentre of what was
eventually to become a powerful regional social movement. By linking these
struggles in mass-based organisations, Port Elizabeth's organisations were
helping to forge new conceptions of resistance and mobilisation during the
opening moments of the new decade. In the meantime similar alignments
were emerging in nearby Uitenhage, but this time under a very different
leadership and centred around workplace rather than community
organisation. With the above account of Port Elizabeth politics as background,
the contrasting patterns of mobilisation between the two centres can be
brought into relief and the significance of the Uitenhage experience
amplified.
COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS IN UITENHAGE
The Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO) was in many ways an
anomaly. It grew out of a PEBCO initiative in 1979 to establish a residents
association in Kwallobuhle called the Kwallobuhle Residents Association
(KRA), but culminated in the formation of UBCO under the direct leadership
of 'workerist' oriented FOSATU activists. This outcome reflected power
relations between the factories and townships in Uitenhage that reversed the
logic that produced the opposite outcome in Port Elizabeth: instead of weak
factory organisation and strong community structures as in the latter case, in
Uitenhage there were powerful factory structures and very weak community
organisations. Although workplace mobilisation will be dealt with later, this
section will attempt to develop a picture of how community organisation
developed in 1979-80.40
By 1980 tensions were mounting in Uitenhage's townships. The
underlying causes were housing shortages and the high cost and poor
quality of urban services. Bill Hickson of the local South African National
Tuberculosis Association said that Uitenhage was "rotten with TB". In July
1979 36 new TB cases were reported. Dickson said the high incidence of TB
in Uitenhage as compared to "other parts of the country" was directly related
to the severity of the housing shortage in Uitenhage.41
Like in Port Elizabeth, local activists used urban gr ievances to mobilise a
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support-base. On October 23rd, an interim committee was established to plan
the formation of what was to eventually become UBCO. According to one
leading organiser at the time:
"What we actually wanted to deal with was civic matters only.
Although you cannot separate the civic from politics, but we felt it
was strategic to fight for the right of our community through the
civic. The first problem we intended to tackle was the rent issue. Our
rent was too high. So we decided to organise the community and we
explained to them the situation."42
This conception of a "civic" was identical to that held by the PEBCO
leadership. Then, on 14th November 1979, Thozamile Botha spoke at a
meeting called to establish the Kwallobuhle Residents Association (KRA).43
This was consistent with the PEBCO strategy of establishing local associations
to underpin the township-wide umbrella organisation, i.e. UBCO in
Uitenhage's case. About 2000 people attended the meeting which was held in
St. Anne's Church Hall. Botha called for the "equal distribution of wealth
among all the peoples of Azania". He argued that the problem was not race
but "economic oppression". However, the economy depended on blacks and
there were shouts of "Amandla" when he said: "If we remove our labour and
our buying power, what will happen to the white man?" He called for unity
and criticised "cosmetic changes" on the grounds that whites made
concessions because "they want you to keep quiet". He argued that political
rights must be accompanied by "the need for economic liberation of the black
man". Botha went on to criticise the Urban Foundation and called it "a devil
bent on creating class divisions among the oppressed". Finally, Botha and
other speakers criticised the community councillors saying they were not
representative of the people. 44 The main decision at the meeting was to
oppose the high rentals in the townships.
Following several more rallies and mass meetings, it became clear that three
issues were of central concern to the residents: (a) high rentals, (b) opposition
amongst Langa residents to moving to new housing extensions in
Kwallobuhle because the rents there were higher than in the older parts of
the township,45 and (c) resistance to the proposed removal of Langa to
Kwallobuhle. A strategy to deal with these problems was formulated which
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involved a decision to negotiate with the ECAB authorities. After several
meetings with local officials, it became clear to UBCO that "in all these
instances they could not redress our grievances. Then we mobilised the
people."46
In short, UBCO went through the initial stages of grassroots mobilisation: the
expression of grievances, formation of an organisation, petitioning and
negotiation to bring problems to the attention of the authorities and then,
when this failed, the turn to mass organisation. 47 Many constituencies were
mobilised around the issues which affected them directly: pensioners who
were forced to queue up for hours to get their money each month; residents
opposed to high rents and removal; women around child-care issues and the
youth under the auspices of the "youth league". Because UBCO activists were
also shopstewards at Volkswagen, and given that this factory employed most
employed workers, it is not surprising that much of the community
organising was actually done in the factory. "That is where the idea started",
said one informant, "because at Volkswagen we could explain to the people
our objectives and we could organise." Specific shop steward meetings of
Volkswagen workers were called to discuss community problems. 48 From
these meetings, workers would be dispatched to different parts of the
township to organise meetings to discuss community problems. These
meetings usually took place on Sundays in houses and then once a month a
mass meeting would be held which was announced with loudhalers.49
Decentralised structures were established that were similar to what became
known later on as the "street committees".50 Although they were not given
this name, informants said they amounted to small house meetings of all
those in a particular neighbourhood or zone. These meetings were
particularly successful in Langa. 51 The organisational power UBCO attempted
to generate this way was directed into a boycott of shops owned by local
government councillors. In this way pressure was brought to bear on the local
state to redress popular grievances.
Volkswagen workers also tried to organise a "worker's culture". They did this
by forming dart clubs in the townships because, as one UBCO leader put it,
"for darts you need an education, you need to be able to count and have
judgment". 52 This could not express more clearly the centrality of the
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established skilled and semi-skilled worker in the whole NAAWU-UBCO
project. This is the actor that had traditionally molded a "working class
culture and politics" in industrial societies and in Uitenhage, this process was
well under way by the end of 1980 complete with its own political ideology,
cultural clubs and general strike (see next section).
Although all informants agreed that UBCO did achieve some success in
organising the community at grassroots level, all was not well amongst the
leadership. UBCO was initiated before the Ford Strikes. By the time the Port
Elizabeth divisions had been packaged into ideological categories and
disseminated, the UBCO executive had been formed and included what later
emerged as two opposing ideological positions, the FOSATU "workerists" and
congress "populists".
Unlike in Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage's unionists - particularly the Volkswagen
shopstewards - felt their factory base was strong enough to support their
move into community politics. Instead of leaving UBCO to the "populists",
the unionists contested and won top executive positions. The biographical
characteristics of this group are significant: they were mostly skilled or semi-
skilled workers; came from fully urbanised stable backgrounds; were
relatively well educated and fairly fluent in english; and their ages ranged
from late twenties to late thirties. Unconnected to the ANC traditions of the
fifties and excluded from the student protests of the mid-1970s, these workers
- like their contemporaries on the East Rand 53 concentrated on building
"worker power" on the shop floor. They tackled community problems only if
this was a logical extension of workplace struggle and if their factory base
could be strengthened in the process. In the final analysis, it was the strength
of union organisation at Volkswagen that made it possible for unionists to
enter township politics and because of the pervasive dominance of this
factory, the shopsteward elite at Volkswagen emerged to dominate all union
and community structures. At the centre of this elite was John Gomomo - -
charismatic, shrewd, skillful, powerful and a brilliant organiser. With his
power-base apparently secure, he and his comrades came to share Freddie
Saul's interpretation of the after-effects of the Ford Strikes:
"The workers will decide what interest is paramount to them
and what should be pursued by any party political organisation.
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But at this point, I think we are operating in a dangerous area
where there's a lot of politicisation, where black nationalist
ideologies dominate. The people who are practical realise that to
get workers united, you need to work in the union movement -
and our prime objective is to build solidarity and proceed step by
step to improve on the demands of the workers. The danger is
where, like the Ford situation, workers can be motivated on
party political issues, but what do they achieve and how do they
benefit?."54
In short, this classic statement of so-called "workerism" accurately suited the
organisational power-base, interests and values represented in the
Volkswagen dominated union, community and cultural structures in
Uitenhage. Strategies, tactics and ideas were shaped by workplace organisation
and extended outwards to the community. Alliances with other community-
based organisations were unnecessary. Not surprisingly, this tightly organised
exclusive leadership soon created its enemies and opposition. This did not
come from a rival source of power within the community context, but rather
emanated from leadership groupings in the union movement itself who
used the ideological rivalry generated by the Ford Strikes to justify the
formation of a separate organisational project.
The NAAWU-UBCO rival coalesced around two men: Ficks Kobese who
worked at Goodyear and felt excluded from the Volkswagen elite, and Emson
Banda, a salesman at a clothing firm in central Uitenhage. Banda was born in
1950 in Uitenhage into a family of 11 children. His schooling was uneven
because the farmer who employed his father on a farm near Kirkwood
insisted on the children working and refused them permission to attend
school regularly. In 1968 Banda's eldest brother died and he had to give up
school altogether to help his family. He got a job in a clothing shop and
remained in its employ until he was badly assaulted by vigilantes in 1987.
The formation of MACVVUSA in later 1980 provided Kobese with an
opportunity to challenge the Gomomo leadership. Resigning his position as
secretary of the Uitenhage branch of NAAVVU, Kobese established a
MACWUSA branch in Uitenhage. Using an array of arguments to justify his
break with FOSATU - ranging from a critique of workerism to accusations
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that NAAWU was organisationally ineffective as a union - Kobese built an
organised worker support-base in Goodyear. Unlike the NAAWU
leadership, the MACWUSA leadership at Goodyear comprised younger
more politicised workers, many of whom had links with the emerging
student and community organisations. It was logical for Banda to join this
group because he knew that his network of organised commercial workers
in town had no place in NAAWU.55 After joining MACWUSA, he said "I
was organising to make trade unions active at the supermarkets, dry
cleaners and all the town's small business places".56
By joining MACWUSA, Kobese - who was on the UBCO executive - and
Banda who helped out in the UBCO office, identified themselves with a
strong anti-FOSATU movement and in so doing effectively challenged the
UBCO leadership. After failing to win a power struggle within UBCO, they
resigned and formed a rival body called Save the Starting Community (SSC).
The SSC immediately began organising a constituency the NAAWU-UBCO
leadership ignored, namely the unemployed. It is worth quoting Banda's
description of what he did:
"[The SSC] had an executive. I was the chairman. We had field
workers who went door-to-door with a survey. They got
information from the owner of that house about
unemployment, what accounts he got and all that. This was
done in Kwallobuhle and Langa, but it was strong in
Kwallobuhle. We also thought of the pensioners every three
months. By the time the third month came, there was no food,
nothing. We gave food to pensioners monthly and
unemployed people weekly. We started writing letters to the
factories that produce food and the East Cape Chamber of
Commerce. We got donations of food and money and made up
food parcels and we also collected old clothes from people and
gave them out."57
This strategy was extremely effective and soon led to the decline of UBCO's
influence in the community. It also paved the way for the formation in 1983
of the Uitenhage Youth Congress(UYCO) that came to represent a wide range
of community interests, but under the leadership of a remarkably capable and
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articulate leadership of young workers, unemployed school and tertiary
institution graduates who also commanded a considerable support-base
amongst the more marginalised largely illiterate unemployed. By 1984,
MACWUSA, the SSC and UYCO were the primary opposition to government
bodies in Uitenhage. They were solidly within the national democratic camp
represented by the UDF and extremely critical of FOSATU which was
regarded as "workerist" and unsympathetic to the problems of workers in the
community.
Although it would appear from the above account of the evolution of the
SSC-MACWUSA-UYCO movement that the contours of ideological
development replicated the workplace-community divisions that had
evolved in Port Elizabeth, this apparent similarity belies three important
facts:
* firstly, it ignores the way the union leadership did make an attempt to
organise the community through UBCO in a way that is not evident in
the Port Elizabeth case;
* secondly, the divisions between coloured and african workers in
Uitenhage were not nearly as severe as they were in Port Elizabeth, a
phenomenon that has much to do with the different patterns of
urbanisation and urban development in the two cities;
* thirdly, the militant general strikes that hit Uitenhage in 1980 were
responsible for creating the space and organisational context for the
growth of community mobilisation during the early- to mid-1980s - it
was this historical connection that led to a community- and workplace-
based social movement during the mid-1980s that was built around a
common interest between unions and community organisations in a
negotiated non-racial and affordable urban system that suited the needs
of the marginalised and employed working people (see Chapters 7 and
8).
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UNIONISATION IN UITENHAGE AND THE 1980 GENERAL STRIKE
The unionisation of Uitenhage's employed workers was heavily dependent
on the central role of the union leadership in the giant R120 million
Volkswagen plant that employed about 6000 people in 1980. The next largest
was Goodyear that employed 2000 in 1980. With an economically active
population Uitenhage as a whole of about 30 000 people in 1980,
Volkswagen's central role in the city's economic and labour history was not
surprising.
In 1980, three unions represented workers at VW in Uitenhage: Yster en Staal
that represented 72,4% of the 1080 white workers, NUMARWOSA
represented 77,7% of the 1620 coloured workers and UAW represented 58,9%
of the 3300 african workers58.
Like many other industries in South Africa, wages and working conditions
were negotiated in Industrial Councils (IC). The IC for the Eastern Cape motor
industry essentially involved the three unions and the three major
employers, namely Ford, Volkswagen and General Motors. Agreements
reached in the IC were binding in law and conflict resolution mechanisms
were managed by the IC. Wage negotiations invariably revolved around the
calculated Household Subsistence Level (HSL) for Uitenhage as determined
by the University of Port Elizabeth. The HSL was the cost of the most basic
basket of goods that an african family of 6 or a coloured family of 5 would
need to barely survive above the poverty datum line. The HSL plus 50%,
however, was regarded as the Household Effective Level (HEL), i.e. the basic
minimum required by a family to ensure a decent living and long-term
reproduction. The HEL was regarded by the European Economic Commission
guidelines for European employers in South Africa as the yardstick for
evaluating the adequacy of wage levels.
Eastern Cape motor manufacturers were proud of their record as employers
who paid relatively high wage levels as compared to Transvaal employers in
the motor manufacturing sector. Eastern Cape rates were 117c per hour in
September 1978 as compared to 82c in the Transvaal, and 129c per hour in
August 1979 as compared to 92c in the Transvaal. The IC agreement that came
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October '75 R118,18 R103,80
October '76 R126,94 R119,37
Sept. 77 R130,59 R134,94
January '78 R136,47 R136,67
May '78 R136,56 R138,40
August '78 R137,56 R147,05
April '79 R151,83 R157,43
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into effect in February 1978 was valid for 18 months with an unwritten
agreement that it would be reviewed - not adjusted - every six months. The
wage levels that this was intended to promote over 5 years were as follows:
TABLE 2.1: WAGE LEVELS IN THE PORT ELIZABETH-UITENHAGE AREA
A new IC negotiated agreement came into effect on August 1979 that
provided for a minimum R1 per hour wage increasing to R1,15 per hour by
February 1980. This meant that the net pay of someone working 43 hours per
week was R218,74 when the HSL was R169,72 for that month; or R254.58 if
this was used to calculated the HEL. VW, however, added in the value of
meal subsidies, transport levies and medical aid in order to increase the basic
minimum wage to R271,60, or 60% above the HSL or 10% above the HEL. The
assumptions underlying the HSL and HEL calculations were, however,
mistrusted by union leaders and members.
In addition to improved wages, VW also implemented extensive training
programmes aimed at black staff. This, however, could not keep up with the
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very rapid rate of employment growth that was taking place in order to meet
the growing demands stimulated by the 1979-1982 boom. The Industrial
Relations Director reflected on the consequences of labour expansion when
he said:
"Most of these new employees are young blacks who have never
worked in a factory before, and I can't say we are doing a good job of
introducing these new people to the industrial environment. The
object is simply to get in as many people in the shortest possible
time."59
The boom, however, was accompanied by rising prices at a rate of about 12%
that rising wages could not always keep up with.
The first indications of tension emerged in May 1980 when wildcat strikes
broke out amongst small groups of workers on the 23 and 26 May and 9 June.
Although there were other grievances expressed, the striking workers
demanded R2 an hour minimum wages. With talk of general strikes for a
living wage rippling through the workforce, and the departure for the United
States of key shop steward John Gomomo in early June, the scene was set for
the 12 June IC negotiations. All this, in turn, was taking place within a
countrywide context of rising mobilisation within the communities. The
schools boycotts described in a previous section provided a focus for
community actions that were coupled in some cases to strike actions in the
workplace. With the 16 June coming up, it was clear to all involved that local
and naticinal tensions were coming to a head.
Without going into the details, a joint employer offer at the 12 June
negotiations was rejected by all three unions in favour of more substantial
increases and less job restructuring. The employers wanted a speedy
settlement on increases that did not exceed the 10,5% limit they had budgeted
for. The unions, however, tabled proposals that would have resulted in 13,5%
increases. Agreement was not reached and negotiations shifted to the plant
level.
The NUMARWOSA and UAW unions had arranged a report back meeting
for Sunday 15 June. However, this meeting was banned by the authorities and
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enforced by the police. With no way of getting a mandate to continue with
negotiations while workers continued to work, the union leaders were
catapulted into a conflict that they never planned for.
Although the black and coloured workers reported for duty on the morning
of the 16th June - the 4th anniversary of the Soweto Uprising, by 8am they
had begun to congregate on the lawn outside the Managing Director's Office.
Eventually, 4000 workers had gathered. The union leadership were powerless
because the crowd said they wanted a report from management, not from the
shop stewards. The shop stewards, in turn, informed a worried management
that the workers wanted R2 an hour. After attempts by management and
union leaders to explain things to the crowd, it eventually broke up into
grumbling smaller groups who trickled off the site after agreement was
reached to hold a mass meeting at VW the next morning.
On Tuesday 17th, the mass meeting took place and after being addressed by
Freddie Sauls, dispersed with the assurance from the union that their
demand for R2 an hour before returning to work would be put to the
management. Subsequent meetings with management resolved nothing.
Instead, management informed workers the next day that the plant was
closed until further notice.
By Tuesday the strike had begun to spread to other factories. Workers at HeIla
where 80% of the workforce was coloured women went on strike over R2 an
hour living wage demands. They were joined by workers at SKF that
afternoon.
In all cases where strike action broke out, the union leadership seemed out of
control and unable to get workers back to work while negotiations proceeded.
Instead, the workers left their plants and marched through Uitenhage's CBD
singing freedom songs and raised clenched fists. When they walked past the
union offices, some of the crowd jeered at the premises in an apparent gesture
of disgust. In the townships police clashed with youths and like in 1977 when
the students and gangs went on the rampage, the acrid biting smell of teargas
once again drifted across the township.
The strike continued through the 18th and police clashed with workers at
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certain factories and in the streets. Workers at least three more factories
joined the three already on strike, including at Goodyear, Borg Warner, and
M. jeeva and Sons. At the same time african and coloured schools were on
full-scale boycotts with no resolution in sight. As tension mounted and police
reinforcements were brought in, Uitenhage was declared an emergency area
which effectively gave the security forces carte blanche to secure the area,
including control over access to information about what was happening by
restricting journalists from having access to the area.
As far as the managers, police and press were concerned, the strike was a pre-
planned political action enforced through intimidation and aimed at forcing a
conflict around an unrealisable R2 per hour wage demand in order to focus
attention on foreign investment in South Africa and extend the political
influence of PEBCO and UBCO in the union sphere. Radio Xhosa accused the
strike of furthering the aims of the ANC. Meetings and formal and informal
contacts between managers, police and the press soon consolidated this
general strategic position that was premised on a conspiratorial analysis and
as is common with this kind of analysis, more is ascribed to the powerful and
ominous intentions of the leadership than to the self-activity of ordinary
people angered by their poverty and politicised by their local and national
environment.
By Friday, management had lost control of the situation to the police. This
meant that negotiation processes to resolve the conflict were difficult to
arrange, strike levels rose and conflict in the townships intensified. Over 8000
workers at twelve establishments were affected by strikes by Friday, including
the municipality. However, it was also payday. This meant that workers
congregated at their factories to get their pay, but because the factories were
closed, they got their pay and then marched back in their thousands through
Uitenhage's CBD to Kabah whereupon the marchers were attacked by police
who used birdshot, teargas and hand grenades to disperse the crowd. By the
end of the week, the police had extended the news blockout to include the
whole town - probably the first time, one journalist noted, that this had
happened to a whole town.
While conflict continued, negotiations resumed on Tuesday 24. Employers
offered R1.40 per hour, increasing at six monthly intervals to R2 per hour by
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January 1982. At a mass meeting of VW employees on 26 June, the employer
offer was rejected outright. Workers voted to continue with the strike.
Management, in turn, decided willy nilly to reopen the plant on Friday 27
June. This proved to be a complete failure as only 96 coloured workers and 10
african workers reported for duty.
By the beginning of the third week of Uitenhage's general strike, two things
were very clear. Firstly, employers were divided with some choosing to settle
quickly on higher than standard wage rates (e.g. SKF), some decided simply to
fire-and-rehire (Goodyear), others to call the police (He11a) and others adopted
a wait-and-see approach (e.g. VW due to the fact that it was under the
international spotlight in Germany). Secondly, unlike during the Port
Elizabeth strikes the previous year, the FOSATU unions managed to retain
the political leadership of the movement instead of losing it to political-cum-
community groups. This had much to do with the fact that the movement
was jointly driven by coloured and african workers, many of whom lived in
mixed areas or in close proximity to one another in and around Kabah.
By the end of the third week, employers that had adopted a compromise-and-
settle position and those that adopted hard-line fire-and-rehire positions
early on in the strike were beginning to get back into full production. Heavy-
handed police action coupled to detentions of union leaders helped to
intimidate workers in many factories into returning to work. The strike at
VW, however, continued. VW employers were instructed by their German
HQ not to fire their employees - a response that had much to do with pressure
from the powerful IG Metal, Germany's biggest trade union. To reinforce the
role of the international unions, a representative of the 15 million strong
International Metalworkers Federation arrived in South Africa to assist the
FOSATU unions. VW management were terrified that he may provide the
unions with valuable information about VVV's finances that could, in turn,
have buttressed the "living wage" demand.
With IC negotiations planned for Friday 4 July, positions began to move. The
unions obliquely indicated the possibility of settling for R1.60 per hour and
management was coming under international pressure to follow the example
of SKF, i.e. to agree on R1.60. In the meantime, more workers began turning
up for work and unions began to worry about retaining the support of
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coloured workers. The dissipation of the general strike substantially
weakened the VW workers who were the first to strike and stayed out the
longest.
Agreement was reached at the IC negotiations on 4 July that workers should
return to work and in return employers agreed to accept in principle the
"living wage" concept. Further negotiations were arranged for the following
Tuesday. After the workers returned to work as agreed on Monday, an
agreement was reached at the Tuesday negotiations on R1.45 per hour, a
service bonus of 3 cents/hour minimum and an investigation into what
constituted a "decent living wage". The agreement was formally accepted at a
meeting of the IC on 15 July after the unions got a mandate of support from
the workers.
CONCLUSION
Although the 1980 General Strike ended well in that workers managed to
win the principle of a living wage, it also ended badly in that the combined
power of the employers, police and press was too much for the unions and
workers. In addition, the free hand that the police enjoyed in the townships
underlined the need for strong community organisation. As a result, during
the months and years that followed the General Strike, unionisation escalated
and prepared the way for the merging of NUMARWOSA and UAW to create
the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU). Over time,
more flexible and less conflictual approaches to industrial bargaining
emerged.
The General Strike contained the seeds of an organisational approach that
subsequently became accepted practice both inside and outside the workplace
in Uitenhage, namely mass organised action around popular demands,
coupled to ongoing and direct negotiations. The existence and maturation of
this approach in the workplace prepared the leadership with organisational
and negotiation skills that were to be used for very different purposes later
on.
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CHAPTER 3
URBANISATION, LOCAL POLITICS AND THE RE-MAKING OF LANGA
INTRODUCTION
South Africa's unique pattern of urban development has been the subject
of extensive scrutiny by sociologists, planners, anthropologists, historians
and public administration analysts. 1 A spate of recent edited collections
has brought together some of the best writing on the subject. 2 The central
issue at stake in all this writing is how best to explain the evolution of the
South African urban system and its various elements. This is no mean
feat because of the enormous complexity of a system that evolved as a
result of a costly, bureaucratically driven and repressive combination of
initiatives that affected where people were born, where and how they were
educated, where and how they lived, where and who they worked for,
what their labour power was worth, how they recuperated their health,
where and how they got old and eventually died and, after that, where
they could be buried. As an exercise in social engineering, the construction
of urban apartheid must rank in the same class as the numerous great
experiments that purposively attempted to create in reality an ideal image
of urban living - from Haussman's Paris, to Peter the Great's. St.
Petersburg, to Robert Moses' New York and onward to the incarnations of
Le Corbusier's one dimensional urban modernism from Atlanta to
Brazilia.3 But unlike the cases referred to here where the search for
modernism masked the domineering drive by the world's urban
bourgeoisie to mold the cities in ways that suited their image of 'modern
living', the South African city - the apartheid city - was consciously
portrayed by the urban middle class and those who controlled the state at
central and local level as a racial project. The debate, therefore, has
essentially revolved around two issues: Was it the logic of race or class
domination that explains the apartheid city? And did the final
manifestation of the apartheid city accord with what the state intended it
to be?
As the debate has progressed through structural functionalist ("urbanism'
will stabilise as modernisation takes its course' 4), Marxist reductionism
('the city reflects the logic of capital's labour requirements 13) and liberal
economistic paradigms ('the non-racial economically rational logic of the
market will undermine the irrationality of race-based development' 6 ), it
133
has become increasingly clear that although grand concepts like class, race
and state help outline general trends, they are less than useful when it
comes to comprehending the complexity of specific urban dynamics. This
is why terms of a different order and history have emerged, namely
locality, specificity and contingency. It is this approach that emerges most
centrally in the recent works of urban geographers,7 sociologists,8
economists9 and political scientists. 10 It is an approach that informs the
analysis provided in this chapter.
In essence, this chapter will start with an outline of the evolution of
Uitenhage's urban geography. This provides the backdrop for an
understanding of the institutional development of black local
government and how this created a local black political elite whose
interests lay in a pattern of urban development that did not accord with
either the bureaucratic interests that represented the central state, or the
local white political interests rooted in Uitenhage's white community. It
was these contradictions that laid the foundations for the emergence of
Langa township.
UITENHAGES URBAN GEOGRAPHY
Black urbanisation in Uitenhage dates back to the mid-c.19th. By the 1920s,
Africans resided in four proclaimed 'locations': Kabah, Doornhoek, Gubbs,
and Oatlands situated respectively to the north, west, south and east of the
centre of Uitenhage (see map 1.2). The population by 1936 was 6588
Africans, 4334 coloureds and 9437 whites. 11 This demographic position
was arrived at after a period of high countrywide urbanisation rates, but
with the highest rates experienced in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region
and surrounding areas. Whereas 58,9% of Africans in this region resided
in rural areas in 1921, this had fallen to 26,7% in 1936. Given that gender
ratios in the urban communities were equalised during the period, it
follows that the urbanising Africans in this region were not single sex
migrants as was the case in a number of other localities. 12 This pattern of
relatively early 'urban stabilisation' is significant for an understanding of
the subsequent history of urban control and social movement resistance to
these controls.
Kabah was located in an area that was later to become known as Langa and
was the largest of the 'locations' that housed Uitenhage's African
population during the 1920s and 1930s. It had electric street lights, central
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water hydrants and daily rubbish removal from central points. 13 Like
similar settlements elsewhere in the country (e.g. Sophiatown, Lady
Selborne, Top Location, Duncan Village, Dukatole, etc), these inner-city
african urban settlements were the product of paternalistic white local
government policies and the home of a lively developing urban culture
rooted in survival and adaptation. 14 Conditions in the other 'locations'
were worse than in Kabah. The number of self-built structures increased,
services were rudimentary to non-existent, health conditions were very
poor, and officials found it difficult to collect rent and service charges.15
As urbanisation continued and unemployment rose and conditions
declined, the Uitenhage Municipality began considering alternative
options. After first applying in 1933 for the application of influx controls in
terms of the notorious Urban Areas Act of 1923 (as amended) to control in-
migration and the settlement of unemployed people, officials began
working on plans to reorganise the locations. These plans essentially
involved the demolition of the three smaller locations and the removal
of the population to Kabah. 16 Part of the plan was to separate the
coloureds living in the three smaller locations from their african brethren
and to relocate them to an area in Kabah designated for coloureds. This
would have brought Uitenhage in line with the requirements of the
Urban Areas Act.17
Although numerous measures taken by the Uitenhage Municipality
during the 1930s succeeded in running down the three smaller locations
and relocating the people in Kabah, by the mid-1940s officials were still
dealing with an extremely overpopulated Kabah township where
development had failed to take place as planned. This prompted the
Uitenhage Municipality into taking certain strategic steps. These steps
included the permanent settlement of urbanised Africans in sub-economic
housing with freehold title, 18 as well as a proposal to demolish all
residential buildings in Kabah on the grounds that they were unhygenic,
that there was inadequate room for expansion, that coloureds and Africans
were too inter-mingled, and that the location was too close to the white
areas. The result was a proposal to remove Kabah to an area known as
Sandfontein, east of the town centre)- 9
 No decisive action was taken,
however, during the war years.
After the war and the coming to power of the Nationalist Party
Government in 1948, a national policy framework began to be put in place
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that favoured much stricter racial segregation of different racial groups
living in the urban areas. It was in this context that the Uitenhage
Municipality revisited the problem of what to do about Kabah. The
renowned Johannesburg town planner T.B. Floyd was retained as a
consultant. Like his work elsewhere in the Transvaal, Floyd's town
planning prescriptions were premised on racial and spatial principles that
were precursors to what would later be inscribed in the Group Areas Act,
namely strict residential segregation on racial grounds. Floyd was critical
of Kabah because it was not separated by a buffer zone from the white
areas, it was not adjacent to the employment areas in the south east which
meant Africans were required to walk through town from the north to get
to work, and it mixed together coloureds and Africans. He therefore
proposed that Kabah be retained for coloureds and that Africans be
relocated to Sandfontein in the east where they should be housed in sub-
economic housing and work as unskilled labour in the nearby factories.20
Although it initially accepted Floyd's town planning scheme, the
Uitenhage Municipality rescinded this decision and decided in 1945 to
upgrade Kabah via a comprehensive sub-economic housing scheme- a
policy framework that was developed and pushed through by white liberal
politicians in control of the 'native affairs' administration.21
Taking advantage of the funds provided by the newly created National
Housing and Planning Commission, the Uitenhage Municipality
approved a scheme in 1947 for the erection of 320 semi-detached houses in
an extension of Kabah called McNaughton. The longer-term aim was to
build 2000 semi-detached units (i.e. 4000 dwellings) for Africans. However,
the quid pro quo was to ensure alignment with the Urban Areas Act by
removing coloureds from Kabah. Hence, in a separate scheme located
closer to town, 100 sub-economic units were planned for coloureds.
Although this was vigorously opposed by the coloured political
leadership, promises of voluntary relocation with financial incentives
pacified the protesters. 22 It was this plan that the Uitenhage Municipality
thought would stabilise the african workforce, segregate off the coloured
community and prepare Uitenhage for what it thought would be the
paternalistic segregated future envisaged by United Party Government (led
by Jan Smuts), complete with financial subsidies to make things happen
and freehold title for Africans. In the end, however, this Faganite vision
for Uitenhage was not to be realised.23
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In the meantime, as indicated in Chapter 1, it was after the war that
Uitenhage's local economy changed from being an agricultural processing
and service centre to a growth centre for the motor industry. The
economic growth that ensued was a major stimulus for further
urbanisation. Whereas the african population was 6588 in 1936, this grew
to 10016 in 1946 and then to 16942 by 1951. Between 1936 and 1946 the
population increased by 3,4.% per annum, and between 1946 and 1951 the
increase was 8,2% per annum. As far as the coloured population was
concerned, it increased from 4334 in 1936, to 4958 in 1946 and 7161 in 1951.
The white population increased from 9437 to 11015 to 14272 during the
same period.24 With increased investment and growth and these levels of
urbanisation, it is not surprising that the urban policy of the Uitenhage
Municipality right up into the 1950s tended to support residential
stabilisation within a segregationist framework, including even the
scrapping of influx controls. 25 However, even though strongly supported
by employers keen on having their labour properly housed, the Uitenhage
municipality never had the resources nor the will to commence a large-
scale mass housing programme commensurate with the principles of its
Faganite urban policies.
The Nationalist Party Government moved quickly to ensure that its
Sauerite urban policies were implemented. The combination of the
amended Urban Areas Act, Group Areas Act and Population Registration
Act and associated regulations fundamentally changed the nature of the
game in all urban areas, but especially in Uitenhage where a consolidated
Faganite urban policy could have been implemented if there was a United
Party Central Government to complement the political orientation of the
United Party-controlled Uitenhage Municipality. Instead, like many other
United Party controlled local governments, the Uitenhage Municipality
was faced with the prospect of being the implementing agents of an urban
policy devised by the Nationalist Party Government and in so doing it
would have had to cut across the delicately balanced matrix of political,
social and economic interests at the local level.
In practical terms, implementing the new urban policy in Uitenhage
effectively meant reversing many of the plans and schemes that
Uitenhage's officials had been developing since the war. Whereas the new
policy required separate residential areas for coloureds, Africans and
whites with each area separated by an adequate buffer zone, Uitenhage was
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faced with an existing situation where coloureds and Africans lived
together in Kabah; coloureds, Africans and poor whites lived together in
the poorer sections of Uitenhage; and the new coloured area that was
about to be built across the road from Kabah was unacceptable to central
government because it was only across the street from Kabah and not
properly separated by a decently sized buffer zone. 26 Throughout the early-
to mid-1950s, squabbles and tensions between on the one hand various
central government departments (the new Commissioner for Coloured
Affairs, Native Affairs Department and the Land Tenure Advisory Board),
and the Uitenhage Municipality on the other over the application of
central government's urban policy effectively prevented forward
movement with respect to both the Uitenhage Municipality's Faganite
strategies and the Central government's Sauerite strategies.27
Under pressure from Indian and Chinese business interests and the
coloured community, the Uitenhage Municipality resolved in 1953 to defy
central government by deciding not to actively implement the Group
Areas Act provisions. However, it was also under enormous pressure
from industrial employers to initiate housing schemes for black workers,
schemes which themselves needed the approval of the agencies that the
Municipality had resolved not to cooperate with. When it came to
resisting the Group Areas Act, what was at stake was the economic
interests of Indian and Coloured business who together owned a sizable
chunk of ratable property, as well as the fact that Indians and Coloureds
were still enfranchised at the local level in the Cape at that time and
therefore had votes that were crucial for United Party Councillors faced
with electoral challenges from the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party. 28 No
such economic and political considerations existed when it came to african
interests, other than the housing demands of employers.
In July 1957 the Uitenhage Municipality was informed by the Chief Native
Commissioner for the Eastern Cape that no financial support for housing
development would be provided unless and until the residential pattern
conformed to the requirement for 500 yard buffer strips between the
residential areas of different racial groups. Besides squeezing it between
the housing demands of employers and the urban policy priorities of the
central government, this presented the Uitenhage Municipality with a
serious practical problem because it had never got round to clearing the
buffer zones - an intended neglect on the part of liberal councillors in
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control 'native administration'. In addition, large numbers of squatters
had moved in over the previous 5 years. Since 1952 the population of
Kabah had swelled from 2000 to 11100 and the number dwellings from 300
to 1200.
To resolve Uitenhage's problem, the Chief Native Commissioner bluntly
suggested the wholesale removal of Kabah to an area south of Uitenhage
and the reproclamation of Kabah as a coloured area. When this was
rejected by the Council on the grounds that it was impractical, he
immediately made applicable to Uitenhage the onerous financial
provisions of the Native Services Levy Act - these levies were payable by
employers to finance black housing and collectable by local government.
This, in turn, prompted a policy change that led the Uitenhage
Municipality to resolve to purchase a farm south of Uitenhage as a site for
the relocation of Kabah. Its only motive was financial: if keeping Kabah
was going to be costly to employers and the ratepayers, and if central
government was willing to subsidise the development of a newly located
african township, then the choice was very clearly to go along with what
the Chief Native Commissioner wanted. After further financial incentives
were provided, the Uitenhage Municipality formally resolved in January
1961 to remove Kabah to the newly acquired site. 29 By July they were
discussing proposals with the Group Areas Board on using the Kabah site
(when it was eventually vacated) for coloured development and a year
later the Municipality was fully involved in discussions to apply the
Group Areas plan to Uitenhage as a whole. The quid pro quo from central
government was to declare a portion of the commercial area a "free trade
zone" in order to allow the Indian and Chinese businessmen to continue
doing business, and substantial financial incentives for Uitenhage's urban
restructuring. It took six years of preparation until, in October 1967, 
Uitenhage as a whole was declared a pure apartheid town when it was
formally proclaimed in terms of the Group Areas Act.30
The forced removal of the century old community of Kabah began a year
later to an area that was called Kwallobuhle - "place of beauty". Unlike
Kabah, this was to be a well planned classic apartheid township located on
the periphery of the white town and safely behind a hill. As for the
employers, their labour was about to get housing for no extra cost and the
white ratepayers were saved from paying for it all because of sizable grants
from central government. And as far as the Indian and coloured middle
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class was concerned, they got their businesses protected and were provided
with exclusive middle class residential areas, complete with financial
compensation and freehold title.
Although the forced removals began in 1968, it was not a simple one-off
process. Instead, a series of removals took place in 1972, 1979, 1981 and
then finally in 1986. The reasons for this were numerous and inter-linked
and included the following: the messy disentangling of the coloured and
african communities as the state attempted to convert Kabah into a
coloured Group Area without adequate funds to do the job in a way that
compensated everyone for their various property losses ; the relatively
slow pace of development at Kwallobuhle that failed to keep up with the
rate of urbanisation; the massive growth during the 1960s of the motor
industry in Uitenhage that drew into Uitenhage increasing numbers of
working class families who tended to infiltrate the 'coloured' areas in
their search for accommodation; and then finally the impact of a new set
of political interests represented in the post-1976 local government
institutions that were created by the state as one response to the build-up
of resistance to the implementation of Grand Apartheid in South Africa's
towns and cities. It is this latter process that is the subject of the next
section of this paper.
THE CHANGING LOCAL STATE AND THE RE-MAKING OF LANGA
The first major removal of Langa's residents took place in 1968 when the
first houses began to be built in Kwallobuhle. This, however, was
incomplete because not everyone moved 31 - only those closest to the
white areas were moved.
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Another removal took place in 1972. On this occasion, 2000 Kabah
households were relocated. By this stage all african houses had been
demolished between 1st and 19th avenues and the residents removed to
Kwallobuhle (see map 3.2) However, between 1972 and 1985, shacks began
to re-emerge on the old plots in Langa for four reasons: the ECDB and
then the KTC decided to limit the number of lodgers who were allowed to
live in houses in Kwallobuhle,32 housing construction in Kwallobuhle
failed to keep pace with population growth and urbanisation, some
people wanted to move back to Langa for social reasons, 33 and, most
importantly, the rentals that backyard shackdwellers were expected to pay
were much lower. 34 In 1979 all shacks beyond 12th avenue were
demolished and at least some of the residents relocated to Kwallobuhle.
In 1981, the 1st - 17th Avenue area was cleared.35
Although there is evidence of a significant ANC-led social movement in
Kabah during the 1950s and 1960s, 36 many activists say that no real
resistance took place during the 1968, 1972 and 1979 removals. This paved
the way for the deproclamation of a section of Langa in terms of
Proclamation No. 1414 of 3 July 1981. This section was proclaimed
coloured and recreational (see map). It was only during the 1980s that the
combined impact of petty bourgeois patronage networks and popular
resistance forced the local and central state in 1986 to reverse its attempt to
remove all Africans from Langa; but then this was soon overruled by a
security-driven forced removal in that same year (see Chapter 8).
The late beginning of the construction of Kwallobuhle in 1968-69 and the
commencement of a series of removals during the early- to mid-1970s
meant that by the late 1970s Uitenhage's Group Areas plan was only
partially implemented. By this stage, the Uitenhage municipality had
come under firm Nationalist Party control and had lost control of the
black townships of Kabah and Kwallobuhle to the East Cape Bantu Affairs
Administration Board (or later the East Cape Development Board [ECD13])
- one of 14 administrative extensions of the central state responsible for
black township administration in 14 regions across the country.37
However, unlike when they were controlled by the white Municipalities,
the townships were now fully self-financing and therefore any internal
upgrading and development had to be financed from revenue derived
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from the residents themselves. Given the dormitory nature of black
townships and the absence of a commercial and industrial tax base, this
administrative framework steadily led to rent and service charge increases
without these increases being sufficient to cover the costs of substantial
upgrading.38
 This was one of the factors that contributed to the 1976
national uprisings which, in turn, forced the state to make reform
concessions.39
By the late 1970s not all Africans were living in Kwallobuhle and
coloureds were still living in mixed areas with Africans. In addition, as
demonstrated in chapter 1, influx control failed to stop african
urbanisation during the 1969-1979 period. Reforms in urban controls
introduced after 1976 as well as liberal lobbying by organised business
helped create a climate that weakened the classical Verwoerdian resolve to
implement a purist urban vision. This fed into trends within Uitenhage
that had resisted this vision since the 1940s. It was this rather
extraordinary mixture of tendencies that provided a space for the re-
emergence of Langa in exactly the area that Africans had inhabited since
the middle of c.19th.
Between 1979 and 1983, the number of shacks in Langa increased from
about 1000 to 4205. By June 1985 there were 6116 shacks. 40 Although the
reasons for why people moved to Langa will be given later, suffice it to say
at this stage that by early 1983 the pressure on the local state to provide
shelter within the framework of the new urban policy was mounting. At
the same time, the government's local government policy was changing
in line with the new urban policy framework outlined by the
government-appointed Riekert Commission. 41 Based on the assumption
that 'urban insiders' must now also be granted the right to 'vote' for their
'own' local governments, the government passed the Community
Councils Act in 1977 that provided for the creation of Community
Councils in african townships. This was the first step towards creating
fully-fledged and autonomous local governments for african townships in
terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982.42
In June 1983, the Director of the ECDB, Louis Koch, announced that the
Community Councils of Cradock, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and
Grahamstown would become Black Local Authorities in terms of the 1982
Black Local Authorities Act.43 The body created for Uitenhage's african
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townships (namely Langa and Kwallobuhle) was called the Kwallobuhle
Town Council. Remarking on what was to become a major source of
tension between the ECDB and the Kwallobuhle Town Council (KTC),
Koch said that it would take six months after the establishment of the
council to transfer administrative functions from the Board to the
councils, including financial powers. He said elections for the first councils
in the Eastern Cape would take place in October 1983.44
Out of 29 community councils that were elected throughout the country in
the major urban areas in 1978, Uitenhage's community council was the
only one whose councillors were elected unopposed._Although the voters
role had 15757 people on it, no-one voted for the 14 councillors. 45 The
same thing happened again in 1.983 when the local authorities were
elected in terms of the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act. On this occasion
16 councillors were elected unopposed (75% of whom were councillors in
the community council). This only happened in 3 out of the 29 elections
that took place in 1983 (the other two being Mhluzi [Middleburg] and
Lingelihle [Cradock]).46
A common saying in Uitenhage during the 1984-86 period was that "the
councillors elected themselves". It is not hard to see how this popular
perception came about. It signified the absence of those legitimising
mechanisms the new Black Local Authority system was supposed to
create, i.e. the appearance of popular representation based on electoral
sanction. Precisely why one more candidate could not be found to contrive
an election is difficult to determine. It may be because of a powerful
unified patronage network that eliminated potential competitors, or else
14 candidates in 1978 and 16 in 1983 really did represent the outer limit of
the number of people willing to participate in local government. If the
latter was the case, then it is possible that different reasons might explain
the low level of participation in each case. The point, however, is that
whatever the underlying explanation may be, the effect was the absence of
the legitimising mechanism of elected popular representation. And it is
this mechanism that was needed to prevent the gap between expectations
of improvement and actual improvement from exploding into protest.
Although the Kwallobuhle Community Council was converted into a
Black Local Authority in 1983 and in the wake of the unopposed
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election of the council, the ceremonial inauguration of the KTC took
place on 16th January 1984. All 16 councillors present were elected
unopposed after paying their R300 candidature fee. The Deputy
Minister of Co-operation and Development was the guest of honour
and in his speech he made an ironic plea that councillors should not be
motivated by "personal gain":
"No councillor or official should grant special consideration,
treatment or advantage to any person which would not be
made available to any other member of the public in similar
circumstances. Councillors and officials should conduct
themselves to promote the full confidence of the public in
the integrity of its local government and their conduct in
both official and private affairs should be above reproach.
They should do nothing which would create in the minds of
the ordinary citizen a lack of confidence in the honest and
impartial administration of the municipality and should not
give any grounds for the impression that they can be
improperly influenced in the performance of their duties."47
The Mayor of Uitenhage was also present and paternalistically compared
the KTC and Uitenhage Municipality to the relationship between a
daughter and a mother. The KTC Mayor, Tini, incisively cut to the root of
what was the main problem with the Black Local Authority system when
he used this occasion to appeal to Central Government to "find other
sources of revenue other than service charges".48
With grandiose visions of how autonomous municipalities could be used
to further the "social and political development for blacks", 49 many
councillors began preparing a social base. They were well aware of the
limitations, but were of the opinion that political rights for blacks needed
to be achieved by first starting with socio-economic development and that
this could best be attained by securing control of local state structures that
were no longer extensions of the ECDB, but had direct access to their own
Minister in the Cabinet.50 Realising the low credibility of the Community
Councils, existing councillors were well aware that if they were going to
enjoy the fruits of being the ones to bring about change for blacks, a strong
support-base for the new local government structures_ was indispensable.
And what better way to create such a support-base than exploiting people's
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housing needs?
It was at this stage that old Mr. G.K. Majombozi began to realise that
popular pressure for shelter could become the basis for a successful
patronage network. Majombozi was 81 years old, lived in Langa and had
been involved in african local government for 40 years. Faced with
pressure from people who wanted to move back to Kabah from
Kwallobuhle because they could not afford the rent and service charges or
who no longer had access to housing,51 Mojombozi began organising
these people into a constituency that shared his lifelong desire to see
Kabah built up into an african community. It was, in fact, the policy of the
_
KTC to enforce the provisions of the national Riekert-inspired urban
policy framework by insisting that the only people who should be allowed
in Kwallobuhle are those who had work, who had 'appropriate
accommodation', and the ability to pay rent and service charges.52
Without the capacity to forcibly exclude people from the urban areas who
had Section 10 l rights'53 and with the loss of direct ECDB control over the
intra-urban movement of people, this policy framework for Kwallobuhle
led those excluded from Kwallobuhle but not from the urban area as a
whole to seek out an area where urban control was less severe - and what
better place than the historical home of Uitenhage's african community.
Not all structures inhabited by Africans were demolished in 1981. The
deproclamation of a portion of Kabah in 1981 following the removal of
people from this area still meant that parts of Kabah were still proclaimed
african. During the three years mid-1981 to mid-1984, an increasing
number of people began moving back into Kabah, but mainly into the area
still proclaimed african. According to East Cape Administration Board
figures, there were 3737 "unauthorised structures" in Kabah by
November.54 By July 1984 this figure had gone up to 4105.55
When 'Old Man' Majombozi decided to turn the increasing number of
shack dwellers into a support base, he had a number of factors in his
favour. Firstly, because the portion of Kabah that was still proclaimed
african was transferred from the ECDB to the KTC, this gave the KTC
effective control over this area. This meant that for the first time, Kabah
shack dwellers were not dealing with white officials employed either by
Uitenhage Municipality or the ECDB, but politically vulnerable moderate
-
politicians. Secondly, there was no need for Majombozi to organise a land
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invasion; all he needed to do was 'sanction' the right of those who had
moved in to remain there. So, over the Easter Weekend of 1984 - when
the ECDB officials were safely out of the way on their Easter vacations -
Councillor Majombozi unilaterally decided to allocate lodgers permits to
people occupying sites - or as former Mayor Tini put it, he actually
"allocated sites".56 When the ECDB officials arrived back from their Easter
breaks, they were furious, but as Mayor Tini put it, "people were officially
given the sites. We could not say people must demolish the shacks - we
could have been sued." 57 Majombozi convinced the council to accept
what had happened as a fait accompli and even got them to agree to install
more taps, grade the roads and commence a bucket system. It was a
masterstroke for Majombozi because no-one wanted to rock the boat at
that delicate moment - the councillors were keen to build a support-base
where they could and since the establishment of the KTC which also
controlled most of the Langa area, the ECDB was powerless to act
unilaterally in the area. Tini pointed out:
"After this we were forced to re-demarcate the Langa area and the
old man automatically moved to the shack area. He knew that in
the next election he is sure of his 100% support. That was his
motive for allocating sites, but he never gave that as a reason. He
only said that he felt sorry for the people."58
Under Majombozi's 'protection' and sanctioned by the issuing of what the
KTC declared to be legally invalid 'lodger's permits', people seeking secure
shelter close to Uitenhage began building shacks in Langa according to the
street layout of the old Kabah. By January 1984 the shacks had been erected
up to 13th avenue. 59 This caused considerable alarm amongst white
residents and in its last meeting of January 1984, the Uitenhage
Municipality discussed the problem. After a discussion that must have
echoed similar discussions by similar kinds of people in the same haloed
halls of the 'Council Chambers' down the decades, the council resolved
that because there was InJo infrastructure provided for this situation", the
spread of shacks in Langa constituted a health problem. 60 Answering this
in true populist style that simultaneously provided a legitimising
discourse for the squatters, Mayor Tini said:
"The people who put up shacks in Kabah [Langa] enjoy
_
residential rights and come from Kwallobuhle where there
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is a housing shortage. The people do not like their living
conditions, but what else can they do? Shacks are their last
resort and we cannot wish them away. Whatever the
legislation, shack dwelling will never be easy to control. The
best way is to provide proper housing.-61
Echoing this sentiment and using terms not substantially
different from Tini's, the main anti-state body, the Uitenhage Black
Civic Organisation (UBCO), said:
"They [the squatters] would rather have a roof over their heads
and tolerate those conditions than sleep in the open."62
In short, the established moderate and radical black leaders
condoned shack construction in Langa thus reinforcing a popular
consensus created initially by Majombozi that squatting in Langa was
officially sanctioned. The patronage network on which this popular
consensus rested gave Majombozi a much needed support-base on the
one hand, and the squatters had the apparent protection of official
approval on the other. Not surprisingly, this arrangement was not
without its contradictions.
Kwallobuhle, Despatch's "Old Location" and Langa fell under KTC's
jurisdiction. KTC had 16 councillors who represented 16 wards; three in
Langa, three in Despatch and ten in Kwallobuhle. Each ward had a ward
committee of between 7 and 10 people which was, in turn, chaired by the
councillor. Mojombozi's ward represented Langa's shack area. The main
activities of each ward was to maintain a support-base of some sort by
providing a link between the grievances of ordinary people, the
councillor and the council. Tini described these activities as follows:
"Those people [on his ward committee] used to help me and
tell me that this and that is going wrong in my constituency.
They would tell me there is a blockage of water there, there is
no water there, the streets are bad, etc. In turn, I would instruct
technical people to fix these things."63
By linking these "neighbourhood-based" ward committees to the council's
service departments, the councillors aimed to link local notables co-opted
into the ward committees to the councils - a system that can most
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appropriately be called "administrative clientilism". Although this never
succeeded as intended because of resource limitations, it did entrench
what had been started with the community councils a few years earlier,
namely a conception of local government that rested on the practice of
neighbourhood participation. Unlike white local government, the
councillors fused political support-bases, patronage networks and
administration into a complex regime that in the event failed to weld
together a stable alliance dependent on existing local government
structures. As will be shown, without a successful collaborative alliance to
keep the local power structure together, new power-centres emerged
which skillfully appropriated and recast the participatory morality of the
ward committees.
There were two issues that dominated the proceedings of council meetings
throughout its existence,64 namely (i) the inadequate fiscal base from
which the council had to derive its income, and (ii) the control of
squatting in Langa. It was the failure to resolve these two issues that led to
the deep and eventually violent conflict between the KTC and the
community.
At the very first meeting of the KTC on 16th January 1984, Mayor Tim
proposed that the Department of Co-operation and Development be
requested to find "other sources of revenue other than service charges" to
augment the council's income. 65 This demand was unsurprising given
the attempt by the councillors to use their systems of administrative
clientilism to legitimate the state instrument that they now controlled, an
instrument that they used to sustain petty accumulation initiatives
(allocating trading sites, etc) and to build up political support bases and
patronage networks. They were of the view that rent and service charge
increases would have made them too unpopular and hence threatened
their control of the KTC and its associated benefits. Although this view
rested on the assumption that they had an electoral support-base to start
off with (partially true for people like Majombozi, but by no means for all
the councillors), it does help explain why they acted in the way that they
did. In any event, the state's failure to resolve the fiscal problem forced
the KTC to contemplate rent and service charge increases in September
1984. This, in turn, triggered the unrest that paved the way for the
resignation of the councillors in March 1985, the Langa massacre and the
killing of Kinikini. But before these events are dealt with in any detail, the
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struggles surrounding squatting in Langa need to be dealt with.
The squatter problem caused enormous tensions and contradictions
within the local state. On the one hand, the councillors wanted to protect
their squatter support-base by preventing the ECDB from demolishing
shacks in Langa. They did this by insisting that their new status as
autonomous municipalities meant that the ECDB had no right to
unilaterally take action against Langa's squatters. On the other hand, the
ECDB and the white officials employed by the KTC, were under
tremendous pressure from Uitenhage's white political establishment to
remove Langa's squatters.
The Oosterlig, an Afrikaans-speaking daily, reported in early March that
white houseowners in suburbs located close to Langa were selling their
houses. House owners interviewed said that when they bought their
houses 30 years ago, they were promised that Africans in Langa would be
moved to Kwallobuhle. Reflecting an accurate understanding of the
history of the Municipality's approach to the problem over the decades,
one resident was quoted as saying: "We don't want the question to take
twenty years to deal with, it must be resolved within the next six months.
We feel that the council is ignoring us." 66 Barry Erasmus, Uitenhage's
town clerk, tried to re-assure his white constituency by saying that he was
trying to find ways to raise funds to facilitate the removal of Africans from
Langa. Once this had been achieved, he said, the area would be
deproclaimed african and turned into a golf course for whites and
coloureds. The remaining area would be proclaimed coloured, he said.67
In other words, by 1984, the Uitenhage Municipality was still singing the
same tune it had sung since the early 1960s - a tune that was first invented
by T.B Floyd in the 1940s: it was committed to the implementation of
Group Areas, but only if the central state covered the costs. But by this
stage, however, the Uitenhage Municipality was having to operate within
a nationally determined urban policy framework that was less inclined to
spend large amounts of money implementing a grand apartheid plan it no
longer completely believed in. More importantly, this framework's local
government policy had resulted in the existence of the KTC because the
central government needed in all black townships a set of black political
allies at the local level who, in the case of Kwallobuhle, were unlikely to
support the forced removal of squatters in Langa, not least because these
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squatters were an important support-base for these allies. While this
hiatus between changing national urban policy and the more orthodox
apartheid agenda at local level provided the space for the expansion and
survival of Langa, it also put in place a contradiction that was only
'resolved' when a State of Emergency in 1986 provided a national security
policy framework that overrode the reformist urban policy framework.
Despite concerted attempts by the ECDB to convince the councillors to
support the removal of Langa's squatters, the councillors refused. The
ECDB even tried to argue that the KTC should relinquish control of Langa
and hand the matter over to the ECDB. In the meantime, the number of
shacks expanded and the pressure from Uitenhage's whites mounted. In
the end, central government got involved in the fray resulting in a special
meeting in Uitenhage between the councillors, the Uitenhage
municipality and the Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development
to discuss the Langa squatters. 68 This meeting, which took place in early
May, was followed by another between Mayor Tini, KTC's town clerk and
the Chief Commissioner. At both these meetings, the state offered to make
available money to build 500 new houses in Kwallobuhle on condition
the ICTC agreed to let the ECDB take control of Langa. 69 Tini tried to delay
this decision by saying he needed to consult with his council.
On 16th May 1984, a crucial meeting was held in the KTC's chambers.
Present were Mayor Tini, deputy Mayor Ntsiko and four councillors
(Majombozi was absent). Then there were all the officials: R.J. Rautenbach,
acting town clerk; P. Mulder, treasurer; S. Erasmus, deputy town secretary;
R. Basson, administrative officer; P. Veldtman, township manager of
Despatch; N. Mqulwana, township manager of Langa; M. Machemba,
senior clerk; C. Hobongwana, committee clerk. Louis Koch, chief director
of the ECDB and D.J. Bezuidenhout, Director of the Department of
Community Affairs, were also present.70
After an introduction by Tini, Koch was asked to present the
government's position. He started by conceding that he "understood the
Council's problems where it had to face an acute housing shortage and
pressure from legitimate residents where it was compelled to make
available open land in Kabah which had already been vacated. This took
place in the council's area of jurisdiction. The Minister had received
--
complaints from white residents as well as from the Municipality and the
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matter was eventually introduced at ministerial level." 71 Koch went on
to argue that by taking over control of Langa, the ECDB was simply
facilitating what was eventually going to happen in any case, i.e. the
transfer of the land to Uitenhage once all the people had been removed.
This did not mean that the powers of the council were being undermined.
To support this argument, Koch even said that the KTC could continue to
speak for the Langa residents even though Langa was no longer under the
council's jurisdiction. Koch concluded with an uncomfortable reminder
for the councillors, namely that given that the ground was going to be
transferred to Uitenhage in any case, by transferring control over Langa to
the ECDB, the KTC "would be relieved of political pressure as this would
then be shouldered by the board." 72 The carrot Koch offered was that if the
council agreed to this strategy, 500 new houses would be erected in
Kwallobuhle before Christmas.
In rapid succession, councillors Tize, Matshaka, Mbengo and Mqolomba
rejected Koch's proposal and argued that the council should retain control
of Langa. Mbengo said that unlike elsewhere in the Eastern Cape,
Uitenhage has politically quiet and the
"civic organisation locally did not enjoy the support of the residents".
However, if KTC relinquished control over Langa, this situation might be
upset. Koch replied that he understood why the civic organisation was a
threat, but argued that the consequences for the council could be even
worse if the removals went ahead while the council still controlled Langa.
Ntsiko responded by saying that just "as the municipality had obligations
to their ratepayers so this council had a responsibility towards its
residents." He said that if the deputy minister implemented his plans, the
result would be a "forced removal". The KTC was not consulted by the
minister and therefore the decision was unacceptable, he argued. He
concluded by proposing (a) that the KTC will undertake to ensure that no
further shacks are built, (b) that if more shacks are built, the ECDB can take
control of Langa, (c) the 500 houses should be built as soon as possible,
after which the people will move to Kwallobuhle.73
Koch responded by suggesting the KTC and ECDB enter into a formal
agreement whereby, (a) the ECDB could be appointed as the KTC's agent
with a mandate to control squatting in Langa and re-house the people in
Kwallobuhle; and (b) the KTC would remain in full control. This proposal
was accepted by Tize and Tini. In the end a motion was passed that rejected
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the Minister's proposal on the grounds that "it may adversely affect the
good relations existing between the Council and the residents and may
give rise to political exploitations (sic) which the council has to date been
able to avert through its effective management of the area." 74 The
alternative that was accepted involved (a) that the council would continue
to "render all civic services"; (b) that joint control between the KTC and
ECDB through a liaison committee be established; and (c) that the ECDB
will handle the control of squatters and the re-housing of Langa's
residents. In short, the KTC agreed to the final implementation of the
apartheid blueprint for Uitenhage, but on terms that ensured that central
government first made available housing in Kwallobuhle before they
would agree to the relocation of the people. This rather shrewd move on
the part of the KTC enabled them to agree to the relocation of Langa, but
on terms they knew very well could never be met, i.e. all that needed to
happen was for insufficient houses to be built in Kwallobuhle and Langa
would remain. In this way they hoped they would not lose their support-
base. What they forgot to consider was the possibility that the emerging
Langa community was less interested in housing in Kwallobuhle than in
staying in Langa where they were in walking distance to the Uitenhage
CBD and industrial area, and where urban controls were easier to avoid. It
was this dynamic that re-emerged later in the process at a time when
councillor-driven patronage networks were no longer in place.
The ECDB submitted a memorandum to the council on housing
construction costs. The memo was discussed on 23rd May. It listed six
different house-types ranging from R5914.00 each to R6783.00. House
rentals were calculated on the basis of 11 different income brackets. The
cheapest house would have cost R13.61 per month for someone earning
between RO and R50.00. The highest rent for the cheapest house would
have been R19.09 for someone earning between R141.00-R150.00. 75 The
type of house being recommended here had the following features: single
150mm concrete block walls, concrete floors, no floor coverings, no
ceilings, no electrical installations, unpainted internal walls, and no fences
or gates.76
By April 1984 the KTC, ECDB and the Department of Cooperation and
Development had accepted this option, as well as the wider plan to
relocate Langa's residents to Kwallobuhle. Included in the package was
the KTC's commitment to prevent further squatting and the ECDB's
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commitment not to remove people until adequate housing had been
erected. In so doing, they effectively agreed on a plan that was impractical
for two reasons: firstly, there is no way that the KTC had the capacity to
prevent the further erection of shacks given the pressures of urbanisation
and homelessness; and secondly, the amount of money allocated was
insufficient to finance the construction of an adequate number of houses
to re-house all the Langa residents. Furthermore, these two objective
obstacles were overdetermined by another set of political processes that the
officials and councillors never anticipated, namely the build-up of highly
conflictual tensions between the KTC and the state in general on the one
hand, and the community as a whole and the Langa ssuattets in patticulat
on the other from about November 1984 onwards. But before these
conflicts are analysed in greater detail in the next chapter, a socio-
economic profile of the emerging Langa community is required.
LANGA: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE77
In general, living conditions in Langa were poor and inadequate. There
was one small health and dental clinic on the south-western
edge of the township. In the squatter areas there were 28 taps. The
sewerage system was one of the biggest problems. A bucket system
operated in the formal housing area. Buckets were placed in the road and
collected twice a week. In the squatter areas, an irregular combination of
pit latrines and bucket system operated. No formal school buildings
existed in Langa during 1985-86. Some concerned teachers and social
workers organised some form of tuition in four church halls and a large
wood and iron shed. There were seven areas that served as "sportsfields".
These were rough, ungrassed open pieces of land that were frequently
littered with rubbish or were too swampy to use. There were eleven
churches, four of which were wood and iron buildings. There were no
other services in Langa: no electricity (except for the brick houses), no
libraries, no parks, no post office, no places of entertainment, no eating
places and no civic halls.78
The most important economic services were provided by four general
shops located on Maduna Road and a few houses were converted into
shops. There were also various clusters of informal sector activities
around Maduna square and along 20th avenue. The bustling legal and
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pirate taxi business centred around Maduna square and provided links
between points within Langa, between Langa and town and between Langa
and Kw allob uhle .
Using the results of a survey conducted by PLANACT covering 225
households and 1147 individual members of these households, it is
possible to construct a fairly accurate socio-economic profile of Langa.79
Reflecting a lower average household density than in the PEU region as a
whole, Langa's household had approximately 6 members each. Only one
third had more than 7 persons per household. This figure is significant
because it stands in stark contrast to comparable figures obtained from
similar surveys of shack settlements where the household density was
10.80 Furthermore, it is significant that when the density figures for the
formal housing areas and shack areas in Langa are disaggregated, it appears
that the average density in the shack areas is only 5, whereas in the formal
areas it is 7. This suggests that shack erection was a solution both to the
housing shortage and overcrowding. In their natural quest for shelter,
Langa's squatters sensibly used available land space to build enough
dwellings to avoid the overcrowding problems experienced as a matter of
course in the formal townships.
The low household density of Langa's squatters was because the
predominant structure of each household unit was the nuclear family.
The PLANACT survey found that the majority of adults living in the
shacks who were not heads of the households were wives or husbands.
Very few (only 5%) were people outside the nuclear family relationship.
The large majority of people living in the shacks (60%) were children of
the head of the household.
Equally significant is the fact that no less than one third of all the
household heads were women and that 54% of the members of the
households surveyed were women. This points to the unusually
prominent role in relative terms that women played in Langa's
community. Many had migrated to the urban areas or left the formal
townships to set up homes and raise families by themselves. Women
were forced into these informal settlements as a result of a "triple
oppression" that apartheid policies forced onto women, namely migrant
labour meant only men could come to town legally, if women did, they
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had to live in illegal settlements; up until the late 1970s, single, divorced
or widowed women were not legally entitled to rental housing stock; wage
rates were nearly 50% lower and unemployment levels higher amongst
women compared to men, i.e. families with women heads were poorer
and hence less capable of affording rates in formal townships. Women in
Langa often justified this in terms of the high costs of consumer culture in
Kwallobuhle, i.e. the pressure to own modern furniture, a large dining-
room table, a hi fi, modern stove and permed hair-styles.
Langa's age profile is of crucial importance given the prominent political
role played by the "youth". The PLANACT survey revealed that over 50%
of Langa's residents were under the age of 25 and no less than a third were
of school-going age. Given that no schools existed in Langa, it is not
surprising that Langa residents regarded educational facilities as a critical
problem (more on this later).
As far as employment was concerned, only 46% of the potentially
economically active population said they had a job. A large proportion of
the population (43%) said they were unemployed despite having had work
previously and then 13% said they had never been employed. This last
category - many of whom were young - is the group that was not located in
the workplace or even in the household economy and which came to fill
the ranks of the youth congress in 1984-86. A breakdown of the
relationship between personal characteristics and work status is contained
in the following table:
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No. and % of sample
who were not working
Head of household 116 - 63% 68 - 37%
Male workers 123 - 60% 82 - 40%
Female workers 70 - 43% 94 - 57%
Under 30 years of age 66 - 50% 65 - 50%
30 - 60 years of age 119 - 68% 56 - 32%
Educated up to Std. 2 72 - 48% 78 - 52%
Educated between Stds.
3 and 8
88 - 52% 81 - 48%
Educated above Std. 9 23 - 72% 9 - 28%
(Source: PLANACT, 1986, p.16)
6::and.%..of 'sample
who were wor
TABLE 3.1: WORK STATUS OF SELECTED SECTORS OF LANGA
COMMUNITY
This table reveals that male household heads aged over 30 years who had
some education tended to have jobs. Women, the youth and the
minimally educated had the highest unemployment rates.
Uitenhage's labour market was very unstable. This was reflected in the fact
that only 7% of those who were employed had worked for an employer
continuously for at least 20 years. 60% of those who were unemployed had
worked for their previous employer for 1 - 5 years. Furthermore, it is
significant that of those who had lost their jobs, 46% said they had been
retrenched or sacked, while 30% lost their jobs because they got sick or
pregnant. Only 23% said they voluntarily left their jobs by retiring or
resigning.
Of those who were employed, 32% said they were union members. This
was much higher than the national union-membership average which
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Percentage
No education 302 29%
Sub A-B 111 110/0
Stds. 1-2 162 16%
Stds. 3-4 179 17%
Stds. 5-8 219 210/0
Stds. 9-10 53 50/0
Post Matric (Std. 10) 12 10/0
•	 No response 109 10%
was 12% at the time. 90% of the union members said they were members
of a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliate while the
rest were members of a Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA)
affiliate.
Bus transport was the primary link between home and work with 60% of
the respondents saying they used the bus to go to work. The remainder
used taxis, private cars or walked.
Contrary to the general educational profile of the PEU region, the general
standard of education in Langa was low. The following table gives the
range and percentages:
TABLE 3.2: EDUCATION LEVELS IN LANGA
High unemployment, low levels of education and general recessionary
conditions resulted in very low wage rates and extreme poverty. The
following table reveals that 21% of all the households had no regular
income and that only 9% had incomes of over R400.00. The average
monthly household income was R186.38.
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Income of Hse. Head
RO 43 21% 66 32%
R1-50 22 110/0 20 1100/0
R51-100 25 12% 32 15%
R101-150 26 12% 24 110/0
R151-200 26 12% 28 13%
R210-300 30 14% 29 14%
R301-400 17 8.0/0 4 20/0
R401-600 9 40/0 5 20/0
Over R600 11 50/0 1 0%
No
response
16 16
TABLE 3.3: INCOME LEVELS IN LANGA
This table shows that only 4% of all heads earned more than R300.00.
More significantly, the fact that only 9% had total incomes of over R400
suggests drastic differences between Langa and the Port Elizabeth squatter
areas where 45% of the households surveyed earned above R400 (see
previous section). This can only be explained by the fact that whereas in
Port Elizabeth people were driven into the informal settlements by the
housing shortage, in Uitenhage it was shear poverty and an inability to
afford the cost of living in the formal townships - especially those
households where women were the head.
The quality of the shacks and when they were built tells us something
about the permanence of the community. 92% of all the shacks were built
between 1971 and 1986, 76% of which were built between 1981 and 1986.
The most distinctive feature about Langa's shacks is how substantial and
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well-built they are. Seasoned observers of Durban's shack areas, Crossroads
and Port Elizabeth's "Soweto-by-the-Sea" remarked on the high quality of
Langa's shacks, most of which were built from "zincs" and planks. The
high quality of the shacks may be explained by the fact that there were
small informal sector builders who built shacks for people. This is why
28% of the shack dwellers said their shacks had been built for them. The
permanence of Langa's squatters that this reflects is reinforced by the fact
that no less than 54% of the shacks had between 3 and 7 actual rooms and
37% had separate kitchens.
The explanation for the stability of Langa's shack dwellers emerges when
the average length of residence is taken into account and why people lived
in Langa. Contrary to the common belief that squatter settlements
comprise "recently arrived rural-urban migrants", the evidence suggests
the opposite. In response to the question "How long have you lived in
this house?", 53% said between 0-4 years, 12% said 5-9 years, 8% said 10-14
years, 6% said 15-19 years, 9% said 20-29 years and 12% said over 30 years.
More significantly, it was found that no less that 84% of the respondents
said that they had lived in Langa prior to moving to where their shack
was at the time of the survey. In other words, the large majority were not
coming from a rural "kraal" to live in town. In fact, the majority of
respondents (62%) said they moved to their present dwelling in Langa
because they wanted their own house or because of overcrowding in other
areas or because they wanted a better home. 22% said they moved because
they liked the location, 6% said they moved because of removals, and
only 4% because they needed work in the area. This confirms with
remarkable exactness the general trends in the PEU region as a whole
identified in Chapter 1.
Although the housing shortage was by far the most important reason why
people moved to the dwellings they were in in 1985-86, when asked
"What do you like most about living here?", the following responses (that
measured the benefits of living in Langa as compared to Kwallobuhle)
were recorded: 97% said the location of Langa was what they liked most.
This was followed by less rent to pay than in Kwallobuhle (79%), Langa
had a good social life (39%), there was a sense of communal solidarity
(21%), it was cheaper to live in Langa (19%), houses and plots were larger,
it is easier to survive (12%), living conditions are better (11%) and Langa is
nearer to other races (3%). Besides the expected importance of material
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factors such as location close to town and places of work and low rent, it is
significant that these figures show that 60% felt that Langa's social life and
sense of communal solidarity were what they liked most about the
community. This contrasts sharply with the sense of isolation, alienation
and breakdown that was recorded amongst these same people after they
were moved to Kwallobuhle (see chapter 9).
In short, Langa's "stability" and sense of "community" was created by its
residents' determination to carve a niche out of the soft underbelly of the
Eastern Cape's metropolis. These efforts, however, would not have been
successful if the contradiction between the demand for shelter and state
housing policy was not overdetermined by the equally contradictory effects
of influx control and the patronage networks of local councillors. It is
significant that 71% of the respondents to the PLANACT survey were in
possession of official lodgers permits and that 94% had never been evicted
from their places of residence. This suggests that either most residents had
Section 10 qualifications and hence were protected from being
"repatriated" Western Cape style to the bantustans, or influx control
regulations were simply not being enforced.81 These remarkable figures
bear testimony to the fact that the patronage network that Majombozi
created was most certainly in the material interests of the squatters and
that the ECDB officials could not or did not undermine this network by
"removing" the squatters out of Uitenhage. This meant that squatter
struggles in Uitenhage were not about entry into the urban domain (as in
the Western Cape82), but rather were about the terms of this inclusion.
CONCLUSION
The incomplete application of the apartheid blueprint in Uitenhage was
the result of tensions and conflicts between a complex constellation of
local interests vying over the application of nationally determined and
locally inspired urban policies during consecutive historical periods. These
local conflicts mediated the way national policy was interpreted and
applied, while national policy prescriptions created structures and
processes that constantly constituted and re-constituted different local
interests. These vertical and horizontal flows of power resulted in the
creation of an urban environment by the 1980s that, in turn, was the well
spring for some very serious multiple political conflicts within the local
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state system and between this system and the community as a whole. This
urban environment, however, may have been a necessary condition for
these political conflicts, but it was by no means a sufficient condition. For
an understanding of these sufficient conditions, we need to venture onto
the relatively more unstable and intangible terrain of politics, without
losing sight of the fact that it was the elements of the urban system that
were the subject of these political conflicts.
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CHAPTER 4
STATE, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF TOWNSHIP CONFLICT,
NOVEMBER 1984-MARCH 1985
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an account of the conflicts that led up to the Langa
Massacre that is, in turn, described in the next chapter. These conflicts
arose of out tensions that existed within the local state system and between
this system and the community as a whole. The concern here and in the
next chapter with the actual detail of the political events arises out of a
need to go beyond the traditional approach to resistance in most South
African writing. The typical approach of most analyses of township politics
is to sketch out a structural and political context, followed by a brief
statement that the event took place, and then concluding with some
statement about what this tells us about the sociology and/or history of
these structural/political conditions. In other words, the dynamics of the
events of the conflict are not seen as a subject of analysis in and of
themselves, but the conflict is simply used as a kind of entrée for analysing
why it took place.
This chapter will build on the preceding chapters and sketch out some of
the immediate political dynamics that created a context of generalised
conflict during the period leading up to the massacre. Although these
events led to a massacre that, in turn, was a product of police violence
against non-violent crowd action, Chapter 6 takes up some of the more
detailed strands of these political dynamics by looking at another form of
crowd action to that which is examined in chapter 5, namely the brutally
violent crowd action that took place two days after the Langa massacre - an
event that heralded South Africa's first 'necklacings'.
In his trenchant work on township politics, Seekings has argued that the
analyses of township politics have been either 'structural' or
'conspiratorial' in nature.' Whereas structural approaches explained
township politics in terms of the political economy of material inequality
and oppression, conspiratorial approaches explained these same political
processes in terms of the activities of a small group of 'agitators' (in the
case of state apologists) or 'leaders' (in the case of oppositional
propagandists) conspiring to overthrow the regime. Seekings observes that
whereas the conspiratorial approach was used by national political
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organisations (state and ANC), the structuralist approach dominated
academic perspectives. He calls for a synthesis of the two approaches by
resorting to the dynamics of locality when he argues that "[a] full account
of protest and conflict needs to locate the choices regarding political action
made by individuals at the local level ..• •" 2 This is what this chapter will
seek to do and in doing so, the irreducible and contingent nature of
political choice will be highlighted.
THE CONTOURS OF CONFLICT
The six month period leading up to the massacre was a period during
which conflicts broke out in the schools, factories and communities. The
'elections' for the newly created 'tri-cameral parliament' for whites,
coloureds and Indians were held in August 1984. This was immediately
followed by the rapid countrywide spread of township resistance and the
emergence of new forms of mass action in the form of the mass stayaway,
consumer boycotts, general strikes and mass demonstrations. 3 The Vaal
Uprising in September 1984, followed soon after by the Transvaal Regional
Stayaway in November 1984 and then spreading outwards to Natal and
the Eastern Cape,4 all set the tone for the intensification of conflict and
resistance at the local level.
Although the occupation and growth of Langa from April 1984 onwards
was one dimension of the evolving local dynamics of political conflict, the
politics of Langa will not be dealt with here because this is the subject of
forthcoming chapters. What is significant here is that the Langa massacre
took place because a large crowd wanted to attend the funerals of people
killed during politically inspired clashes with the police, and the police
were trying to stop them because it was, they believed, their duty to
maintain 'law and order' in an area where 'unrest' had reached what the
police perceived to be crisis levels - a euphemism for 'threat to the white
community'.
Increasingly violent policemen, the activities of vigilantes linked to the
police and the increasingly organised 'amabutho' 3 squads were the central
actors in an escalating cycle of violence and counter-violence that
characterised the September 1984 - March 1985 period. Two empirical
surveys done at the time provide rough indicators as to the nature of this
escalation. The following table is derived from figures provided by the
police in evidence to the Kannemeyer Commission:6
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TABLE 4.1: TARGETS THAT WERE ATTACKED BY GROUPS, OCTOBER
1984 to MARCH 1985
Although this table is indicative of these rising levels of conflict, it is
obviously misleading because it creates the impression that the only
source of violence was groups who were attacking government, SAP and
private property and persons. To rival this view, the human rights activist
group Black Sash released a report entitled Memorandum on Police
Conduct in the Eastern Cape. 7 This report was compiled from a long list of
affidavits taken from ordinary people who experienced first hand
extremely brutal forms of police misconduct during this same period.
These included drunken behavior by policemen on duty, repeated
lashings of randomly arrested people, indiscriminate shooting at
individuals and groups, assaults of innocent people walking along the
road, prolonged torture in police cells (especially of young people), the
beating up and killing of children, and the intimidation of public and
private doctors into revealing the identities of patients who reported
bullet wounds. 8 The memorandum concludes:
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"There are too many corroborating affidavits for anyone to believe
that the police are blameless in helping create conditions in the
Eastern Cape which led to the disaster on 21st March."9
The rising levels of increasingly violent conflict in Uitenhage may have
been the result of police and vigilante action, but before this is
empirically established, the relationship between violent action on the
part of police, vigilantes and amabutho and the internal and external
dynamics of the KTC needs to be understood. For in the final analysis, it
was these dynamics that triggered the build-up of conflict from September
1984 onwards.
THE POLITICS OF FISCAL UNVIABILITY
The fiscal unviability of the KTC was an issue that was raised by Mayor
Tini as early as 16 January 1984, the day this newly established Black Local
Authority (BLA) was inaugurated. Like BLAs elsewhere in the country,
this fiscal crisis originated in the mistaken notion that black townships
that had no viable tax base could become politically autonomous and
financially viable. 10 In reality, the labour and consumer power that
resided in the townships helped sustain the tax base of a legally and
constitutionally separate local authority (namely the white Municipality)
that, in turn, had no fiscal responsibilities towards the township. The
resulting intra-urban resource flows systematically underdeveloped the
townships in a manner reminiscent of colonial relationships of
exploitation. 11
 This in-built fiscal fault had disastrous political
consequences for the new petty bourgeois elite that grasped these local
state instruments: they were illegitimate from the start because they were
presented by the national government as substitutes for national political
rights and they did not have the resources needed to bring about
substantive urban upgrading and development - a strategy that if they
were financially viable may have ameliorated the consequences of
illegitimacy. It was this conundrum that the KTC found itself trying to
handle during 1984 and in so doing found itself squeezed between central
government departments that were reluctant to provide the Council.with
additional funds, and an increasingly politicised community that was
unable and unwilling to shoulder the burden of increased levies at a time
of deepening recession.
-
At a meeting in the Council Chamber on 28 May 1984 attended by
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Councillors, Council officials, the Director of Local Government John
Hitge, and C.C. Kloppers from the Chief Commissioner's Office, the
overall financial position of the KTC was reviewed. 12 As far as the 1983-84
budget estimates were concerned, no real problems were raised and it was
noted that they provided for no service charge increases for the period up
to June 1984. However, John Hitge expressed concern about the fact that
the Council's income was not as high as was projected in the budget
estimates. This, the city treasurer explained, was due to the fact that the
expected income from lodger's fees was not forthcoming, i.e. the fees from
people who the Council had resolved were not members of the family in
whose name houses were rented, but nevertheless lived in these houses.
To compensate, Hitge proposed that the Council's liquor outlets should
generate higher profits, vacancies should not be filled, debts currently
being carried by the ECDB on behalf of the KTC should be retained in the
ECDB books and not transferred, and that various special funds and levies
currently managed by the ECDB should be transferred to the KTC to make
the income side of the books look a bit more respectable. In other words, to
make the books look a little better, Hitge wanted them juggled and
manipulated.
However, when it came to the 1984-85 budget estimates, manipulative
accounting was not going to solve the problem. In essence, the KTC
proposed a budget for approval by the Minister that increased expenditure
by 117% over the 1983-84 budget without recommending an increase in
service charges levied on the residents. Hitge rejected this outright and
proposed service charge increases of between 15% and 20% and a reduction
in expenditure. The councillors agreed to reconsider the matter in line
with national guidelines laid down by the Department of Public Finance
(normally around 15%).
After various discussions and meetings during May and June, the Council
met again on 3 July in a defiant mood. 13 It resolved to confirm and
approve its 1984/85 budget estimate of just over R6 million which
represented a 30% increase over its previous budget - a substantial
compromise from 117%! Nevertheless, this effectively meant going
against the instructions contained in a letter dated 8 March 1984 from the
Department of Public Finance. To justify a higher increase than what the
Department of Public Finance was prepared to recommend for approval to
the Minister, the Council pointed out that with its increased
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responsibilities as a result of becoming a BLA, it had additional costs that
needed to be taken into account. However, the Council resolved that it
was prepared to accept only very minor increases in service charges,
namely an increase in hostel fees from R7 to R10 per month, and the
installation of water meters in businesses so that water can be charged in
accordance with metered consumption. The problem with the budget,
however, was that income was well below the planned expenditure. The
Council rejected the notion that increases of more than 15% should be
contemplated to make up the difference on the grounds that residents
were unable to afford this "... as a result of the current recession and
unemployment prevalent in the areas ...•"14 It was in this light that the
Council concluded that "having only very recently become a local
authority, [it] will at an early stage already be faced with a serious financial
problem... •"15
To resolve its "financial problem", the KTC resolved to request the then
Minister of Cooperation and Development to agree to (i) that the profits
that accrued from liquor outlets during 1982/83 owned by the ECDB be
paid over to the KTC; (ii) the transfer of "labour contributions" payable by
employers to the ECDB to the KTC; (iii) the direct payment to the KTC of
money provided to the ECDB by Central Government to make up for
deficits incurred from service provision; (iv) the transfer from the ECDB
to the KTC of the R357 138 in the Services Levy Fund; (v) the transfer of all
interest made by the ECDB from investments made by the ECDB of money
that by rights belonged to KTC; (vi) provide the KTC with suggestions on
how it could balance its budget without increasing service charges by way
of direct subsidies from Central Government or indirect taxes.16
In the end, the meeting resolved on increases for residential and business
sites that were all more or less 13%. As far as residential sites in
Kwallobuhle were concerned, these were supposed to go up from R19.90
per month to R22.90, and in Kabah from R17.29 to R19.90. The meeting
also resolved to impose lodger's fees on various categories of lodgers
(married with dependents, single with dependents, single without
dependents). 17 However, although this was the formal decision taken,
there is clear evidence that the Councillors were of the view that no real
increases would need to be levied because all that was needed was for the
ECDB to give the KTC a grant to offset the additional income that was
supposed to be obtained from service charge increases. 18 But for this to
171
happen, the KTC needed community support as a form of pressure to back
up its case - something that it attempted to get at a public meeting in
September.
In short, after several months of wrangles and tension with various
central government departments that dragged out the final approval of
the KTC budget to a point where it risked collapsing financially altogether,
the KTC was eventually cajoled into accepting a drastically reduced capital
development programme as well as service charge increases - albeit more
moderate ones than originally envisaged by John Hitge. This effectively
placed the KTC in a politically invidious position vis-a-vis the
community: by August -September it had failed to acquire the large-scale
resources it needed to finance substantive upgrading and development to
legitimise the KTC structure; it had effectively compromised on the
principle of retaining Kabah as an african settlement (see chapter 3); and it
had committed itself to (moderate) service charge increases. By the time
the Councillors called a public meeting in September to discuss the
council's activities and the question of service charges, it had nothing
significant to deliver to counter the growing social movement
campaigning against it.
THE FAILURE OF LEGITIMATION AND THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS
The build-up of national resistance against the implementation of the tri-
cameral constitution and the "Koornhof Bills" 19 began in earnest in 1983
with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF). 20 It was
common for a "civic association" of some kind to form in order to
mobilise residents around housing and service charge issues that the BLAs
were supposed to deal with. However, the historical pre-existence of
UBCO meant that the "space" for a militant grassroots mass-based civic
was already occupied. It was therefore the leadership of the Uitenhage
Youth Congress (UYCO) that became the primary organisers of the anti-
BLA campaign in Uitenhage. 21 Although UYCO's base was in the ranks of
young workers, students, unemployed school leavers as well as
marginalised elements with very low literacy levels and minimal chances
of employment, it soon began building a base amongst tenants of council
housing, owner-occupiers in site-and-service schemes and shack dwellers -
all of whom were opposed to increases in municipal service charges. In
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the words of Nkala:
"The people all over the country rejected overwhelmingly the
puppet councils. In Uitenhage (i.e. Langa and Kw allobuhle
townships) the Uitenhage Youth Congress undertook a peaceful but
vigorous campaign against the dummy councils. Through one of
the Koornhof Bills which later became law, the 'community'
councils were given repressive and oppressive powers. For
example, the community hall was place under their control. So it
was easy for the council to refuse the use of the hall to who
whoever was opposed to their Pretoria-cooked ideas. Had it not
been for the protest for the residents, they would have raised the
already high rents. The rent issue is also under their control."22
Although tensions between the councillors and the community were
building up during the course of 1984, these tensions came to a head and
broke out into open conflict on 9 September 1984. This was the day that
the Councillors called a public meeting to inform the community about
the progress of the council and to inform them about the issue of rent and
service charge increases. There is agreement amongst informants that the
bulk of the meeting was taken up with reports from councillors about
what had been done and what their plans were. Mayor Tini, however, was
not there for most of the meeting - he was addressing a meeting in
Uitenhage. However, the meeting had been informed that it was Mayor
Tini who was going to deal with the service charge issue. When he
eventually arrived the hall was tense and there were clearly elements
present who were waiting for this issue to come up. Although newspaper
reports leading up to the meeting reported that the meeting was called to
announce service charge increases, and although this is what was reported
to have happened at the meeting,23 Mayor Tini is adamant that he came
in and announced that there would be no increases. In order to get the
ECDB and Central Government to provide the KTC with additional funds,
he explained in an interview that "we were going to force that it should be
a grant, hence we called the public meeting so that there should be no
increases in service charge. Nobody would return and say there must be an
increase in service charge. We called the meeting and informed the people
that no increases were forthcoming, but it was too late because there were
political organisations which were saying there will be no increases."24
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After Tini made his announcement, in his view the crowd became
extremely angry and accused him of lying. By all accounts, the crowd
simply dismissed Tini no matter what he said - if he said there were to be
no increases, they never believed him; and if he tried to justify the
increases, they would have rejected that too. Tini and other eyewitness
accounts are in agreement that the crowd then started throwing things at
the councillors and as the dynamic got uglier, it was clear that the
councillors were in danger of being physically attacked. They managed to
escape out of a side door and that night chose to sleep outside the
township.25
In short, Tini got his resounding community rejection of increases, but it
was not his political project that got the credit. Instead, increases were
prevented, but it was UYCO that got the credit.
This was the turning point. From this point onwards, the relationship
between the local state and the community shifted: it was no longer about
a race between different political projects using different means to
improve township living, it became an outright violent confrontation.
Councillors, officials, policemen and activists are in agreement that this
was the event that triggered the escalation of open conflict leading
eventually to the massacre. But, once again, there is nothing inevitable
about this train of events. The actual activities and decisions of the actors
need to be comprehended.
It was immediately following the September 9 debacle that the Councillors
requested and got both personal arms for their protection, and a police
guard.26 The community response to the meeting was immediate: UYCO
called for the resignation of the councillors and a boycott of their
businesses. Tini admitted that the boycott of both his and the businesses of
Councillor Benjamin Kinikini was a "100 percent boycott". 27 Not
surprisingly, having lost their bid for community backing for their
struggle with higher levels of the state to get additional resources, the
councillors, who were now in defensive positions, had to react to the way
they were being targeted by UYCO and its supporters. This was not,
however, done in a united manner. Instead, different factions emerged
with different approaches. The leading elements of the two factions were
Mayor Tini and Councillor Benjamin Kinikini.
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SPLITS IN THE COUNCIL AND THE TURN TO VIOLENCE
Tini was 45 years old in 1984. He was born in Uitenhage and lived in
Kabah until 1976. He spent 24 years working his way up the lower ranks of
the "Bantu Administration" bureaucracy where he came to understand
the workings of the apartheid state. It was also a position he used to get
himself elected on the Executive Committees of sports and community
bodies. He joined the Community Council in 1978 and was elected the first
Mayor of the KTC in 1983. He got involved with Benjamin Kinikini's
undertaker business in the late 1970s and in 1983/84 started his own
funeral parlour and undertaker business. This followed a fall-out with the
Kinikini family, particularly Joyce Kinikini, Benjamin's wife.28
Benjamin Kinikini was a petty accumulator in the classic mold. He was a
thin sickly man who often needed to spend time in bed. 29 He wore large
square steel rimmed tinted glasses that were too large for his thin drawn
face. Beneath the face and wizened body, however, it was not difficult to
sense the hardened cruelty of a self-made man that had used whatever
means that were available to survive and who managed to command the
absolute loyalty of his family and the small group of young men that he
collected around himself - young men who became police informers and
members of a vigilante gang called the Peacemakers.
Instead of being concerned primarily with defensive action, Kinikini -
together with the Peacemakers and leading Peacemaker and wealthy
businessman Jimmy Claassens - entered into a proactive relationship with
the police. As advocated by the strategic framework of "counter-
revolutionary warfare", security agencies formed alliances with moderate
elements in the community who became the "eyes-and-ears" of the
security forces and were willing to perform extra-legal activities that the
security forces were prohibited from doing.30
Even before the September meeting and subsequent conflicts, it was clear
that there were distinct factions within the Council itself. At a Council
meeting in late August, Mayor Tini referred to divisions amongst
councillors and called for a vote of confidence in his leadership. Ten out of
the fifteen councillors present voiced their support for Tini, while
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Kinikini reacted negatively to the way the issue was handled. 31 Tini
publicly admitted much later that there were two factions in the Council,
one led by himself (most of whom bowed to community pressure and
resigned in March 1985), and the other led by Kinikini who publicly 	 '
refused to resign and was eventually murdered by a violent crowd two
days after the massacre (see chapter 6).
It was Kinikini and the Peacemakers that effectively brought the police
directly into the KTC-community conflict and in so doing gradually
marginalised Mayor Tini and his group. This was demonstrated most
clearly by an incident that officials, policemen, ex-councillors and activists
always refer to when describing the build-up of conflict during this period,
namely the conflict over the use of the community hall in November.
The UDF organisations applied via a committee of respected individuals
to use the hall for a mass meeting. Although there is confusing evidence
on how it came about, Kinikini was the person who either directly
controlled the key to the hall, or controlled the caretaker who kept the
keys to the hal1.32 After heated confrontations where Kinikini openly
brandished his firearm, Kinikini flatly refused on behalf of the Council to
allow the UDF organisations to use the hall. UYCO was extremely angry
and some its supporters stoned the Kinikini residence in protest. Joyce
Kinikini said that crowds gathered outside their house and chanted:
"Kinikini, give us the key to the hall." 33 It was after these events that the
conflict was taken over by two groups that were openly committed to the
use of violence, namely the Peacemakers and the 'amabutho'. The police,
in turn, openly backed the Peacemakers and in so doing transformed the
conflict into a "low intensity war".
The Peacemakers were a gang that operated as a close-knit vigilante-cum-
dispute resolution group. It was based in Kabah and had a leader called
Mfusi Sibigla who was known to his followers as Busa Bisa. 34 The day-to-
day activities of the Peacemakers revolved around apprehending
'criminals' and 'troublemakers' and taking them to the police station to be
charged. They would also recover stolen goods and assist feuding groups
or families to resolve their problems. They had a "court" at 20 9th Ave
Kabah where there was a judge, prosecutor and defense that disposed of
the matters that the Peacemakers brought to it for a decision, usually in
the form of an aggrieved and an accused party. The role of the
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Peacemakers was to enforce the decisions of the court - including referring
the matter to the police or the authorities.35
As the conflict between the KTC and the Amabutho 36 (who were often
rank-and-file supporters of UYCO) intensified, Kinikini sought the
assistance of the Peacemakers. Eric, one of Kinikini's sons, was already a
member of the Peacemakers.37 The Peacemakers, who already had strong
relationships with the police because of their role in bringing into the
police station people against whom others wanted to lay charges,38 quickly
took over the role of hunting down "comrades", "arresting" them (as they
called it) and bringing them into the police station for questioning, torture
and occasionally arrest or simply prolonged detention. Quite often the
Peacemakers participated in the assaults.
The police soon came to rely heavily on the Peacemakers as their interface
with the community. In a trial of three Peacemakers accused of assaulting
a group of young men on the night of 29/30 January 1985 (one of whom
later died), evidence of the relationship between the police and
Peacemakers was given in camera - evidence that led the Judge in his
judgment to conclude: "It seemed from the evidence that accused no.'s 1, 3
and 5 belonged to a group called the Peacemakers who either with the
connivance of the police, or upon whom the police turned a blind eye,
apprehended and dealt with law-breakers in the township. If we
understood the evidence correctly it would seem that these people acted as
vigilantes; that in the case of minor offenses they would deal with the
perpetrators themselves, and in the case of more serious efforts they
would hand them over to the police." 39 This remarkable confirmation of
the way police used extra-legal means to intervene in township affairs,
was reinforced by other policemen during the trial of those accused of
murdering Kinikini on 23rd March. Major Theron, second-in-command
of the SAP in Uitenhage, said the police regarded the Peacemakers as
helpful in maintaining law and order and admitted that members of the
Peacemakers were acting as "informers" for the security police. 40 One well
known Peacemaker, Dumse Ngocaza, was very familiar with, in
particular, the black policemen - "he moved freely with us when we went
out [on patrol]", one policeman admitted.41
After the community hall affair, the Peacemakers effectively became the
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private army of Kin.ikini and his cabal in the Council. They set out to wage
war, and in the process reinforced the build-up of the amabutho squads as
the only defensive action available to the community. As a prominent
supporter of Kinikini and the Peacemakers, Jimmy Claassen was directly
associated with them. Inevitably, urban legends about the extremely
violent and rapacious behaviour of the Peacemakers circulated around
the community. These legends were fueled by fear and extortion that
preyed on impoverishment and the existence of a legally unprotected and
politically voiceless majority. As will be demonstrated in later chapters,
some of the exploits of the Peacemakers were tolerated by the security
forces, but even this tolerance was insufficient to protect some of the
Peacemakers who were eventually tried and imprisoned for violence-
related activities. A common story was related by Weza Made:
"There's this guy Jimmy Claassen who is being used by the police.
He's the one who has been kidnapping people. He's a businessman
in Uitenhage. He moves with these gangsters at night kidnapping
people. We don't know what happens to the people he kidnaps. But
people believe that he killed them. We now have evidence that this
guy killed people. We have this girl who was kidnapped by Jimmy
Claassen, but fortunately she escaped. She told us how she was
given a lift by Jimmy Claassen, but he took her into the bush and
raped her. She was then taken to a spot where these thugs of Jimmy
Claassen were. She told us that at this spot there were many heads
of people and parts of flesh of people. She said that human flesh
was being cooked."42
Although one of the more horrific accounts of the activities of the
Peacemakers, Made's story is similar to numerous accounts of abduction,
rape, torture and intimidation that are captured in Black Sash affidavits,
court records and press reports from the period. The fact that the police -
and black policemen in particular - were implicated in these activities
helps provide a foundation for understanding many of the events and
activities dealt with in the rest of this thesis. It also helps explain the
extremely violent demise of the Councillors later on.
THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
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The schools crisis was an important dimension of the conflict. In fact,
according to one policeman, the "unrest" began in Uitenhage in the
schools in August. 43 By August 1984 many parts of the country were
plagued by endemic school boycotts, a number of which started early in
1983. Conflict between the Congress of South African Students (COSAS)
and the education authorities in Uitenhage frequently spilled over into
running street battles in the streets. This generated an atmosphere of
tension and conflict that began, in turn, to engender sympathetic
responses from the trade union movement. The schools crisis resulted in
an important alliance between the Federation of South African Trade
Unions (FOSATU) and COSAS as unions came under pressure from
parents to do something about the problems. The Uitenhage Parents
Committee was established by FOSATU elements which were, in turn,
instrumental in resolving the schools crisis in Uitenhage in January-
February 1985. FOSATU was also involved in the Parents Teachers and
Students Association which was formed in February 1985 to take up
educational grievances in Uitenhage's coloured schools.44
On 3 December the home of Fikile Kobese - prominent union organiser
and Vice-President of the UDF Eastern Cape - was firebombed and in a
subsequent attack his brother Leslie Kobese was killed. The Peacemakers
were blamed for this and Benjamin Kinikini's nephew, Zamuxolo
Mondile, was subsequently killed by an amabutho group outside Kobese's
home on the day of Leslie Kobese's funeral. Triggering an amabutho
reaction, a running series of attacks and counter-attacks ensued claiming
lives throughout December, January and February. For every house
belonging to a "comrade" that was attacked, the house of a black
policeman or councillor would be attacked. While the Peacemakers and
the police initially had the advantage due to the fact that they were armed
and patrolled in police vehicles, the amabutho soon picked up the crude
skills of urban warfare. Petrol bombs were their main weapons. Eleven
different kinds of petrol bombs were invented, including the so-called
"acid bomb" - a bomb made of sulfuric acid. 45 By January, in the words of
Captain Goosen of the Uitenhage SAP, "sporadic incidents of unrest and
firebombing was the order of the day. The situation escalated ... with more
attacks on police patrols taking place._ ." 46 The amabutho groups quickly
learnt how to counter teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot - the primary
means used to disperse groups until March. For birdshot and rubber
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bullets, they wrapped their bodies and limbs up in strips of tyre tubing.
Then when they were shot, they would fall down and a few moments
later, in the words of a policeman, "jump up and run away as if nothing
happened". 47 Using urine-soaked cloths to counter the effects of teargas
was another tactic. Wounds soon became status symbols amongst these
self-anointed urban warriors.
By February, several incidents per day of direct conflict between amabutho
groups on the one hand and a combination of Peacemakers, police and
armed councillors was the norm. The ineffectiveness of vigilante terror
and police action became a source of concern to both the councillors and
senior policemen. In two successive statements, Mayor Tini and Kinikini
called for peace talks between the Council and UDF organisations in a bid
to quell the escalating violence. 48 However, a few days later a group of
Councillors visited the Chief of Police for Uitenhage, Colonel Pretorius, to
appeal to him to find more effective ways of countering the "unrest". They
said that teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot were ineffective and the daily
use of teargas was causing great discomfort to the residents. They proposed
that hard ammunition be used, "as in 1976". 49
 This set the stage for a visit
to the region by the Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange and
Commissioner of Police General Coetzee on 19 February. They were
thoroughly briefed on the situation by local policemen and the
ineffectiveness of "soft" weaponry was demonstrated.50
FROM SOFT AMMO TO 'ELIMINATION'
On 8 February the District Commander of the Port Elizabeth Security
Branch sent a telex to Security Branch HQ in Pretoria that outlined the
unrest situation and pointed out that teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot
are no longer effective. He requested permission to use buckshot and
handguns. Brigadier Wandrag replied the same day giving permission on
condition daily reports were sent to Pretoria outlining the effects of the
new tactics.51
On 14 March Uitenhage's most senior police officers that comprised what
was called the "Order Group" met to discuss strategy. Colonel Pretorius
laid out the problems for discussion, including a telex from Pretoria
urging all police vehicles to ensure that helmets and shields were carried;
_
the fact that petrol and acid bombs were becoming an increasingly serious
problem; the growing danger to life and safety of the policemen; that they
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never had AAA ammunition (a relatively light shotgun shell); that they
only had SSG ammo (a heavy shot); and that under certain circumstances,
rubber bullets and birdshot were ineffective against petrol and acid bombs.
He told the Order Group not to use teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot
when under heavy attack.52
As a result of the Order Group discussion on the 14th, police patrols
were not issued teargas (because the community leaders objected to the
smell and it was getting too expensive 53), nor were they given rubber
bullets and birdshot on the 15th March. Instead they carried heavier
ammunition only and no loudhailers. 54 On 19 March a telex was received
from Pretoria instructing all Caspirs to carry R1 automatic rifles and
sufficient ammunition. This was the telex that read: When acid bombs
and/or petrol bombs are thrown at police vehicles, private vehicles and
buildings, then under all circumstances an attempt must be made to
eliminate the guilty parties." 55 In short, as the cycle of violence and
counter-violence escalated, all the police could do was to finally issue the
order to its patrols to "shoot to kill". Additional policemen were flown in
and on 20th March, a special "temporary base" was established on a
Uitenhage sports field to coordinate the new operation. The stage was
now set for a ten day period beginning 16 March of organised resistance,
increasingly brutal police action and barbarous crowd violence - ten days of
fury that transformed Uitenhage's political relationships.
In the meantime, the councillors finally realised that the game was up.
Three councillors resigned in mid-February, one resigned in early March
and the rest (except Kinikini) led by Mayor Tini himself resigned en masse
on 12 March at a special meeting of the Council. Benjamin Kinikini was
not at the meeting and was, therefore, the only councillor who never
resigned.56
 Instead, Kinikini, his sons and members of the Peacemakers
were guarding Kinikini's funeral parlour day and night - a building that
both he and the community began to call the "barracks". Under pressure
from his wife Joyce, Benjamin inquired from the officials how he could
resign given that he was not at the meeting. Joyce Kinikini said "he was
told that ... [it] was late for him to resign. ... he should come and see them
the following week."57 Benjamin Kinikini never lived long enough to
carry out his wife's wishes.
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THE BLACK WEEKEND
In response to dynamics that originated in UDF organisations in Port
Elizabeth, a call was issued for a three-day stayaway and consumer boycott
starting Saturday 16th March. The issues around which these mass actions
were organised were recession-induced retrenchments, the merger
between AMCAR and Ford motor companies that was going to result in
more retrenchments, and petrol price increases. Although the unions
rejected the action, it went ahead nevertheless. The "Black Weekend" of
16-17 March was successful in Port Elizabeth and moderately supported in
Uitenhage. However, at least two and up to six people were killed in
clashes with the new heavily armed police patrols. It was these victims
that were eventually to be buried on 21 March - the 25th anniversary of
Sharpeville Day!
The Labour Monitoring Group conducted a study among employers,
unions, and community organisations in the area to ascertain the
dimensions of the various actions.58 In Port Elizabeth a random sample
of 50 of the 235 firms listed in the Midlands Chamber of Industries
Directory were interviewed. Seventy-five percent of industrial employers
in Uitenhage were interviewed, along with a sample of employers in the
commercial sector. All interviews with employers were conducted over
the telephone. In-depth interviews were conducted with key activists in
the community and the trade unions. The main findings of the telephone
survey were:
1. Forty-three percent of black workers in Port Elizabeth
and 62% of black workers in Uitenhage were on some form of short-
time
TABLE 4.2: SHORT-TIME WORK IN PEU
1 Africans Coloureds All Black
Port Elizabeth 40% 48% 43%
Uitenhage 65% 49% U.
2.	 In Port Elizabeth 99,5% of the African work force in
the commercial sector heeded the call to stay away on 16 March, a
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Saturday morning shopping day. Workers classified as coloured came
to work as usual, although many stores closed early. On Monday 18
March 90% of African industrial workers stayed away. Again few
coloured workers participated. The situation in Uitenhage was less
clear, as 69% of the companies surveyed employed African workers
who were not expected to work that day because of some form of short-
time. Of those meant to come to work on 18 March, 36% stayed away.
Date Port
Elizabeth
Uitenhage
18th 90% 36%
21st - 98%
22nd - 97%
3. In Uitenhage a further stayaway was called on 21 March,
the anniversary of Sharpeville, so that all members of the
community could attend the funerals of people killed by the police
the previous weekend. The massacre at Langa on 21. March ensured
that the following day was also a stayaway. Ninety-eight percent of
the African workers stayed away on Thursday and 97% on Friday.
The proportion of coloured workers staying away reached 16% on
Thursday but dropped to 4% on Friday.
Low as coloured participation in the stayaway may seem, it was
nonetheless high in comparison with that in the Port Elizabeth
area. In certain factories the coloured stayaway was much higher
than the mean. This reflects the fact that geographical and
organisational divisions are not so clear cut in Uitenhage.
4. Sixty-one percent of the employers surveyed in Port
Elizabeth, and 73% of those surveyed in Uitenhage held discussions
with employees before the stayaway. All employers, regardless of
whether they held such discussions or not, followed a policy of 'no
work, no pay' as recommended by employer bodies. In some
companies workers lost their attendance and service bonuses, and a
few workers in unorganised firms were dismissed.
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5.	 Of the employers, 71% of the sample in Port Elizabeth and 69% in
Uitenhage predicted that stayaways would continue in the future.
Only one employer thought stayaways would not continue.
"Stayaways", one employer remarked, "have become a fact of life".
Most of our informants felt that the solution to stayaways lay either
in quelling the unrest or employing coloureds instead of Africans in
future.
The unions' opposition to the stayaway has been interpreted in different
ways. The consensus among community organisations was that the
stayaway was a resounding success, and that the unions had misjudged the
level of support for it among workers. In the words of the President of the
Port Elizabeth Youth Congress: "For the first time we have managed to
draw our parents into the struggle". As far as the unions were concerned
workers stayed away because of intimidation. Although it is extremely
difficult to ascertain the truth of the matter, there is evidence of
substantial support among workers for some form of collective action, but
there was also a feeling that workers feared the consequences of not
staying away.
Views of the political objectives of the stayaway also differed. The vice-
president of FOSATU criticised the stayaway as not being in the interests of
the working class. Instead, he argued, non-workers ultimately benefited:
white chainstores registered record takings on the Friday before the Black
Weekend; black traders and shebeen owners made a killing over the
weekend; taxi drivers did extremely well because there were no buses; and
it was only workers who lost out - they lost a day's pay, some lost their
jobs, and they were left weaker and more divided than before.59
Community organisers judged success in very different terms. As they
saw it the stayaway demonstrated the level of resistance in the township,
increased the organisational power of community organisations, and
satisfied the demand by unemployed youths for more militant action.
These differences reflected the disharmony between unions and
community organisations over the purpose of political mobilisation. To
the unions, community-based action should not have played into the
hands of non-working class interests. The unions did not provide an
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alternative plan of action which, in turn, reflected the difficulty of
organising a pure working-class politics outside the workplace, especially
when unions were preoccupied with defending workers on the shop floor
during a recession.
To the community organisations, there was no real difference between the
interests of the community and those of employed workers, many of
whom were on short-time in any case. Therefore, they argued, the unions
should have followed where the community was leading. This indicated
that the political strategies of the community organisations were being
shaped predominantly by community conditions and particularly by the
highly politicised youth who bore the brunt of the depressed regional
economy.
This kind of politics, however, ran the risk of intensifying divisions
between unemployed and employed workers, especially as it was couched
in populist ideology. All this reinforced the traditional ideologically-based
divisions that had plagued union-community relationships in the Eastern
Cape.
Significantly, during the stayaways in Uitenhage on 21 and 22 March there
was greater harmony than in Port Elizabeth between community and
union organisations as well as between coloured and African workers.
This was partly due to the strength of UYCO which, unlike PEYCO, had a
substantial base among the older working-class members of the
community,60 and also because the unions did not oppose these
stayaways. This paved the way for greater unity later on when struggles
around the removal of Langa became the focus.
CONCLUSION
The most important consequence of the Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth
stayaways and the state's response to them in the form, in particular, of
the Langa Massacre, was to catapult the Eastern Cape into the forefront of
mass resistance. By joining what the Transvaal started the previous year,
the Eastern Cape turned township resistance into a national uprising that
eventually forced the state into imposing a selective State of Emergency in
these two regions for the period July 1985 - March 1986. This chapter has
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demonstrated how the political choices of those involved in the
Uitenhage conflict during the September 1984 - March 1985 period
triggered dynamics that rippled outwards into the political culture and
fabric of the Eastern Cape.
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CHAPTER 5
THE STORY OF A BICYCLE: 21 MARCH 1985
"And there was a bicycle which was also moving along
Maduna road. I cannot say where it originally came from but
it was about to pass the white prisoner truck. The bicycle
would have passed on to the left side of the white truck but I
show with my left hand that the policeman on top of the
white truck made a sign to the person riding the bicycle to
move between the two vehicles. ... The bicycle was still in
front of the crowd. I saw that the policeman on top of the
white prisoner truck shot at the one riding the bicycle and as
he was hit, he was almost thrown into the air and I saw that
he was shot through the head. And I saw that the one on top
of the Hippo held his rifle and he was moving from the one
side to the other and he was shooting all the time, and I saw
people falling." - E. Thambani, Langa resident.
"At no stage until I left the scene was there a bicycle on the
scene." Warrant Officer Pentz, South African Police.
INTRODUCTION
Thursday, 21 March 1985: it was quiet, hot and cloudless, the start of a
typical March day for the Eastern Cape. Most people in Uitenhage's white
suburbs were still asleep as the few dozen riot policemen reported for duty
at their Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage bases shortly before 6.00 a.m. Many
white workers were sleeping late because the giant VW factory was closed
for the day. Adhering to the stayaway call, very few residents were
planning to go to work in the black townships. The absence of the usual
bustle of early morning cars, pedestrians and pirate taxis left what one
policeman on patrol later described as a "deathly quiet". 1 There were
some who tried to walk to work at about 6.00 am, but they were turned
back by small groups of residents. 2 No-one anticipated the tragic violence
that was soon to claim the lives of 43 people, nor were the people of Langa
to know that their poor dusty township would, by the end of the day,
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become a name synonymous with the worst of Apartheid in the eyes of
the world.3
THE FUNERAL BA1VNINGS
On Thursday 14th March, Captain Andre Goosen of the Security Branch
acted in accordance with the new hard-line security tactics by approaching
the local magistrate - Magistrate Steyn - to issue an order banning the
holding of funerals on weekends and public holidays. Goosen gave the
banning orders to a Sergeant Snyman with orders to deliver them to the
families of four victims of police action that were due to be buried that
weekend.4 The intention was to prevent further mass political funerals
from taking place because these had become the primary means whereby
the political leadership galvanised the community into resisting police
action.
In response, community organisations called mass meetings for the
weekend where it was announced that the funerals had been banned and
that they would be held on Thursday 21st March 5 - this not being a legal
public holiday, but rather a "people's holiday" to commemorate
Sharpeville Day. 6 Pamphlets were then distributed urging people to
stayaway on the 21st to attend the funeral. Follow-up meetings took place
after that in various areas.
On Monday 18th, Magistrate Steyn was made aware of the consequences of
his banning the weekend funerals - he had effectively assisted the activists
in ensuring that Sharpeville Day was going to be a mass stayaway and a
major political success.7 Employers were equally concerned and together
with the trade unions made representations requesting that the banning
order be lifted because the result was going to be a stayaway. As a result,
Magistrate Steyn deliberated on the matter and when he saw Captain
Goosen again on the 20th March, he issued another order that stated that
funerals were only allowed to take place on Sundays. 8 This order was
issued at 4pm on the 20th and was again given to Sergeant Snyman for
distribution.
Police vehicles then announced the new banning order in both
Kwallobuhle and Langa. Sergeant Bradly from the Riot Squad in Port
Elizabeth was in the vehicle that did the announcements in Langa
between 18h00 and 21h00. Although it is clear that the Magistrate and
190
Security Police intended to prevent all political funerals from taking place
on Thursday in a rather fruitless bid to prevent a mass stayaway, the
wording of the order and the briefing given to those who announced the
new order through loudhailers that evening was confusing and unclear.
The result was that Sergeant Bradley and his team only announced that
the funeral of one of the victims had been moved from Thursday to
Sunday.9 The other funerals, the community could only have concluded,
were still going to go ahead in Kwallobuhle as planned.
Besides the pamphlets distributed by the fleet-footed boys that scamper
about the township, as well as the announcements made at many factories
reminding people that there was going to be a stayaway the next day so
that people could go to the funeral, a mass meeting was held on
Wednesday night in the Apostolic Church Hall in Tsoshowa Street to
finalise the activities. One participant in the meeting said that the funeral
and proposed stayaway were discussed and the transport arrangements
were announced. It was agreed that no-one would go to work and people
would meet at the taxi rank on Maduna Road between 8h00 and 8h30 to
travel to Kwallobuhle. No mention was made of the bannings.10
THE POLICEMEN
Lt. Fouche reported for duty at Uitenhage's temporary base at 5.45 a.m. He
was aware it was Sharpeville Day, but never discussed this with his
men. 11 Despite this, he never expected more trouble than the usual unrest
conditions of recent times. 12 Although he was the station commander in
Kirkwood, this tough hard policemen was brought over to Uitenhage to
take command of an anti-riot detail on 15th March. On that day, he found
the body of a policeman in a township street who had been killed by
crowds13 and retaliated by condoning the vicious beating of young black
men in the local police station. 14 He was aged 43, had served in the police
force since 1961 in various small Eastern Cape towns and had received
medals for bravery, merit, loyalty and one for outstanding service during
his stints on the border. After attending an anti-terrorism course in 1973,
he spent 68 days fighting in East Caprivi and Rhodesia in 1974, 106 days in
Ovambo in 1977 and 110 days in Ovambo in 1980.15
-
191
Fouche was in charge of 2 caspirs and a landrover. There were six men in
his caspir: Sergeant Noonen, one of Fouche's men brought in from
Kirkwood and who was armed with a 9mm pistol which was his personal
possession; Adjutant Doyle, armed with a shotgun and his personal 9mm
pistol; Sergeant Smit who had an R1; Sergeant Manama, another Fouche
man from Kirkwood and armed with a shotgun; Constable Danster who
had an R1 and Constable Marais who was armed with a shotgun. Fouche
had an R1.
Fouche took charge of one caspir (a certain kind of armoured vehicle) and
put Adjutant Officer Pentz in charge of the other. Pentz, also an Eastern
Cape policeman, had behind him 18 years experience including three years
as station commander in Glenconnor in 1972-1975. After this, he was
posted to Uitenhage's detective branch and played a role in the police
units that put down township rebellions in 1976. He had done two stints
on the border, three months in 1971 and three and a half in 1980 when he
received two medals. 16 On March 21st, Pentz brought his own 9mm
Beretta to work and wore it in a holster on his side.
Pentz had six men in his caspir: Sergeant Stumke, a seasoned policeman
with 13 years experience in Uitenhage and the recipient of the SAP anti-
terrorism medal in 1984; Sergeant Rudman, a 30 year old who attended
police college in Pretoria, participated in counter-insurgency courses in
1976 and did border duty in 1977, 1981 and 1984 during which he received a
medal for meritous service; Constable Andrews, a 33 year old coloured
man with seven years in the force behind him, was the only one in the
caspir who could speak Xhosa because he grew up in the poor multi-racial
Port Elizabeth suburb of Korsten; and then there was Constable Els and
another two coloured policemen, Constables Keteldas and Loff.17
In addition to the caspirs and landrover from Uitenhage's temporary base,
four other units from Port Elizabeth were patrolling Uitenhage. Warrant
Officer Barn and Sergeant Le Roux were each in charge of caspirs, while
Sergeant Lekuba commanded a caspir with a detail of black Transvaal
policemen. Sergeant Makgobokoane was in charge of a troop carrier.18
None of these units carried teargas, birdshot, rubber bullets or a
loudhailer; only heavy ammunition like R1s and SSG shotgun rounds.
After Adjutant Meyer had dispensed SSG and R1 ammunition from the
magazine at the base, the caspirs entered the townships. None of them
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were worried about the fact that they had no teargas, rubber bullets,
loudhailers or the lighter birdshot. The policemen sensed the tense quiet
and noticed how empty the streets were. Stumke thought that he had
better be "more on guard than normal for these rioters"19 and Fouche
thought "this stayaway was one hundred percent successful". 20 Pentz said
he knew about the stayaway call and cancellation of the funerals, but was
unaware of the significance of Sharpeville Day.21
Pentz went to patrol Kwallobuhle while Fouche drove to Langa. Pentz
arrived in Kwallobuhle at about 6.30 and as he turned into Matanzima
Road, he found a group turning back pedestrians and cars trying to leave
Kwallobuhle. An attempt was made to disperse the group and Stumke
fired a shot. This probably failed to disperse the group because Pentz
radioed Fouche for assistance.22
Fouche arrived in Langa just after 6.00 a.m. and reported by radio that
everything was "still and quiet". 23 Responding to Pentz's report of trouble
in Kwallobuhle, he left Langa soon after 7.00 am and arrived in
Kwallobuhle around 8.00. On his way he must have had a tiff with a
television crew, because at 7.35 he reported having bashed their car. This
probably explains why he took so long to get to Kwallobuhle. (Television
crews were frequently targets of frustrated and aggressive riot policemen.)
From 8.00-9.20, Fouche concentrated on breaking up groups and protecting
strategic points (such as main entrances) from being occupied by stayaway
supporters.24 Barn and Le Roux were also in Kwallobuhle, but Fouche
was unaware of them. At 9.00 Pentz went back to the police station to pick
up Constable Groep, an additional member of his crew. Instead of
returning to Kwallobuhle where Fouche was now, Pentz decided to head
for Langa. He took the Kamesh Road entrance, turned right into 23rd
Avenue and then right again into Maduna Road. He entered Maduna
Road about a block away from the square where the taxis and buses
congregated. That is when he saw a crowd of about 250 gathered on the
square.25
Pentz and his crew were not the first police patrol to see the crowd.
Sergeant Lekuba drove straight to Langa from his Port Elizabeth base and
at about 9.00 am came across a group gathered on Maduna square.
_
Although the group was singing and some had raised clenched fists, his
impression was not that they were in any way unruly or threatening. He
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drove up a side street out of sight of the crowd and tried to make radio
contact with other units to notify them about the crowd. He stayed there
for between 20 and 30 minutes as he tried in vain to get his faulty radio to
work.26
When the police encountered the crowd on Maduna square, they felt
morally obliged to enforce what they understood to be the truth: the
funerals were banned by legal decree and no-one should be allowed to
attend them. What they could not see was that every person who came to
Maduna square that morning supported the stayaway and participated in a
collective march precisely because they all believed it was their natural
traditional obligation to show solidarity with the dead by attending the
funeral. When two such profound belief systems constitute two social
groups so antagonistically - one small but armed and the other large and
unarmed - the outcome was unsurprisingly violent under the
circumstances..
THE CROWD
Mr. E. Thembani lived in a shack on 15th Avenue. He had been
unemployed since April 1983 when he was retrenched from Volkswagen.
He had a wife and children, one of whom worked to support the family.
His mother occasionally shared her meager pension to help him out. 27 On
the morning of the 21st he planned to go to the funeral. He never knew
the deceased, but planned to attend the funeral because everyone went to
these funerals. No-one in particular told him about the funeral, he had
"just heard about it". He had planned to go to the square to catch a "kwela-
kwela" (taxi), but by the time he got down to Maduna road, the crowd had
already begun marching towards Uitenhage. Instead of joining the front of
the crowd, he walked down to 16th Avenue to find a place in the middle
of the crowd. When asked why he joined the crowd instead of going
straight to Kwallobuhle on a different road he said: "I knew that these
people were also going to the funeral." 28
 He never knew the funerals had
been banned.
Gabriel Matebelie was an unmarried man of 24 years who lived in a shack
on 10th Avenue with his aunt, brother, cousin and his 6 month old baby.
He lost his job on 8th March 1985. He planned to go to the funera1. 29 On
his way to the square where he was intending to catch a taxi to
Kwallobuhle, he came across the crowd marching down Maduna Road.
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He joined the crowd and participated in the singing of what he called the
"guerrilla song", the one about the guerrillas who "have arrived in South
Africa to free us."30
Moses Mgwanza was aged 25 and lived with his wife and children in a
brick house in du Bois Street. He worked at Volkswagen as an apprentice
electrician and was in his third year of training in 1985. A staunch
NAAWU member and deacon in the Presbyterian Church, Moses was a
good example of a stable politicised young worker. After meeting his
friends Tomile and Zanga, these three set off to attend the funeral.
However, when he saw the crowd marching down Maduna Road and
realising he might have to walk to Kwallobuhle, Moses ran back home to
put on his "takIcies".31
Between 7.00 a.m. when Fouche left Langa and 9.00 a.m. when Lekuba
arrived on the scene, a crowd of about 250 had already begun to form on
Maduna square. Many of them could tell similar stories to Thembani,
Matebelie and Mgwanza. Using biographical data obtained from three
sources, it is possible to reconstruct a profile of the crowd as it was shortly
before the shooting took place.32
Using a sample of 70 people in the crowd about whom details of their
gender is available, no less than 80% were male. Out of a total of 82 whose
ages are known, 47,5% (i.e. 39) were between the ages of 10 and 20, 36,5%
(i.e. 30) were in the 20-30 age bracket, 8,5% (i.e. 7) in the 30-40 range and
then 7,3% (i.e. 6) were aged between 40 and 50 years old. Assuming this
sample is representative, it would suggest the crowd was overwhelmingly
young and largely male. Nevertheless, the presence of older people and
young girls in the front rows of the crowd suggests that this was not a
crowd of "angry male youths".
Probably more important than the age and gender profile of the crowd was
its origins from within the township (see map 5.1). Reflecting the existence
of a widespread sense of purpose, the 25 members of the crowd whose
addresses are known came from all the major sections of the township.
Obviously this was facilitated by the fact that Maduna Road was the main
road through the township.
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The people who congregated on Maduna square, the Kannemeyer
Commission concluded, were indeed intending to find transport to the
funeral:
"The point is that the victims were elevated to the position of
martyrs in their communities and their funerals assumed a political
character. Attendance was a means of showing one's sympathy for
and solidarity with the deceased and the cause they supposedly
espoused. "33
This is all the political activists had organised through pamphlets and
small meetings since the previous weekend. The magisterial ban of the
funeral had no effect on this sense of "solidarity" because, the order
stipulated that funerals could only be held on Sundays but never
rescinded the previous ban of funerals on Sundays, not all the funerals
were prohibited on Thursday 21st, and the information announced by
police loudhailers the previous day was "inadequate".34
 No witness at the
Kannemeyer Commission or interviewee spoken to by the author was
under the impression on the morning of the 21st March that all funerals
had been banned and none of them believed it might be illegal to try to
attend the funeral.
Significantly, very few members of the crowd knew it was Sharpeville
Day. A survey of political attitudes conducted by the lawyers amongst
members of the crowd they had contact with revealed that'only about 5%
were aware that it was Sharpeville. This suggests a low level of national
political awareness which, nevertheless, did not in any way diminish
support for a local form of defiance and solidarity with the victims of
police violence.
In short, the original intention of those who later formed a crowd was to
attend the funeral. "I would not have joined if they were going to attack
the hippo", Thembani said, "I was on my way to a funeral." Refuting
police claims that the crowd was intending to kill whites in Uitenhage and
not attend a funeral, Kannemeyer observed that if this was the intention
of the crowd, "it is improbable that girls and children would have been
included. ... Also, had this been their intention one would have expected
some degree of organisation. ... [T]here is no indication_of any
organisation. People joined the ranks at random and appear to have
walked as and where they chose."35
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PRELUDE TO VIOLENCE
While Lekuba was up a side street fiddling with his radio, Pentz
approached the crowd and eventually stopped his vehicle on the
Uitenhage side of Maduna square facing south. He used his radio to notify
Fouche of the crowd and asked for reinforcements. Although police
evidence maintained that at this stage the crowd was armed, frenzied and
singing about going to "kill the whites", members of the crowd and eye
witnesses described how the police taunted and provoked a relatively
harmless and calm crowd into an aggressive and agitated mood. David
Tini described how police shouted to the crowd "throw, throw" and one
policeman said: "We're going to show you today." Andrew Williams said
a policeman shouted "where are the stones, throw them, throw, throw."
Another policeman shouted: "Now we've got them nicely." 36 Because of
the inconsistency of police testimony and consistency of community
witnesses, Kannemeyer conceded that police provoked those gathered on
the square into a more cohesive and antagonistic posture. This was
coupled to police actions to prevent bakkies and taxis from transporting
people .37
More important than provocative police remarks was the undisputed fact
that the police told the crowd that the funerals were banned. Given this,
those who came to Maduna square soon formed a cohesive crowd when
they believed their right to attend the funeral had been violated - a right
that had in effect been sanctioned by the first magisterial order. They
rejected police claims that the funerals were prohibited because these
claims were seen as arbitrary and unfounded. One member of the crowd
said when asked whether the police announced the banning that yes "they
did say that they had banned the funeral and then we said to them that we
did not know that this had been done." Council for the police then said:
"So in spite of the fact that the police said the funeral was banned, you all
said you were still going to the funeral?" "Yes", was the reply, "we were
determined to go to the funeral. .. We did not believe that they spoke the
truth. We thought that they did not want us to attend the funeral."38 This
was an unsurprising assessment given the provocative and aggressive
behavior of Pentz's crew in particular and the community's perception of
the police in general.
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After breaking up to let Pentz's caspir through, the crowd then began to
move down Maduna Road in an "orderly" fashion. 39 The front ranks
linked arms and everyone began singing freedom songs. Many held
clenched fists in the air. Out in front was a man with dreadlocks dressed in
a black cloak and girdle, while others took responsibility for keeping the
crowd orderly and giving direction. "The people were singing silently. ... I
would say softly", Andrew Williams said.40 Kelman Bafile said "the
people were walking in an orderly manner. They said that they were on
their way to a funeral and they were not going to turn back." 41 From all
sides of the original crowd of about 300, hundreds flocked to swell its
ranks. They came down the side streets, across the open ground and out
from the houses alongside Maduna Road and intersections. A small group
walked below a large sun umbrella and many others simply moved into
the crowd and found a place to walk. Twenty-two year old Sydney
Ntlanjeni was in the third row where he could see the rastafarian leader,
hear the people singing freedom songs and see the caspirs moving
alongside and in front of the crowd. Like all the other members of the
crowd who gave evidence to the Commission, Sydney said he saw no-one
carrying weapons.42
After the crowd began to move, Pentz drove 100 to 120 metres along the
road and stopped until the crowd reached him again. Although denied by
the community witnesses, Pentz insists he tried once again at this stage to
turn back the crowd. He then moved to a spot on a rise just below 15th
Avenue and parked across the road. On his way to this point, Pentz was in
constant contact with Fouche who said he was on his way from
Kwallobuhle.43
MOSES BUCWE: THE CYCLIST
Kwabele Moses Bucwe was 15 years old in 1985. He lived in a shack at 6
Stofile road with his two sisters and brother. He had a standard 3
education and worked at Graham's Poultry Farm, a job he got in January
1985. He left school in 1983 because his mother could no longer afford to
pay his fees - "she is poor", he said. The Farm paid him R19.50 per week,
part of which he used to buy a bicycle from his brother.44
Moses went to work as usual on Wednesday 20th. He arrived home that
evening at 5.00 p.m. He was aware that the next day was a stayaway and
that a funeral was to take place because the people had been "speaking
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about it in the township". However, he was unaware of the significance of
the day itself (i.e. Sharpeville Day), nor did he know that the deceased
were meant to have been buried the previous weekend. He never heard
any announcements that evening canceling or banning the funerals.
Nevertheless, Moses had decided his job at the poultry farm was too
valuable to risk for the sake of a funeral or stayaway.
He normally left for work at 6.00 a.m. However, on the morning of the
21st, he knew "no-one was going to work" and although some people tried
to go to work at 6.00 a.m. he was afraid to go with them at that stage. He
eventually got on his bicycle and left for work at 9.15 a.m. He took his
normal route from Stofile Road, down 16th Avenue and then left into
Maduna Road.
Moses will probably never forget the scene that confronted him as he
turned into Maduna Road that morning. On his right was a very large
crowd singing "Nkosi Sikelele iAfrica" and on his left, about 25 metres
from the crowd, were two caspirs parked in a "V" formation across the
road just below 15th Avenue. He tried to get past on the right side of the
caspirs, but a policeman standing on top of the caspir on the left signaled
that he should ride in between the two vehicles. He turned in towards the
centre of the road, but before proceeding between the caspirs, he turned
towards the crowd and, in order to dispel any suspicions about his true
destination, he gave a clenched fist salute. 45 As he did so, he was shot in
the back of the head.46 Bucwe said there was no warning shot nor were
there any announcements. The strike-breaker became the first target.
FEAR, VIOLENCE AND THE TRUTH: POLICE VS THE COMMUNITY
The police completely disagreed with Bucwe's version of events. As far as
they were concerned, the crowd was 10 metres away, it was aggressive and
armed, people in the crowd stoned the caspirs, the police fired a warning
shot and tried to tell the crowd to disperse. More importantly, they all
emphatically denied the existence of a cyclist. Very few of these claims
withstood cross-examination and only some were accepted by
Kannemeyer. Both Kannemeyer and Haysom called into question the
reliability of police evidence. Haysom argued that the accepted existence of
Moses Bucwe on his bicycle proved the police conspired to "fabricate the
evidence. The existence of the boy on the bicycle established conclusively
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that each and every police witness had lied. They had lied because the
existence of the boy on the bicycle would indicate that the crowd could not
have been as close and as threatening as they alleged."47
Irrespective of how the policemen presented their version of events after
the shooting, there is little doubt they were a small well armed group faced
by a crowd of 1-3000 people determined to walk through part of white
Uitenhage.48 Pentz said that after parking his caspir behind Fouche's in a
"V" formation, he "realised that there was going to be a confrontation.
That is what I realised - this crowd is approaching, we were standing in the
road and we were attempting to stop them. ... They swung the sticks and
weapons, jumped in the air, made the black power salute and shouted and
screamed."49 Andrews told Pentz that the crowd was singing a song that
said: "Ons gaan die blankes doodmaak vandag in die dorp." ("We are
going to kill the whites in town today.") Fouche's assessment was that this
crowd could overwhelm the caspirs and recalled the mutilated body of the
policeman he picked up on the 15th avenue. "I was not prepared to let
myself and my men be mutilated like that." 50 Stumke said he was very
afraid of the oncoming crowd, "I feared for my life."51 Andrews echoed
this when he said: "With their words that they were going to kill us, that
is the boers, and I called myself a boer at that specific moment because they
call all policemen boers and dogs. ... I realised that my life is now in
danger. I was finished, got scared, I was scared." 52
 One police witness said
he was so frightened that he cowered on the floor of his caspir.
To summarise the police version of the sequence of events: 53
 Fouche and
Pentz formed a "V" on the hill; the crowd was ordered to stop when it
was 50 metres away; a warning shot was fired when the crowd was 10
metres away; a bare-breasted coloured woman jumped out from the crowd
and threw a stone; the leader pulled out a petrol bomb; 6. the order was
given to fire when the crowd is 7 metres in front of the caspirs.
The community version can be summarised as follows: 54 orderly march
of unarmed people took place from Maduna square; the caspir moved
ahead and parked across the road near 15h Avenue; another caspir .
arrived and formed a "V" across the road with the first caspir; Bucwe
appeared on his bicycle when the crowd was 50 metres from the caspirs; as
the crowd moved forward a policeman held up his hand in what appeared
to be a signal to stop; some members in front of the crowd stopped
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momentarily; Bucwe then turned inwards to go between the caspirs;
without warning, a volley of shots was fired from the caspirs; Bucwe was
the first to fall; the crowd turned and fled as the shooting continued.
THE SHOOTING
Sydney Ntlanjeni: "They shot at the front row in front of us and I saw that
the police were all visible from the top of the hippos. The one behind was
also shooting. They also shot up to the third row. I was holding a girl, she
fell, and as I started to pick her up, I was shot at in the back. I let go of her
and I started running and I was grazed by the bullet in the, on my waist. I
ran up to the house which was in front and I looked back at the scene, and
I looked at what was happening. There were people trying to stand up but
these were shot at again."
Gabriel Matebelie: "Well I heard the shooting and as I turned back to run, I
heard another shot and I felt hit on my head and I put my hand over my
head and I could feel blood. My legs started shaking and I fell down. ... It
was as I was turning to run into 16th avenue."
Two R1 bullets, forty-four shotgun cartridges and at least four 9mm pistol
rounds were fired by police during the shooting. The Commission had
confirmed post-mortem reports of 20 people who were killed. Molly
Blackburn and Emson Banda testified to the effect that it was believed in
the community that 43 people were killed. Neither of them could provide
the commission with hard documentary evidence to support this
allegation. Of the 20 official deaths, there were 5 women and 15 men.
Their ages ranged from 11 to 50 years, with nine of the deceased below the
age of 16.55 In addition, 27 were wounded excluding many of those who
never went to hospital for treatment for fear of being arrested. Of the
known injured, 20 were men and 7 were women. Of the 23 whose ages
could be established, 6 were 16 or younger, 15 were between 18 and 30 years
and 2 were between 30 and 50 years of age.
Of those killed, one died from a 9mm pistol bullet and 19 died from
shotgun ammunition. All except one of the injured were hit by shotgun
fire while the remaining victim was hit by an R1 bullet.
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Only one of those killed was shot from the front while five of the injured
were hit from the front. No less than 35 of the total of 47 dead and injured
were shot from the rear.56
Given that most of those injured and killed were probably in the front row
of the crowd, and given that over a quarter were women and that a high
proportion were young people, it follows that the police shot people -
many of whom were women and children - who had already turned
round to run away. Their gender, age and absence of weapons would
suggest this was not an aggressive organised mob bent on overpowering
two caspirs and making its way to Uitenhage to kill whites. One member
of the crowd summed up the feelings of many when he said: "I never
thought that they would do anything to us with their guns because we had
nothing. "57
The people fled to the opposite hill and watched the police climb down
from their caspirs. About seventy people lay dead or screaming in pain.
The community witnesses alleged the police then laid stones amongst the
bodies, shot some survivors, made ugly comments and prevented the
ambulances from arriving for twenty minutes. No matter what happened
after the shooting, the fact remains that the moment of extreme violence
had arrived. It brought to a head months of ongoing violence between
Uitenhage's black community and police and triggered a rupture between
state and community that would, until the forced removal of Langa over a
year later, give rise to a new form of resistance and conflict.
CONCLUSION
The policemen who gave evidence to the Kannemeyer Commission were
united in their attempt to argue that the primary objective of the crowd
and its leaders was to kill whites in Uitenhage and not attend a funeral in
Kwallobuhle. This was crucial for them because as long as the view that
the crowd was on its way to a funeral remained credible, then their
decision to use such brutal force to stop the crowd could be seriously
questioned. They knew that if it came to weighing up the moral validity of
implementing a badly conceived magisterial order and the right of the
crowd to attend a funeral that had been planned well in advance, the
_
conclusion that the police acted in bad faith was more than a distinct
probability.
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Everything hinges, then, on the collective intention of the crowd. To
determine the intentions of collectivities means questioning traditional
liberal assumptions about individual rationality. On one extreme Elias
Cannetti has argued that when individuals join crowds a collective sense
of power is created that destroys the individuals' respect for authority and
turns him or her into a manipulable member of a "hunting pack"
motivated by destructive primordial instincts. The leaders of crowds are
pathological paranoiacs who crave power for its own sake and not because
they desire retribution or justice.58
E.P. Thompson, Charles Tilly et. al., George Rude and Barrington Moore
reject the notion that crowds express primordial or irrational impulses.59
Instead, using an historical method absent in Cannetti's work, they
explain the occurrence of crowd action in terms of the violation of shared
moral norms or popular conceptions of justice. For Thompson "the
grievances [of the crowd] operated within a popular consensus as to what
were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices." 60 For the Tillys,
"[i]n general, justice - and conflicting conceptions of justice at that - lies at
the heart of violent conflict."61
Cannetti's theory of crowd behavior is implicit in police perceptions of the
township mob. Its irrational violent intentions, the strange rastafarian
leader carrying a petrol bomb, the primitive singing style and the bizarre
account of the bare-breasted woman, are all images of the primordial,
clearly calculated to justify their role as enforcers of "civilised" law and
order.
This chapter has questioned the irrationalist conception of crowd behavior
and attempted to reconstruct the logic of crowd action, a logic that is
determined by both the contingencies of the moment and the dull
compulsion of deeper longer-run social tensions. In the final analysis the
crowd was a collectivity united by the immediate belief that their right to
attend the funeral had been violated. This was the "popular consensus"
that resulted in the march. It was based on the desire to enforce what was
seen as a legitimate practice and not on the revolutionary objective to
challenge authority for its own sake.
EPILOGUE
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In the end, justice was done when the state agreed to settle a damages
claim lodged by 51 of the victims. In August 1987, the state handed over a
total of R1,3 million to these victims and in so doing effectively admitted
liability for this terrible event. Moses Bucwe, who was one of the
recipients, told a reporter that he intended using his R17 000.00 payout to
buy his family a house. But by then he, his family and many other families
had been forcibly removed from Langa to Kwallobuhle.62
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CHAPTER 6
THE "NECKLACING" OF BENJAMIN KINIKINI: A CASE STUDY OF
CROWD VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION
As dawn broke on Tuesday 1 September 1987, and the first rays of summer
illuminated the imposing walls of Pretoria Central Prison, Moses Jantjies
and Wellington Mielies were fetched by the wardens from their place on
death row. They were prepared in the usual fashion and then taken to a room
where they were hung by their necks until they died. 1 Accused of being South
Africa's first inecklaces2 murderers, these two young men from Uitenhage
were tortured into admitting that they were part of a crowd that was directly
responsible for the brutal killing and necklacing of Benjamin Kinikini and
his sons and associates on the 23rd March 1985, 3 just two days after the Langa
Massacre.
Even though there was insufficient evidence that they directly assaulted the
victims, the mere fact that they were part of a crowd engaged in collective
violence was sufficient to convict them of murder in terms of the notorious
doctrine of 'common purpose'. As Justice Mullings, the presiding Judge,
argued in his final judgment: "Where .... the state has no evidence of the
participation by an accused in the actual assault which causes the death of the
deceased, the state must prove not only the intention to kill, but also active
participation in the acts or conduct of the group or crowd which is responsible
for such killing."4 It was this simple and remarkable statement that was the
basis of the Judge's decision to not only find Jantjies and Mielies guilty of
murder, but also to sentence them to death by hanging.5
This chapter is disinterested in the individual guilt or innocence of Jantjies
and Mielies, and more interested in how this crowd formed and why it acted
in the way that it did. The defense, prosecution and the Judge spent much
time during the year-long trial discussing this crowd, but only in order to
establish whether the accused were part of and/or shared the putative
intentions of the crowd. Without being concerned with court-room
argumentation, this same material will be used in this chapter to understand
the crowd and its direct and undisputed involvement-in extremely brutal
forms of collective violence.6
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When it comes to the "behavior" of crowds and mobilised groups involved
in collective violence, it has been the social psychologists rather than the
sociologists, historians or political scientists that have in recent years been
most helpful in illuminating the moral economy of violent crowds.7 Foster,8
Manganyi9 and Straker et. al. 10 all share the view that crowd violence needs
to be understood in terms of a complex merging of the wider set of power
relations that are socially, culturally and politically structured and the
psychology of the individual participant in crowd action that is the subject
that mediates these relations in space and time. 11 Taking this as a conceptual
point of departure, this chapter will link the events of the 23rd March to the
immediate aftermath of the Langa Massacre, and to the deeper and more
longer-term consequences of the political conflicts identified most particularly
in Chapter 4 and the socio-economic trends identified in Chapters 1 and 2.
The analysis of crowd action provided here will go beyond most previous
accounts of crowd action because instead of simply looking at causes (mainly
'social' and 'structural' for opposition writers and 'conspiratorial' for state-
linked writers) and effects (mainly psychological and political), an attempt
will be made here to examine the specific events and actions that transformed
what was an initially relatively peaceful (albeit defensive) gathering, into an
extremely violent crowd that embarked on actions that started a new trend in
the way crowds vented their anger in South Africa's townships - a trend that
many caught up in the desperate street battles of the 1980s were to emulate in
townships across the country over the years that followed. 12 This
examination of violent crowd action also fills a gap that Seekings identified in
his survey of 500 publications on township politics after which he concluded
that whereas non-violent crowd action was well researched, the opposite was
true for cases of violent crowd action. 13 It also takes up where Dennis Davis
left off when he criticised the notion of "deindividuation" which was used as
a psychological device by defense teams during "common purpose" trials to
diminish the intended and rational guilt of their clients.14
The killing of the Kinikini family and the destruction of their property was
presented by the local and international media as primarily a political act by
an angry crowd seeking revenge for the Langa Massacre. Although logical
enough, the reality was that the final acts of violence that took place around
11h00 on Saturday 23rd March were the result of a tragic chain of events that
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began with pre-dawn abductions of children by Jimmy Claassen's
Peacemakers. In other words, just like all the instances of conflict and
negotiation dealt with in this thesis, even here there are explanations for
violent crowd behavior that are highly contingent and, therefore, their
explanation is difficult to derive exclusively from the logic of the larger
structural and political dynamics.
LEAD-UP TO THE FORMATION OF THE CROWD
Mzobanzi Kamteni was 19 years old in March 1985. He was not attending
school that year and the previous year he failed standard 7. He had studied
English, Xhosa, history and geography and could tell the time. On the night of
22nd March he slept alone in his parents house because his parents were
visiting friends, at least this is what he told the court. At about 4am (probably
later because the dawn light was already visible), he was suddenly awakened
by the sound of his front door being kicked open. Then next moment three
men rushed into his room, grabbed him under the arms and dragged him out
into the yard, beating him as they went along. Jimmy Claassens was waiting at
the gate with a gun in his hand. Mzobansi was loaded into a Ford Custom
where he found two other boys, Landile Kula and Thami Brenda. A fourth
boy was then picked up, his name was Michael Klaas. After - moving about the
township and accosting people in a generally threatening and aggressive
manner, the Peacemakers made their way to Benjamin Kinikini's funeral
parlour, a place that the community and the Kinikini family referred to as the
"barracks". When they arrived there, the youths were put into the cold room
where bodies that were there waiting to be prepared for burial were kept.
They were in this cold room for a while until at about 6h30-7h00, they were
taken by truck out to a place referred to as "the bush" where Kamteni and one
other was severely beaten with sjamboks. The assault was interrupted by the
arrival of a police vehicle that took the children to a garage on the outskirts of
Kwallobuhle where they were transferred to another vehicle that took them
to the police station.15
Major Theron was second-in-command of the South African Police (SAP)
forces in Uitenhage at the time, and in full command of all unrest units on
the 23rd March. He was a seasoned policeman with 22 years experience in the
force during which time he was responsible for conventional policing (except
for a brief stint dealing with unrest in 1976). He only started dealing with
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'unrest' matters in Uitenhage in March 1985 16 and although he had been
stationed in Uitenhage since 1967 and steadily climbed his way up the ladder,
he "first set foot" in Kwallobuhle on the 22nd March 1985. 17 This was the
man who was to make the key strategic decisions about how to handle crowd
action that day.
Major Theron reported for special duty at the temporary base in Uitenhage
shortly before 6h00. His special duties were the result of a huge police
operation that was mounted hours after the massacre on the 21st, including
the flying in of 120 policemen from around the country as reinforcements to
deal with the Uitenhage crisis 18 - many of them encamped in the temporary
base. Major Theron, however, was never given a proper briefing. Instead he
and the other policemen on the 6h00-18h00 shift on the 23rd started the day
with what seemed like a haphazard parade where section leaders were
allocated their teams and given their vehicles and ammunition. A quick
briefing on their duties was provided. As one policeman put it, "things were
very disorganised during those first few days".19
Major Theron had 3 Caspirs at his disposal, a landrover and the truck he was
in. There was also a helicopter available at the base. He entered Kwallobuhle
to patrol the area shortly after 6h00. For much of the first hour he noticed
nothing that was cause for alarm. 20 That was until he arrived at Poswa
Square where a large agitated crowd had gathered. This was shortly after 7h00.
As in Langa on the 21st, both Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth-based security
forces were responsible for patrolling Uitenhage townships without much
coordination between them. 21 This is why Lt. Kritzinger of Port Elizabeth's
Diamond and Gold branch was doing special duty in Kwallobuhle on the
morning of the 23rd.22 He was in charge of a Caspir and ten men and was in
radio contact with the temporary base. He was moving southwards down
Mabandla Street towards Poswa Sq. some time before 7am when he came
across a group of 10 to 12 men. He stopped at the group and with the
assistance of Constable April who interpreted for him, Kritzinger established
from the group that they were looking for children that Jimmy and the
Peacemakers had abducted that morning.
Dumse Nogcaza woke up at his uncle Jimmy's house early on Saturday 23rd.
He was a member of the Peacemakers and had participated in various
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Peacemaker activities.23 He was 20 years old in March 1985 and was born in
Langa at 21 Khetse street. He was functionally illiterate and could not tell the
time. He had left school when he was doing standard 3 because "I did not
have money to buy books and uniform". 24 Through his uncle Jimmy,
though, he got involved with the Peacemakers. Jimmy gave him work in his
shop where he packed groceries and did deliveries. 25 After the beginning of
"the comrades and the burning of people" 26 he began living at Jimmy's
house in Relu street. His whereabouts and what he saw during the course of
the morning of the 23rd is what made him the state's most valuable witness
during the trial of Jantjies and the others. (At the time of the trial he was
already serving one year of a two year sentence [one year suspended] for his
participation in the assault of three youths by Jimmy and the Peacemakers27
during April 1985.)
Dumse's story was simple: he, Jimmy, and a group of Jimmy's men decided to
take three (he disagreed that there were four) youths who had been 'arrested'
by the Peacemakers to the police station. On their way, they were flagged
down by Benjamin Kinikini and his sons who wanted a lift to the 'barracks'.
According to Dumse, the Kinikini group were dropped off at the barracks and
because it was drizzling slightly and he only had on a t-shirt, he decided to
stay behind with them.28 As they always did with people they 'arrested',
Jimmy and his men then took the children to the police station. Ignoring for
the moment the fact that Dumse had an interest in denying that the youths
were ever taken to the 'bush' to be beaten, it is possible to accept that Dumse
did join the Kinikini group at some stage and sat outside with them probably
talking about the sounds of the toyi-toyi 29 coming from the direction of
Poswa Square. This group included Benjamin Kinikini (the father), 20 year
old Silumko who was his son, a 13 year old boy called Stanley (known as
Gwala) who was also Benjamin's son, the 16 year old Qondile who was
Benjamin's nephew and 20 year old Eric (known as Geelmuis) who was
another nephew, and Zalisile Pram (a friend of Silumko's). 30 It soon became
clear that the toyi-toying group was getting louder and seemed to be getting
closer. Geelmuis climbed onto the roof and shouted down: "They are coming
towards Mabandla. There are people coming, armed with pick handles and
spades, and they are singing 'sellout!', 'sellout!'". 31 The group then moved
inside and began preparing to protect themselves. Only Dumse survived to
tell the story of what happened to them that day.
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Partly in reaction to the abduction of the children, but also responding to the
early morning disturbances caused by the Peacemakers, a small group of
people gathered on Poswa Square before 7h00. Some of them had already
telephoned the temporary base where they spoke to a Sgt. Loubscher and
inquired whether the abducted children had been brought into the temporary
base or police station. Loubscher replied that no children had been brought in
and after checking, reported that there were no reports of children having
been brought into the Uitenhage police station. 32 The effects of the unknown
whereabouts of the children and the knowledge that Jimmy and the
Peacemakers were responsible for taking them, must have generated a sense
of panic and anxiety amongst those who began to gather at Poswa Square to
collectively discuss the problem. When Lieutenant Kritzinger first met them,
he said there were only about 10 or 12 in the group 33 and that they were
extremely agitated by all accounts. Amongst this early group was Brandy Boss
and Phindile Mkoto,34 as well as Moses Jantjies.35 Although it is unclear
how he actually became involved in this original group, it is clear that unlike
most of the others who were accused of murdering Kinikini et. al., he was
one of the few who was actually there from when the crowd was still a small
gathering of frightened and angry people from the community.
His death by hanging was a tragedy, but for Moses Jantjies life was probably
an even greater tragedy. Like Dumse Nogcaza whose testimony was
responsible for the judgment that led to his death, Moses was caught up in
the cycles of violence that consumed daily life during those almost traumatic
days in late March - days when violence gave desperate lives a momentary
meaning. Although the court accepted that Moses was born in Langa
somewhere around 1964, he never knew his birth date when his lawyer
interviewed him on death row in August 1987. 36 His father deserted the
family when he was four months old and he was brought up by his mother's
sister. He first met his mother in 1979, but she died that same year. He
remembers being badly beaten by his Aunt who often hit him all over his
body and head with a stick. He remembers running away at times to get away
from the beatings. At the time of his arrest in 1985, he was living with his
aunt in Kwallobuhle in a house they moved into after the forced removals
from Langa in 1981 ejected them from their Langa home. His aunt worked as
a domestic worker until she lost her job in 1984. She could not afford to send
him to school beyond "sub B", thus leaving him illiterate. He grew up as just
another one of those hungry badly clothed boys who roam the streets of most
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townships. He was last employed as a construction worker in 1983 and after
his cousin lost her job in 1984, the household had no steady income. He
managed to scrape together enough to buy food by being a caddie at the golf
course or helping his uncle who sold firewood in return for some spare food.
However, he often went hungry. This is why he eventually turned to crime.
He was sentenced to 6 months in prison for housebreaking in 1981, 6 months
for theft in 1981-82 and another 9 months in 1982-83 for theft. This was also a
period during which he started to suffer from severe epilepsy.
Although the prosecution made much of the fact that Jantjies defined himself
as a "comrade" in the statement that was coerced out . of him during his
interrogation, there is no evidence of any real political awareness. He was not
a member of a political organisation at the time, and his view of the UDF was
of an organisation that was "trying to put things right for people. I am told
that we as black people want to live in white areas." He knew that Mandela
was the head of the ANC, but not that the ANC was banned. As Straker et. al.
found when dealing with similar people, Jantjies was typical of the kind of
person that found a home in the toyi-toyi and an outlet for his deepest rage
in crowd violence.37 Like the state witness that testified against him, their
domestic and social lives prepared them well for the brutality they witnessed.
THE CROWD IN THE MAKING
It was wet and cloudy with occasional light rain when people started
gathering at Poswa Square between 6h30 and 7h00. 38 The small group that
gathered was intent on finding the abducted children and had already decided
to go to the "barracks" to search for them. 39 Someone in the group reported
that the children were not at the temporary base or the police station and
someone else said that normally Jimmy's captives are kept in what was called
the "fridge", i.e. the cold room for storing corpses that were going to be
buried.40 While some stood, most of the group sat around in a circle while
someone stood in the centre of the circle and tried to organise the discussion
about what to do.41 More people joined the group all the time and a number
were armed with various implements.42 It was at this point that Lt.
ICritzinger came across the group. Across the way at the "barracks", Dumse
Nogcaza and the Kinikinis also saw Kritzinger approach the group. 43 Lt.
Kritzinger and Constable. April got out of their Caspir and with April
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interpreting Kritzinger asked the group what the problem was. Everyone
then crowded around them and speaking all at once told the policemen that
they were looking for the children that Jimmy had arrested. The group was
convinced that the children had been taken to the "barracks". Kritzinger
asked the group to calm down and for two people to be put forward to talk to
him. After Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto came forward to represent the
group, and after some discussion, ICritzinger, April, Brandy, Phindi1e and a
Constable Kruger walked to the "barracks", taking a short cut through the
shop's yard behind the "barracks" and across the wire fence. This delegation
met Benjamin Kinikini outside in the yard of the "barracks" and after a
discussion conducted in Afrikaans, Kinikini allowed the delegation to search
the premises, including the cold room. They found nothing. They then
walked back to what had become a crowd which by this stage had grown
rapidly from a small group that had earlier agreed to the terms of a search of
the premises to find the children, to a large crowd of about 1000 that was
unaware of what had transpired earlier. Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto
tried to report back to the crowd that the children were not in the 'barracks".
The crowd, however, was not satisfied with this and without denying the
truth of what was reported back, started to chant "We want our children! We
want our children!" In other words, the fact that the children were not found
in the "barracks" did not resolve the crowd's problem because this simply
proved where the children were not, and not where they actually were.
Kritzinger responded by trying to find out by radio if there was any news of
the children at the temporary base, but Sgt. Loubscher had nothing positive to
report. While the original group that were still clustered around Kritzinger
were prepared to wait until he found out something definite, the crowd
which was growing rapidly to about 3000 in number was becoming extremely
restless and aggressive. Kritzinger, however, did not feel threatened at this
stage because he did not believe that the anger was directed at the police.
After waiting in vain for a positive radio report, Kritzinger noticed that
Major Theron had arrived on the scene in a white pick-up truck,
accompanied by a Caspir. A landrover with a sneeze machine attached to it
followed soon after. Knowing that Theron was first in command, Kritzinger
did two things: he wrote down his details on a piece of paper and gave this to
Brandy and Phindile, and he ordered his radio man to inform Theron about
what had happened.44 Major Theron addressed the crowd through a
loudspeaker, but Kritzinger could not hear what he was saying. Instead, he
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noticed that things had begun to get extremely tense: "I felt here was a can of
petrol," he told the court, "all it needed was someone to light the match." He
eventually left the scene to follow up on a group that had broken away from
the crowd and was heading towards Kinikini's house.45
Although Major Theron insists that he immediately entered into
negotiations with representatives from the crowd, Lt. Kritizinger said that
before he (Kritzinger) left the scene, the sneeze machine was used to disperse
the crowd, thus implicating Theron. However, according to Dumse who was
watching from the "barracks", it was Kritzinger assisted by the sneeze
machine who dispersed the crowd46 before Theron arrived. In any event,
what is indisputable is that by the time Theron arrived, the crowd was about
3000 strong and very agitated. It was toyi-toying and slogans were ringing out
aimed at Jimmy and the Kinikinis. 47 Whether Kritzinger or Theron
dispersed the crowd, the fact of the matter was that it had grown rapidly to a
large crowd in a matter of an hour and notwithstanding ICritzinger's efforts,
instead of finding redress had been forcibly dispersed by police action.
Nevertheless, all accounts agree that it re-grouped and after re-grouping was a
large toyi-toying crowd that seemed unlikely to negotiate a resolution to its
problems. This, however, is exactly what happened once again before the final
transition to violent action was made.
Theron's truck and the Caspir that was with him stopped a few paces away
from the 3000 strong toyi-toying crowd that comprised men, women and
children - it was not simply a youthful bunch of male "comrades".48 Nor was
it tightly bunched up in a way that may have reflected an organised common
purpose. It was loosely structured and smaller groups were constantly
breaking off the main group to head off in their own directions. 49 Theron
insisted repeatedly in court that the crowd was not at all hostile to the police
at this stage. The men from the Caspir got out while Theron walked up to the
crowd and asked them to put forward representatives to talk to him. This
time four people came forward, two of them old people. After 15 minutes
discussion, Theron proposed that he send them to the police station to see for
themselves whether the children were there. Whereas the two older people
agreed with this strategy, the younger ones were opposed to it. To resolve
their differences, the four went back to the crowd and through a loud hailer
supplied by Theron informed the crowd of Theron's offer. Eventually, two
people came back to Theron and declared their readiness to go to the police
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station50 - they were Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto. 51 They were taken in
a police vehicle while Theron remained behind with the crowd. It was an
hour before Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto returned. Although the toyi-
toying continued and the crowd grew in size during this hour, it remained
calm and grouped together.52
While the crowd and Theron negotiated, one of the police vehicles was
contacted by Sgt. Loubscher and instructed to investigate an area where the
children were being assaulted. This was done, and as Kamteni's account
makes clear, the assault was interrupted and the children taken to the police
station. 53 Theron radioed ahead to the temporary base and found out that a
group of children had indeed arrived at the temporary base. However, he was
convinced that the crowd would never have accepted his word because this
report would have come from the police and not from "their own people". In
other words, he assumed that "they will not trust the police" during a process
that he appropriately called a "negotiation".54
When Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto returned by police vehicle from the
temporary base, they reported to the crowd through the loud hailer that the
children were safe. They did not, however, bring the children with them
because the police were still processing charges laid against them by Jimmy -
charges that Theron was to later in the day dismiss on the grounds that
Jimmy had unlawfully "arrested" the youths. 55 The news that the children
were "safe" but still in police custody, however, failed to satisfy the crowd.
Theron then ordered the crowd through an interpreter to disperse, but there
was no reaction. Instead, stones were thrown at the police as the crowd's
frustration mounted and suspicions were expressed that the children were
still not safe.56 In other words, the failure by Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto
to bring back the children was interpreted as a refusal by the police to give
back to the community what Jimmy had effectively stolen. Theron then
ordered all his men back into their vehicles and for the sneeze machine to be
used to disperse the crowd. He later described the refusal of the crowd to
disperse after hearing that the children were safe as very "strange" behavior57
and in so doing revealed how little he understood about the dynamics within
the community as a whole and how these dynamics were playing themselves
out in the behavior of this crowd. He then left the scene to patrol other areas
where trouble was brewing and therefore never saw the way the crowd
rapidly re-grouped once again.58
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This was, in effect, the turning point for two reasons. Firstly, the crowd that
re-grouped was probably also re-composed in a way that brought elements to
the fore who were prepared to go to the next stage of defiance under the
leadership of people with a very different approach to Brandy Boss and
Phindile Mkoto - possibly the kinds of people that had disagreed with
Theron's proposal to send a delegation to the police station to find the
children. Lt. Kritzinger, who was one of the few state witnesses who seemed
aware of differences in the crowd, illuminated this tension between
immediate and deeper dynamics when he said that even if the children had
been found and brought directly to the crowd, then the "immediate group
that had been directly concerned with the issue would have been satisfied. I
don't know if we could have satisfied everyone."59
Secondly, the re-grouped crowd was now no longer in a mood to negotiate. It
was angry and unsatisfied because its attempt to find recourse by negotiating
with the police was premised on the hope that the police would support
community demands instead of continuing to protect Jimmy and the
Peacemakers. When the children were not physically returned and no
matter how reassured Brandy and Phindile were, the fears and concerns that
led to the formation of the crowd in the first place were not adequately
addressed by the police. By the time the crowd was involuntarily dispersed for
the second time that day, the immediate issues of the children and the clumsy
police responses had passed away and the deeper dynamics created by the
context of general upheaval that characterised the post-massacre period began
to take over
What does not follow automatically from the above logic is why the property
and persons of the Claassens/Kinikini group became the targets at the point
when crowd anger was directed at the police for not delivering the children.
What is significant is that neither the prosecution nor the Judge substantially
countered the defense argument that aimed to "show how correct the crowd
was. It is to show the probability that Kinikini and his family were rightly or
wrongly viewed as being enemies of the community."60 When asked why
she thought her family was killed on 23rd March 1985, Joyce Kinikini,
Benjamin's wife said: "They died on that day because the beginning of the
whole thing was about that key. The 28th of November ... 1984 ... and that he
was a member of the Bantu Council. Thirdly, he was an 'impimpi of Piet
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Botha (sic)." 61 In short, unable to attack armoured vehicles with implements,
and given the direct connection between Claassens, Kinikini and the police
that had been the subject of negotiations between the crowd and police that
morning, and given the overall perceptions of the community captured so
graphically by Joyce Kinikini's court testimony, it is unsurprising that the re-
grouped and re-composed crowd was driven inexorably towards targets that
Were accessible, in close proximity and largely unprotected despite the circling
helicopter and police presence in the township. And, furthermore, for the
Jantjies' of life that ran with this crowd, these were targets that were morally
justified by a popular community consensus. It is possible, therefore, that for
them this moment of violent action was the fulfilling of a deeper mission to
do for the,community what they would have liked done for themselves - a
decisive apocalyptic delivery from intense suffering by forcibly removing the
cause of this suffering.
THE BURNING OF THE BARRACKS
Soon after re-grouping, the crowd started moving up Mabandla Road
towards Kinikini's house and Jimmy's supermarket located opposite the
Kinikini house. Smaller groups started roaming the streets attacking targets
that were associated with the police, local government and authority in
genera1. 62 Significantly, the group that moved past ex-Mayor Tini's house
never bothered to attack it despite the fears of Tini and his family who were
peeping through the windows from behind the closed curtains: "They didn't
even throw a stone at my house", he told the court. 63
 This suggests that the
crowd was able to rationally select explicable targets - in Tini's case, his
resignation from the council eliminated him as a target. As the main group
moved up the street, it split into two, with one group attacking Jimmy's
supermarket and the other Kinikini's house. According to Mono Badela, a
journalist who witnessed the events, although the police initially used
teargas to break up the crowd, the police on guard outside the house
eventually fled when they saw the size and mood of the approaching crowd.
Luckily Joyce Kinikini had packed up her house and, with the help of Lt.
Kritzinger and his Caspir,64 taken what she could carry and her daughters
out of the township shortly before the main crowd arrived.65
After the truck parked outside the Kinikini house was set alight, the house
was next to go up in flames. 66 It was after this that the crowd turned its
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attention to the "barracks" 67 where the Kinikinis, Dumse and Pram were
boarding up and securing the windows.68
Shortly after the crowd was dispersed for the first time, the group that had
been sitting around in the yard of the "barracks" decided to go inside.
Although Dumse testified that they were not particularly worried at first, he
did admit that Silumko said at the time that the "barracks" had been stoned
before and that the people who did it may be involved with the oncoming
crowd. Following a suggestion by Silumko, the group boarded up and secured
the windowless windows with planks and corrugated iron69 - windowless
because frequent stonings had smashed the window pains. Given that this
must have been anywhere between 7h00 and 8h30 (i.e. before the second re-
grouping of the crowd), it is conceivable that the group was not too concerned
that they were going to be directly attacked, especially with so many police
around. Benjamin, however, carried his loaded revolver on his hip just in
case. They went into a TV room to watch TV which is where, a while later,
they heard the first stone land on the roof.70
As the stoning intensified, the group heard the crowd chanting the names of
Geelmuis, Qondile and Silumko, calling them "impimpis" ("sellouts").71
The cars were then set alight, starting with Benjamin Kinikini's that was
standing at the garage and with Jimmy Claassens' Datsun that was parked on
the street. This was followed by the burning of the outside toilet. By this stage
the entire building was surrounded by the crowd and parts of it began to be set
alight as petrol bombs were thrown. Using a wet blanket, some of the group
failed to put out the fire that had broken out in the office because the stones
flying through the broken windows made it too dangerous. Gwala was struck
by a stone in the ribs and screamed, while Dumse was hit on the leg. 72 To
avoid the spreading fire and the stones, the group decided to find a safer
room. Silumko, meanwhile, grabbed his father's gun and fired three shots
into the crowd through a window facing Jongilanga Street - he obeyed,
however, an instruction from Benjamin to stop. By this time, none of the
rooms were safe from fire and stones and above them they heard banging as
someone tried to break open the roof. Burning tyres were thrown into the
building through the doorways creating a stench and smoke that caused
Gwala to suffocate and faint. While Silumko tried to revive him with a wet
blanket, Benjamin also started to faint. This was when they realised they
would need to get out of the burning building. With tyres burning in the
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doorways, their only way out was through a window. They ripped off the
barricade from a window and began climbing out. The crowd was there to
meet them and when it saw the group coming out, people shouted "Joh, they
are still here and they are not dead yet." First Silumko climbed out, followed
by Geelmuis, Gwala, Benjamin, Qondile, Dumse and then Pram. The crowd
allowed them to climb out without immediately attacking them 73 - there was
a kind of respite in the frenzy. The group stood helplessly terrified before the
crowd and pleaded for "forgiveness": "Forgive us," Dumse claimed they said,
"we have done nothing. The people you are looking for, are not here." 74 The
crowd responded by saying that if Silumko throws them the gun, they will be
allowed to go. Silumko refused, some stones were then thrown and the
Kinikini group passed up the last possible moment of negotiation that could
have prevented the killing that soon followed.
Silumko took the lead in trying to make a desperate dash for freedom by
darting round the corner to the back of the building towards the fence. The
others followed, with the crowd not far behind. Dumse was Mt on the back
with a stone and just after he jumped over the fence, Silumko was hit by a
brick. The others then changed direction to jump the fence further away, but
before they got there Geelmuis decided to hide in a dog kennel in the back
yard of the "barracks" while Qondile was pummeled by stones. Gwala and
Benjamin were then grabbed by groups and began to be assaulted, while Pram
made it over the fence. Groups, however, caught up with them all. In
Badela's words:
"The angry crowd starting hacking at their bodies with pangas,
beating them with sticks, and then dragging them to the
township's main road, Matanzima Street. Tyres were placed
over what was left of their bodies, and they were roasted. People
danced around the bodies of these people as they burned. To
them, they were burning the symbols of oppression."75
Dumse, in the meantime, managed to find his way into the burnt out garage
and made his way back through the wreckage to the Iongilanga street side of
the building. He looked out and saw only a few people standing around - the
crowd had all moved round to Mabandla street7 6 He tan out, picked up a
stone and threw it at the house shouting "impimpi" so that others would
think he was part of the crowd. He then fled towards Jabavu Street in the
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direction of the hostel where he found policemen congregated at the Labour
Office.
Major Theron left the township at about 10h00 and returned to the temporary
base. Before taking off in the helicopter at about 12h45, he made sure that the
children were released without being charged. It was from the air that he first
noticed that the "barracks" and other buildings in the vicinity were on fire.
He landed the helicopter near the Development Board offices. Dumse was
there to meet him and briefed him on what had happened. He arrived on the
scene at 13h00 where he found the burnt out buildings and the victims, some
of which were still burning.77 Kritzinger also arrived on the scene after the
killing and burning had already taken place, and there are no reports of others
having been there. The truth will probably never be known as to why there
were so few police vehicles in the vicinity for that crucial hour and half
between 10h00 and 11h30 despite the fact that all the police were aware that
earlier that morning there was a crowd that was quite clearly very angry with
the Kinikini/Claassens group.78
When the police arrived to inspect the scene, all that was left of Benjamin
was his spinal column lying near the "barracks" and Eric's and Qondile's
bodies were found near the dog kennel. Eric's penis had been amputated, his
skull smashed and he had been stabbed twice in the neck before being burnt.
Qondile's arm was amputated, his jugular cut and his head bashed in before
he was burnt. Silumko's body was found in Mabandla street - his right leg and
arms were amputated and he was badly assaulted before he was burnt. Pram
was found further down Mabandla street where he died from head injuries
before he was burnt - a 20cm long knife was thrust deep into his mouth.79
Gwala's body was never found.
The video taken of the toyi-toying crowds surrounding the burning bodies
caught one prominent person shouting: "These things that they do, we have
had enough, we must burn them." The videod evidence that finalised the
guilt of Jantjies in the eyes of the court was of him standing around
Silumko's burning body saying: "This is a dog, viva!" Another moment of
extreme violence had arrived. What was not clear then is how much of a
turning point it really was.
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AFTERMATH
The search for the children, followed by crowd-police negotiations and the
climax in the killings was the start of a day that Lt. Kritzinger said was very
different from the heightened state of unrest that existed during that March-
April period: "It was", he told the court, "in fact absolute chaos." 80 The shift
that day never ended at 18h00 - Major Theron only went off duty at 2am the
next morning. Badela's description captures, once again, what followed the
killings and how little the police were really able to do:
"The crowd moved towards the homes of policemen in the
township. The hunted the streets for several hours, searching for
other symbols of oppression. By 4pm, more than a dozen
policemen's homes had been destroyed. The policemen
themselves had moved their furniture and possessions while
Kinikini was burning. ... For the next two days, police were
unable to enter the township. It was a no-go area - all police
could do was hover the area in a helicopter, powerless to act. It
was a day to remember: the first necklace killings in South
Africa. It was the culmination of a spiral of violence that had
been building for months in the two Uitenhage townships of
Kwallobuhle and Langa."81
By the end of the weekend, the houses and numerous businesses that once
belonged to Benjamin Kinikini and Jimmy Claassens lay in smoldering ruins.
Jimmy, his family, what was left of the Kinikini family and many black
policemen and their families fled the township. They were given a disused
building in the white suburbs of what was once the prestigious Innes Primary
School to sleep in. 82 By mid-April the homes of some 30 policemen and
police reservists had been gutted.83
And then, as a kind of reminder of where it all began, the funeral of those
who were supposed to have been buried on 21st March took place on Sunday
24th in Kwallobuhle.
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CONCLUSION
The transformation of a small crudely armed search party led by people like
Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto into a large highly mobilised violent crowd
has been explained in terms of a chain of events that were simultaneously
contextual and fortuitous. Contextual because the individuals and forces that
created these events were the product of their context. There was Jimmy and
the Peacemakers , the vigilantes who had hitherto acted as extra-legal
extensions of the local authority and the local police. But on the 23rd they
acted in a way that, in the aftermath of the Langa massacre, finally triggered a
community reaction that the police could not cope with. The policemen were
over-extended, badly briefed and untrained to manage themselves out of a
conundrum that was partly the result of their alliance with Claassens and
Kinikini, and partly a response to the Langa massacre. And then there was the
Kinikini family: as defenders of the council, they were as unpopular as other
councillors; but with Benjamin being seen as a hard-liner who refused to
resign when the other councillors did and as someone who represented the
violent wing of that whole group of "sellouts", they were predictable targets.
Finally, there was the crowd and its different elements. From the small group
concerned about the children, to people like Jantjies and others like him, the
crowd's reactions were clearly shaped by the economic and political context
described in preceding chapters. After all, it was this context that defined the
targets of those who threw the stones, propelled the petrol bombs, assaulted
the victims and lit the tyres dowsed in petrol.
But these events were also fortuitous. A close look at the key moments in the
chain of events - from the moment the first reports came into the temporary
base that the Peacemakers had abducted children to that final moment when
the Kinildni group climbed out of the window and faced the crowd - reveals a
certain contingent unpredictability. It is only possible to speculate about what
would have happened if the following things had played out even slightly
differently: the misinformation that the children were in the fridge, the lack
of coordination between Theron and Kritzinger, the tactically disastrous
decisions to disperse the crowd on two occasions, the failure by whoever took
Brandy Boss and Phindile Mkoto to the temporary base to release the children
there and then so that they could have been brought back to the crowd, and
then the final absence from the immediate vicinity of key security vehicles
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(Theron was in the air and Kritzinger was taking Joyce Kinikini out of the
township).
In the finally analysis, the power relations that have been unraveled in this case study
reveal how, even at this level of detail, it is possible discern the way the decisions and
activities of those with authority and coercive power created dynamics that shaped thE
nature of crowd formation and action, and how crowd action reacted back on authorit;
this case, however, this dynamic ended in extreme crowd violence that effectively
transformed the balance of power. As the next chapters show, this moment may have
brought to a brutal end one constellation of power relations, but it was also the beginn
of another completely new configuration of forces.
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CHAPTER 7
"BECAUSE YOUR YARD IS TOO BIG": THE POLITICS OF
SQUATTER STRUGGLES
"I will build my shack right in the back yard of the white
man's house. And when he wakes up the next morning
and asks why I have built a shack in his yard, I'll say:
'Because your yard is too big." - Langa Resident
INTRODUCTION
By focusing largely on the struggle Langa's squatters waged against forced
removal, this chapter will attempt to analyse the complex interactions
between local township administrators, the white establishment,
employers, community organisations and trade unions. To understand
this complexity, the romantic conception of unstratified communities
united against a monolithic state needs to be jettisoned. Instead, the
internal workings of both the social movements and state apparatuses
must be studied. This cannot be achieved, however, without taking into
account the impact social movements have on the state and how the
actions of state officials affect the strategies of social movements.
Furthermore, this relationship does not exist outside the influence
employer interests exert on the local state and the way this influence is
mediated by trade union pressure.
As this chapter will show, once the object of study is extended in this way,
social processes come to light that call into question two teleologies. The
first is the optimistic view that social movements are only important to
the extent that they contribute to the build-up of a national movement
that will, at some moment in the future, detonate the collapse of the state.
This basic revolutionary tenet has a long tradition in South African
theory. After a useful review Cohn Bundy sums up this conception of a
"revolutionary seizure of power" by arguing that "this will happen only if
those who seek transformation from below can construct organisational
means to their ends, so as to link mass actions and effective leadership; if
appropriate strategies are devised in the interplay between theory and
practice, and if the armed forces of the state can to a degree be
neutralised."1
229
The second is the pessimistic view that social movements only win those
concessions that structural conditions allow ruling class interests to
concede.2 In both cases, the impact of local movements and how they
determine the terms of social organisation is ignored. For the former, the
structure of society will only be transformed when the moment of
revolution arrives and not before. As far as the latter is concerned, any
changes that do take place, occur on terms determined almost entirely by
the ruling class.
The struggle of Langa's squatters helps demonstrate that concessions can
be won prior to the moment of fundamental change and that these
changes did not take place entirely on terms determined by the interests of
the dominant classes. Instead, the differential responses within the state
and the complexities of responses from differentiated interests within 'the
community' led to outcomes that could not have been predicted from the
outset from a reading of structural condictions. These patterns in the case
of Langa that are studied in this and the next chapter confirm the findings
of Morris and Sapire which were based on similar experiences elsewhere
in the country. 3 This chapter will deal with the political conditions that
led to the beginnings of what was one of the country's first "local-level
negotiations". The analysis, however, extends into the next chapter where
a detailed analysis of these negotiations is provided.
To anticipate the argument in this and the next chapter, there were in fact
five aspects of Langa's pattern and form of political mobilisation and
organisation that determined its impact on the strategic thinking of the
representatives of the local state and local business. Firstly, and most
importantly from a symbolic point of view, there was the Langa Massacre.
This generated enough national and international attention to prompt the
appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Secondly, Langa had become
one of the most organised communities in the Eastern Cape. Thirdly,
Langa's squatters had begun to construct their shacks in a way that made
police patrols impossible, thus effectively rendering parts of the
community, in the words of a local policeman, "uncontrollable".
Fourthly, the community leaders were prepared to enter the risky area of
negotiations. Finally, by forging unity between community organisations,
youth movements and trade unions, and then using this to force business
to support key community demands, the Langa community significantly
increased pressure on sections of the state to address its grievances.
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The power mobilised by the social movement was enhanced by tensions
within and between the state apparatuses and employer organisations. The
collapse of the Council of the KTC, trade union and international pressure
on Volkswagen, right-wing political tendencies in the white community
and tensions between local and central state representatives and between
these and the security forces, all played themselves out in ways that
initially gave the social movement space to win some key victories.
However, as chapter 9 will show, these forces eventually lined up behind
a coercive option after the declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency that
led to the decimation of the social movement.
FROM MOBILISATION TO MASS ORGANISATION
The massacre, the revenge on Kinikini and rising levels of conflict
between the community and security forces in Langa, transformed popular
consciousness. As thousands flocked to join community organisations,
the activists had to find new creative ways of coping with a mass base in
the context of heightened repression.
It has been reliably calculated that a total of 140 people died in politically
related incidents in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area during 1985. 4 This
was higher than any other region. Significantly, although 20 were killed in
the Langa massacre, the number of deaths in March was 52 - the highest
for any month.5 This means that another 32 people were killed in that
month, most of them in Uitenhage. This is just one indicator of the
intensity of political violence in Uitenhage's townships after the massacre.
The number of violent "incidents" however, is a superficial measure of
resistance. More important is the extent to which different layers of the
community were being mobilised. The most significant feature of the post-
massacre period was the rapid mobilisation and organisation of different
constituencies; a process which was uneven, frequently undirected and
often contradictory. It was this process that transformed daily life in
Uitenhage's townships as schools, factories, community halls, shebeens
and shacks all became abodes for the relentless struggle for control and
power. Weza Made summed up the atmosphere when he said:
"People of Langa asked our leaders to go to Brigadier Swart to
ask for the removal of the soldiers and SAP. People believe
that if the soldiers and police force can be removed in our
township, there will be no death and violence. The people
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need peace. But there is no peace when there are people
moving around us with guns. Uitenhage is the Ovambo of
the Eastern Cape. What you hear about Ovambo, its
happening in Uitenhage. Brutal killing of people,
kidnappings, disappearances, lot of things. The people believe
that what happens in a war zone is happening in Uitenhage -
weapons, hippos, buffels and war vehicles."6
Continuing the long-standing boycott of schools that began in
1984, the Uitenhage branch of COSAS continued to support school boycotts
into 1985. The key demand of the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage schools was
the release of 11 senior COSAS leaders. When 9 were released on bail after
being charged with public violence on January 21st, the boycott was
temporarily called off in Port Elizabeth. The Uitenhage branch of COSAS
said it would not suspend the boycott until its nine demands had been met
(see chapter 8). By mid-July, Uitenhage's schools were still empty. 7 This
hard-line position in Uitenhage can be explained in terms of the impact
escalating violent clashes with the police was having on school pupils. In
this context, the schools actually served contradictory purposes. On the
one hand the schools movement could not be sustained if the boycott
continued indefinitely because COSAS leaders lost direct contact with their
base. On the other hand, schoolgoers were soft targets for frustrated
policemen who saw every uniformed black youth as a potential rioter.
Even though there may have been good reason to continue the boycott, it
was an accepted fact that going to school even when there was no boycott
was a high risk venture. It was in the context of this vicious circle that
parents began to be drawn into the education struggle. Their desire to find
some way of resolving the problem and the absence of channels for them
to do so within the educational establishment gave the Parents Committee
the opportunity it had been waiting for to organise parents. 8 By the end of
the year, organised parents were playing a more important role than
pupils in the education struggle.9
Reflecting heightened levels of political consciousness, Uitenhage's
factories, Volkswagen in particular, were hit by strikes in April. On Friday
April 22nd at about 11.00 a.m., 3500 NAAWU workers downed tools at
Volkswagen over wage demands.10 Some workers threatened to march
down Uitenhage's main street, but a downpour of rain prevented this
suggestion from being taken up. The issue at stake was directly related to
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the recession: up until the end of 1984, an agreement was in force that
provided for wage increases at six month intervals. Because of the
recession, management claimed this agreement could not be renewed and
that it intended increasing wages only every twelve months. NAAWU
rejected this by pointing out that this would result in wage increases
falling below the Consumer Price Index. To prevent this, NAAVVU
demanded increases of between 20 and 27%. Underlying this conflict was
another struggle related to control over the bargaining process. Following
the example of NAAWU workers at East London's Mercedes Benz plant
who won a 21% increase in the minimum wage through plant-level
bargaining, VW workers demanded direct negotiations with management
outside the Industrial Council. After initially refusing to accept this,
management agreed after the strike went into its second day. Besides wage
demands, Uitenhage's workers were also demanding a reduction of the
working week from 45 to 40 hours, new job security provisions, paid
public holidays including May Day, and paid maternity leave.
Throughout the year many of Uitenhage's factories were hit by go-slows,
stoppages and strikes. This workplace resistance reflected the spread of a
new militancy amongst workers in both organised and unorganised
factories. Significantly, a number of Uitenhage factories observed the
FOSATU call for solidarity action on May 14th in protest against the death
of Andries Raditsela, a Transvaal unionist. Like the stayaways
surrounding the massacre, this was another sign that political grievances
were bound to spill over into the factories. Much would depend, however,
on how relations with constituencies who had much less to lose than a
job or a house would be worked out.
The so-called "youth" were the most potent force to emerge from the
battles of township resistance during 1984-86. 11 In Uitenhage the "youth"
became important in a number of roles, i.e. defense, door-to-door
organisation, ideological direction and crime control. Although the details
of youth organisation will be dealt with in a later section, it is necessary at
this stage to unpack the rather amorphous meaning of the word "youth".
In general, the "youth" in township political culture refers roughly to a
political generation that lies somewhere between the school pupils and
employed workers. There are, however, important overlaps. In the
_
Uitenhage area, those who constituted the "youth" can be divided into
roughly 3 categories. The leadership of the youth congress came essentially
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from a fairly well educated group of young workers, unemployed young
men and students. It was largely male and most were in their mid
twenties. This group had a remarkably clear political ideology derived
from a reading of the alternative media, banned literature (usually ANC
material) and some well used Marxist texts (especially Lenin) published by
Progress and Lawrence and Wishart. Other influences included regional or
national gatherings, workshops and discussions with leaders or old timers
from the 1950s. Many of these people remembered 1976 and the leaders of
that period as important early political experiences.
There was a relatively small group of young employed workers involved
in the youth movement. Although this group overlapped in obvious
ways with the formal employed working class constituency, it did
nevertheless constitute an important grouping active in both youth
congress and trade union activities. As such, it helped bridge differences
later on.
From the perspective of sheer numbers, the most important component of
the "youth" were the largely uneducated unemployed. These people were
the product of prolonged school boycotts that had forced them out onto
the streets, age limit restrictions and structural unemployment.
Exacerbating this was the fact that because there were no schools in Langa
for Africans, it was frequently too expensive for the poorest parents to
afford the busfares pupils required to travel to Kwallobuhle. All these
pressures produced desperate young men who lived on the fringes of
legality and who soon found a home in the social movements as political
increased. Their ages ranged from early teens and later twenties. A large
number came from extremely poor families who lived in shacks and
whose main breadwinner would invariably be unemployed. Interestingly,
some of the more renowned members of this group came from families
who had strong rural links and still displayed traditional dress and make-
up, such as ochre-painted faces and headdresses.
Out of this "lumpenproletariat" came essentially two types of political
actors. The one was the person who had for some time been a petty
criminal and came into the social movements largely because by adopting
an anti-state resistance ideology he could legitimise his illegal activities
and define his actions as being in the interests of the community. Their
anti-social sub-culture and predisposition to use violence to give effect to
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policy decisions existed uncomfortably alongside the social and communal
morality that imbued the ideology of national resistance and their own
desire to be re-absorbed into the community. Prior to the hegemony of
"liberation", it was these same kinds of people who were members of the
Peacemakers who comfortably reinforced the dominance of criminal, petty
accumulator and Councillor interests. However, there were elements in
the amabutho who were the products of the schools movement rather
than lumpen groups and they joined the amabutho for very different
reasons. Because they were more articulate, they often became the
"military commanders".
On the surface it seems incorrect to lump the young ideologues and
unionists into the same category as the much less educated 'more
militaristic' unemployed. However, these social categories were bound
together by the ideology propounded by the youth congress leadership.
The leaders, ideologues and young workers were defined as leading the
"political wing" of the movement, while the less articulate, poorer
unemployed youths soon formed themselves into a "military wing"
comprised of fairly disciplined action groups - called "amabutho" - with a
separate leading body called the "Military Council". Although these
"wings" were a recipe for tension, the political leadership attempted to
retain the loyalty of the amabutho by appealing to them to respect the
political leadership in the same way that MK was subordinate to the
ANC.12
Finally, there was the constituency loosely referred to in township political
jargon as "the residents". Obviously this group also overlapped with the
employed working class and "youth" constituencies, but given an
unemployment rate of at least 56% - a figure that was usually based on the
grossly inadequate records of job seekers 13 - there was obviously a sizable
proportion of family heads who were unemployed. 14 The residents of
Langa, then, were those employed and unemployed working class people
who were responsible for the reproduction of their households including
the construction of shelter which, in most cases, consisted of shacks.
White opposition to the existence and spread of Langa soon mobilised the
residents into tightly structured organisations aimed at "protecting the
community".
_
After the massacre, community organisations experienced a huge inflow
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of members and for the first time, mass-based grassroots structures were
established. Two interlinked forms of organisation emerged. To represent
specific constituencies, there were a range of constituency-based
organisations. These included UYCO, Uitenhage Women's Organisation
(UWO), Uitenhage Students Congress (USCO), Uitenhage Parents Crisis
Committee, Uitenhage Traders Association, Consumer Boycott
Committee and trade unions. In January 1986 the Uitenhage Residents
Civic Organisation (URECO) was formed specifically to take up "civic"
issues, a function that UYCO had been fulfilling up until then. Alongside
the constituency-based structures, locality-based multi-constituency
structures emerged, namely the street and area committees. By the end of
1985, nearly all Langa's streets had street committees which in turn elected
representatives to five area committees. Whereas the actual membership
of the street committees varied in size, the area committees stabilised at
about ten members each (more on this later).
The first community-based campaign that was mounted after the massacre
was the consumer boycott. Although originating from within the youth
congress, the initial boycotts gained support. Uitenhage experienced more
consumer boycotts than any other town during the 1985-86 period.
Consumer boycotts were called for the following periods:
* April-July 1985;
* late July - late September 1985;
* resumes two weeks later and ends 14th December 1985;
* 1st January 1986 - 10th March 1986.
The first boycott was a direct response to the massacre and reflected the
growing strength of the community organisations as large numbers
became actively involved. The success of the first three boycotts, according
to press reports, varied from between 70% and 100%. However, the last
one was relatively unsuccessful with less than 50% support.
The consumer boycott demands can be divided into local and national
ones. The local ones were: students be allowed to form SRCs;
reinstatement of dismissed workers at Volkswagen; upgrade rather than
removal of Langa. The national demands were release of detainees;
unbanning of UDF meetings; withdrawal of troops; killers of CRADOCK
leaders be charged (added in July) 15; leaders must not be killed, kidnapped
or harassed.
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Unlike the Port Elizabeth boycott, the Uitenhage boycott was not nearly as
successful, nor did it have as dramatic an impact. There were four reasons
for this: firstly, unlike most Eastern Cape towns, Uitenhage's african
community was located in two townships to the north (Langa) and south
(Kwallobuhle) of the white town. This made it difficult to organise a
united and synchronised response from the two communities because
each faced very different problems related to the fact that in Langa people
were poorer, black shops with appropriate goods were less available, the
imperatives of the anti-removal struggle often conflicted with those of the
largely Kwallobuhle led consumer boycott, and antagonisms between the
youth and residents often produced a reaction against the boycott.
Secondly, the trade unions never threw their full weight behind the
boycotts. Thirdly, the consumer boycotts dragged on for too long without
any meaningful concessions being won. Fourthly, Uitenhage did not have
a local Chamber of Commerce imbued with the same liberal ideological
bias that Tony Gilson and his colleagues gave the Port Elizabeth Chamber
of Commerce.
To emphasise the role of the youth in the boycotts, it must be pointed out
that the militaristic sub-culture of the amabutho militated against the
successful implementation of this strategy. Shaped by the dynamic of
ongoing street battles with the security forces, the consciousness of the
amabutho was not sensitive enough to the complex task of organisation,
persuasion and tactical decision-making. Furthermore, FOSATU's
controversial role in the magisterial decision to reverse the bannings that
led to the massacre, created considerable tensions between amabutho
groups and NAAWU workers. It was these tensions between the
unemployed, unionised workers and residents that undercut the
consumer boycott.
The rest of this chapter will show that it was the struggle over the terms
of reproduction of the labour force rather than consumption or
production struggles that was to facilitate the building of organisational
unity in Uitenhage across community and workplace organisations. There
is little truth in Glenn Adler's generalisation that in Uitenhage "working
class responses to worsening social and economic conditions were at best
completely uncoordinated during 1985, or at worst in direct conflict."16
After the councillors resigned en masse and ECAB began finding it
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increasingly difficult to enter Langa to carry out administrative duties (e.g.
rent collection, house repairs, garbage collection etc), responsibility for the
development of the community fell onto the shoulders of the community
organisations. Renewed efforts by Uitenhage's whites to secure the
removal of Langa underlined the need for direction and leadership from
the community organisations.
However, these organisations had no idea about how to proceed or what
alternatives were available to them. This is how Weza Made summed up
the dilemma facing community organisations by June 1985: "The first
stage of our strategy was to force the councillors to resign. We succeeded.
The second stage was to eliminate the black policemen from the
townships. We succeeded. And now we don't know what to do."17
The impossibility of emulating other "Third World" revolutionary
strategies by creating liberated zones defended by permanent people's
armies in South Africa's urban areas meant that popular organisations
had two choices: either they could immediately take on the might of the
state in a full frontal assault to "seize power", or they could reach an
accommodation with the authorities to secure space to organise and
consolidate their structures until this moment is reached. The first was
not a realistic option because of the loyalty to the state and strength of the
security forces and the regionally uneven nature of the national
movement and the young underdeveloped condition of the local
grassroots structures. Not surprisingly, in Langa, as elsewhere, this
dynamic led community organisations into what was referred to as
"people's power". "People's power" referred to a complex set of apparantly
contradictory activities including negotiations with authorities and
businessmen on the one hand, and 'mass action' on the other. Reading
this strategic choice correctly and then leading with an appropriate strategy
was, in this context, a particularly difficult and often hazardous task for
anyone in a leadership position. It was Weza Made who played a central
role in leading Langa's community organisations into the unchartered
territory of local-level negotiations.
Weza Made, the soft-spoken, intelligent, shy and slightly built man whose
name was to become synonymous with the anti-removal campaigns of
1985-86, was 25 years old in 1985. 18 He was born in Kabah on 15 February
1960 in a house on 4th Street. The first eight to nine years of his life were
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spent in a one-roomed backyard unit behind a house on 5th Avenue that
had been constructed for rental by a relatively well off businesswoman
who owned the main house - ownership made possible by the fact that she
was classified coloured, although she was a Xhosa from Cape Town. Weza
lived with his grandmother, mother and younger sister (who died from
illness early in his life.) He was nine years old when he started school in
Kabah at the James Ndulula lower primary. He was living at the time with
his grandmother's sister's family in a mud-built house on Nakani street.
Although this was a big family that survived on the brink of starvation
because the sole income was from his grandfather's job at Gubb and Ings,
he fondly remembers that "there were very very good relationships
among the family. We loved each other and we were happy ... despite
such poverty and starvation... ."19 The house on Nakani Street and the
James Ndulula school were demolished in 1969-70, victims of the first
forced removals. By 1970 the household had been moved to Kwallobuhle
and Weza was enrolled at the Alex Jayiya lower primary. Weza's mother,
however, managed to escape removal to Kwallobuhle by getting a house
in Macuba street.
Weza's most enduring memories of his childhood are of starvation and
the struggle for food. He remembers hating school because he would often
go there hungry and be unable to cope, only to be faced with severe and
continuous beatings from his teachers who abused children that were seen
as lazy and stupid. He eventually stopped going to school and he and
others in a similar situation would go off into the forest to eat food they
had stolen from their homes. Huts were built in the forest where they
often stayed to escape from the brutalities and misery of school, home and
the streets. They formed relationships with the young men who spent
time in the forest going through their circumcision and initiation into
manhood ceremonies - in return for food they would run errands for
these young men and the older mentors that ran the circumcision camps.
They also kept themselves alive by picking the berries and beans off the
hedges that grew on the fences of certain houses which they then sold to
the Indian traders in town. It was the money from these transactions that
was used by the boys to go to the cinema, or to buy bread and pilchards -
their favorite food.
-
He got his first break while he was still at school in Kwallobuhle when a
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young woman teacher began to encourage him to take his studies
seriously. To keep him in school she brought him bread and butter each
day - "I wanted that bread and butter, it was the only thing I went for at
school." But he soon discovered that he had ability and began passing well
until he came second in the school. He no longer had a reason to "dodge
schooling".
When his grandfather died in 1972, a key breadwinner was lost to the
family. Things got even worse for the household. One way he survived
was to sell fish baked by his grandmother over the weekends. By 1974 his
mother's financial position improved so she brought him back to Langa to
live in her Macuba street home. He progressed well in school until 1977
when he encountered the harsh realities of the political struggle for the
first time. It was on June 16 1977 when students from his school tried to
organise other schools to commemorate the events that took place a year
earlier in Soweto. The school was surrounded and before any action could
be taken, large contingents of police invaded the school, beat up some
students and arrested many more. Weza managed to escape. His school,
however, was burnt down when members of the Mongrels and Mafia
gangs joined forces with angry students and went on the rampage. After
that, it was back to Kwallobuhle for Weza where he resumed school in
1978 and furthered his successful amateur soccer career. By 1980 he was
working in Uitenhage's auto factories where he experienced a very
different form of resistance, namely militant trade union action. By the
mid-1980s he was unemployed, living in Langa and active in the
Uitenhage Youth Congress.
REMOVAL AND THE SEARCH FOR A STRATEGY
The squatter's struggle against removal began in earnest in May 1985 after
350 white ratepayers signed a petition drafted by the deputy Mayor, Mr.
Bokkie Human, to the deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development,
Dr. G de V Morrison. It called for the removal of Langa's squatters.
Refuting press reports that ECAB was planning the removal, the Director,
Louis Koch, quickly pointed out that Langa fell under the jurisdiction of
the KTC and that ECAB's only function was the technical provision of
housing and infrastructure. 20 On May 21st, Koch told a journalist that the
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ECDB was giving "urgent attention" to the rehousing of Langa residents in
Kwallobuhle. He said this was a decision made twenty years ago but
because of a "lack of funds" this was not immediately feasible. Now 3000
sites had been completed and 520 houses were in various stages of
completion. How many were going to afford these houses without a
subsidy was a problem his Board had not yet resolved.
By this stage, however, KTC was not only defunct because the Council had
resigned, but also because an Administrator had not yet been appointed.
This bureaucratic confusion within the state was a crucial moment for the
Langa community because it meant there was no coherent or capable
authority that could respond immediately and with sufficient force to
implement the demands of the white community. Nor was there
sufficient agreement on the issue between the local NP MP and the
Uitenhage municipality over how to deal with the issue. 21 There is very
little likelihood that Langa's community organisations could have
instigated united resistance against removal if the state had acted
immediately. In the event, bureaucratic confusion meant there was
sufficient time and space for the community organisations to organise a
response and develop appropriate organisational forms.
Soon after the press carried reports of the white petition, a meeting of 1 800
people representing youth, student, women's and community
organisations met on Sunday 26th May to discuss the threatened removal.
Speakers from the floor repeatedly emphasised the injustice of the white
call for the removal of Langa. One old man got up and said: "I will build
my shack right in the back yard of the white man's house. And when he
wakes up the next morning and asks why I have built a shack in his yard,
I'll say: 'Because your yard is too big." 22 The meeting called on the KTC to
upgrade Langa and rejected the proposed removal. Made told a journalist:
"The people decided they will not be able to afford the high rents in
Kwallobuhle. Most of the squatters are unemployed or on short-
time. Most people are dependent on pensions and on money paid
by their lodgers."23
It was decided that a delegation should meet the KTC to inquire about
plans to remove Langa. The delegation comprised youth congress, area
committee and trade union representatives. Its leader was B. Haas (UYCO -
Kwallobuhle), and the rest were W. Made (UYCO - Langa), B. Sandi (area
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committees), S. Mandabana
(MACWUSA), P. Speelman (area committees), G. Nojilama (area
committees) and S. Nxusa (area committees). Significantly, this delegation
excluded FOSATU unionists and the clergy.
Deftly exploiting the bureaucratic confusion in township administration,
the spokesperson for the delegation, Weza Made, said that "since Mr.
Louis Koch made it clear that he was not responsible for the removals and
said that it was the council, we would like to ask Mr. Tini to clarify that
comment."24 Made went on to say that the Sunday meeting had resolved
to call on the KTC to upgrade rather than remove Langa, and to build
"decent low-rent houses". According to Made:
"The people decided they will not be able to afford the high rents in
Kwallobuhle. Most of the squatters are unemployed or on short
time. Most people are dependent on pensions and money paid by
their lodgers. The people are aware that living conditions in the
area are bad in terms of health. But the people [have] asked the
town clerk to develop the area and make it healthier."25
When the press contacted Tini, he referred all questions to the town clerk
claiming he had disassociated himself from the council. Coetzee, speaking
for the KTC, said that he had received no requests from the community to
upgrade Langa. He said: "If I receive such a request I will evaluate it and
discuss it with the Department of Cooperation and Development. Those
concerned may either come and see me or put their request in writing."
Before Langa is removed, he claimed, a long negotiation process would
have to be completed:
"I must first find out what the people want. I'm not going to force
anyone to move."26
Coetzee maintained that KTC was doing three things to control squatters:
firstly, it had already prepared 3 000 sites in Kwallobuhle but was planning
to more than double this number to cater for Langa's "6 600" squatter
families. Secondly, strict measures were being taken to ensure that no new
squatter families arrived in Langa. Thirdly, illegal residents were being
warned to move out but no-one was being fined or prosecuted. Fourthly,
-
steps still needed to be taken to "clear" shacks that had been erected on
roads thus barring the path of sanitation and refuse removal trucks.
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The delegation met the officials on 11 June 1985 at 3.30 in the Langa offices
of the KTC. The officials were J. Coetzee (town clerk), P. Veldtrnan (acting
deputy secretary), S. Somtsewu (superintendent of Langa), and R.D.
Basson (administration officer). (Barry Erasmus was not present because
he had yet to be appointed as Administrator.)
The meeting, which lasted an hour and forty minutes, never got much
further than both parties stating their respective cases. 27 However, it
started with both parties applauding the fact that such a meeting had taken
place. Coetzee thanked the delegation for initiating the meeting and
proposed that such meetings take place on a regular basis. He pointed out
that whereas meetings of this sort were impossible in the past because the
councillors had prevented him from meeting community representatives,
in future he would be prepared to meet arty group regardless of their
"political attitudes" provided they were genuinely concerned about the
welfare of the community. Haas, in turn, thanked the officials for the
meeting and expressed his appreciation of the view that the basis of such
meetings should be community problems rather than political affiliation.
Despite their promise not to forcibly remove anyone, the officials
strongly urged people to move to Kwallobuhle Extension IV because
services are better and houses can be purchased there. The delegation
reiterated their opposition to forced removal. However, there was a
significant difference between what Kwallobuhle and Langa
representatives respectively were saying. Whereas the Kwallobuhle
representatives argued that people would probably move if they could
afford the rentals and were convinced that conditions were improved,
the Langa representatives insisted that Langa residents were only
interested in the upgrading and retention of Langa.
Some key issues were discussed during the course of this meeting. Firstly,
in response to the claim by the delegation that Langa residents do not want
to move because they believe they cannot afford the rents in Kwallobuhle,
the officials spent some time explaining the affordability advantages of
moving to Kwallobuhle. These included, (a) a built-in R63.81 subsidy per
site to be carried by the government so that service charges could be pegged
at R19.90 per month; (b) rentals calculated according to income on a sliding
scale; (c) the right to purchase a house for R6794 + R160 (for 99-year
leasehold) + R6.00 (administration cost). As far as the officials were
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concerned, all employed people should have been able to afford these
rates.
Mandabana and Made both responded by asking what plans existed for
unemployed or retrenched workers. Coetzee said that although a blanket
policy exempting unemployed people from payments does not exist, each
case would be dealt with on its merits and with sympathy. He strongly
emphasized that evictions were not an answer. Nevertheless, the
unemployed clearly never figured in official planning, something the
delegation was quick to notice.
Secondly, the question of upgrading was discussed. The delegation argued
that the houses under construction in Kwallobuhle should be made
available for homeless people living in Kwallobuhle and that Langa
should be retained and upgraded to cater for the Langa residents. Coetzee
said he supported the idea in principle but gave reasons why the
upgrading of Langa was practically not possible: (a) Langa was only big
enough for 2000 sites, whereas 8000 were needed; (b) no funds were
available to cover the high costs of upgrading Langa's infrastructure; (c)
there is no adjacent land into which Langa could expand; (d) in sutu
upgrading was impossible.
In response to Coetzee's insistence that the upgrading of Langa was
practically impossible, Made explained that the majority wanted to remain
in Langa and suggested that existing services be upgraded. Mandobana
submitted there is enough land in and around Langa to accommodate all
the people if the Group Areas Act was ignored. Made pointed out that
"peace would not be restored" in Langa as long as there were poor living
conditions. He strongly urged Coetzee to convey to the government
Langa's request to be upgraded. Coetzee promised at the end of the
meeting to submit a report to the government.
The importance of the land issue was brought home to the delegation
during the meeting, prompting Made to coin a phrase that he used often
in the months to follow: "The squatter's struggle is a struggle for land."
More importantly, the leaders realised how seriously the officials took the
community's capacity to resist. Made's implicit threat that confrontation
and unrest would result from removal pointed to the only real form of
leverage the community had over the KTC.
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Thirdly, the delegation expressed grievances about existing conditions:
high bus tariffs, no lower primary school facilities which meant parents
had to pay high busfares to send children to schools in Kwallobuhle, no
street lights or highrnast lighting and the poor condition of Maduna Rd.
Fourthly, in response to Haas' argument that some Langa people wanted
to move to Kwallobuhle but were prevented because of an inability to pay
the rent/service charges there, Coetzee suggested that with the help of the
delegation and the residents he would conduct a survey to determine the
housing needs of the community. This would have involved finding out
how many wanted serviced sites only, how many wanted the Council to
obtain loans for them to erect houses on their behalf, how many were
assisted by employers and how many could afford to take out a bond.
Coetzee's request that the delegation work with him on this matter
displayed how seriously the authorities took the extra-state community
leadership at a time when official policy was to define such people as
revolutionary agitators bent on overthrowing state power. It also pointed
to the mechanisms that could have been used to draw this leadership into
a de facto Crossroads-type administrative structure.28
Towards the end of the meeting, Coetzee summed up the situation by
saying the committee has to decide which option was in the best interests
of the community: remaining in Langa and bearing the cost of upgrading
it, or moving to Kwallobuhle where sites have already been prepared at
very low cost. The delegation responded by saying that it had no mandate
to make that choice. It was only there to communicate the demands of the
community and intended returning to discuss the outcome of the meeting
with the community.
The meeting ended with both parties agreeing on the usefulness of the
meeting and on the necessity for meeting again. However, the conclusion
of the meeting left both sides in limbo. The officials were deeply
suspicious of the delegation's insistence that it had no power to make a
decision and required a mandate. Displaying a fundamental
misunderstanding of democracy and how things worked in the extra-state
organisations, they interpreted this as a sign of weakness and concluded
that if these leaders were so unsure of what their people wanted that they
had to go back and "consult", this must mean they are not the "real
leaders".29 Over and above the ignorance this view displayed, by making
245
this comment the officials were in fact admitting how they judged the
representivity of black leadership in the absence of legitimate
institutionalised representative mechanisms.
As far as the delegation was concerned, they were well aware of the fact
that a choice in economic terms had to be made about which option was in
the best interests of the community. However, they had no way of making
such a calculation. They were well aware of the dangers of either
depending on the "expertise" of the officials or simply rejecting the
Kwallobuhle option without offering an alternative to the community.
It was to resolve the above dilemma that Made and a few of his comrades
decided to seek professional assistance in Johannesburg.
Through friends, Weza Made and his comrades made contact with
various support groups and press reporters. These groups pledged their
support for Langa's anti-removal struggle and during the coming months
he was to work closely with academics connected to the Durban-based
Built Environment Support Group (BESG), Sue Lund of the
Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC), Mono Badela of City Press and a
group of Johannesburg-based professionals who later formed PLANACT.
Resulting from discussions with members of these groups, Made proposed
that the community organisations initiate their own upgrading proposals
as an alternative to the removal plans of KTC. A group of Natal,
Johannesburg and Grahamstown academics were assembled and plans
made to travel to Uitenhage in late July to assess the viability of this
suggestion. However, these plans were aborted when a State of Emergency
was declared in July.
By June-July, the leadership was faced with a range of related problems
that demanded organisational solutions. These included: (a) appropriate
means of defense against both official repression and vigilante action; (b)
the necessity for finding ways of re-organising to cope with expanding
membership and rising levels of mobilisation; (c) how extra-state
organisations could move beyond reaction and boycott politics to proactive
strategies aimed at resolving the crisis of daily life in the townships, i.e.
the role of negotiations in particular. In other words, the leadership
were searching for a balance between challenging the state, defending the
community against repression and negotiating with officials to find
solutions to local problems. At a national level, the UDF was faced with
246
similar problems and responded with the call "Mobilisation to
Organisation. Protest to Challenge". 30 However, the call for
"ungovernability" - a popular slogan of the time - reflected more
accurately the nature of popular politics in mid-1985: rising levels of
mobilisation, violent attacks on councillors and police, collapse of
township administration and spreading consumer boycotts. The
declaration of the State of Emergency in July and the detention of the
most established leaders, enabled the militant youth and their belief that
violence must be met with violence, to take control of township politics.
This pattern repeated itself in particularly violent ways in Langa.
EMERGENCY RULE, UNGOVERNABILITY AND THE RISE OF THE
AMABUTHO
There is little doubt that the rising levels of police violence and
community counter-violence in Uitenhage were related to the threat of
removal. The youth squads by this stage were becoming increasingly
organised. Whereas outsiders visiting other communities were greeted
with the familiar clenched fist and pointed thumb sign accompanied by
the shout "Amandla", in Uitenhage they were greeted with the call "Asiyi
Kwallobuhle" ("We will not move to Kwallobuhle"). By July some of the
youth squads were armed with stolen arms and captured R.1 rifles. They
would agree amongst themselves who would stand guard at selected
points, watching for any attempt to demolish shacks. They had their own
quasi-military command structure and identity. Crude guerrilla tactics
were devised to harass SADF-SAP patrols. The most famous was the
"hippo trap". A hole longer than the length of a caspir and about four feet
deep would be dug in the road. Sheets of corrugated iron were then placed
over the hole and disguised with a layer of sand. The next unsuspecting
caspir that came along would drop into the hole at which point a large
contingent of crudely armed youths would pounce on the caspir from
different sides. They would invariably be repulsed but, according to some
sources, not before a number of stones and petrol bombs were thrown.
The white youth patrolling the townships in police caspirs and
army buffels were equally uncontrollable and extremely vicious.
According to one soldier who staffed an army buffel in Langa during
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July-August 1985, it was accepted practice that each caspir or buffel unit
would beat up a black person at least once a day. This would invariably
take the form of selecting a target who had pulled a fist or thrown a
stone, chasing him down and then beating him up on the spot in front of
the community. No arrests would be made. 31 This meant that about
seven to ten people were beaten up in Langa and Kwallobuhle each day
if we assume there was an average of seven units patrolling the
townships on a daily basis. Furthermore, informants insisted that they
never carried teargas or rubber bullets.
During the height of the Emergency in about August-September 1985,
reports of police brutality flowed into the Black Sash offices and
churches. One story that was documented is worth repeating in full
because it is representative of the many documented accounts that
organisations such as the Black Sash accumulated.32
"I was born on 3 March and am 18 years of age. On 15th
September 1985 I attended the funeral of Lungile Nqgikashe
at Despatch. The police were watching the funeral from a
distance over the bridge. They were there from 10 am.
On our way back from the graveyard after we had buried
Lungile, the police put a Hippo across the street where many
of the people were returning home. They took me there and
put me in the Hippo. I have the same mother as Lungile and
I spoke at the church and at the grave.
Then the Hippo drove to the rent office in Despatch and I was
put in a white police van. There were a number of policemen
there - more than 6, but they were in different cars. Some of
them were wearing uniform, some of them were in plain
clothes. They were all whites.
When I was in the police van, the police sprayed teargas
about three times through the mesh with aerosols. The van
did not have windows. The teargas was too much because
they sprayed it on my clothes and in my face. I was coughing
and then I think I lost consciousness.
One of the cars that came to the police van before they put me
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in it was a yellow Sierra. There were two white men in plain
clothes inside. One of them Ht me with the open hand a few
times in the face. This policeman I know his face as a
Uitenhage policeman, but do not know his name - accused
me of being the leader of Despatch. They also asked me where
I got my T-shirt. I said somebody at the funeral gave it to me
there. It was a Uitenhage Youth Congress T-Shirt. Then I was
taken to Swift grounds where the police have tents. This is
where I was tortured.
They took me from the police van to another sergeant. He
asked me where I bought my T-shirt. I said somebody gave it
to me there at the funeral. Then they asked me what I said at
the graveyard. Then I said to them I was doing a prayer there.
After that they took me to a tent. Then there was an iron there
- they handcuffed me to the iron with my hands behind my
back. Then they started to hit and kick me. There were four
white men who were not in uniform. They kept on hitting
me. The police left me standing there handcuffed to the iron
bar. I think they went to eat. Then the same four men came
back and started to hit me again. I lost consciousness. They put
me in a police van and left me to sleep. They threw water into
the van, and I had to sleep in the water. I stayed like this the
whole night."
As conflict took its toll, a politicised culture emerged and spread through
the community. The "toyi toyi" was the most visible manifestation of this
culture. These were dances performed in the streets by large groups of
mainly young people ranging in age from young children to people in
their early twenties. It took the form of a slow forward moving jog
accompanied by rhythmic freedom songs, most of which were about or in
praise of armed resistance, the ANC and its leaders. Winding their way
through the dusty dilapidated streets, these groups performed two crucial
political functions: they absorbed into their ranks increasing numbers of
young people and acted as effective means for communicating political
messages on a regular basis. Given that the style of this communication
was repetitive, relatively simple and widespread, it is not surprising that
their depiction of the threat of removal was in terms of a white challenge
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to the "unity" of the Langa community. It was this emotive rejection of
removal, coupled to a political discourse of national anti-Apartheid
resistance, that underlay the determination of many youth squads to meet
violence with violence.33
Alongside the youth groups, street committees had begun to emerge as
early as May in certain parts of Langa, i.e. some months before they were
being written about in the press and before they were evident in other
parts of the country (except, of course, in Cradock). Nevertheless, although
ever-widening layers of the community were being politicised, the volatile
and violent state of conflict between the security forces and youth squads
militated against the organisational priorities of the activist leadership.
The declaration of the State of Emergency forced them underground or
into detention leaving the youth squads free to pursue their own
voluntarist strategies.
When Made got to Johannesburg in mid-June, foremost in his mind was
the rising level of violence in the township and its link to the threat of
removal:
"We now have a problem in Langa. It is surrounded by
the coloured area, the white area and the business sector area.
The white people of Levyvale, they made a petition asking
the government to remove the people from Langa to
Kwallobuhle because they said in their petition that they feel
unsafe. They said that KwaLanga is too near to them. The
people of Langa asked the whites to stop demanding the
removal of Langa and pointed out that it is the people of
Langa who are unsafe from these white soldiers and SAPs
who enter our township carrying guns, killing the people,
killing the children and innocent people. But the people of
KwaLanga never signed a petition about that."34
Another well-known Kwallobuhle-based UYCO activist was also in
Johannesburg at this time. He presented a similar picture of escalating
violence but went further to say that activists who still supported non-
violent methods of organisation and resistance were finding it
increasingly difficult to justify their position and even presencein the
township. He told one of his friends in Soweto that he decided to come to
Johannesburg after a crowd forced him to light the petrol of a "necklace"
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after he voiced strong objections to that method of punishment.35
Although the position of the activist leadership became even more
tenuous after the Emergency was declared in July, they were painfully
aware at this stage - as were the national leadership - that unless "mass
mobilisation" was turned into "mass organisation", struggle was in danger
of degenerating into a straight military confrontation which the
communities could never win.
For the next few months the Uitenhage leadership ceased to operate as a
coherent force. Although some were detained (e.g. Haas), others
disappeared underground. The only groups who remained organised and
retained the capacity to mobilise opposition to the security forces were the
amabutho. The trade unions concentrated on protecting the union's base
in the face of mounting repression and increasingly politicised
communities.
Rather than resolving Langa's problems, the State of Emergency
exacerbated them. With the security forces and amabutho squads battling it
out on the streets, the township administrators were unable to restore the
council's authority and it was too risky for community activists to pursue
above-ground legal organisational methods. Not surprisingly,
negotiations on the removal question in this context were remote. In any
case, Mr. Haas, the leader of the delegation that met KTC in June, was
detained. The only communal response to the Emergency was the
consumer boycott which was resumed in late July after being called off in
early July. However, in the absence of an organisational infrastructure
capable of coping at this stage with extreme repression and given the
militarised nature of daily conflict, the renewed consumer boycott was
coercively enforced by the amabutho who staffed "people's roadblocks" to
"check" whether residents had purchased goods in town.
SHIFTING BATTLELINES, NEW TACTICS
As endemic violence continued, both the state and community
organisations realised new strategies were required to move beyond this
no-win situation. Whereas the state decided to proceed with the removals
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in a more direct and purposive manner, the community activists
attempted to establish new structures to cope with repression, removal
and mass support.
By the end of October 1985 conditions began to change in two respects.
Firstly, leaders began to re-emerge determined to operate underground in
ways that kept them out of sight as far as the security forces were
concerned, but in contact with their constituencies. Having monitored the
methods and strategies of the security forces fairly closely so as to identify
predictable patterns, the activists decided to re-emerge and operate in ways
they thought least risky. This is when the street committees became
crucially important as defensive structures. Secondly, and related to the
new organising style of the activists, older residents began reacting to
youth domination of township politics by establishing their own
structures to represent their interests. This led to the spread of the street
committees and the formation of Parents Crisis Committees in line with
the national Soweto Parent's Crisis Committee initiative to bring the
schools boycott to an end.
The semi-underground activist leadership plugged into these street
committee and parent's initiatives because they supported the need to
establish organisational bases capable of countering the power of the
amabutho. What followed was an important series of conflicts over the
control and direction of the street committees and Parents' Committees as
older residents and activists struggled to assert a less militaristic and non-
voluntarist approach. Ironically, it was renewed attempts by KTC to evict
426 squatter families in October that galvanised older residents into action.
It was in this light that it became necessary for the leadership to find
strategies to deal with new needs and pressures. These included space to
organise; the need to reassert political authority to displace the dominance
of the youth squads; concessions to sustain organisation; and defense
against repression. This was the context that led key Langa leaders to the
conclusion that firstly, negotiations with the local authority must be re-
initiated; and secondly, that organisational structures must be
decentralised along street committee lines, a particularly important step if
the support of the older residents was to be retained.36
By late September the KTC and its Administrator, Barry Erasmus, appointed
on 13th September, was caught between two contradictory pressures. Firstly,
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the Uitenhage municipality, responding to renewed demands from its white
ratepayers for the removal of Langa, was becoming increasingly insistent that
KTC do something about the expanding squatter camp. To increase its
pressure on KTC, the Uitenhage municipality appealed to Minister Heunis at
the National Party's congress held in Port Elizabeth in September, to
intervene directly on its behalf.37 Secondly, the continued unrest in Langa
that repressive tactics seemed unable to quell, virtually brought daily
township administration to a standstill. This enabled incoming squatters to
erect shacks in the 4th-9th Avenue area (more on this later) thus fueling
white opposition to the continued existence of Langa. KTC realised that a
resolution to the squatter problem was impossible without bringing an end to
the unrest.38
It took the KTC until September to work out a clear strategy because of
bureaucratic confusion within the local state. Although Erasmus was
formally appointed as Administrator on 13th September in terms of the Law
on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act, he had been
what Heunis called an "advisor" to KTC's town clerk since June, 39 i.e. one
month after his early retirement from Uitenhage Municipality where he had
been town clerk. Furthermore, lines of authority were unclear because
responsibility for Black Local Authorities was transferred to the Department of
Constitutional Development and Planning in July following the cabinet
reshuffle that finally dismantled that old Verwoerdian empire, namely the
Department of Cooperation and Development (formerly the infamous
Department of Native Affairs).
Significantly, Erasmus said he turned down the offer of a senior management
position at Volkswagen in order to accept his post. This points to a link
between Erasmus and Volkswagen that was to crucially affect the outcome of
the Langa struggle later on.
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As the bureaucratic dust began to settle, ICTC devised two strategies to deal
with the pressures it was facing - one coercive and the other concessionary.
The concessionary response arose out of a memorandum that Coetzee sent
to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP)
reporting the demands expressed by the Langa delegation that met KTC in
June. Responding to the community's strong demand for upgrading, the
DCDP appointed a special Task Group to investigate the Langa problem40
and its existence was publicly announced by Heunis at the NP Congress.41
The Task Group comprised members of various government
departments including the police and army, Barry Erasmus and was
chaired by Dr. Scheepers, deputy director-general of the DCDP. The Task
Group's brief was to investigate the feasibility of upgrading the area
between 22nd and 9th avenues and to compile a Guide Plan.
Two points must be noted: firstly, the fact that squatting was only taking
place between 22nd and 9th avenues up until June, and that the Task
Group's brief was limited to this area, meant that no account was taken of
how rapidly the shack settlement was growing. This meant that
agreements reached in June were irrelevant by October when literally
hundreds more shacks had been erected. Secondly, the Pretoria-based state
engineer who worked on the project was told to operate within a
conventional planning framework which was deeply hostile to the
concept of in sutu squatter upgrading along lines proposed by the Urban
Foundation.42 Nevertheless, the seniority of the chairperson bears
testimony to the importance attached to the Langa problem.
It was also at this point that the NP MP for Uitenhage, a Mr. D. Le Roux,
got directly involved in the Langa problem. Le Roux was a large, extremely
confident and bright man in his late thirties. He was the senior partner of
the most prestigious firm of Uitenhage attorneys whose offices are located
in the old colonial magistrate's building, complete with palm trees and
colonnades at the entrance. His office was lined with hunting trophies,
pictures of Afrikaner ancestors and of his old rugby and university teams.
His firm acted for the Kwallobuhle Town Council and because Erasmus
used to be Uitenhage's Town Clerk, Le Roux knew him intimately.
Together Le Roux and Erasmus made up a formidable duo of skillful
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manipulators.
Although KTC's coercive response was formulated in a private caucus
between Le Roux and Erasmus, it was formally recorded at a meeting of
"the council" (i.e. Coetzee and Erasmus) held on 30th September 1985,
shortly after the NP Congress. On this occasion, a resolution was taken to
empower the Town Clerk to instruct the KTC's attorneys to institute an
action or alternatively an Application in the Supreme Court to secure the
"removal of all illegal shacks/homes and/or structures in and the eviction
of all persons living in the area between 9th avenue ... and 4th". 43 Having
chosen not to go for a Supreme Court Application, on 8 October KTC
served eviction notices on 426 squatters living between 9th and 4th
avenues. The notices were delivered between 2am and 4am by KTC
officials accompanied by a phalanx of SADF troops who aggressively broke
down doors and damaged shacks. This response was clearly designed to
remove squatters closest to the white areas in order to temporarily assuage
white fears until a more permanent solution could be found. It was no
coincidence that the 426 squatters occupied the only part of Langa that was
visible from the white suburbs. However, the carefully worded eviction
notice prepared by Le Roux, gave very different reasons for the removal.
The notice pointed out to each shack dweller:
* his/her shack was erected without "any permit or authority from KTC"
and is "accordingly an illegal structure";
* the shacks are a health hazard with the danger of a cholera outbreak
because in the area between 9th and 4th avenues there are no toilets, water
supplies, drainage or sewerage;
* the area is a fire hazard because the shacks have been built
in a manner which prevents "proper access".
The eviction orders were violating the patronage contracts between
councillors and squatters, contracts which squatters could "prove" because
councillors issued them with "Lodger's Permits" in the name oi the "Cape
Midlands Bantu Affairs Administration. Board!' the original name oi the
ECDB) and stamped with a 1.3ite-nhage-Despatch CommurAty Coin
stamp. Consequently, the eviction notice contained, a paragraph which
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clearly stated that if "you have been shown a site by certain persons [read:
Majombozi] who have taken it upon themselves to allocate sites in the
area for shacks" and/or if "you paid any money to a person in order to
allocate a shack site to you", then this person acted illegally. This legal
protection against potential claims that squatters were given "permission"
to reside in the area was coupled to another more serious measure. When
the KTC officials and SADF troops served the notices, they asked the
squatters to surrender their permits. Although most unsuspectingly
obliged, a few wily old women with years of experience that had taught
them that possessing official-looking documents is better than having
nothing, simply refused by saying they had lost their permits.44
Nevertheless, by surrendering their permits the majority gave up their
only proof that someone officially sanctioned their right to reside in the
area. By defining this sanction as illegal the eviction notice overturned
the community's popular conception of the justice of their residential
rights.
Aware of the political consequences of this violation of popular norms
and patronage contracts, the KTC attempted to establish and legitimise a
new norm. The eviction notices stated that the KTC is "aware of the need
for housing" and has, therefore, provided fully serviced sites in
Kwallobuhle at a monthly cost of R19.90. In addition, the notice stated,
KTC will transport all belongings from Langa to Kwallobuhle free of
charge.
The notice ended by stating that the shack dweller had ten days to remove
his/her structures. If he/she fails to do so, the KTC would assume that
he/she "thereby contest[s] the right of the Council to remove you" and it
will apply for a court order to remove the shack by force.
The eviction notices generated a sense of panic and outrage in the
community as a whole. Panic because the removal of the 426 squatters was
seen as the first step towards the removal of Langa as a whole. Outrage
because a popular norm - despite it being rooted in the patronage networks
of the councillors - had been violated. The effect on political
consciousness was immediate and electric. Fortuitously, the following day
was October 9, the Day of Peace and Reconciliation that Bishop Tutu and
other prominent clergy had called to protest against the State of
Emergency. Although there was general confusion in most parts of the
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country as to whether this day was meant to be a stayaway or not, in Langa
the message was rapidly spread through the street committees that no-one
must go to work and that as many people as possible must squeeze into
Langa's eleven churches to discuss Langa's problems in general and the
evictions in particular. Disguised as "prayer meetings", discussion about
the evictions and other problems went on throughout the day, providing
activists with a rare opportunity to canvass a broad spread of opinion at a
time when all meetings were banned under the Emergency regulations.
The activists, taking full advantage of the opportunity, divided
themselves into groups and took charge of proceedings in the churches.
They had agreed amongst themselves that although the usual speeches,
freedom songs and discussion was important, the
main aim should be to ask the meetings to throw up demands related
specifically to Langa. These were written down in order of priority. At the
end of the day the activists met and, as one of them put it, "Congress of
the People style" put all the demands together, categorised and prioritised
them. The result was six key demands (wording as in original):
lifting of influx control;
* relieving unemployment;
* upgrading of township: who is the cause of health and fire
hazard?
* people must be allowed to live where they like;
* schools, clinics, creches, playing grounds;
* allow us to hold meetings and air our views."
These demands were, in effect, thrown up from the grassroots in a
popular manner. They represented, therefore, the community's
answer to the Task Group whose recommendations were bound to be
purely technical and conventional and were kept secret and never
revealed to the community.
A committee was elected from these meetings to represent the
squatters and mandated to meet KTC to appeal against the eviction. The
committee comprised Freddie Magugu (FOSATU), Weza Made (UYCO),
Sipho Mandabana (MACWUSA), T.E. Majoka (UYCO Kwallobuhle), Z.
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Mge (UYCO - Kwallobuhle), M.E. Antonie (FOSATU), Nelson Teyise
(street committees), Rev. Bashman and A.F. Diko (no details known). This
committee became known as the Langa Coordinating Committee (LCC).
Significantly, the LCC included FOSATU representatives thus signaling
the beginnings of cooperative relations that transcended the old
animosities between the FOSATU leadership around John Gomomo and
the MACWUSA/UDF leadership around Fiks Kobese. It was Magugu,
Made, Mandabana and others who represented the new generation of
trade union and community activists who decided to ignore divisions in
the established leadership and forge working relations between the street
committees and shop floor structures. To quote Sue Lund who worked
closely with this new leadership at the time, she observed:
"Leaving aside the most vocal and vociferous feuders, they
set about work at grassroots amongst the bereaved and
frightened, building new forms of organisation in Langa."45
Although the anti-removal struggle provided a material basis for
cooperation between community organisations and trade unions,
this was soon extended into other matters. After the transformation
of FOSATU into the less "workerist" and more UDF/ANC aligned
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in late 1985,
trade unions got direct representation on street committees, the
Consumer Boycott Committee, the LCC and the Uitenhage
Residents Civic Organisation (URECO).
LOCAL MOVES BEYOND EMERGENCY RULE
The LCC immediately contacted the KTC and requested a meeting to
discuss the removals and to urge the KTC to stay the evictions. The KTC
agreed not to go ahead with removals until the meeting had taken place.
The fact that the meeting took place on the 22nd October, i.e. four days
after the deadline to move had elapsed, greatly strengthened the resolve of
the squatters and activists who interpreted this concession as a sign of
weakness on the part of the KTC. In reality, the local state was deeply
concerned about the political implications of the evictions.46 This concern
was motivated by the fact that Volkswagen wanted to avoid at all costs
another blow-up in Langa because of the international_ profile of the
township. Le Roux, the KTC and elements in the municipality were well
aware of the consequences of a Volkswagen pull-out if the international
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spotlight on Langa resulted in disinvestment pressure on Volkswagen's
German headquarters. The KTC tried on several occasions prior to October
8th to arrange meetings with the LCC, but the response was that no
meetings would take place until Mr. Haas was released from detention.47
In the end, mounting pressure from Uitenhage municipality forced KTC
to issue eviction notices. 48 When this galvanised the community
organisations into action, including the LCC's decision to request a
meeting and drop its pre-condition that Haas be released, the KTC was
more than willing to find a way of going ahead with the removal without
escalating the unrest. Coetzee and Erasmus genuinely believed they could
convince the leaders to support the removal with scary reports about
health hazards, welfarist housing concessions in Kwallobuhle and
denials about the influence of white pressure on their decision.
The meeting was delayed because the LCC knew that meeting the KTC to
simply appeal against the removal was too weak and reactive. They were
aware of the need to make concrete counter-proposals in line with the
community's demands. As a result, they contacted the group of
Johannesburg and Durban-based academics they had had contact with
before the Emergency and urged them to come down before the meeting
with KTC. Two (including the author) traveled to Uitenhage on the 17th
and 18th and after some discussions, a document entitled Proposed Steps
for Developing Langa was written up that outlined a strategy.
The document started by defining the KTC position as follows: 1) Langa
must be removed; 2) Langa cannot be developed; 3) there are no financial
resources to upgrade Langa. Based on the assumption that the removal
could be stalled, the document recommended that this time be used to
develop an alternative that should start with three steps: firstly, the
initiation of a detailed socio-economic and attitudinal survey; secondly,
using the survey as a basis the compilation of a detailed development
plan; thirdly, the mounting of a campaign both within the community as
well as nationally and internationally to ensure that maximum pressure is
brought to bear on the authorities. The document ended by emphasising
two general points: a) if leaders negotiate without a mandate they can be
coopted; b) unity and cooperation between community organisations and
trade unions will be necessary. The document was subsequently discussed
and accepted by the community organisations.
260
The meeting with the KTC took place on the appointed day at 4.00 pm in
the ICTC's Langa offices. The officials present were the newly appointed
Administrator, Barry Erasmus, Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee, R.D. Basson,
Administrative Officer and S. Somtsewu, Langa Township
superintendent.
Erasmus started the meeting by explaining his appointment as City
Administrator. He then immediately went on to say how urgent it was
that unrest in Langa be brought to an end. However, betraying a callous
ignorance of problems in Langa, he continued to reiterate the need for
removing squatters between 9th and 4th avenues because of pressures
from Uitenhage's municipality. As far as upgrading was concerned, he
said that the Task Group was favourably disposed towards this idea, but
agreed with the KTC that Langa was only big enough for 2000 sites and that
8000 sites were needed to accommodate all Langa's inhabitants. Erasmus
informed the LCC that the Task Group would be holding its first meeting
on 28th October.
Erasmus explained that eviction notices were served on the 426 squatters
living between 9th and 4th avenues because of the appalling living
conditions in the area and the constant threat of a cholera outbreak. He
rejected press speculation that the evictions were motivated by a concern
for Group Area boundaries. He said that those who moved to
Kwallobuhle would be given a serviced site, free transport to the new area
and unemployed people would not be required to pay service charges.
Employed persons who wanted to erect houses would be given loans from
the council to purchase on-site materials and council-paid labour would be
made available.
In short, KTC was making every possible concession to attract people to
Kwallobuhle. Free services for unemployed people and cheap loans and
labour for those who wanted to erect houses were, in effect, welfarist
policies. More importantly, given that the author is unaware of a similar
scheme elsewhere in the country, the explanation for why the local state
formulated these policies lies in the fact that they were a response to the
intensity of struggle over shelter in the area.
Made responded on behalf of the LCC delegation by pointing out that the
community is prepared to negotiate solutions to any problems and
difficulties it experiences. He then went on to say that the LCC called the
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meeting to discuss the eviction notices that were handed out. He pointed
out, (a) that the squatters were unhappy about the 10 day ultimatum to
move to Kwallobuhle, (b) that people were angered by the actions of
soldiers who damaged shacks when doors were kicked open, (c) that the
LCC was discontented by the fact that KTC went ahead with the eviction
notices without consulting them, and (d) the people want their permits
returned to them.
Other members of the delegation added their comments: Teyise said that
the KTC's claims that its concern was health conditions and not white
pressure was doubtful in light of the fact that other areas of Langa were
worse off than those in the 9th-4th Avenue area. Mge said that people
were angry because they believed that permission to erect shacks had been
given by the councillors, but now that the shacks were getting close to the
white area the KTC was under pressure from whites to remove the shacks.
Antonie, in true unionist style, said that the KTC was undermining the
authority of the LCC by issuing eviction notices without the Committee's
consent.
Much of what followed amounted to argumentation about various
conflicting perceptions and reports about what was happening between 9th
and 4th avenues. In particular, it became evident to the officials that the
LCC was not buying their arguments. The former's position was finally
discredited when at one stage Erasmus found it necessary to defend white
fears by pointing out that Levyvale residents complained of regular
burglaries, seven petrol bomb attacks and dropping property values.
Erasmus said there were three ways to deal with the squatter problem: (a)
shacks could be demolished by KTC officials immediately; (13) a court order
could be obtained from a magistrate; (c) an application to the Supreme
Court could be made. As far as Coetzee and Erasmus were concerned, the
latter option was best because it would allow the community to put
forward its case in court following which the Supreme Court decision -
which they were confident would go in their favour - could be
implemented. This would create the appearance of neutrality and
fairness49
 in order to redefine the issue in legalistic terms. Le Roux
worked out this scheme to use the Supreme Court to depoliticise the
issue.50 In the long run, as the KTC and Le Roux intended, this forced the
community organisations onto a terrain where they were weakest.
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In response to Erasmus' proposals and in a clear bid to retain control of the
decision-making process, the LCC submitted two concrete proposals:
firstly, the Task Group must meet the Committee; and secondly, Mr.
Erasmus must point out to the Task Group that the 9th-4th Avenue area
must be included in the upgrading proposals. The officials responded by
pointing out that when the initial request for upgrading was received
from the community in June, no-one was living in the 9th-4th Avenue
area. This meant the Task Group's brief only concerned the 22nd-9th
Avenue area. Nevertheless they recommended that the LCC submit a
memorandum to the Task Group. The officials agreed to request that the
Task Group meet the LCC. In return, however, they requested the LCC to
ensure that no further shacks were erected. The Committee, unlike the
Councillors before them, refused to give this undertaking.
At the end of this rather stormy 2 hour meeting, the two parties agreed on
three significant formal resolutions:
"Resolved:
1) That it be noted that:
a) The Kwallobuhle Town Council has instructed their
attorneys to issue letters to the
residents between 9th and 4th avenue Kabah to
remove their illegal structures to Kwallobuhle
within 10 days expiring on 18.10.85.
b) No action was instituted by the Kwallobuhle
Town Council in terms of paragraph (a) above
pending deliberation with the residents committee
of Kabah.
2) That the residents committee BE REQUIRED (sic) to
compile a memorandum on the upgrading of Kabah for
submission to the Task Group at a meeting to be held on
28 October 1985.
3) That a report back meeting on the meeting of the Task
Group on 28.10.1985 BE SCHEDULED (sic) to lake place on
29.10.1985 at 16h00 at Town Council offices, Kabah.-51
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On a number of levels the activists felt "the negotiations" were a success:
the removal had been stalled; the KTC had effectively recognised the LCC
as the representative of the Langa community; KTC agreed to support the
inclusion of the 4th-9th Avenue area into the definition of the area which
must be upgraded; and the KTC's support for the proposal that the Task
Group meet the LCC was won.52 The other gain - that activists never
perceived as such because it was not related directly to the removal
question - was the welfarist housing and settlement policies the KTC was
proposing for Kwallobuhle. These were substantially improved
concessions to what they were offered in June. Their spatial location,
however, undermined their socio-economic impact.
On the negative side two processes were evident that would eventually
weaken the community's capacity to resist. These were firstly the clear
indication that the KTC was going to proceed with a Supreme Court
Application. Over-optimistic expectations in the "fairness" of the legal
system in the coming months would serve to distract activists from
concentrating on the organisation of the community, their only real
source of power. Secondly, the LCC agreed to submit a memorandum to
the Task Group without first discussing this tactic with community
organisations. Although the idea of an upgrading plan was being
discussed, these discussions were by no means as widespread in the
community and factories as they should have been. Given that outside
"experts" were inevitably going to be involved in formulating this
memorandum, this was the first step towards a dependence on experts as a
substitute for organisation that would, like legalism, critically weaken the
whole anti-removal movement.
Some activists were keenly aware of these dangers. However, they were
not simply strategic or organisational problems. They were, in fact,
inscribed into the institutional framework within which the community
organisations and trade unions had to operate. This applies to their
inability to challenge the decision to take the matter to the Supreme Court,
the necessity for "experts" once the decision was taken to enter into
negotiations and the sustained level of repression that severely
constrained mass participation in the complex and intricate negotiation
and planning processes.
(Very similar problems were facing the Parents Crisis Committee which
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was also engaged in negotiations with the Department of Education and
Training. A crucial meeting took place between the Committee and Sam
de Beer, deputy Minister of the Department of Education and Training on
31st September 1985. The meeting, which was organised by Le Roux and
Erasmus and took place in the KTC offices, resolved that Uitenhage's
schools boycott could only be ended when Student Representative
Councils were established.53)
After the meeting with the KTC, activists contacted Dr. Mike Sutcliffe, an
urban planner and member of the Durban-based Built Environment
Support Group (BESG). They asked him to come down to Uitenhage
immediately to help them compile a memorandum for the Task Group.
Sutcliffe spent the weekend of 25th-26th October in Langa at the end of
which he compiled a memorandum entitled A Feasibility Survey of the
Prospects for Upgrading Kabah, Uitenhage. The memorandum made the
following points:
* upgrading of informal settlements rather than their removal was
increasingly becoming an accepted principle of national government
policy;
* the shacks in the 9th-4th Avenue area were:-
the best ventilated, highest and driest in the whole of
Langa;
of a lower density than most areas in Langa and therefore did
not pose a fire problem;
well-built structures indicating that the residents had been
there for some time;
inhabited by tenants who are not "illegals" and who paid
service charges to KTC and possessed "official lodgers
permits".
* factors in favour of upgrading: more than enough land, perfect
topography, and strong community organisation.
* urgent problems: high densities in some areas, bad roads, inadequate
drainage, and insufficient standpipes.
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Sutcliffe concluded by pointing out that political consciousness in Langa
was such that top-down planning decisions made on behalf of rather than
in consultation with the community, would be rejected. He proposed that
the KTC petition Minister Heunis to get approval for the upgrading of
Langa, including the identification of available land. This, he argued,
should be coupled to an LCC strategy aimed at securing funding for a large-
scale development project. The first step in this regard, he proposed,
should be the initiation of socio-economic and site surveys in Langa.
It is important to note that Sutcliffe took his brief from the LCC which
insisted that the 9th-4th Avenue area be included in the upgrade. One of
the reasons given by ICTC officials for why the Task Group did not
consider the report at its meeting was precisely because the LCC refused to
give Sutcliffe the same brief that the KTC gave to the Task Group, i.e.
consideration only of the 22nd-9th Avenue area. This is a good example of
how planning expresses conflicting material interests.
Sutcliffe's memorandum was handed in to the KTC early on the morning
of Monday 27th October in time to be discussed at the Task Group meeting
that day. Not unexpectedly, the ICTC officials were extremely surprised
when the LCC arrived with the memorandum. They never thought the
LCC had the resources or the inclination to compile a memorandum
during the short time since the last meeting. In the event, the Task Group
did not discuss the memo that day.
The LCC met the ICTC again on 28th October. It started off with a report
back by Erasmus of the Task Group proceedings the previous day. Erasmus
made the following points:
• the Task Group comprises representatives from all government
departments;
• Scheepers delivered a message from Heunis that the KTC should
proceed with an application for a court order to remove the
squatters between 9th and 4th avenues;
• Erasmus said that after taking the Task Group on a tour of Langa, he
felt positive that its members would view sympathetically the
community's request for upgrading, however no firm decision was
reached within the Task Group on whether to support upgrading or
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not;
Erasmus and Coetzee pointed out that the Task Group was of the
opinion that urbanisation was inevitable, but that the most pressing
problem was the influx of unemployed people into the urban areas.
That this view was expressed then is significant, because it pre-
figures government thinking that eventually led to the scrapping of
influx control in July 1986. This might suggest that Langa's struggle
and the very real difficulties it posed for the state, made a direct
impact on government policy.
The LCC forcefully expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the
Task Group never considered their memorandum and that the only firm
decision concerned the court order. Magugu submitted that this indicated
a refusal by government to listen to the Langa community's demands
and that there is, therefore, no reason why there should be further
negotiations. Evidence that Magugu's suggestion plus the Task Groups'
lack of a strategy put the KTC in a difficult position came when Coetzee
suggested to the LCC that it wait for the Task Group's next meeting
where issues might clarify before reporting back to the community.
Clearly he was reluctant to see the LCC tell the community anything: if
they said that upgrading had been won, this would remove the pressure
to move and lend too much legitimacy to the UDF affiliates; if they said
removals were to go ahead, this would, as Mandabana pointed out, lead
to confrontation.
The ICTC replied by trying to re-define the issue in legalistic and technicist
terms. The legalistic solution lay in the ICTC's constant insistence that the
LCC respond in court to the KTC's application, i.e. they clearly perceived
that the community's willingness to "participate" in the legal action
would ensure its "success", no matter what the outcome was. Keeping
the conflict off the streets was their only concern. If the court ruled in
favour of the community, then, the KTC officials conceded, the 9th-4th
Avenue area would be included in the upgrade and the LCC would have
to participate in "certain of the re-planning and upgrading aspects". If the
court ruled in favour of the KTC, then the community would have to
"accept" this. The technicist solution lay in Coetzee's argument that the
Task Group would be considering the feasibility of upgrading the 22nd-9th
Avenue area "in Pretoria". Once again, its conclusions would be "final"
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and beyond dispute.
Contrary to Lund's suggestion that negotiations had "come to nothing"54
because the KTC and Task Group were of the opinion that upgrading
would only be considered after the court ruling, the evidence seems to
point to a much more sophisticated divide through concession and rule
through repression strategy: concessions to those living in the 22nd-9th
Avenue area and repression for the 9th-4th Avenue area. This is why
Coetzee reacted so strongly when Mandabana threatened this strategy by
suggesting that the 9th-4th Avenue area people move into another area of
Langa until the Task Group and Court had reached their respective
decisions.
Finally, and confirming the Task Group's technicist thrust, when the LCC
asked whether Erasmus had asked the Task Group to meet the Committee,
Erasmus said the request was denied because "the politicians" would be
brought in and deliberations would be delayed. Later, when the Urban
Foundation attempted to urge Scheepers to meet the LCC, the Task
Group's response was that its task was technical, not political. Only after
he had reported to Heunis, Scheepers pointed out, could this decision be
made.55 The Task Group subsequently formed a technical sub-committee
chaired by an engineer called Mr. Bath to compile a report about the
technicalities of upgrading Langa. Bath visited Uitenhage twice spending
his time meeting the Uitenhage municipality and the KTC, but refused to
meet the LCC.56
The meeting ended on a bad note with the LCC under the impression that
the Task Group never took its memorandum seriously and with the KTC
officials feeling the LCC was unreasonable for refusing to accept the
welfarist incentives to get people to move to Kwallobuhle. In reality, the
KTC officials later admitted that they never took the Sutcliffe
memorandum very seriously because Sutcliffe did not bother to come and
see them while doing his research!57
Although the Task Group did not oppose the need to apply for a court
order to remove the 9th-4th Avenue squatters, there is no evidence that
any clarity existed on whether Langa should be retained and upgraded
and, if so, how this should be done. This reflected an uncertainty in
government urbanisation policy as a whole.
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To date government policy was deeply hostile to the spread of informal
settlements, particularly if they were as close to the white areas as Langa
was. However, this lack of clarity was a function of changes in macro
urbanisation policy. The Report of the Committee for Constitutional
Affairs of the President's Council on An Urbanisation Strategy for the
Republic of South Africa was published on 12th September 1985. This
reflected the thinking of a reformist group with support in the upper
echelons of the Department of Constitutional Development and
Planning. It was a response to the obvious fact that influx control was
simply not working as a mechanism to keep the urbanising masses out.
More importantly, however, the influx control system was a negative
urbanisation strategy in the sense that once a large contingent of
urbanising people had broken through the urban barrier and established
communities like Crossroads and Langa, the official policy framework did
not provide guidelines on how these settlements should be dealt with. In
fact, once these settlements became inhabited by people with Section 10 (1)
(a)(b) or (c) "rights", influx control instruments were rendered ineffective.
This enabled these communities to survive and expand, providing •
relatively protected spaces for other incoming groups.58
The conflict in Langa, therefore, came at a time when two contradictory
tendencies were reaching a head at national level: on the one hand the
squatter communities were clearly winning the battle against influx
control and their struggles helped destroy the classic myth that the urban
areas were an exclusive white abode. These struggles finally buried the
Riekert Commission's urbanisation policy and the intentions of the fated
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. 59 On the other
hand, by the end of 1985 policy makers had come to support the Urban
Foundation's argument that influx control needed to be scrapped, but like
the Urban Foundations' policy makers they were unclear about what
should replace it.60
It was in this context that the impact of the struggles of the Langa
community on state policy should be assessed. The Langa community
struggled to make itself important. It was important enough to have
prompted the formation of a Task Group headed by the Deputy Director
General of the DCDP not simply because it physically existed, but because it
had established for itself a political identity.
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The political sensitivity of Langa became apparent in contradictory press
statements made during the week after the Task Group met. Whereas
Erasmus said the decision to apply for a court order to remove the
squatters was made by Heunis and communicated to the KTC by the Task
Group. Scheepers said that his Task Group had nothing to do with the
removal and was only investigating the feasibility of upgrading.61
Erasmus' statement was in any case false, because he and Le Roux had
already concocted the scheme and the KTC had already resolved on 30
September to apply for a court order. What was certain is that no-one
wanted to accept responsibility for what might happen if the removal
went ahead, especially in light of repeated warnings from the LCC that
confrontation was inevitable.
Related to, but more significant than the decision to apply for a court
order, was the KTC's conclusion that negotiations with the LCC were
fruitless. 62 In the notice of motion it distributed in November, Coetzee
wrote:
"Prior to the delivery of these letters, certain negotiations also took
place between the Applicant and unofficial representatives of a large
number of shack dwellers, aimed at voluntary removal of the shack
dwellers to Applicant's housing scheme site in Kwallobuhle.
These negotiations made some progress, but later did not
continue and have come to naught."63
This statement starkly reveals that for the KTC, negotiations
were seen as useful only to the extent that they could facilitate the
implementation of its own pre-conceived plans. When this possibility was
thwarted by the LCC that had no mandate to compromise the squatter's
demands, the KTC officials used their power to terminate the negotiations.
By the beginning of November the community organisations were
uncertain where they stood: negotiations had broken down, the Task
Group engineer claimed he was still conducting his study, and the KTC
was probably preparing its case but this was by no means certain as far as
the LCC was concerned. The KTC strategy only became clear on 8th
November when the KTC served notices of motion on the 426 squatters in
the 9th-4th Avenue area. These notices were handed out between 2.00 am
and 4.00 am in an extremely provocative manner. One policeman said to
a resident: "We know you are going to resist, but let us see who is going to
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win."
The notice gave the respondents until 22nd November to notify the court
of their intention to respond and a further fourteen days after that to file
responding affidavits.
The notice of motion that was given to the 426 squatters was a lengthy 78-
page document with detailed maps, photographs and affidavits to back up
its case. The 1CTC supported its case with the following basic arguments:
* uncontrolled squatting in the 9th-4th Avenue was taking place at such a
rate that 10 new shacks were erected each day;
* the structures were put up without the Applicants permission or
knowledge;
* there were no taps, sewerage or refuse removal services in the area, thus
creating the real danger of a cholera or typhoid outbreak;
* proper roads did not exist because of the unplanned nature of the area,
which meant that in the event of a fire, the Fire Brigade would be unable
to stop it;
* 400 residents of Uitenhage signed a petition that prompted the
Uitenhage Municipality to lodge a formal complaint with the KTC about
the "dangerous and unsanitary conditions" in Langa;
* the drainage and slope of the land was such that "while upgrading of this
area may be theoretically possible, it is not possible at any practicably
acceptable cost level";
* fully serviced sites had been made available in Kwallobuhle in an area
that "is about the same distance from the Uitenhage industrial area ... as
the illegal shacks";
* attempts to encourage the squatters to move voluntarily by negotiating
with "unofficial representatives" failed, thus leading the KTC to conclude
that the "Respondents dispute the illegality of their occupation in the
area".
The key component of the notice was provided by an affidavit from
Major Theron. Theron was in charge of Uitenhage's Riot Control Unit
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as of March 1984. He argued that the "high density" and "unplanned"
nature of the shack area had given rise to a situation that "is extremely
difficult to patrol and to police properly".
"There are no proper streets or street numbers - nor are there
any passable roads. Attempts to put up street numbers have
been frustrated by elements in the population who remove the
numbers or over-paint them. Because this happens at night, it is
not possible to say who is responsible."64
Criminals are protected in the area because it is "very difficult to trace
witnesses afterwards who melt away into the mass of unplanned,
haphazard shacks". However, Theron proceeds, the same does not apply to
the new area in Kwallobuhle to which the KTC would like to move the
squatters. Revealing the intimate connection between urban planning and
police control, Theron pointed out that "[i]n this area Police protection of
residents will become vastly facilitated [sic] and investigation of crime
tremendously simplified."65
It is important to note that Coetzee's affidavit specifically pointed out that
the 9th-4th Avenue squatters had erected shacks without in any way
notifying or informing the KTC. This is significant because it meant that
unlike the 22nd-9th Avenue squatters, the 9th-4th squatters erected their
shelter without the condonement of councillors and their patronage
networks. The resignation of the councillors, therefore, had two
contradictory effects: it removed the protection of patronage but
simultaneously created the impression that official obstacles to the
erection of shacks had also been removed. The ideology of
ungovernability served to confirm this latter impression. But when it
became clear that the KTC was still able to function and threaten the
squatters, it was not the patronage networks that they turned to for
support but rather the extra-state organisations whose opposition to the
state offered a solution that made sense to people whose attempts to find
an accommodation within the system had failed.
The delivery of these notices clearly drew the battlelines. As far as the
local state was concerned, the first priority was the clearing of the 9th-3rd
Avenue (i.e. the number of squatters had increased beyond 4th avenue
into 3rd avenue) area to satisfy the white residents. Once this was
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achieved, the rest was negotiable. However, given the politicised nature of
the community, the KTC was attempting to legitimise the removal by way
of a Supreme Court Action that would require the "participation" of the
community in the process. KTC officials hoped in this way to at least
diminish to acceptable levels the confrontational aspect of the removal.
As far as the community was concerned, the new terrain had both obvious
advantages and dangers. The main advantage was time. The lawyers
assured the community leaders that they could comfortably expect the case
to come to court only in early 1986. This was important to leaders who
were aware that time was required to build a social movement capable of
directly countering any attempt to forcibly remove the squatters if the
court case failed. The main danger, of course, was legalism and the
possibility that a belief could spread that organisation was now
unnecessary. Some of these issues and problems surfaced at a mass
meeting of squatters held on the 24th November. On the one hand the
meeting had to approve the appointment of the lawyer, while on the
other the activists were careful to reiterate the need to strengthen
organisation.
On December 12th 1985 the squatters submitted counter-applications to the
court that contested the legality of KTC's right to evict on the grounds of a
small technicality. Pointing out that it was the "Town Council of
Kwallobuhle" that was established in terms of the BLA Act in 1983 and
not the "Kwallobuhle Town Council, and that there was no Town
Council with any members able to exercise any rights or powers, Virginia
Williams said in her affidavit that the 9th-4th Avenue squatters did not
need to obtain permission from the ICTC to build shacks because it was not
a lawfully constituted authority. It followed from this that the lack of
services that created health and other hazards was because of the ICTC's
failure to provide adequate facilities. Made's affidavit rested on a rejection
of Coetzee's contention that the negotiations had come to naught.
Submitting minutes of these meetings, Made argued the negotiations were
wide ranging and revolved largely around the question of upgrading. He
said the community would like to continue negotiations.66
Between November 1985 and May 1986, a stalemate existed. Except for the
demolition of twenty newly erected shacks on the outskirts of the 4th-9th
Avenue area "because they were challenging the authority of the
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Kwallobuhle municipality", 67 neither side opted for negotiated or
coercive strategies to win the strategic initiative. The community needed
to build organisation and formulate its alternative to removal, while the
KTC waited for its case to be heard by the court. This stalemate was not
affected by moves to suspend the boycott and bring about negotiations in
accordance with the Port Elizabeth example. 68 The Uitenhage Consumer
Boycott Committee said its demands were:
* the withdrawal of troops and members of the SAP's reaction unit from
the townships;
* lifting of the State of Emergency;
* an end to the harassment of community leaders by security forces;
* that all workers sacked because of stayaways from work or through
detention under the Emergency be reinstated;
* that Langa be upgraded and the forced removal of residents to
Kwallobuhle halted;
* the prosecution of the killers of the Cradock leaders and the location of
the missing Port Elizabeth leaders.69
On Sunday 8th December, a mass meeting took place in Jabavu Stadium in
Kwallobuhle to discuss the consumer boycott. Permission was granted by
the magistrate when applications to hold the meeting was supported by
the KTC.70 The meeting agreed that negotiations with the Chamber of
Commerce could take place only if Uitenhage's detainees were released.71
The statement released by the Consumer Boycott Committee said: "This
shows that when leaders are released from detention they are in a better
position to talk and solve problems. This was the case in Port Elizabeth."72
There were three reasons why the consumer boycott "talks" in Uitenhage
went in a very different direction to those in Port Elizabeth. Firstly, unlike
the Port Elizabeth chamber, the Uitenhage Chamber of Commerce was
National Party dominated. Secondly, the pillar of economic power in
Uitenhage was industrial capital, not commerce - this is why the MCI
eventually came to play such a crucial role in negotiating a solution to the
squatter crisis. Thirdly, unlike the Ibhayi Town Council, all the councillors
resigned from KTC leaving the white officials with much greater scope for
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proactive intervention and unconventional action.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the KTC became the central actor. During
December and January Erasmus went on the offensive to coopt
Kwallobuhle and Langa leaders into a multi-racial ad hoc committee. He
called a meeting of all the community organisations - mainly UDF
affiliates - on Saturday 25th January to discuss the proposed Regional
Services Councils and the potential for non-racial municipalities. Most of
the key Kwallobuhle leaders went to the meeting, while the Langa leaders
refused. Despite Erasmus' personal approach to Weza Made urging him to
come to the meeting because he is a "true leader and supported by the
people",73 the Langa leaders were deeply suspicious of Erasmus' motives.
They were unwilling to cooperate on any venture until the removals
issue was resolved. In the event an ad hoc committee was elected at the
meeting comprising Erasmus, Coetzee, Sam Haas and another URECO
representative. Keith Ingram of the Chamber of Commerce was also
incorporated into the committee. The committee decided to approach
Brigadier Schnetler to request the release of detainees and permission to
hold meetings. However, before the following week was out, the URECO
leaders were forced by the Kwallobuhle organisations to resign from the
committee on grounds that they never received a mandate to participate.
Luckily the Langa leaders escaped the acrimony this Kwallobuhle-centred
controversy generated.
Despite the failure of this committee, Erasmus was deeply impressed with
the URECO leaders74 and his optimism was reflected in a press statement
he made at the time:
"There is a conciliatory spirit at the moment. There is an
atmosphere of change."75
It was in this context that Erasmus called for a local power-sharing option
for Uitenhage. He made this suggestion at a special symposium for the
public and private sector in December 1985 to consider Uitenhage's future
prospects. He suggested that black community leaders be incorporated into
the special "contact committee" that the Uitenhage municipality had
recently established in response to the consumer boycott. He argued that
this will help improve Uitenhage's image as a place with one of the worst
race relations problems in the world.76
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Even the school pupils voted at mass meetings in stadiums at
Kwallobuhle and Langa that they should return to school on the 28th
January in line with resolutions taken at the Johannesburg conference of
the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee.
CONCLUSION
The easing of tensions in the Eastern Cape from the end of 1985 and into
January 1986 was clearly part of a shift in state strategy. Withdrawal of the
massive security force presence, negotiations with UDF organisations,
release of detainees and other moves were also coupled to an injection of
R43 million into township development. Minister Heunis personally
handed the cheque over to the ECDB in November. To be used for
unemployment relief, infrastructural upgrading, self-help housing and
the training of municipal police, these funds were distributed to 35 E. Cape
townships with Aliwal North, Bedford, Cathcart, Cradock, Fort Beaufort,
Grahamstown, King William's Town, Kirkwood, Molteno, East London,
Queenstown, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth receiving the largest
amounts. 77 These areas, not surprisingly, were the most well organised E.
Cape towns. The municipal police forces this fund helped establish were to
play a critically important repressive role later on.
Uitenhage's political pendulum was to swing a few more times between
January and July 1986 before this "atmosphere of change" gave way to
undiluted repressive rule.
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CHAPTER 8
BEYOND UNGOVERNABILITY: PEOPLE'S POWER AND
NEGOTIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
During the first six months of 1986, the Eastern Cape erupted into a
regional revolt that dominated international headlines, underpinned
growing revolutionary hopes amongst leaders of the liberation movement
and led eventually to the declaration of a National State of Emergency in
July 1986. After the lifting of the partial State of Emergency in March 1986
and the re-declaration of the national State of Emergency in July, an
opening was created that exploded outwards into a set of social
movements the nature of which will be debated for many years to come.
Uitenhage may not have been the epicentre of this revolt, but there is little
doubt that the Langa massacre loomed large in the collective imagination
of the region's 'amabutho' squads as they took to the streets to do battle
with the security forces. More importantly, the regional revolt must be
understood as the context within which the localised dynamics within
Uitenhage itself took place. In addition to responding to the logic of local
dynamics, the leaders of Uitenhage's local stakeholders across the
spectrum took into account the regional processes as they made their
tactical and strategic decisions. This is why it is necessary to outline these
regional dynamics in this chapter in order to set the context for an
understanding of the local processes in Uitenhage.
Previous chapters have explained the dynamics that turned Uitenhage
into just one of the Eastern Cape's arenas of conflict. Although the first
part of this chapter will briefly describe the Eastern Cape revolt of January-
July 1986, it will remain focussed on Uitenhage so that complex local
processes can be revealed that may shed light on what may have been
happening on a wider scale. In the process, certain assumptions by various
writers and interested parties will be questioned. In particular, the ongoing
struggle for and negotiations about the removal/upgrading of Langa
involved processes that do not fit neatly into numerous analyses of the
period of 'people's power'. Two in particular are worth mentioning. The
"people's power" literature that flowered during the mid-1980s depicted
the emerging forms of grassroots popular power as the precursors to an
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emerging revolutionary rupture. The concept of "ungovernability"
captured the essence of this notion, but it was an extremely unstable
essence that highlighted some important organisational weaknesses facing
those who hoped for revolution. Whereas on the streets
I/ungovernability" was the slogan used by the youthful street fighters bent
on attacking the symbols and representatives of authority in a way that
challenged the state but did not necessarily build up a revolutionary
alternative, the UDF leadership argued that "ungovernability" was not an
anarchistic drive, but referred rather to the process of making the
townships "governable by the people". To back up this ideology, written
analysis of these "organs of popular power" argued that the form,
function and leadership of these structures reflected the dynamic of
revolutionary transformation.1
The second view denigrated the organisational significance of the
emerging forms of popular power by arguing that "Ip]eople's power' was
primarily a response to the breakdown of formal local state structures, but
also to the lack of discipline among the militant youth, and 'corn-
tsotsis t ."2 In other words, instead of conceding that people actually can
make their own history, even substantive mass action and organisation
was written off by this kind of state-centric analysis as simply a reaction to
the internal collapse of the state system.
In the end, the literature on revolution and social movements is not
particularly helpful in understanding the interface between the grassroots
structures that emerged during this period and the apartheid state system
at different levels. Instead, the vast international literature on the
dynamics of negotiating the relations of power between interests engaged
in conflict is far more useful. An indigenous South African literature has
now emerged that has explored the intricate relations of power,
interaction and negotiation that emerged both before the transition began
in 1990 and subsequent to this turning point when negotiations became
the central political dynamic at all levels. 3 Instead of assuming that state
systems are impervious to external challenges and that the logical strategic
choice for a radical social movement is the revolutionary seizure of
power, the negotiations literature highlights the minutiae of dynamics at
the local level that demonstrated that parties locked in conflicts at the local
level prior to the commencement of the transition often reached a point
281
where the balance of power was in neither of their interests. To break this
kind of 'power stalemate', negotiations to find a new equilibrium took
place in those situations where the parties came to understand that
negotiating may be less costly than destructive spiraling conflict.4
THE REGIONAL REVOLT
In many ways, the images, language and iconography that make up the
idealisation of the entire process of rebellion during the 1980s that
culminated in the transition of the 1990s were drawn from the Eastern
Cape. No-where else in the country (except possibly in parts of the
Transvaal and OFS) was there anything approximating the heroic battles
between 'people' and 'power bloc' that the idealisation portrays. Across
the region, from metropolitan Port Elizabeth to the smallest Karoo towns
in the north and north-west, local activists launched campaigns, waged
dramatically intense struggles and tried their best to mobilise and organise
households on a door-to-door basis. The following map of 'flash points'
prepared by the Indicator SA project illustrates the geographical dispersal
of reported processes of action and conflict in the region.5
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Based on detailed studies of conflict in some 30 localities countrywide
(with most of the case studies drawn from the Cape Province), it was
possible to draw up a typology of the conflict processes as they manifested
themselves at local level over time.6 This typology is offered here as a
general description of what happened in the communities identified in
the map above. However, it would be a mistake to see this as a linear set of
phases that proceeded irreversibly to the final phase in all cases. These
non-linear phases were as follows:
* grievance expression : the first signs of community protest emerged
when grievances were expressed about appalling living conditions in the
community. When these were not addressed by councillors or
administrators, a delegation of local notables would normally present the
grievances in the form of a petition of some kind or simply as a verbal
articulation of 'what the community felt'.
* official rebuke: in case after case the authorities either ignored, rebuked
or dismissed petitioners. Officials frequently responded with excuses that
rested on unproven bureaucratic assertions rather than reasoned
discussion or demonstrable facts, e.g. 'this is a political matter' or 'this is
not my jurisdiction'.
* mobilisation of counter-power: given the absence of democratic
representation in government and (during the late 1970s and early 1980s) a
lack of access to intermediaries like the media, professionals and liberal
pressure groups, active elements in the community then resorted to the
mobilisation of counter-power as the only reasonable response to official
rebukes.
* mobilisation and organisation: grassroots organisation then spread
across communities resulting in regional and national webs and networks
that facilitated resource transfers, communication and campaign building.
It was these networks that were formalised into UDF structures that were,
in turn, effective articulators of the link between the failure to resolve
local grievances and the political nature of state power.
* demonstrating power: local and regional organisatiOnal structures
provided the basis for mounting campaigns to demonstrate counter-power
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on a coordinated basis.
* the spiral of repression and resistance: as grassroots organisation
developed and as campaigns gathered momentum, so the security forces
escalated the level of repression. Although repression did weaken
organisation, it also provided a compelling community-wide rationale for
greater effort and determination to strengthen organisation, build
solidarity and demonstrate that the weaker party actually did have the
power to match the power of the state. This, in turn, was met with
repression which in turn encouraged greater resistance.
* constructing dual power: as the cycle of repression and resistance
continued, so it became necessary to form defensive decentralised
structures capable of bringing greater numbers of people into the daily
struggle to defend the residents from repression and to mount offensive
strategies. It was these dynamics that contributed to the formation of street
and area committees.
* stalemate and negotiations: eventually, the repression-resistance cycle
resulted in an equilibrium of sorts as the activists began to find
community allies from outside the communities in both business and
local state circles. Partly as a result of mass actions of various kinds, these
alliances were built on the desire to find an alternative to brute repression
to solve the problems. This helped isolate the security forces to some
extent at local level and effectively prepared the way for 'local-level
negotiations'. Because the security forces were absent from these
negotiations because they did not share the perception of stalemate, they
effectively reserved the power to destroy the negotiations processes at will
- a power they used with devastating success after the State of Emergency
was declared in 1986.
Although an inadequate measure of organisational coherence, the
number of recorded fatalities caused by political conflict does point to the
levels of conflict between organised forces within communities and the
security forces. As indicated in the tables below, if the high March 1985
figure tapering off into the also relatively high April 1985 figure is
regarded as a special case due to the Uitenhage massacre and aftermath, it
is clear how the number of fatalities from political conflict rose
consistently from February 1985 through to July 1986, with the first six
months of 1986 recording more fatalities than the last six months of 1985.
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Fatalities arose out of many different circumstances, but some of the most
common circumstances surrounding fatalities suffered by the community
included massacres of demonstrating crowds, shootings at funerals, attacks
on security vehicles by amabutho, random shooting of innocent people by
security forces, planned assassinations/assaults by secret security units, and
deaths while in custody. In most instances, deaths came at a time of
heightened tension and conflict between communities and the security
forces.
Given that the national State of Emergency was aimed at 'destabilising'
oppositional organisations and detaining activists, it should be no surprise
that this corresponded with a drastic reduction in the number of fatalities.
This correlation lends weight to the fatalities indicator as a measure of
organisation, without claiming it is anything more than an indicator. (See
table 8.1.
As far as mass campaigns were concerned, five are significant and can be
measured from reports. The Eastern Cape was renowned for the
effectiveness of its consumer boycotts. The following tables describe the
timing and some of the processes.
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Table 8.3
•
• •****Date
'18211318:5
28/3/85 •••:•:.
1/5/85. : *
14/5/85 •
21/5/85.::.'
23-24/9/85
26/9/85 • • •
1/10/85
9/1 wa5 •
2113/86
28/4/86
1/5/86 	
5-11/5/86
16/6/86
14-15/7/86
31/7/86 •
14/8/86
1/10/86
12/3/87 •
5-6/5/87
16/6/87
21/3/88
6-8/6/88
16/6/88
UPPOrt•:-::••:•:.•••:
90% PE, 36% Ultenhage .
•• •••	 8 000	 • :
• 
limited WOrkPlabi.i stoppages
100%•Attioan workers'• 	.•
:100% AfrICin workeiS
100% African WOrkert
mass support In PE/Uitehhage
100% African & coloureds
most Afric&i.WOrkers
90% in PE/Uitenhage
most AfriCári WOrnen •
100% in PE/Uitenhage
39% of PE Africans
partial
	 • • •
	 •	 •
Partial	 -
limited Workplace stoppages
limited Workplace stoppages
97% in PE/Uitenhage
93% of Africans •
65% of African & coloureds
low workplace attendance
unknown
6ie •
.	  .
tvlanY of the Work:stayaWays that affected the Eastern Cape were part of broader national .
Stay-atL hOene CallS: ft was In the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage conurbatiOn that these national
stayaways tended to have their greatest impact.
Source: Palmer. R., "Militant Traditions: The Ungovernable Townships", in Bennett, M. and Quin, D., Political Conflict
in South Africa: Data Trends 1984-88, Durban, Indicator SA, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of
Natal, Durban, 1988.
TRANSPORT BOYCOTTS
Table 8.4
Place
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-1985-86 • 
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1985-86 
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1985-86
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Note
It is extremely difficult to establish precise dates for the beginning or end of
consumer boycotts. Boycotts did not run continuously (as the above dates
might imply) - in many instances they were suspended for brief periods and
then resumed again.
Route
Mdantsane - East London
KwaZakele - Port Elizabeth
Date	 Trigger
Jul 1983 - Mar 1985 various
begins Apr 1985	 intro of mini buses
Source: Palmer. R., 'Militant Traditions: The Ungovernable Townships", in Bennett, M. and Quin, D., Political Conflict
in South Africa: Data Trends 1984-88, Durban, Indicator SA, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of
Natal, Durban, 1988.
The classic Eastern Cape urban context was the small white town
centred around its CBD characterised by well serviced suburbs, and on an
outer perimeter a black township with uniform houses centred around
transport nodes, basic commercial services and all this surrounded by
shacks. This was a particularly easy geographical unit to use as a basis for
organising consumer boycotts, particularly if township business people
stood to gain from the boycott of white shops and in return supported
activists with food, money and transport. The consumer boycotts
invariably had two sets of objectives. The first set was articulated by
politically articulate local and regional leaders in terms of the need to force
local business to support political demands such as the lifting of the State
of Emergency, release of political prisoners, unbanning of organisations
and so on. This set of demands were often published in pamphlets, news
and other popular forms. The second set were articulated at a local level by
local leaders involved in mobilising local constituencies and/or involved
in justifying the strategy. To achieve these organisational objectives, local
activists and leaders attached a set of local demands that were specific to
each local context (e.g. repair and/or upgrading of services, improvement
of recreational facilities, scrapping of local petty apartheid laws, stopping of
forced removals or even the release from detention of a local leader or
two). It was these demands (that were hardly ever given prominence in
the print media) that became the basis for local-level negotiations between
Consumer Boycott Committees and local business and local government
representatives.7
The second form of action was the stayaways. Unlike the consumer boycott
that could be sustained for fairly significant lengths of time, the stayaway
remained a short dramatic demonstration of power rather than the
embryo of a general strike because in a stayaway labour simply stays at
home rather than occupying the points of production. Like the consumer
boycott, the geography of the apartheid town/city was extremely helpful
when it came to mobilising people to stay at home - the neighbourhood
rather than the workplace was where the stayaway was organised from
(with the exception of Uitenhage in certain instances). The stayaways had a
range of local determinants, with some stayaways motivated entirely by
local community demands and others simply imposed on local
communities by national campaigns. Quite often the overuse of the tactic
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and lack of coordination between workplace and community
organisations led to serious confusion.8
Although not as prominent as in the Transvaal during the 1985-86 period,
there were also transport boycotts. The most well known and probably
longest transport boycott took place in Mdantsane-East London, but was
largely resolved by 1985-86. 9 There were other smaller scale boycotts at
local level for short periods of time (e.g. there was one in the Port
Elizabeth township of Kwazakhele that began in April 1985 in response to
conflicts over the introduction of mini buses).
The rent/service charge boycotts were often a combination of spontaneous
household decisions to stop paying for affordability reasons, and organised
strategies by civics and/or youth congresses. Although spontaneous
household decisions probably played the most important role, it would be
a mistake to ignore the organisational energy that went into organising
rent/service charge boycotts in certain communities. In particular, the
rent/service charge boycotts connected to a larger nationally conceived
campaign against township administration and government. This
provided regionally informed and linked local activists with an important
motive for introducing and/or supporting the boycotts of service and
rental tariffs.
Finally, there were the sustained campaigns against the Community
Councils and Black Local Authorities in the region. Prior to the
conversion of all Community Councils into fully-fledged local authorities
in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act in 1986, there were 46
Community Councils established in terms of the Community Councils
Act of 1977 and 4 Town Councils established in terms of the Black Local
Authorities Act of 1982. The campaigns against the councillors and the
councils themselves began in earnest from about September 1984 when a
spate of service charge increases were promulgated. Local activists probably
spent more time and energy mobilising people against these local
government structures than anything else. They were motivated by a
complex mix of political strategy, response to genuine grievances caused
by the injustices of the system and competition between competing local
elites. These campaigns - together with the inherent fiscal and
administrative weaknesses of the system itself - were responsible for the
virtual collapse of black local government by mid-1986. Table 8.5 reflects
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the process of collapse over time:10
TABLE 8.5: POLITICAL STATUS OF BLACK LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
MAY 1985 TO JULY 1986
MAY 1985 JAN. 1986 MAY 1986 JULY 1986
No. of
Councillors
who had
resigned
from all CCs
133 173 no info
available
211
No. of
individual
CCs where
all
Councillors
had resigned
13 13+ 20 20+
No. of CCs
without a
quorum due
to
resignations
of some, but
not all
Councillors
5 5+ 8 11
No. of CCs
where
municipal
administra-
tion had
collapsed
18 28 28 31
These figures reveal that the majority of councillors resigned between
September 1984 and May 1985, i.e. the period between the start of mass
anti-BLA campaigns that began nationally with the Vaal Uprising in
September 1984 and the declaration of the first State of Emergency.
However, despite the large number of resignations during this period,
only 39% of the Councils actually collapsed. The collapse of the majority of
Councils (68%) occurred during the second period, i.e. June 1985 to July
1986.
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This focus on primary campaigns and the recorded effects of these
campaigns does not reveal the complexity of everyday political life in the
Eastern Cape communities. As the old apartheid regulatory mechanisms
broke down in the face of political pressure and because of their own
inherent weaknesses, local activists found themselves having to deal
with day-to-day problems. With no resources, hunted by the police and
caught up in a whirlwind of fairly disorganised activity, these activists
were unable to hold together all the components of the emerging process.
At an ideological level they promoted "people's power", i.e. the view that
what was being created was the embryo of the new society by direct mass
action from below. To quote one popular pamphlet entitled "Forward to
People's Power - Down With Minority Rule!":
"1. APARTHEID - THE REAL AGITATOR: The government and its
stooges are blaming the current political turmoil on the work of so-
called agitators. Before their own ignorant eyes they see how the
people destroy the system day by day. No longer are we prepared to
wait for Botha to make changes in our country - we are taking our
destiny in our own hands. Democracy will not come at the day of
our national liberation - it should be built already in the process of
destroying the old order. 
	
"5. BUILD PEOPLE'S POWER EVERYWHERE: The people have long
decided that they have to take control over their own destiny. We
must consolidate all organisations and the structures which
organises and develops politically every single member of the
community. Those structures (area committees, street committees,
etc) must be tested to see its (sic) ability to sustain struggle. Our people
have shown their understanding that organisation can only be strong
if they are strong."
Although these structures of "people's power" were far more robust and
deep-rooted than some analysts have suggested, 11 it is true that the reality
did not measure up to the ideology. Rather than accepting the skepticism of
observers like Seekings, a more reliable indicator of the problems with the
"people's power" structures comes from the activists who were building
these structures. In a report to the UDF compiled by the author, 12 activists
identified the following grassroots organisational problems:
*	 in certain areas where the councillors had resigned, the state's
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administrative machinery chose to work through local civic
associations and other UDF structures. Although this was seen by
activists as recognition of the "people's structures" and hence a
victory, many were concerned that by taking responsibility for certain
administrative tasks they were effectively helping to "govern
apartheid". The road from this to cooption was seen as a very short
one indeed. It was this organisational dynamic that underpinned the
heated debates about "local-level negotiations" at the time.
* although the "people's power structures" were supposed to be more
accountable and democratic, in reality the amabutho were only
loosely controlled by these structures. This helps explain the
controversial people's courts - whereas in certain areas there was
evidence that these constituted genuine - albeit very rough - attempts
to forge a new form of 'popular justice', there were probably more
examples of 'people's courts' that were in fact coercive 'kangaroo
courts' that some local leaders tended to distance themselves from.
In addition, clearly defined written rules and procedures and the
necessary organisational skill to sustain self-organised structures
were very rare. This militated against sustainable long-term
institution building and opened up these structures to two dangers:
top-down coercive control from the leadership and/or undirected
spontaneous action from below.
* although the language of the ideology of 'people's power' often
masked what were in reality quite often very mundane activities of
ordinary people involved with the struggle for daily survival in
impoverished conditions, this language led the security forces to
believe that the street and area committees were in fact part of an
elaborate revolutionary plan to revive the 1960-61 cell structure that
was devised by the ANC to launch the armed struggle. This, in turn,
invited vicious repressive retaliation from the security forces for
activities that were probably quite harmless and which had little to
do with the crudely armed amabutho squads that were committed
to meeting violence with violence.
* activists were also concerned about the absence of strong and
effective regional and even national coordination of 'people's
power'. This weakness, it was argued, meant that campaigns were
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shaped by local rather than regional/national demands and that this
enabled the state to use different strategies in different areas, e.g.
stopping forced removals in Duncan Village (East London) and
proceeding with them in Langa.
finally, activists clearly recognised the limits of a movement that
was confined to a single group area, namely the black/african group
area. It was out of this limitation that the demand for non-racial
municipalities emerged in certain areas.
Although a large number of people in the communities were involved in
and/or affected by to a lesser or greater degree the campaigns mounted by
the local activists during the peak of the revolt during the first six months
of 1986, in the end it was a relatively small group of local leaders who had
the energy, moral legitimacy, resources and (in some cases) coercive
capacity to mount what Robin Palmer has described as the "tenth frontier
war". 13 The Black Sash estimated conservatively that 1200 people were
detained in the Eastern Cape between June 1986 and late 1988. 14 If it is
assumed that the security forces managed to detain at least the rump of the
activist leadership, and given the decline in resistance the extraction of
this leadership caused, it can be assumed that this constitutes more or less
the size of the leadership core that effectively executed the 1984-86
rebellion.
Three conceptions exist of the Eastern Cape rebellion. The first is the
"frontier war" image developed from a liberal perspective by Robin
Palmer 15 and which appears repeatedly as a powerful leit motif in the
writings of Port Elizabeth-based liberal human rights campaigner Rory
Riorden. 16 The second is the orthodox revolutionary line developed by
intellectuals close to the UDF and ANC. For them, the Eastern Cape
rebellion provided the best example of how an urban-based mass
movement could develop into a revolutionary movement capable of
challenging state power itself. Thirdly, there was the security force
interpretation that took the UDF/ANC position at face value in order to
justify its conspiracy theory.
The notion of a clash between two power blocs that these three
conceptions share does not help to reveal the way urban conflict leads in
complex and locally specific ways to the breakdown of old definitions of
the meaning of the urban system and the definition and development of
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new meanings more appropriate to changing urban dynamics and
processes. 17 Out of the stress and pain of the 1984-86 rebellion there
emerged signs and elements of an alternative urban meaning. The clearest
indication of this revolved around the notion of a non-racial
municipality. In a region-wide survey conducted in 1986 amongst local
activist leadership and amongst white local government officials, it was
found that the notion of a non-racial municipality was seen as a possible
'fresh start' for the region because it was seen as a concept that all
stakeholders could support. 18 It was this concept that became the central
concern of a number of local-level negotiations.19
The impact of the social movements and negotiations on white local
officials was measured in the 1986 survey and it was found that of those
interviewed, 63% were in favour of some form of non-racial alternative
and that an additional 21% believed that the black township should be
administered by the same authority that administered the white town.20
In April 1986 the Queenstown municipality formally proposed to a
conference of the Cape Municipal Association that some form of non-
racial municipality should be formed at local level. A similar call was
made by the Town Clerk of Port Elizabeth in July 198621 and by the
Midlands Chamber of Industries in January 1986.22
However, instead of supporting the local negotiation processes in the
Eastern Cape that could have allowed this region to amicably resolve
problems at the local level, the central state intervened from mid-1986
onwards with three new reform-cum-repressive strategies: the National
State of Emergency, Regional Services Councils and township upgrading
to the tune of R1 billion over five years for the Eastern Cape (more on this
unfolding national process and its impact on Uitenhage in Chapter 9)
BACK TO UITENHAGE
The preceding section provides an overview of the changing regional
context for the local processes and dynamics that emerged in Uitenhage
during the first half of 1986. The complex set of conflictual and negotiation
processes that emerged led to concrete changes in how the local
stakeholders came to understand the future of Uitenhage's urban system.
Although this was overridden by a forced removal managed by the
activated security system acting on a central state mandate after the
national State of Emergency was declared in July 1986, the processes that
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preceded this destructive event gave rise to a new urban project that was
finally aloud to come to fruition after the national transition began in
1990. Before examining the actual negotiations in detail, a closer insight
into the internal workings of the social movements in Uitenhage is
required.
Taking advantage of the general perception in the community that the
KTC had decided to take legal action rather than seek negotiated solutions,
activists began to strengthen and systematise organisation. They were
helped by conditions which were easing and by December, following the
famous negotiated settlement that ended the Port Elizabeth Consumer
Boycott, security force harassment had diminished considerably. The
general feeling in the community was that advances were being made and
that victories were possible. It was this sense of expectation coupled to the
specificity of Langa's struggle that facilitated the rapid growth and
entrenchment of the street and area committees.
Contrary to the popular view that street and area committees were
initially produced by a deepening revolutionary rupture between state and
people,23 it was actually the context of breakdown and social disruption
towards the end of 1984 that brought people together in small meetings at
street level. The most noticeable comment made by all activists when
asked about street committees was, to quote a good example, "when it
comes to issues of trying to ensure discipline amongst the people, like
theft and quarrels, then they [street committees] were quite active."24
Otherwise, this informant said, "they were not very strong" from a
"political" point of view.
The absence of the most basic services such as sewerage, adequate water
supplies, drainage, electricity and shelter, made daily life both a struggle
and the cause of internal friction. The disposal of buckets of nightsoil
when the authorities failed to collect them, for example, created huge
problems. If they were disposed in holes dug for the purpose, crucial
questions were raised: Where must these holes be? must everybody use
them? If so, who will dig the holes? What about water from the few
available taps? Numerous squabbles arose when women did their
washing at taps while others were queuing up to fill their water buckets.
Then, of course, there was the problem of where new arrivals in the
community should build their shacks. Each new arrival meant more
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pressure on available services, i.e. more people wanting to do their
washing, more people in the queue at the tap and more people needing to
dispose of their sewerage. The division and fencing-off of yards, garbage
disposal, child-care and many other problems of collective living that state
agencies usually take care of, became the responsibility of the residents
themselves and therefore, a potential source of friction.
In addition to these communal tensions, unemployment and poverty
created cleavages within the household. Young unemployed men -
especially those who had turned to crime - fed off the household without
contributing financially. Furthermore, because they were too poor, they
could not afford the lobola required to turn their sexual liaisons into
marriage. This often resulted in offspring outside marriage that the
parents ended up taking care of. The tensions this caused between
unmarried mothers living with "mothers-in-law" frequently blew up
into severe arguments about familial rights and duties. The absence of
formal marriage arrangements also caused bloody conflicts between men
who accused each other of "stealing" women. Then, of course, there were
tensions that arose out of the economic redundancy of the traditional
male head of the family. When his sons or wife were the breadwinners,
his authority was undermined thus removing the traditional patriarchal
mechanism for resolving conflict.
These kinds of communal and household tensions are common in
impoverished communities 25 and need not necessarily give rise to
organic coping mechanisms. However, when these tensions are overlaid
by the perceived failure or breakdown of state coordinated regulatory
mechanisms, then members of the community can only cope if they find
alternative dispute-settling or administrative structures. Given the context
of rising levels of violent conflict between police and members of the
community and the permanent failure of the KTC to deal with the
squatter problem, then it is unsurprising that new forms of social
organisation began to emerge to handle communal and household
problems. The most logical structure to create in this context was a
meeting point for people that occupied an area that brought them into
direct daily contact with one another, i.e. the street or block. When asked
who were the most active street committee members, Magugu said:
"Most of them were elderly people. The idea [of street
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committees] itself was not projected in a political way. People
regarded street committees as being things that would look
into the problems of the street. This means that if you project
that they were acting in that sense, then people would always
look for elderly people to take up their problems. Every street
in Langa has a street committee. It was something that came
up quite rapidly with no political input."26
After the massacre it was these pre-existing structures that came to fulfill
two functions: they were identified by the activists as useful networks and
meeting points when organisation and meetings were effectively
prohibited; and they provided crucially important forums capable of
absorbing the influx of people into grassroots structures. This is what
underlies the comments of two leading activists:
"Before the massacre they [street committees] had just a low
profile. They were there before the massacre, but not very
strong and only in some areas. But after the massacre they
just rocketed."27
"The police and the community councillors lost control of
the people, they have no control over the people. That is why
people formed these area committees to prevent the crime
rate and keep control of the community."28
Drawing from comments made by activists and my own observations, the
following pattern of organisation emerges: before the massacre,
inconspicuous forms of local organisation emerge in some areas to handle
household and communal problems; after the massacre, there was a
massive influx of people into these meeting points and for the first time
activists begin using the term "street committee" to describe these
meetings; with the declaration of the 1985 Emergency, many of these
meetings ceased or got much smaller. It was only towards the end of 1985,
from about October, that the most politicised activists in the upper
echelons of UYCO began formalising the structures and using them as foci
for organisational consolidation under repressive conditions.
The organisational drive from late 1985 sought to create an elected street
committee for each street. Once these committees had been elected at
rather large but loosely organised house meetings, then they elected
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representatives to area committees. Langa was divided into five areas each
presided over by an area committee of between ten and twenty people. The
area committees acted as a higher authority over the street committees, i.e.
structures to which more difficult problems could be referred. Then at
township level, there was a committee elected by the area committees
called the Coordinating Committee or Advisory Committee. These
structures were put into place by energetic groups of activists who would
spend 3-4 weeks concentrating on one specific area. One activist described
the process as follows:
"So what we did was that we went at night for each street and
we called a mass meeting in one of the houses to address the
people. We explained what a street committee was and why
we wanted to form them, what are their future goals so that
the people can have a clear idea of what they are participating
in. One of us has to be there when the street committee was
formed. .. When we finished, the election followed and they
decide who they want to represent them in the street
committee. We make it clear to them that it is very
important to them for street committees to be formed and
especially in these conditions and the situation we are now
in, with the repression of the South African government and
the people fighting under the State of Emergency, banning of
meetings, troops and police. It is very difficult for people to
meet and discuss their problems in mass meetings. So it will
be very dangerous for us when the repression is high to sit
back and wait until the government will allow us to have the
freedom of movement and the freedom of expression. We
must adapt ourselves to work under these conditions and
continue with the struggle."29
Given that many ordinary people in these structures were there to resolve.
basic communal and household problems, a key problem lay in how the
balance between control functions and political functions could be
achieved. Many activists complained that the committees had emerged
too quickly and there were too few experienced cadres to give them
direction. Consequently, street committees were not structured by a single
directive from a coordinated leadership centre, nor did they develop in a
unilinear direction. The quirks and concerns of the dominant
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personalities played the most crucial role in pushing some committees
into coherent organs of political mobilisation, while others became rather
disjointed marriage guidance associations or street cleaning collectives.
One activist said: "Some of the people you find that it is the first time they
participate in these structures and they lack the experience, some don't
even know what they are fighting for."30
To coordinate the street and area committees according to coherent
guidelines, a new structure was established in late 1985. This was called
the Uitenhage People's Congress (UPECO). It met on Wednesdays and the
chairpeople of all the area committees attended. Representatives of the
executives of all the organisations also attended these meetings. The main
activity of these meetings was to deal with problems, queries and issues
raised in area committee meetings that needed to be referred to a higher
authority. UPECO would then discuss the ways of handling these issues
and if action was required, tasks would be assigned to the relevant
organisations, i.e. civic matters to URECO, youth matters to UYCO,
women's issues to UWCO, and so forth. If there was a very serious matter
too sensitive to handle even within UPECO, then the "Committee of Ten"
would meet secretly to decide on a course of action. It was within UPECO
that activists formulated in early 1986 a "code of conduct" and "timetable"
for these committees that stipulated what days of the week they should
meet and when "social problems" or "political issues" should be discussed.
The LTPECO exercise was an attempt to formalise the dual function of the
committees and in this respect was only partially successful. In the end,
the removal and police violence (e.g. funerals) became the main "political
issues" that were discussed at street level. There was very little evidence
that any "ideological education" took place in the committees (e.g. study
groups, discussion of ANC strategy, or even UDF educational material,
etc). The "social problems" discussed included domestic squabbles, crime
control, street cleaning, shack allocation, health conditions, child care,
transport problems and occasionally unemployment. The most important
of these was crime control which included issues ranging from petty
crime, to marriage problems, to neighbourhood conflicts.
In general the committees dealt with petty crime. Thieves were found and
ordered to return the goods to the original owner, thugs who had
assaulted people would be required to cover the medical fees of those who
302
had been assaulted, wife beaters would be brought together with their
wives and relatives to talk about the family problems and adulterers were
treated in the same way - a not too dissimilar role as that played by the
Peacemakers during an earlier period.
There was also a general campaign to disarm the criminals or at least to
prevent them from carrying arms into shebeens. Shebeens were given
specific times to close so that troublesome drunks could be kept off the
streets at night. This was an effective way of making the walk home
through Langa's dark unlit streets measurably safer for thousands of
workers. The general principle was to avoid the use of physical force. The
emphasis, instead, was to use a political logic to divert grievances
outwards against the state. Made expressed this in these terms:
"In these things we get a chance of educating people about our
struggle. We try and bring people nearer to our cause. What we
say is that fighting each other as oppressed people won't help us,
the major thing which people must concentrate on is our fight
against the system."31
On why the shebeens were told to close at 9.00 am, Made said: "It
is because some of these fights and attacks start as people leave
the shebeens for home and most importantly because people can
be victims of the system which is patrolling our streets."32
Major crime, however, was not dealt with by the committees. This was
not for any theoretical or moral reason, but because in practical terms
crimes such as rape required medical examination. Murder too was
referred to the police. There was no people's court in Langa, although
there was one in Kwallobuhle.
The street and area committees were crucial not only for the mobilisation
of power, but for the instrumental use of that power to win recognition
and concessions via the negotiation process. Without this network of
committees, the leadership would never have been able to negotiate
because a mechanism for obtaining mandates and gauging opinion would
not have been available. Made said:
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"Whatever we do we get the mandate from the street
committees. Even under this heavy repression we do hold
meetings and so we do get mandates from the people. ... So
that we know that from each street the problems of
the street will come. In each and every street we will know
what is happening and what we will go to present to the
authorities is really a reflection of the real situation."33
"The community supports these negotiations. All the
negotiating committees have to report back to the
community. The community monitors these negotiations
through the street and area committees. Even before we go to
negotiate we scout for views and suggestions from the people
through the street committees."34
Street committee meetings varied in size and frequency. When a
particular section of the township was faced with a direct threat, e.g.
vigilante action or removal, then large meetings of a few hundred could
take place a few times a week. This, however, was unusual. Most of the
time, a large meeting of a few hundred people from the street would meet
fortnightly or even less often. The street committees themselves started
off by meeting weekly, but as the crisis mounted during the months that
led up to the 1986 Emergency, they began to meet more often. The smaller
more disciplined area committees provided the link between the street
and leadership levels. This coordination became particularly important
during the negotiation phases.
The story of Mrs. Peta, a middle-aged assistant in a dental surgery and
mother of a son in his early twenties, was typical of these times.
Whereas before the 1985 Emergency she used to make disparaging
comments about her son's politics and why he needed to take such
risks "for nothing", by early 1986 she was participating in her local
street committee. Interviewed in mid-1987 when talking of this
activity was dangerous, she had this to say:
* Q: Are there street committees now in Langa? A: They
are afraid to come out. Q: And before? A: Ya ... Q: Before the
Emergency, did they exist? A: Ya! Yoh! Q: Did you go to the
meetings? A: Ya, I used to but I don't want people to know I
used to go to those meetings. Q: Weren't they mainly youths?
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A: There were older people. Older than me. ... There was one in
our street. Q: When did it start? A: Somewhere in '85-'86. Q:
how many were in the street committee? A: It used to take
place once a week. Sometimes only a few would come and other
times about twenty. Q: How involved were the older people? A:
They used to be the chairmen. Q: Not the youth? A: No.
This story confirms what was probably the most significant aspect of the
street committees, namely their ability to facilitate grassroots participation.
Recognising this, one activist said:
"Street committees are the best way of organising and
mobilising people. It is the easiest way of having campaigns
and support and making the point that at least the people
will support and participate fully in our campaigns. It is the
easiest way again to help the people and get their ideas,
sometimes more so than in mass meetings, because in mass
meetings some people are free to express their ideas, but
many people are afraid, maybe because they think their ideas
will not be accepted by the whole."35
The most dramatic interpretation of the role of the street
committees was given at a mass meeting of squatters in May 1986. The
speaker got up and said:
"Comrades, when we talk of the clause of the Freedom
Charter that says "the people shall govern", it is not right.
This is because the people are governing! Today we have the
people's government that did not exist when the Freedom
Charter was written during the times of Z.K. Mathews in
1955. If you have a problem with your house, take the matter
to your government and not to the puppet local authorities.
The people have started to exercise their own future
government of South Africa, just as it has been prophesied in
the Charter in 1955."36
At the end of his speech he said: "Viva the people's government, Viva!".
The crowd replied: "VIVA!" The speaker: "The People .._.!" The Crowd: "...
are governing." And a new slogan was coined.37
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THE YOUTH
Although "the youth"38 played an important role in the build-up of
popular power, this was an extremely problematic role because in the final
analysis, their tendency to use arbitrary violence and act autonomously
from civic structures that critically weakened the support-base of the
community organisations in the long run. The activist leadership were
acutely aware of these problems but failed to secure durable structures to
control the amabutho.
Although youth groups committed to meeting violence with violence
emerged as early as 1984, it took some time before a formal structure
evolved. By mid-1985 the amabutho were organised into so-called "action
committees" whose role was consciously defined in military terms. It is
essential to note that this organisational initiative and self-definition
came from within amabutho ranks and not from the activist leadership or
formal community organisations. The action committees had a crude
military command structure and enforced their own internal military
discipline. The most well organised groups comprised people who
changed their names and began living together in groups on the outskirts
of the townships in what they referred to as 'bases". Up until late 1985
there was an overall military commander - referred to as a "general" - who
coordinated the activities of the action committees. However, he was
captured by the security forces, charged for Umkhonto We Sizwe activities
and sentenced to 24 years in prison. Although the General had managed to
keep the amabutho under control to some extent, after his capture the
action committees became increasingly violent as an anti-social element
gained the upper hand in some areas.
The activist leadership were forced to step in to take counter-measures. A
Military Council was established and a group of "commanders" appointed
who were politically aware and trustworthy from the activist's point of
view, but also respected by the amabutho. The identity of this Council
remained secret, except for the overall commander who was the liaison
between the area committees and the action committees. In other words,
the activist leadership could only control the amabutho to the extent that
they could retain the loyalty of some key amabutho leaders. Not all
amabutho were UYCO members and even if they were, this was not
formal disciplined membership in the organisational sense. This rather
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tenuous link was coupled to the permanent possibility and reality of
tension between the autonomous action committees on the one hand and
the street and area committees on the other.39
The activist leadership were painfully aware that without a disciplined
relationship between the area committees and executives of the
community organisations on the one hand and the action committees and
Military Council on the other, they would be unable to prevent the
amabutho from using force against the community. As a result the activist
leaders worked out a framework for winning the allegiance of the
amabutho. To quote Made's version of this:
"What I did was never condemn them and I tried to say
look I think we can move together and sit together and tell
stories and discuss the history of resistance. I found them so
fascinated when I told them we can discover a history of
resistance from the time of the Youth League when Mandela
joined the struggle in 1943, the adoption of the Freedom
Charter in 1955 and the formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe.
They were so interested and they listened. What I found out
was that when you talk to them about MK they were very
interested in that they would like to imitate it. They would
ask me to tell them about Umkhonto. I told them that MK
was the most disciplined military and so they wanted to
imitate that discipline. I told them that anyone who has
done something wrong in MK made a correction and was
disciplined by the army. MK is very loyal to the ANC and MK
is aware that it cannot negotiate with the Botha government,
it is only Mandela, Oliver Tambo and the ANC that goes
there. MK is there to protect the people and to confuse the
government. So they took all those things into the local
situation. They saw us as the ANC, so that is why they are
now very loyal, because of what I have told them."40
The amabutho commanders confirmed this conception of the
relationship when they said:
"Before we do anything we go to the people and tell them. If
they refuse we stop, because it is the people who must
govern, not amabutho. ... The action committee consults
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with the executive and the area committee. ... The area
committee has stopped us to kill people here in the
township."41
The activist leadership understood the youth and knew how to
handle them. Displaying a sensitive insight into the problem, Made
said:
"You find that young people are so emotional, they think that
we are going to get liberation tomorrow, so some of the things
they do are out of hand, but they are innocent because they
think they are doing the right thing without any knowledge
that they are wrong."42
The amabutho had their own internal disciplinary structure. If any
resident had a complaint about the behavior of one of their members, this
was taken up through the area committees and then to the leadership who
would then take the matter up with the Military Council. Usually the
military council would isolate the offender for a few weeks, confining him
to his house. Or, if the crime was severe enough, he would be physically
punished.
Despite these formal structures and agreements, the cut and thrust of
township conflict, unstable conditions and the shear enormity of the
demands on the relatively small activist leadership prevented the
amabutho from being brought effectively under control. Although
amabutho violence was drastically reduced by about February 1986, there
were still occasional reports of arbitrary violence, e.g. stonings of buses,
beatings of consumer boycott breakers, killing of "AZAPO" supporters43
and forcible disruption of funerals of "sellouts". For every activist who
was detained, a potential controller of amabutho violence was removed.
At times, Magugu said, the "amabutho became a reign of terror over the
community."44 In the end, the amabutho took on the system where the
community was weakest - on the streets and barricades. Any security
policeman worth his salt had ample opportunity to exploit this; all he
needed was a handful of agent provocateurs.
(On a lighter note, it is worth mentioning that the amabutho developed a
strange anti-shebeen alliance with middle-class women: Both these groups
had a vested interest in running down shebeens - the amabutho because
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they could not afford the costs of shebeen liquor and hence had no access
to the women who frequented the shebeens; and the middle-aged mothers
who held the view that their daughters "got pregnant" because they went
to shebeens. So when the amabutho enforced the closure of shebeens at
9.00 pm, this met with considerable approval from older women.)
COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS
Langa and Kwallobuhle had very different organisational structures. In
general, the leadership of the various community organisations was based
in Kwallobuhle and revolved largely around Ficks Kobese of
MACWUSA, Emson Banda who was chairperson of the Parents
Committee and Wonga Nkala, president of the Uitenhage Youth
Congress. These articulate, politicised and public figures were well known
in UDF circles as the "Uitenhage comrades" and could draw on a support-
base of students, youth and a relatively small group of MACVVUSA
organised workers. The inner policy-making structure was the so-called
"Committee of 10" - a secret committee that gave effect to its decisions via
the various organisations. Significantly, Kwallobuhle did not have street
committees. Instead, area committees and the executives of the
organisations were the key structures. The youth played an important
directing role in these structures. Furthermore, a people's court was
established.
The organisational links between Langa's structures and the largely
Kwallobuhle-based community organisations were very unclear. This was
probably due to the mobilisation of support bases with different profiles.
Unlike in Kwallobuhle, the Langa structures were rooted in the material
requirements of impoverished residents living in an unserviced
township. Social cohesion depended on organisation at street level.
Furthermore, some of the leading Langa activists had strong links with
COSATU unions.
Very few of Langa's activists held formal executive positions in any of the
organisations and none of them were public figures or well known in
UDF (or COSATU) circles. Langa's street and area committees were not
given formal representation in the Kwallobuhle-based structures except,
of course, when they were specifically invited to send representatives to
meetings of activists. This division between the Langa and Kwallobuhle
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leadership was reflected in where they were contactable: the Kwallobuhle
leadership could invariably be found in the Black Sash funded Advice
Office on the south east side of town, while the Langa leadership usually
gathered at the COSATU offices on the north western fringe of town next
to Langa.
Given that Uitenhage's formal community organisations had very
shallow roots in Langa, it was not surprising that the Langa Coordinating
Committee became the de facto civic representative of Langa's residents as
the squatter struggle against removal became the dominant dynamic of
resistance in the community. Instead of simply acting as a delegation to
represent squatter grievances to the authorities, it became a key
coordinator of organisation and struggle. It also came to represent Langa's
struggle as special and therefore distinct from Kwallobuhle's. It was this,
plus the leadership's union connections, that resulted in a power struggle
over the Langa issue between the Langa and Kwallobuhle leaderships.
The dominance of the Kwallobuhle leadership meant that Langa's
leadership had virtually no access to resources. Langa's organisational
infrastructure was built and sustained without financial support. There
were no full-time paid organisers, nor was there money for pamphlets,
reading material, offices, legal assistance or publicity. The financial
resources that did exist were accessible largely to the Kwallobuhle
leadership. The unionists at least had offices which gave the Langa
leadership access to a telephone, a meeting place to connect with outside
support workers and occasionally a photostat machine. Normal
organisational procedures were absent such as, for example, bookkeeping,
budgets, minute taking, membership lists, training, specialisation,
documentation and forward planning. Not even the activists were
sustained by donations to cover their living expenses, a particularly severe
problem for those who were unemployed. Instead, most activists made up
for all these organisational deficiencies with Herculean efforts to inform
their communities without media, to sustain organisation without
resources, to build support without promises of improvements and lead
without clearly defined structures. It is not surprising they were
continuously exhausted and often fell asleep or arrived late during crucial
meetings - much to the disdain of the relaxed support workers, visitors
and media people.
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Contrary to expectations, this situation was not improved by the founding
of URECO in January 1986. This was an important step for the whole anti-
removal struggle because up until this stage the LCC was largely an ad hoc
grouping of leaders whose organisational connection with the main
organisations and street committees was unclear. It made sense, therefore,
that a "civic" take responsibility for the removal. Unfortunately, the
initiative to establish URECO came from the Kwallobuhle-based Kobese
grouping who had, until this stage, attempted to dislodge the Langa
leadership located in the LCC from their position as representatives of
Langa's high profile anti-removal struggle. URECO was formed at a
meeting in Kwallobuhle to which the Langa leadership were not invited
and the key resolution of the meeting concerned the removals. However,
after the Langa leadership threatened to publicly denounce URECO, Weza
Made accepted an offer of an executive position in the organisation thus
preventing an open rupture amongst the leadership. Made's demand to
be included in the URECO executive could not be ignored because he had
the full backing of Langa's street and area committees plus significant
COSATU unionists based at Volkswagen, although the latter did not
count for much in the eyes of Kobese and his associates.
If Langa's social movement had had absolutely no access to resources, it's
impact on state and society would have been negligible. The LCC
connected with various "operators"45 which gave the movement access to
crucial media, academic and publicity resources. There were four groups of
operators: lawyers, academics, media personnel and service organisations.
By far the most important service organisation was the Grahamstown
Rural Committee (GRC). GRC was established as part of the network of
rural support groups loosely affiliated to the National Committee Against
Removals (NCAR). GRC had a local committee of progressive
Grahamstown-based intellectuals and employed Sue Lund, an ex-student
activist from Rhodes and member of the UDF affiliated Grahamstown
Democratic Action Committee. Lund had a fairly well equipped office in
Grahamstown and a nation-wide network of support group contacts to
draw on. GRC's main function was the coordination of legal aid and
publicity. PLANACT, a collective of engineers, architects, planners and
urban sociologists, complemented GRC's activities by acting as consultants
on the upgrading proposals the LCC presented to the authorities.
PLANACT was based in Johannesburg, had offices, funds, full-time
workers and its members were largely left-wing intellectuals. Without
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these skills, the LCC would not have been able to present alternative
planning proposals to the state. Finally, there was Mono Badela of City
Press and Patrick Bracher, a Port Elizabeth lawyer. Badela committed
himself to keeping Langa in the news which meant there was good
international coverage because of the way foreign media used to take their
queue from City Press reports. Bracher, whose fees were covered by the
Urban Foundation via the Legal Resources Centre, became a crucial source
of legal aid and advice throughout the struggle.
In short, Langa's social movement was made largely by the voluntary
practices of the people whose grievances it represented. Welling up from
below, these grievances generated an organisational structure that enabled
people to cope and live in conditions of deep conflict, violence and
grinding poverty. Wanting only to protect their space and right to create
their own environment, Langa's residents could mobilise only one
resource their collective capacity to organise, protest and demand. It was
only when the movement connected with its operators that it had access
to resources, but this was on terms the movement's structures had no
direct control over. Unlike comparable movements, 46 these resources did
not become the foundation of a stabilised professional leadership.
IDEOLOGY
The most distinctive feature about the popular ideology of township
movements in the 1980s was their complexity. The mix of ideas, symbols,
demands and perceptions was not codified by a single ideological centre.
Nor did the movements have a uniform class profile across localities. The
specificities of each local terrain of struggle also generated different
ideologies and consciousness. In this section an attempt will be made to
reconstruct the world-view of Uitenhage's social movement.47
Uitenhage's popular ideology was a complex mix of apparently
contradictory elements. A speech made by UYCO president, Wonga
Nkala, to 60 000 people on the first anniversary of the massacre, is an
example worth quoting to illustrate this point:
"In 1960 all the people of South Africa were complaining
about the unfair distribution of wages. They were also
protesting against the carrying of passes. In 1960 the people
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were shot dead in Sharpeville for having fought this. This
regime continues to assault and attack the people. Today we
are saying, this country is not ours, but it is our father's
country. This is our fore-father's country. This country
belongs to Hintsa, Naka, Cetshwayo, Moeshoeshoe and
many others. We therefore can't betray that to anybody
whatever it may cost. We are prepared to fight shoulder to
shoulder, we are prepared to travel together on this journey
from Egypt into the promised land. We are prepared to die
together or lie with one another on the road to freedom.
We say enough is enough."48
National liberation was one of the more important ideological elements
in Langa's social movement. By this is meant the view that, to quote one
activist, "this is an illegitimate government" that "we must bring
down".49 In order "to be liberated in our lifetime", one speaker urged,
"we have the street committees and area committees. We are here to
build the people's government and this demands your commitment and
participation."50 For the average activist, this struggle was a non-racial
struggle. This message was repeated ad nauseam. Talking in deep Xhosa
at a mass meeting of squatters, one speaker said: "We must commit
ourselves to educate our people about non-racialism because our struggle
is not about colour. We therefore invite the white community to join
us."51 One of Weza Made's concerns was the ideological consequences of
the white petition against the squatters: "People are saying the white
man is the enemy."52 The most remarkable feature about Langa during
this period - and indeed throughout the country - was the extent to
which non-racialism had penetrated downwards to the grassroots. From
the most uneducated battle-scarred amabutho fighter to the urbane left-
wing intellectuals, non-racialism was an accepted principle.
The notion that the enemy was the "illegitimate white minority regime"
and that this had to be dismantled by an organised popular movement
based on a complex network of "people's committees" was coupled to an
uncontested definition of who the leading organisations and people
were. To quote one well-known song:
"The ANC is the organisation (3 times);
The government is scared of that ;
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Oliver Tambo is our leader (3 times);
The government is scared of that (2 times);
Mandela is our leader (3 times);
Umkhonto is going to seize the land (3 times);
COSATU is going to lead us."
The Congress movement was not only seen as leading the struggle in
real terms, but it was also seen as a tradition that could be appealed to
when mobilising the "older people". To quote one activist:
"It is very difficult to organise old people, because some of
them have lost hope and some of them have found it very
difficult to get work. So if you address them you must address
them in a way that interests them, like if you remind them
about the sacrifice of their leaders, like Nelson Mandela and
Oliver Tambo. ... [This is] so that they can remember the old
days, the Defiance Campaign and sacrifices by our leaders in
the past."
In terms of long-term perspectives, Made summed up popular
consciousness when he said in answer to the question "What do
you think will happen in the long-term?"
"The South African government doesn't see that the
majority of the people support the African National Congress
and regard Nelson Mandela as their leader. Botha must
release Mandela and talk to him about the future of this
country. The majority are not demanding that the black man
must rule this country. They are demanding that everybody
must have a right to this country, regardless of colour or race.
No group must dominate over another group. If the South
African government can release all political prisoners and
allow those who were forced to go into exile to come back to
their country, and unban all those who have been banned,
then freedom and democracy will rule in this country. This is
the only solution I see. I believe in one-man-one-vote. The
people must choose their leaders."53
The Langa movement's working class profile at leadership and rank-
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and-file level meant it was receptive to socialist ideas that depicted the
interests of the workers, homeless and unemployed as lying beyond
simply the dismantling of apartheid. This socialist discourse mingled
relatively easily with the ideology of national liberation. One speaker
told a mass meeting in Langa:
"I am saying the struggle continues. It will only end when we
have dismantled apartheid and when we have destroyed the
capitalist economic system. We are being removed because the
government is protecting the interests of the capitalist class."54
Another speaker at the same meeting said:
"To all those who believe in the national struggle and
as an oppressed nation, we know that the government is
trying to hide behind its racial laws and we know the
monopolistic power of capital and we know that we are the
creators of wealth in this country. We know that his wealth is
being appropriated by Anglo-American, Barlow Rand and the
Rembrandt Group and these are the people who together
with the government are responsible for these removals."55
There were times when socialists explicitly criticised the "petty bourgeois
leadership" of the national movement, with one activist saying "we are
not prepared to be diverted in our direction as the working class by the
petty bourgeoisie". The most dramatic public statement of socialist
loyalties came during the Langa commemoration meeting on 21st March
1986. Wonga Nkala, UYCO president, began his address to the 60 000-
strong crowd as follows:
VVN: Long live the spirit of Karl Marx!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Lenin, long live!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Moses Kotane, long live!
Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live the spirit of Moses Mabhida, long live!
Crowd: Long live!	 -
WN: Long live the spirit of Oliver Tambo, long live!
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Crowd: Long live!
WN: Long live Joe Slovo, long live!
Crowd: Long live!56
As far as the implications of this socialist discourse for practical politics
was concerned, it became clear during the early months of 1986 that the
basis for unity between unions and community organisations was the
perceived link between "exploitation wages" in the factories and the cost
of housing in the communities. One unionist put it this way:
"We know that the struggle of the workers is not only
confined to the factory floor, but it goes beyond the factory
floor. We know that the rent we have to pay cannot come
from our meagre wages. We know that the money we earn is
not sufficient to pay the ever-increasing transportation costs.
It is therefore for these reasons that the shop stewards must
work hand-in-hand with other activists outside the
factory."57
Although socialism and trade unionism are not synonymous, there is no
doubt that Uitenhage's trade unions were partly responsible for the
introduction of socialist discourse into the wider movement. At the same
time, straight trade unionism - understood as collective bargaining over
the terms of employment - was an extensive and accepted part of popular
consciousness. This role was rarely questioned, except when trade unions
used the imperatives of this role to justify non-support for popular
campaigns. The point is trade unions provided a model of how mass
organisation around short-term economic demands should be linked to
long-term political goals. It was this conception of the relationship
between short- and long-term objectives that translated itself into the
community context when forced removals were thrust onto the agenda.
The result was the emergence of the third key element in Langa's popular
ideology, namely urban reform.
Urban reform refers to those strategies that involved bargaining over the
terms of urban living. This included the demand for upgrading as an
alternative to removal. Weza Made said this to a question put to him by a
visiting UDF activist:
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"Q: In your opinion, how do you think the people can go
beyond the point they have reached?
A: We have short term and long term plans in our
struggle. Our short term plans are seeing that Uitenhage
becomes developed to a standard which is comparable to other
towns. In the long term we want to see a national strengthening
of area committees, unions and student organisations."58
It went without saying that the short-term objective could not be
achieved unilaterally. It involved - as in Uitenhage - of necessity
bargaining with the state over immediate concessions to sustain an
organised base for struggle over the long term.
Urban reform was linked in practice to national liberation through the
process of "people's power". The street and area committees were a system
of local democracy necessary for the urban reform strategy but also
intimately connected to a conception of liberation. This desire to
democratise local power and empower local communities was a common
feature of urban movements in other parts of the world. 59 It arose, in the
South African context, out of a need to win control over the mechanisms
of urban regulation as the first step towards creating a liberatory system of
administration. This was a natural and logical opposite to the corrupt
bureaucratic Black Local Authority system. One speaker told a mass
meeting:
"The people today are governing their own affairs. If
you have a water leakage problem, we put on our overalls
and help. We take your problems and make them ours. We
wake up in the middle of the night and help immediately."60
Weza Made captured, as usual, the complexity in these simple
terms:
"Street committees is where all the people are participating.
Its where they are producing people's power. It is where they
will learn to govern themselves and make decisions about
what they need or what they desire for the future of this
country. So they will learn at the local level. We_hope this
will spread to other townships in other parts of the country.
317
What we aim is to improve the government from the local
level."61
Finally, militarism was also mixed into this already complex web of
discourses. Although the UDF's formal position was one of non-violence,
and although the community organisations and local leadership in
Uitenhage firmly refused to sanction any deviation from this, the
amabutho groups brought with them a lexicon and set of symbols that
glorified the armed struggle and Umkhonto We Sizwe. The "toyi toyi",
the commonly worn black beret, the petrol bomb and wooden AK 47s,
were all manifestations of a militaristic sub-culture that became part of
township life and political meetings. The most common amabutho songs
were:
"The boer is oppressing us (repeated);
The SADF is shooting us like animals (x 3);
Kill the boer (several times)."
And:
"We won't abandon Umkhonto we Sizwe (x5);
These boer blood suckers won't get us (x3); We
won't abandon Umkhonto We Sizwe (x3)."
And:
"Have hope parents;
Have hope workers;
Umkhonto is going to assure us of our victory."
The first verse of a well known poem called "Run guerrilla run" goes:
"Run guerrilla run
Chase them for the run
Get Botha and Malan
Destroy mother, father and son
'Till they say to you
Number one
Run guerrilla run."
The amabutho see themselves as soldiers. One senior commander
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said during a group discussion:
"I don't want to school or work. I want to fight for freedom.
We will go to school and work after we have won our
freedom."62
Another member of this group said: "We are prepared to talk to them [the
government], but if they kill, we are also going to kill them."
In short, national liberation, socialism, trade unionism, urban reform,
local democracy and militarism come together in an intricate blend of
discourses that was fluid, fragile and uncodified. There were no formal
institutions or even permanent organisations to reproduce them. The rise
and fall of different forces as the cut and thrust of struggle went through
different phases, brought some discourses to the fore while others were
suppressed. During times of popular power new symbols and slogans were
forged and invariably found their way into the local public eye as graffiti63
and/or in pamphlets and speeches. Langa's social movement had its own
language, messages and culture. However, when the entire community
was eventually dismantled shack-by-shack in 1986, the organisational
infrastructure that reproduced this popular ideology was smashed. The
discourses of this consciousness then sank down to subterrainean levels
only to re-surface when the Emergency ended, but by then urban reform
had become the dominant discourse.
URBAN REFORM IN PRACTICE: EXPLOITING THE CONTRADICTIONS
Given the context within which popular mobilisation was taking place,
the mere existence of popular structures was insufficient when it came to
making gains. This grassroots power needed to be coupled to the use of a
range of instruments if the outcome was going to be anything other than
straight repression. From late 1985 but more concertedly from early
January 1986, a combination of tactics were devised to complement
grassroots organising.
Realising the importance of communicating their demands as widely as
possible, the activists worked closely with their allies to publicise Langa's
struggle. Working closely with Sue Lund of the GRC, Mono Badela of City
Press and the author, the activists attempted to build Langa into a story
that could remain in the headlines. This turned out to be a remarkably
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successful strategy, mainly because the Langa massacre had turned the
township into one of South Africa's most well known after places like
Soweto and Crossroads. A number of international TV documentaries
were made by foreign crews and local newspapers regularly carried news
from Langa. There is no doubt that this helped keep the pressure on the
authorities, but more importantly, it helped build a self-confidence in the
community and amongst the leadership.
With regard to KTC's supreme court application, a decision was taken to
contest it. Significantly, this decision did not follow a debate in the
organisations. It was assumed with very little discussion that lawyers
needed to be retained and responding affidavits filed. Although there was
an awareness that optimism about the outcome should not replace the
need for organisation, there was still a surprisingly hopeful view even
amongst the activists that the court would rule in favour of the squatters.
This optimism was probably due more to an internal moral belief that the
squatters were right in what they were doing than a faith in the justice of
the legal system. As far as the activists were concerned, they constantly
reiterated the danger of a full-frontal violent confrontation between the
authorities and the squatters if the removals went ahead. The prospect
that this moment could be postponed by way of a protracted legal battle
was more than appealing to them. Nevertheless, in a brief meeting that
the LCC initiated with the KTC in February, Made urged the KTC to
withdraw its case because the people were unwilling to defend themselves
in court and would not, in any case, respect the findings of the court.64
The most important part of the overall strategy used to counter the
removals - besides grassroots organisation - was the commissioning of an
alternative development plan. GRC, BESG and PLANACT were instructed
to proceed with the survey as the first step towards formulating an
alternative upgrading plan for Langa. The brief to BESG and PLANACT
was to formulate an upgrading plan based on four principles: (a)
upgrading must take place for the whole of Langa, not just a part as the
KTC was recommending; (b) the plan must take into account the needs of
all strata, particularly the unemployed; (c) financial formulae must be
based on what people can afford; (d) the upgrading process must be
democratically controlled. The decision to go ahead with this initiative
without official sanction was communicated to the KTC at a meeting on
3rd February. One of the resolutions taken at the end of this meeting that
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expressed the feelings of the LCC went as follows:
"That all planning with regard to the upgrading of
Kabah BE DONE in conjunction with the Coordinating
Committee of Kabah. Furthermore that it BE NOTED that
any planning done without the consent of the committee
would be rejected by the people of Kabah."65
It was decided not to abandon negotiations. However, the
activists ruled out any possibility of talking sense into the KTC officials
and decided, therefore, to meet the Task Group which was perceived as a
higher authority that may be more rational and responsive. To reach the
Task Group, activists decided to try to go through the KTC once again and
also the Urban Foundation. At the February 3rd meeting with the KTC,
the LCC's main request was that the ICTC make contact with the Task
Group to ask it to meet the LCC. In addition, the academics were requested
to set up a meeting with the Urban Foundation which, the activists
decided, Would be requested to support Langa's struggle and take steps to
pressurise Dr. Scheepers into meeting the LCC. It was this meeting that
saw the beginning of the most interesting phase of the Langa story: the
development of an alliance between business, trade unions and
community organisations. However, unlike in the Crossroads case, this
alliance was not characterised by the dominance of business and reformist
interests.66
The Urban Foundation (UF) meeting took place on Sunday 10 November,
two days after the notices were handed to the 9th-4th Avenue squatters.
The high-powered UF delegation comprised Dr. Robin Lee, Managing
Director of the UF; Roger Matlock, Director, Eastern Cape Region of the
UF; Anne Bernstein, Director, Urbanisation Unit. The LCC delegation
comprised the core Uitenhage leadership: Weza Made, Freddie Magugu,
Sipho Mandabana and Nelson Teyise. The others present were Sue Lund
of GRC, Father Lerniham (catholic priest in whose house the meeting took
place), Glenn Adler (an American student) and the author.67
After all the parties had introduced their roles and after some discussion
that helped clarify the function and purpose of the UF, Made explained
why the meeting had been called:
"The delegation decided to call the UF. They came to
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the conclusion that it was vital to call the UF to talk with it.
The question of eviction and the feasibility of upgrading:
maybe the government can approve upgrading, that we don't
know. The Kwallobuhle Town Council will opt for the UF
and try to co-opt it to it's side and I think that would be a
major problem."
Magugu reiterated the point when he said:
"If ever the government decides to go ahead, it is highly
likely that the UF will be co-opted and used against the
residents. The UF has the expertise and is in a position to
help as the people involved in these activities."
The agreement reached between the LCC and the UF was as follows:
* the UF would support the Langa community's opposition to
removal;
* the UF would approach Dr. Scheepers, chairperson of the Task
Group, in order to arrange for a meeting between him and the LCC;
* the UF's Eastern Cape office would provide the technical skills
required to compile an upgrading plan, with Dr. Mike Sutcliffe of
the BESG as the coordinator of the technical side;
* no press statements or meetings with government officials
without the knowledge of the LCC;
* UF must only consult with the LCC on the question of Langa, no-
one else has a mandate to represent the community on this issue.
As far as the activists were concerned, this meeting was a success because
it won them a powerful ally and the UF could provide crucial technical
skills in the event of state approval of upgrading. The significance of this
alliance only emerged later when the state attempted to undermine it. The
UF team was under surveillance when it arrived in Uitenhage. 68 That
night, the UF's Port Elizabeth offices were broken into and searched. More
significantly, Minister Heunis later communicated his displeasure to the
UF's Managing Director Jan Steyn questioning why the UF had agreed to
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cover the legal costs of the Supreme Court action. Heunis communicated
this grievance to leading Afrikaner corporate businessman Fred du Plessis
as well. As far as the KTC officials were concerned, PLANACT and BESG
were merely UF fronts that Matlock established to hide his involvement
in Langa.69
Made was under no illusions about the game that needed to be played. He
said this to a visiting UDF organiser:
"We called the director of the Urban Foundation and its
Eastern Cape director. We told them that the people see the
Foundation as a government created structure and the people
are aware that the Urban Foundation was created
immediately after the 1976 riots for the purpose of
neutralising and normalising the situation. In its projects it
works hand-in-hand with the councillors which are not
representing our community. We told them that most of
their projects are unpopular among the people. They build
houses which people cannot afford, and the rental of their
houses is expensive. We even told them that they are
helping the government by forcibly removing people for its
strategic reasons by building these houses. We asked them to
disassociate themselves from the government if they want to
regain credibility. We told that in future if they want to build
houses they must consult with the people."70
Meeting the LCC made a substantial impact on Matlock. Whereas before
the meeting he was extremely nervous that the community leaders were
about to criticise the activities of his organisation, some months later he
explained to the author that the meeting was the start of a new set of
relationships between the UF and extra-parliamentary organisations in
the Eastern Cape.71 Obviously, this re-alignment affected the UF's
relationships with the state. In particular, in a letter to Erasmus, Matlock
spelt out his support for, (a) "process oriented housing mechanisms as
opposed to the normal product oriented housing delivery mechanism";
(b) in-situ upgrading of informal settlements; and (c) the necessity for
"forming a coalition with communities in the planning and
implementation of select projects". 72 Obviously these policies differed
drastically from the KTC's technicist top-down approach and should be
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interpreted as a response to pressures and demands emanating from the
black communities that the UF had to deal with.
Just over a month after the meeting with the UF, Roger Matlock sent an
internal memo to Robin Lee enclosing a letter he recommended should be
sent by Lee to Dr. Scheepers of the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning. 73 This letter was a follow up to a meeting
that Lee had with Scheepers in the weeks that followed the original
meeting. After referring to discussions with representatives of
multinational companies who were signatories to the Sullivan Principles,
the letter went on to warn about unrest and calls for direct negotiations
between the government and LCC. The most important paragraphs of this
rather remarkable letter are quoted in full:
"The multinational companies in Uitenhage are strongly
supportive of their employee's aspirations, including their rights to
live where they like and to express their political rights in
whichever way possible. As a result of the international focus on
Uitenhage prompted by the incident in Kabah in March 1985, they
are extremely concerned about the adverse effect on their presence
in South Africa which a further similar incident would invariably
precipitate. It is their belief that no action which is contrary to the
attached draft corporate statement on fundamental human rights
should be undertaken. ....
"... [Flrom the Urban Foundation's limited degree of contact with
the residents of Kabah it does appear that they are a highly
organised community which has shown a great deal of solidarity
with regard to the retention and upgrading of Kabah. ...
"In conclusion, I feel that the time is ripe for an agreement to be
negotiated between the authorities and the community for the
replanning of Kabah."
During December, January and the early part of February, the activists
concentrated on building organisation and completing the survey.
Sutcliffe and Lund drafted the survey and after a group of Uitenhage
volunteers were trained to administer the questionnaires by someone
connected to the Institute for Social and Economic Research at Rhodes
University, a sample was drawn and the work began in earnest. It was by
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no means a simple task. After the security police cottoned onto what was
happening, activists caught at roadblocks in possession of surveys were
immediately detained. The completed surveys were stashed with a
sympathetic nun at a nearby convent. Despite numerous problems and
breakdowns, the surveys were eventually completed. By mid-February
they had been sent to Sutcliffe who began processing them.
About the time the questionnaires were completed, the lawyers notified
the activists that the date set for the court case was 25 March. This gave the
activists little over a month, but they also realised the need to take full
advantage of the fact that the court case was to take place four days after
the first anniversary of the Langa massacre. In conjunction with
PLANACT and GRC members, the LCC activists formulated a strategy.
This involved the completion of an upgrading report under the auspices
of PLANACT and in conjunction with GRC and BESG. This report, the
LCC decided, had to be completed before the court case so that a press
conference could be held to announce the community's own proposals for
a peaceful solution to the Langa problem. Significantly, the LCC decided to
invite everyone to this press conference: the UDF affiliates, trade unions,
all Uitenhage employers, the KTC, police, Dr. Scheepers and even Minister
Heunis and his senior officials.
In the meantime, the number of Langa squatters was increasing. It is
worth discussing in greater detail the development of a new growth point
in the Kamesh Rd area that the KTC decided to take action against (see
map 8.5) The ground occupied by the squatters was formerly proclaimed
for black residential but this was revoked in 1981. People began erecting
their shacks in this area in early November. On November 4th 1985, a
number of these were demolished by the Uitenhage municipality. From
that point on the number of shacks increased as follows.74
7 November:
14 November:
21 November:
28 November:
5 December:
9 shacks
no change
3 toilets erected
no change
1 completed shack first noticed
on the 3rd and 1 completed
frame that had been erected
during the night of the 4th.
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12 December:
20 December:
6 January:
13 January:
20 January:
24 January:
31 January:
7 February:
14 February:
24 February:
frame completed as a toilet.
5 further shacks erected
total of 53
total of 60
total of 78
3
5
9
total of 41 structures counted
total of 42 structures (shacks and toilets)
The most significant feature about this expansion was that it took place
despite official warnings that the structures were illegal. Furthermore, the
people were not allocated sites by corrupt councillors. Instead, this erection
of structures was in open defiance of authority and hence almost from the
start, this area had a thriving area committee. The municipal officials also
referred repeatedly to the fact that "there has been an escalation of
violence in the area in that Municipal Officials have been threatened with
their lives if they continue to carry out inspections and services in the
area."75
During the week of 10-14 February, eviction notices were served on 72
families who had built shacks in this area over the previous few months.
The case was heard on 15 April and an order was granted that declared the
shacks illegal and gave them until April 30 to move to Kwallobuhle
failing which their structures would be forcibly dismantled. This
effectively meant that if the squatters failed to move, the forced removals
would take place on May Day, the day COSA'TU planned on staging South
Africa's biggest ever national stayaway. Clearly the pressure was building
up to a climax - some residents could not handle it and about 70 families
moved to Kwallobuhle at this point. 76
 By this stage, however, a new set
of negotiations had been initiated that were to substantially alter the
balance of forces in the area.
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Surprisingly, everything worked according to plan. The academics
completed an upgrading report entitled Langa: The Case For Upgrade, and
a large press conference was held on 19 March attended by a number of
TV crews, journalists and business representatives. The ICTC never came
and Heunis sent a telegram to Made's home address apologising for not
being able to attend. Press reports and editorials remarked on the
constructive nature of the press conference and the report.
Weza Made opened the conference with these words:
"By calling this press conference it is our last attempt to find a
peaceful solution; this is out last attempt to prevent
bloodshed and confrontation with the government. ... We
want you to save the township from explosion because if the
government can force us to move to this place we don't
want, we therefore have no alternative but to use force to use
anything at our disposal."77
Freddie Magugu then gave a detailed account of the LCC's attempts to find
a negotiated solution to Langa's problems and ended with the query: "The
KTC claims to be representing us and yet it is the one which is taking us to
court, this does not make sense". 78 Wonga Nkala, President of UYCO,
gave an articulate emotional speech that centred around what he called
the "crucial question", namely:
"[W]here will the money come from? According to the
report the people have no money. The first phase will
cost about R3,5 million and the second phase will cost about
R22 million. The government has the money which has been
taken from the people of Langa and big business has benefited
from the people of Langa. It is high time it pays back and helps
the people of Langa. If the government had no money there
wouldn't be an SADF occupational army in Namibia,
oppressing and killing Namibians. If the government didn't
have any money RENAMO and UNITA wouldn't have any
support. It is high time the government diverts its financial
assistance from rebel groups to the people of Langa."79
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The formal speeches were followed by comments from residents who
arrived at the press conference on their own accord. Speaking in broken
english but with great emotion, mainly old people got up and made
comments like this one:
"Why must I move to Kwallobuhle, I stay here and this is my
home. I am not moving anywhere, they can shoot me dead."80
In addition, the Eastern Cape's most prominent political and
trade union leaders were present. Stone Sizane of PEBCO and the UDF
Eastern Cape Executive expressed solidarity with the Langa struggle on
behalf of the Front. Michael Dube of COSATU's Eastern Cape interim
executive and one time Langa resident, forcefully backed the LCC's
demand that the state and business pay for the upgrading of Langa. He
argued it was high time that business did something for Langa in return
for the labour power this community provided for Uitenhage's industry.
Finally, Gugile Nkwinti of Port Alfred threatened solidarity action from
the hinterland towns if the Langa removals proceeded.
The report's basic conclusions were delivered by PLANACT
representatives. The most important were:
* an average household income was R186.38 per month;
* only 9% of households earned above R400 per month while
less than 1% would have qualified for a mortgage;
* 43% of the respondents of the survey were unemployed.
These figures, PLANACT concluded, pointed to the need for subsidised
housing. The report itself, however, recommended a
R3,5 million Emergency Scheme and a larger R22 million programme to
upgrade infrastructure. This, PLANACT argued, would involve a water-
borne sewerage system, water supplies to each house, tarring of certain
roads, improvement of the drainage system and the installation of
electricity. This focus on infrastructure rather than on housing was shaped
by survey results which revealed that housing was less important to the
residents than basic services.
Most importantly, PLANACT recommended that the streetand area
committee system could have become the structure through which
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community participation in the upgrading process was organised.
Community solidarity around opposition to the removal was greatly
strengthened by the press coverage given to the report. More importantly,
however, the whole of black Uitenhage forcefully demonstrated its unity
and power by giving 99% support to the stayaway call on 21 March.
Furthermore, 82% of Uitenhage's coloured workers also heeded the
stayaway call. Over 60 000 people packed the Kwallobuhle stadium for a
day long rally in commemoration of the victims of the Langa massacre.
The sustained mobilisation of the older residents that this meeting
represented was explained by many activists in terms of the effect
repression was having. One activist said: "The repression and violence
from the government made the parents to unite with the youth and fight
back."81
This stayaway marked the high point of community-union solidarity. In
dozens of factory meetings during the weeks leading up to the stayaway,
workers had debated the issue and come to a decision to call a full day
stayaway. This decision was widely supported in street and area committee
meetings. The combined impact of tight workplace and community
organisation ensured the success of the stayaway. This is why grassroots
activists were more than a little peeved when two days before the stayaway
the Kwallobuhle leadership issued a directive that all workers must
stayaway.82
Langa's problems, however, were by no means over. The court case took
place as scheduled on 25 March. It was clear that the state was under
tremendous pressure to find an amicable settlement by this stage. Le Roux
had this say about that period:
"There was active agitation to encourage people to move in
and squat. It became a real problem from the point of view of
control. There was nothing anybody could do to stop this
flow because the police, municipalities and management
committees all feared an eruption. It then became a political
test of wills: the squatters defiantly moved towards the white
areas. The position was out of control. Everyone was scared of
an international incident. Everyone knew it was a bomb with
a lid on."83
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Roger Matlock of the Urban Foundation phoned Dr. Scheepers at the
Department of Constitutional Development and Planning on the 21st to
propose a deal that went as follows: after KTC obtains a court order to
evict the squatters on the 25th, this should be used as a stick to negotiate
with the community from a position of strength. He urged that direct
removals should be avoided at all costs.
No doubt responding to international media coverage of Langa on the
anniversary of the massacre, from business pressure and from the threat
of extensive disruption, KTC's lawyers arrived with a message from
Minister Heunis on the morning of the 25th urging the parties to reach an
out-of-court settlement. The deal KTC offered was that if the 9th-4th
Avenue squatters agreed to move to Kwallobuhle, they could live there
rent free; while the rest of Langa would be upgraded. Realising that if they
agreed to this offer without consulting the people serious divisions could
open up in the community, the LCC turned it down. The case went ahead
and judgment was reserved indefinitely.
The LCC had now rejected what was, in effect, the state's final offer. This
was the most it could have hoped to win at that stage. However, the
imperatives of extra-state organisation and the potential for division if
agreements were reached that resulted in the sacrificing of the interests of
even a minority group, were pressures the LCC could not have ignored.
Some of the LCC leaders were well aware that it was "divide-and-rule"
deals like this that resulted in bloody intra-community conflicts in the
Western Cape.
As mentioned above, the Kamesh Rd squatters case came to court on 15
April and a removal order was issued instructing squatters to vacate the
premises by 30 April. Obviously the Langa conflict was reaching a head
and the potential for major confrontations prompted community, trade
union and business leaders to seek last minute solutions. Using the LCC
call made at the press conference urging business to involve themselves
in the Langa conflict, and under pressure from the unions to do likewise,
the Uitenhage branch of Midland Chamber of Industries (MCI) decided to
take action. Ronny Kruger of the giant Volkswagen Company (VW)
commented on this decision by saying that "business has a responsibility
to get involved in issues that affect their workers. ... Happy employees
make for happy consumers."84
 The LCC met the MCI for a preliminary
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meeting on the 25th April and it was agreed that future meetings would
take place to hammer out a compromise.
The MCI then took steps that managed to convince the KTC to stay the
removal of the Kamesh Rd squatters for ten days on the grounds that the
MCI wanted to meet trade union and community representatives in an
attempt to find a less violent solution. This intervention was timeous
because the Uitenhage municipality was under tremendous pressure from
its Conservative Party members to go for a full-on armed confrontation to
remove the Kamesh Rd squatters - an option with widespread support in
Uitenhage's white community. The Mayor was quoted in a Grenada
television documentary screened in November 1985 as saying: "If we are
attacked we will resist."85 Using their considerable influence, Le Roux and
Erasmus - responding largely to pressure from business - managed to
convince the Deputy Sheriff and the Mayor to stay the removals for ten
days. This bulwark against an ultra-right-wing line brought together an
informal five person caucus of Uitenhage's most powerful white leaders -
Le Roux, Erasmus, Coetzee, Kruger, and Robin Williams, Uitenhage's
town clerk. They met regularly to plan strategy and agreed to support a
negotiation/compromise position for the moment. 86 This crucial alliance
between multi-national capital and the local state revolved largely around
two concerns: (a) the international consequences of a violent eruption,
and (b) the potential advantages of upgrading. It was agreed that Kruger
would act as the broker between the state and community. Their objective
was twofold: (a) to secure the removal to Kwallobuhle of the Kamesh Rd
squatters and the 9th-4th Avenue squatters; and (b) upgrading of the rest of
Langa. 87 Their weapons were the stick of forced removal and the carrot of
upgrading.
Two mass meetings took place that cemented the alliance between
community organisations and trade unions that was to carry the next
round of negotiations through. The first was a mass political funeral in
Langa stadium where Weza Made spoke on the removal issue. This was
the first high profile mass meeting he had ever spoken at. The second was
a mass indoor meeting on Mayday. The speakers at this meeting included
Freddie Magugu, Wonga Nkala, John Gomomo and Weza Made. Made's
comment after the meeting was: "For the first time we see unity between
unions and community organisations. It was decided thatwhatever we do
there should be joint decision-making."88 From this point on, the LCC
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became a core of leaders that comprised the original four, i.e. Made,
Magugu, Mandabana and Teyise, plus the NAAWU leadership centred
around Gomomo. It was this alliance that finally forced an open rupture
between the Langa and Kwallobuhle leadership. The URECO leadership
accused the LCC of working autonomously because of the influence of
"FOSATU" (sic). Underlying this tension were the old disagreements over
strategy. The Kwallobuhle leadership saw no reason why negotiations
should take place with the MCI to resolve a forced removal problem. For
them, it was nothing less than a question of state power. .
The meeting between the LCC, trade unionists and the MCI took place on
2nd May - the day after all Uitenhage's workers stayed away for political
reasons. Only 11 Africans out of a total of 7 615 employed at Uitenhage's
major enterprises turned up for work that day - it was clear who held
power on the factory floor.89 The MCI delegates arrived at the meeting90
with a discussion paper relating to solutions to the question of the
Kamesh Rd squatters only. The paper started by saying that any solution
arrived at must be acceptable to the Uitenhage municipality, the "coloured
community" (read: the Coloured Management Committee), the Langa
community and the Kamesh Rd squatters. Having defined the parties to
the conflict in this way - a definition that was not opposed by the unionists
and LCC, the MCI paper then went on to identify the cause of the problem
as conflicting "interests arising from the problems of rapid urbanisation".
(my emphasis)
Accepting the squatter's reasons for not wanting to move as being ease of
access to places of employment and the high cost of living in
Kwallobuhle, the MCI paper said it was prepared to "lobby support for the
implementation of the following":
1. that the Kamesh Rd area be zoned for community recreational activities;
2. that Langa be upgraded and, if necessary, extended to the north;
3. that any upgrading or other improvements be undertaken in a way that
alleviates unemployment in Langa, i.e. by utilising labour from the
community.
In return for its support for these proposals, the MCI argued that the
community should agree that the Kamesh Rd squatters be "temporarily
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and acceptably ... accommodated elsewhere."
The LCC responded by making four points: 91 firstly, if the Kamesh Rd
squatters agreed to move, this would be a sign of weakness that could set a
precedent for the removal of all Langa's squatters in the future. Clearly the
leaders were reluctant to be party to a decision that would allow the thin
end of the removal wedge into the community. This demand also clearly
revealed the extent to which politically organised squatters who had
physically occupied land could use this presence as a lever when making
community demands.
Secondly, the leaders said they would refuse to agree to any compromises
until the basic principle that Langa be upgraded is approved. This reflected
a shrewd realisation that it would be a mistake to separate bargaining over
the future of the Kamesh Road area from the larger struggle for upgrading.
Thirdly, and related to the second point, the leaders argued that upgrading
must be planned to ensure that it does not only benefit the better-off
sections of the community, but that the poorest elements also benefit. This
point was made because activists had been discussing the mistakes made
in upgrading schemes elsewhere that worked to the disadvantage of the
poorest strata who were pushed out of the community because of an
inability to afford the upgraded services and housing (e.g. Crossroads and
Alexandra).
Fourthly, they said it was unacceptable that the only reason why people
could not live in the Kamesh Rd area was because it was zoned in terms of
the Group Areas act as "non-residential".
The MCI and LCC agreed to meet again on the 9th. The MCI delegates
went back to discuss the issues raised by the LCC with the caucus. The LCC
returned to discuss various options with the community. A special
meeting for all Uitenhage's organisations was held on Sunday 4th to
discuss the removal and the meeting with MCI. On the same day Made
gave a moving speech to the Kamesh Rd squatters. Relating the stories of
Sofasonke's struggles in Johannesburg in the 1940s and the struggle for
Crossroads, he reiterated his view that "the struggle of squatters is the
struggle for land". On the court case, he related how Mandela refused to
recognise the legitimacy of the South African courts at his trial. He
concluded be saying that all that squatters have is the power to organise
and that "there is no easy walk to freedom". This is why, he said, the
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Kamesh Rd squatters should agree to move to another area in Langa.
By this stage the Kamesh Rd area committee was meeting on a daily basis
to discuss plans for resisting the removal. A key problem, as far as the
amabutho were concerned, was the open and unprotected location of the
Kamesh Rd squatters from a military point of view. 92 The key question in
the minds of the LCC activists was whether the Kamesh Rd area
committee would agree to the voluntary relocation of the squatters to
another area inside Langa. The activists were well aware of the fact that if
the rest of Langa was to be upgraded, the community might have to agree
to compromise on the Kamesh Rd area. Everything, however, depended
on the Kamesh Rd area committee. Eventually, this area committee
decided at a meeting on the 6th that the Kamesh Rd squatters would agree
to move voluntarily to another location in Langa if this would ensure the
upgrading of the rest of Langa. The activists, who had spent literally
dozens of hours in talks with the Kamesh Rd squatters, were elated with
this decision. However, the amabutho leaders and some Kwallobuhle
leaders were opposed to the decision arguing that this in effect meant
recognising the Group Areas Act. They also argued that the "black man's
struggle for the return of his land" must not be reversed for the sake of
compromise.
In the meantime, the LCC and the unionists had decided that a mass
meeting needed to be held to get a general mandate for the Kamesh Rd
compromise. The white caucus agreed to support the LCC application to
the magistrate to hold such a meeting. The result was that the LCC applied
for permission to hold a meeting with letters of support from the KTC,
MCI and Uitenhage municipality. Not surprisingly, the magistrate gave
permission for the meeting. The meeting took place on the 8th in a soccer
field in Langa. It lasted most of the day with speeches from all the major
Uitenhage organisations, including the trade unions. The LCC leaders
chaired the meeting.
An old ex-Robben Islander gave a key speech which began with
these words:
"I remember in 1937 and 1938 when people were removed
from what is known today as Van Riebeeck's Hoogte to
Kabah, some of those people were thrown here in
Uitenhage. The white people who occupied these areas are
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still there today. The crucial question to ask is why should
we be moved around like this? What kind of people are we
to be moved around like this? There is even a court order
saying that we must leave this place. It is quite clear that the
courts belong to the white community because our people
were shot and the courts did nothing about it. ... Today we
are being moved from this place because of this monster
that the government has created, this monster of apartheid.
We are saying that the people of South Africa must unite
irrespective of colour, creed and ideology. I was a member of
the ANC and I have spent 22 years in jail, but all this has
not broken my spirit. The fight we fought continues even
today. "93
A call was also made on residents to support the forthcoming rent boycott,
to get ready for another consumer boycott and to participate in the living
wage campaign.
The meeting ended with discussion from the crowd about what should
happen to Kamesh Rd. Unfortunately, due mainly to lack of experience,
the leadership posed the problem as being a question of whether people
should move to Kwallobuhle or not. Obviously, this was roundly rejected
as an option. One speaker from Kamesh Rd area committee said:
"Comrades, I am not going to give a long speech. What I want to say
is that we must make it clear to Botha and his children that we are
not going to Kwallobuhle."94
However, because the leaders never laid out the complexities of the
compromise then under discussion with MCI - i.e. whether the Kamesh
Rd squatters should agree to move to another area in Langa - no clear
mandate was obtained for action either way from this meeting. In the end
the more radical elements took this opportunity to make emotional
statements about the weak and cowardly nature of any proposed move.
Given the atmosphere of the meeting, speakers from the Kamesh Rd. area
also spoke out against the decision to move.
With no room to compromise at this stage, the LCC activists decided to go
ahead with its meeting with the MCI scheduled for the 9th, but to use
"delaying tactics", i.e. not to agree to anything concrete until further
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community meetings could be held.
The meeting with the MCI took place as scheduled on the 9th. The MCI
arrived with a revised paper that noted that in addition to the previous
reasons for why the squatters refused to move, i.e. ease of access to
employment and high cost of living in Kwallobuhle, there was also a fear
that the removal of the Kamesh Rd squatters would set a precedent for the
removal of all squatters and that the "non-residential" zoning of the
Kamesh Rd area was perceived as "political and therefore not acceptable".
In addition to the three proposals put forward at the last meeting, the MCI
suggested a further three:
4. that the MCI would "seek a guarantee from the authorities" that Langa
would indefinitely remain zoned as a Black residential area;
5. that the MCI would request reasons why the Kamesh Rd area should
remain zoned "non-residential";
6. "the upgrading of Kabah/Langa be planned to accommodate all income
groups, which would include an area for, i.a. shack dwellers".
The paper ended by saying all the above concessions were conditional on
the Kamesh Rd squatters agreeing to move elsewhere.
The LCC requested the scrapping of the proposal that the Kamesh Rd area
be zoned for community recreational facilities (proposal 1 above). What
eventually happened to this area, they argued, should be negotiated as part
of the overall upgrading process. They also asked for more time to discuss
matters with the Kamesh Rd squatters before finally agreeing to the MCI's
proposals. Through most of the night of the 9th June and into the
following day, the Kamesh Rd squatters and the leaders met and discussed
all the options. Bitter arguments broke out, but eventually all the squatters
agreed that to compromise at this stage was preferable to losing the battle
for the whole of Langa in the long run. When the more radical elements
heard about this decision, they accused the LCC leadership of acting
without a mandate.
At the meeting with the MCI held on the 11th June, the LCC agreed to all
the MCI's proposals (set out in points 1-6 above). In addition further
discussion on related issues resulted in agreement on the following
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points:
1. "that the squatters are prepared to voluntarily move to an alternative
and acceptable location within Langa/Kabah";
2. that the LCC will identify which area in Langa would be the most
acceptable location to which the squatters could be moved;
3. that another meeting be held on June 20th attended by the LCC, MCI and
representatives of the Uitenhage Municipality, KTC and the coloured and
Indian management committees;
4. that the MCI would approach its members to help the squatters with
materials to re-build their shacks after they move.
However, the LCC activists insisted that before final agreement on all
these points was reached, they wanted to return to the community to fully
discuss the proposals. Despite the declaration of the Emergency the
following day (i.e. 12th June), the proposals were discussed by area
committees, the URECO executive and COSATU's Uitenhage local. A final
meeting between the LCC and MCI was held on the 14th June where six
key points were agreed to. Because they represent the basis of an
agreement arrived at democratically through negotiation, compromise
and community participation, they will be quoted in full as they appeared
in the minutes of the meeting:
"The MCI is prepared to recommend and lobby support for the
implementation of the following:
1. Kabah/Langa will indefinitely remain an area zoned for Black residents.
2. That Kabah/Langa be upgraded and, if necessary, extended on the
Northern side, to accommodate the existing residents within sound town
planning principles.
3. That such upgrading be planned to accommodate all income groups,
which would include, i.a., shack dwellers.
4. That any such upgrading programme be undertaken utilizing the labour
of residents presently unemployed, in order to help alleviate the
hardships experienced in the present economic recession.
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5. That the Municipality of Uitenhage obtain the support of PLANACT for
the master plan to upgrade Kabah/Langa, and to clearly define the future
of zone 61 [Kamesh Rd].
6. It is understood that if the authorities agree to the above, the squatters
will agree to voluntarily move."
This deal meant the Langa squatters were being offered much more than
before the court case in March, i.e. the removal of 9th-4th Avenue and
upgrading of the rest. They were, in fact, being offered almost all of what
they had struggled for from the beginning.
With this agreement under his belt, Ronny Kruger of VW and the MCI
convinced the Uitenhage Municipality to allow him to talk to the Council
as a whole. It was this talk that convinced the Mayor to agree to come to
the June 20th meeting to discuss the upgrading proposals. Largely because
of pressure from VW, by the middle of June all the major interests in the
white establishment had accepted the proposals, i.e. the KTC, Uitenhage
municipality, Le Roux, and the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning and its Minister, namely Chris Heunis.95 As
far as the community leaders and unionists were concerned, the June 20th
meeting accepted the proposals the MCI and LCC had agreed to on the
14th. Although the coloured and Indian Management Committees were
not there, the KTC, Uitenhage municipality, LCC, trade unionists and MCI
sat around a table and, with a map of Uitenhage on the wall, discussed the
most suitable areas into which Langa could be extended.
According to Freddie Magugu, "it was quite a nice meeting where
everybody was convinced that if we can keep working in this spirit, we can
achieve a lot of things". 96 The KTC agreed to provide the bulldozers to
clear the area agreed upon. The MCI said it would provide the materials
for the re-erection of the shacks and the LCC agreed to provide the full
names and addresses of the Kamesh Rd squatters to the KTC so that the
area cleared would be inhabited by the right people. All this proceeded as
planned.
Heunis visited Port Elizabeth at this stage to hold discussions with MPs
and officials where he expressed support for the retention and upgrading
of Langa.97 This message was communicated at the time to the MCI.98
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As far as the Task Group was concerned, Scheepers abandoned his early
position that stipulated that his brief was strictly technical and therefore he
could not meet community representatives. Prior to the June 20th
meeting in Uiterthage, Scheepers led a delegation of Uitenhage and Port
Elizabeth Mrs (Dawid Le Roux, Sakkie Louw and Gert Van Der Linde) that
met representatives of the UDF's Eastern Cape Regional Executive on June
4th. The meeting was held at the offices of S.A. Bottling and was chaired by
Mr. P. Gutsche, an S.A. Bottling director. Also present were
representatives of the Eastern Cape Chamber of Commerce, the Eastern
Cape branch of the National African Federation of Chambers of
Commerce.
Scheepers defined the purpose of the meeting as being the need to discuss
the future upgrading of infrastructure in the Port Elizabeth - Uitenhage
region in terms of the Rive Plan guidelines for the Eastern Cape (see
Chapter 1). Scheepers pointed out that government had allocated R200
million Rand for this purpose. The UDF delegates, who were all from
civic organisations, emphasised their commitment to non-violent
solutions and the need for joint negotiation over the upgrading and
development of infrastructure.
The issues discussed were:99
* the crucial importance of negotiations over upgrading;
* that a special Task Force of government officials be established to carry
forward these negotiations with the community;
* the fact that the Rive Plan was not compiled in consultation with the
community;
* the general acceptance that the Rive Plan was sufficiently flexible to
allow for changes that might flow from negotiations;
* that the UDF organisations were representative of the community;
* the necessity for community leaders to enter into genuine negotiations
instead of acting as rubber stamps.
The meeting ended with agreement that further meetings were essential
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and the next meeting was scheduled for 23rd June, three days after the
Uitenhage meeting and, in the event, eleven days after the State of
Emergency was declared.
CONCLUSION
To all intents and purposes, therefore, the struggle for Langa had been
won. Through grassroots organisation, mass struggle, negotiation,
compromise and the building of alliances, Langa's social movement
forced multi-national capital, the local state and top government officials
to agree on concessions that favoured the majority of Langa's residents. In
addition, the function of Scheepers' Task Force changed towards the end
when agreement was reached with the UDF regional leadership that
planning would take place within the context of genuine negotiations.
In the end, however, these gains were reversed. The unique and fragile
balance of forces that made possible mass organisation in the township,
divisions in the white power bloc and negotiations over realisable
concessions, changed fundamentally when the declaration of the State of
Emergency on 12th June 1986 imposed an external dynamic . that subsumed
by its shear force all other local dynamics. As the next chapter will reveal,
working closely with the SADF and SAP, Le Roux and Erasmus reneged
on their commitment to negotiation and used their newly trained
"greenbeans" (municipal police) to engineer one of the most sophisticated
and precision-timed forced removals South African has ever seen.
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CHAPTER 9
THE WHAM BAM REMOVALS: STATE SECURITY, ORDERLY
URBANISATION AND URBAN APARTHEID'S LAST STAND
INTRODUCTION
The National State of Emergency was declared on 12 June 1986. Just over a
month later, the forced removal of Kabah began. On 13 July municipal
police and a bulldozer moved into Extension 61 and began demolishing
shacks. In a bid to prevent resistance, key community leaders were
detained on 11 July and by 14 July many key activists had been - to use the
security-speak of the time - 'taken out'. The way was clear for one last
final attempt to impose an apartheid plan on Uitenhage. These events
marked the end of local-level negotiations and the beginning of a period
of repressive urban reform that was made possible by the switch in
national level state policy reflected in the declaration of the Emergency.
However, they were also the result of a strategy aimed at forcibly realising
the long cherished vision by Uitenhage's officialdom of an urbanised black
community settled far away from leafy white suburbia where property
prices had a higher value than the quality of life of the black community,
and where white ratepayers were moving rightward in their political
allegiances.
The irony is that the State of Emergency did not shore up the cracks in
urban apartheid as was hoped by the officials, policemen and politicians
who enforced the removal. Instead, it was the prelude to a political
transition that began in 1989-90 at national level that was complemented
by the beginnings of an urban transition that included the scrapping of
influx control, Group Areas and racially structured local government. As
the Epilogue will describe, the newly negotiated post-February 1990
national urban policy framework provided the necessary conditions for
the Return to Langa campaign to succeed in winning back Kabah for the
people. In short, although the forced removal and the State of Emergency
scuppered the agreements reached in the negotiations prior to and just
after the declaration of the Emergency, these agreements were finally
implemented three and half years later.
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WHAM, BAM AND URBAN POLICY
There is consensus in the literature on the state during the 1980s that the
declaration of the 1986 State of Emergency marked a decisive turning point
in state strategy and, to a lesser extent, in state policy. lBased on extensive
primary research, this author argued that by the mid-1980s the essential
elements of state reform policy had failed to secure for the dominant
classes a stable 'consociational democracy' capable of winning
international recognition and popular legitimacy. 2 Whereas reform policy
in the early 1980s was coupled to a "counter-insurgency" security strategy,
by the mid-1980s security strategists were arguing that a mounting
revolutionary threat required a shift to what was called a "winning-hearts-
and-minds" ("WHAM") approach coupled to a "counter-revolutionary
warfare" ("CRW") strategy. 3 This shift in strategy went hand-in-hand with
a restructuring of the internal dynamics of state power4 and of the
relations between state and capita1.5 In particular, it meant the demise of
the negotiation-oriented reform strategies of Minister Chris Heunis and
his Department of Constitutional Development and Planning - strategies
that penetrated directly into the Uitenhage conflict shortly before the State
of Emergency was declared. Instead of local-level negotiations to resolve
problems, the newly empowered "securocrats" installed the so-called Joint
Management Centres to coordinate state strategy at local level. It was these
structures that overrode civilian authority and any negotiated agreements
reached at local level prior to the commencement of the Emergency.
Although the literature on the shift in state strategy during the mid-1980s
adequately provided overviews of the dynamics of state reform policy and
strategy, less attention was given to how all this intersected with local-
level dynamics. Where this was done, it became abundantly clear that
"WHAM" and "CRW" strategies as implemented by the state through an
"inner-state" system called the National Security Management System
(NSMS) had clearly and unambiguously targeted urban townships as the
key foci for WHAM.6 This, in turn, led to attempts to conceptualise at a
general level the relationships between local urban dynamics and national
security strategies during the Emergency period.7 The conclusions were
that the complexity of the urban system was such that the aims of state
security strategy were extremely difficult - if not impossible - to realise at
the local level. The contradictions and cross-cutting structure of interests
in towns and cities across the country was such that state security strategies
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failed to nail down the lid on urban social movements in the way that was
originally intended.8 Instead, by the late 1980s, local-level negotiations
returned with a vengeance, but this time driven by powerful rent boycotts
that were crippling the central linchpins of both WHAM and CRW,
namely black local government. 9 It was these local-level negotiations that
preceded the commencement of the transition in February 1990 and
provided demonstrable proof to both the state and the opposition that a
mutually hurting power stalemate could be broken.10
Although these direct linkages between WHAM and the urban system had
much to do with the 'targets' that WHAM strategists selected, they also
resulted from the way urban policy shifted in the mid-1980s in response to
two primary points of pressure; namely the demographic processes and
social movements that ignored and/or resisted the logic and regulations of
influx control, and the calls from organised business to scrap influx
controls. The State President announced the abolition of influx control in
June 1986, shortly before the Emergency was declared. Now whereas
organised business had hoped that this would have triggered a new urban
development approach that was not premised on the principles of racial
control that had shaped the urban system since at least the 1920s, in reality
the state implemented what they called an "orderly urbanisation" policy,
with much more emphasis on "orderly" than on "urbanisation". At the
very centre of this policy framework was the need to build strong,
legitimate and viable black local governments - a project that inevitably
needed to be achieved coercively. In short, urban reforms were conceded
from 1985-86 onward, but these were subsumed into a national security
strategy that contradicted what the social movements and capital would
have liked a post-influx control urban system to achieve.11
To realise the aims of WHAM (popular support for the system by meeting
certain material needs) and CRW (elimination of the revolutionary threat
by 'taking out' the revolutionaries), three strategies in particular were
used in urban townships: mass detentions to 'take out' the activists, urban
development in accordance with the 'orderly urbanisation' framework,
and the restructuring of civil society via the creation of state-supporting
"community leaders" (invariably vigilantes). All three of these were
implemented in Uitenhage during the Emergency period. Not
surprisingly, it was the specific constellation of local interests that
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mediated the particular form that WHAM (and to a lesser extent CRW)
took in Uitenhage.
TAKING OUT' THE LEADERSHIP
It is commonly accepted that the 1986 State of Emergency hit the Eastern
Cape region harder than the other regions of the country. It has been
estimated by the Black Sash that 1200 people were detained from the
Eastern Cape communities. 12 The rate of detentions (i.e. the number
taking place per month) peaked during the June-August 1986 period and
*dropped off slightly from September through November. Releases starting
occurring from September and roughly equaled the detention rate through
to April-May 1987. From this point through to mid-1988 the number of
detainees declined steadily until there were 56 still "inside" in April 1988.
de Villiers and Roux conclude:
"Analysis of our data suggests that the underlying purpose of
emergency detention is destabilisation. As a strategy, it destabilises
both communities and individuals by the huge length of detentions
and the emphasis on young adults. Interviews with a sample of 200
ex-detainees show that the average period of emergency detention is
ten months. Over 50 per cent of these ex-detainees are under the age
of 26 years."13
The Detainees Parents Support Committee's estimates are higher than the
Black Sash figures. It estimated that out of a total of 2516 known detainees
from the Eastern Cape for the period mid-1986 through to early 1987, 552
were political activists/community workers, 169 were
scholars/students/teachers, 28 were church workers and 9 were
journalists.14
In order to find out whether there was a strategy behind the detentions, de
Villiers and Roux interviewed 200 ex-detainees. The pattern was that
leadership would be removed to remote police stations for interrogation
• for between 1 and 3 weeks, either at the beginning or the end of the
detention period. Non-leadership people, however, were quite often
never interrogated. Torture was widely used, with police using in
particular a technique that combined suffocation and electrocution that
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was difficult for doctors to trace. It was also common for detainees who
had been tortured to be used by police to identify others who were paraded
before these anonymous informers. 15 de Villiers and Roux conclude that
detentions were "used to unnerve communities and break down
individuals."16
A total of 752 people from the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area were known
to have been detained in terms of the Emergency regulations by August
1986. The real figure, however, could have been double this amount
because these lists were compiled from reports of detentions that were
received by the Black Sash Advice Office, PE Crisis Centre, Legal Resources
Centre and private attorneys. Out of the 752 known detainees, 100 were
from Uitenhage.17
'Taking out' the leadership through detention and assassinations 18 was a
strategy that went hand-in-glove with the establishment of poorly trained
municipal police forces. In accordance with the theory of 'counter-
revolutionary warfare', law and order can only be maintained in a
revolutionary situation by people who come directly from the
communities that revolutionaries seek to control and these 'constables'
must work closely with friendly community leaders. Hence the strategy of
effectively 'arming the councillors' with the newly created municipal
police forces - or 'greenflies' as they came to be known in the townships
after their green uniforms. By July 1986 there were 429 municipal
policemen in Eastern Cape townships with many more employed over the
next year. de Villiers and Roux argued that they played four essential roles:
(i) to fill the vacuum left by the decimated community organisations, (ii)
to enforce the policies of the councils, (iii) to act as black auxiliaries of the
SAP, and (iv) to work with and provide support for vigilante groups.
Significantly, there is extensive evidence that a number of municipal
policemen were recruited from the ranks of the amabutho and so, as one
activist put it, "they know everything" about the community.19
The declaration of the State of Emergency and the commencement of
detentions fundamentally altered the delicate balance of power that had
emerged over the previous six months. Before the Emergency, local
leaders were becoming increasingly relaxed about their profile. They slept
at home, called public meetings, spoke openly to the press and some even
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began contemplating their longer-term futures. The prospect of upgrading
and development would have created job opportunities that some, at
least, could have applied for. The security police, in the meantime, were
excluded from negotiations and so were most of their informers. They
began, therefore, to loose control of township political dynamics. Even the
local white establishment began to think that maybe Minister Heunis was
correct when he told them that negotiations rather than "kragdadigheid"
was the future. This was, at least, what the leadership of the white
industrial sector had concluded. All of this was, of course, wiped out by
what subsequently happened.
After the Emergency, activists went into hiding. Finding safe places with
family, friends and sympathetic whites from town was the name of the
game. With no access to mass public meetings and the press, strategy was
developed in whispers in small clandestine meetings that had to be
carefully set up so that only those who were supposed to be there were
informed about it, and even then there was a chance that someone was an
informer. Not surprisingly, effective negotiations and non-violent action
in this context were impossible.
But as detentions proceeded, it became clear that police strategy was to
systematically break down the leadership structure by brutally breaking up
the psychological systems of individuals, and then disorganising the
relationships that sustained the dynamic of the movement. And in their
place to put the notorious municipal police and vigilantes. In a letter to
his mother, Weza Made described his conditions of detention in Hankey
Prison as follows:
"I have a difficult time. I do not get food. For three days I had one
meal a day and sometimes I sleep very hungry, not even having
any money to send someone to buy me some bread. ... I feel lost, as
if no-one cares for me any longer."
In a subsequent letter to the author that was smuggled out of the prison he
said:
"I'm still alright in health, but my mind is a little bit disturb because
of conditions inside the cell are deteriorating every day, even this
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letter I've written under difficult conditions because we are being
searched ... This chief here and his sergeants have a conservative
attitudes towards us, they really hate us. One detainee here asked to
see a doctor because he was beaten by police. He was taken by the
chief and another black sergeant. When they arrived at doctor's
surgery, the chief threaten him that if he tell the doctor who beat
him, he (chief) will beat him again at the police station. .. I've heard
of what happened to my township... ."
FORCED REMOVAL
Although influx controls were scrapped in mid-1986, thus removing
restrictions on rural-urban migration, the Group Areas Act remained
intact. This meant that the locus of control shifted from a focus on the
rural-urban nexus, to the intra-urban movement and location of the
african population. The struggles waged against influx control succeeded
in destroying these rural-urban controls, but in so doing communities
were created that did not fit into a Group Area grid. The result was a
second round of battles against intra-urban removals in places like
Oukasie in Brits, Crossroads in Cape Town, Hasbult at Soekrnekaar,
Thusang at Roedtan, Tshikoto in Louis Trichardt, Wheeler's Farm
outside Vereeniging and, of course, Langa in Uitenhage 20 where nearly 50
000 people were forcibly moved in a space of 3-4 months making one of
the largest ever forced removals in an urban area.21
The introduction of the State of Emergency, mass detentions and the
judicial defeat in late July suffered by the squatters in the court case
initiated by the KTC earlier in the year were the necessary conditions for
the execution of the forced removal of about 30 000 people during the
July-October period from Kabah to Tyoksville - the popular name given to
the tent town that originally housed those who were removed. 22 There
were, however, organisational processes that provided the sufficient
conditions.
The declaration of the Emergency and the commencement of detentions
immediately triggered crippling tensions within the community
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structures. Prior to the Emergency there were tensions within the Langa
Coordinating Committee between the community leadership and
NAAVVU trade unionists with the former accusing the latter of not
putting sufficient pressure on employers to do something about the
removals. Related problems were that NAAWU representatives did not
regularly attend LCC meetings and NAAWU appeared reluctant to
support a rent boycott campaign by calling on employers to cancel stop-
order payments to the KTC that covered the rental and service charge
payments of union members. After LCC leaders were either detained or
disappeared underground, new leaders took over the LCC who were
unfamiliar with the complexity of the process. This exacerbated tensions
between the LCC and the URECO leadership who had felt excluded from
the anti-removal struggle for some time.
The URECO and NAAVVU leadership decided to launched a separate
structure to deal with the removals and so, three days after the declaration
of the Emergency on 19 June the Anti-Removal Committee (ARC) was
established composed of two NAAVVU representatives, two MACVVUSA
representatives, one NUTW representative, one youth representative and
one URECO representative. The resultant competition between the LCC
and ARC meant that by the time the authorities moved decisively to
execute the removal in July, the leadership were too divided to respond
appropriately. These divisions filtered downward to the community - a
fact that became evident when a stayaway called by the unions for 20 June
failed.
At 10h30 on 11 July a key meeting took place between officials from the
KTC and SAP, the local member of parliament and senior government
officials. This meeting agreed on three points: (i) to establish a temporary
police station in Langa staffed by municipal police as the command centre
for the removals that were to take place; (ii) to prevent the further erection
of any additional shack structures in Langa; (iii) to commence with the
forced removals - or what was termed the intensification of the process of
persuasion of shack dwellers to move to Kwallobuhle.
By 17h00 on the same day, the temporary police station was up and staffed
by the new municipal policemen that the KTC had recently been financed
and empowered to employ. That night, numerous key activists were
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detained and a spree of detentions continued through to 14 July. The close
connection between the success of the removals and the detentions was
acknowledged by KTC Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee in a court affidavit when
he said:
"I respectfully believe that these arrests and the consequent removal
of the threat of intimidation by the 'comrades' had a great deal to do
with the events that followed."
The NP Member of Parliament for the area, Le Roux, agreed with
Coetzee's view, but added that the removal would not have been possible
if the police did not have the extended powers granted to them by the
Emergency regulations.23
On 13 July municipal police began dismantling shacks in Extension 61.
Although the ICTC Town Clerk Eddie Coetzee denied that force was used
to remove people, affidavit after affidavit and the author's own
interviews repeatedly confirm that Coetzee was lying. No-one, however,
could independently verify what the people were saying because of the
total control over the press that the security forces had in terms of the
Emergency regulations. Instead, Coetzee instructed his 'greenflies' to tell
the people that in Kwallobuhle they would have fully serviced sites, and
that there would be free transportation to the new area and that tents
would be provided to those who needed time to re-build their shacks.
By 15 July Coetzee was arguing that there were suddenly large numbers of
people who wanted to move voluntarily. This was challenged on 15 July
by NAAWU unionists who visited ICTC Administrator Barry Erasmus to
raise claims by union members that they were being forced to move. The
unionists were given 60 names of people who had stated categorically that
they wanted to move - claims that the unionists found difficult to
question, but promised to provide their own lists of people who did not
want to move. The problem with this debate, of course, was that the
officials were smart enough to define the issue in technical terms by
breaking up the question of removal into an individual matter rather
than contesting leadership claims about a collective mind-set.
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As momentum built up, Coetzee used the rapid decision-making system
that the National Security Management System made possible to get the
money to rent more trucks, get tents flown down from Johannesburg,
purchase a large number of portable toilets and mobilise more policemen.
The number of trucks used ranged from 8 in July, 35 in August, 39 in
September, 27 in October, 27 in November and 6 in December.24 This
provided Coetzee - who was effectively in command of operations - with
the necessary resources to intensify the forced removal. In the process,
officials in the KTC cut corners and instead of tendering as is normal
practice, they gave the job to friends who, in turn, got rich overnight by
renting trucks to service what in the end was a R6 million contract for the
transport alone. These fraudulent practices became the subject of a police
investigation in 198925 and led to Eddie Coetzee's resignation in mid-1983.
The assaults would start at around midnight when trucks, bulldozers and
police vehicles would role into selected sections of Kabah under blinding
floodlights. Commands to residents to dismantle their shacks would be
barked through loudhailers. Residents were given a simple choice: either
demolish your shack yourself, or the bulldozer would do it for you. Under
the circumstances, it is not surprising what happened. Le Roux - the NP
Member of Parliament - was out of town when he got a call from a
jubilant Eddie Coetzee who said there was a "miracle, they are breaking
down their shacks". Le Roux, in turn, was in contact with Minister Heunis
on a daily basis to keep him informed 26 even though Heunis had made it
clear to the Uitenhage Council that removals were no longer a matter for
Pretoria to decide upon, but "will be left to the local interest groups."27
And just over the hill these local interest groups celebrated the removal
in the white suburbs of Vanes Estate and Levyvale. White residents
formed themselves into armed street guards just in case violence triggered
by the removal spilled over into the suburbs - a defensive measure that
neo-Nazi leader Eugene Terre'Blanche commended at a mass meeting in
Uitenhage in mid-July.28 One white resident praised the removal: "Our
houses were going right down in value. There is hardly a house that
hasn't been burgled. We're delighted."29
The following story, contained in an affidavit that was signed on 23 July
1986 before legal representatives of the community, says it all:
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"I am an adult black male 24 years old, residing at 1500 5th Ave, Kabah
and employed at Farm Fare (Pty) Ltd., Kruisriver Road, Uitenhage.
I was living in a two room corrugated sheet shack in 5th avenue. This
residence was erected by myself during June 1985. Prior to this I was
living as a lodger with Mrs. Mamzwanga at no. 11 Sinyani Street,
Langa. I came to Uitenhage during March 1984 from Cookhouse to find
a job and was living at the mentioned address. At this stage my family
were still living in Cookhouse. I was given permission to reside in
Uitenhage by the E. Cape Development Board. My common law wife
and my 8 year old son joined me during July 1985 and we lived in the
residence which I erected. There were already a lot of squatter shacks on
these premises when I started building.
On a certain day, I cannot remember the day and date, at about
midnight I was awakened by a knock at the door of my shack and when
I opened the door I was confronted by a white Police Officer dressed in
camouflaged uniform. This officer did not introduce himself so I do
not know his name. He handed me a piece of paper and explained to
me that it was a notice stating that I would be required to move from
my house to Kwallobuhle as this area is a health hazard, due to the
lack of sewerage facilities. I was also informed that I would be called to
the E. Cape Development Board in due course to be formally informed
about the eviction date. The Police Officer then left and I saw him
walking to the house next door. I also noticed two 'Hippo' police
vehicles outside. I was also informed that no. 1500 has been allocated to
my house.
The following day I heard that all the residence (sic) in the area has
received similar notices from the Police and people were talking about
it. I heard that some of the people had gone to the Offices of the E. Cape
Development Board to inquire about the notice and they were told to
remain in the area pending the outcome of a Court decision.
I did not hear anything about this incident until Monday 21.7.86 after
work when I was again approached by a Police Officer at my house and
was instructed that I would be moved to Kwallobuhle today and was
instructed to prepare my belongings to be loaded later. There were a lot
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of Policemen present and I saw one Hippo Police vehicle. There were
also trucks from the E.Cape Development Board onto which some of
the people's belongings were being loaded. There people were unhappy
about the removal and were protesting as they were being moved
against their will.
When being instructed by the police to get my things ready for removal
I told him that I did not want to move and I was told that I am the only
person objecting against the removal as the other people had agreed to
move, so I had no option but to comply with the instruction. The
Police left my house and I move my belongings out of the house and
then demolished the house. I did this because of fear of being assaulted
if I did not comply. The water supply to the taps in the area has also
been cut off.
At 01h05 a truck from the E. Cape Development Board stopped at my
place and four Black Police Officers, dressed in camouflage uniform,
took my belongings and loaded it onto the truck. They did not say
anything to me. The material that I used to build the shack with was
also loaded. I was then instructed to board another truck with my
family. There were other families also on the truck. We were then
taken to the Offices of the E. Cape Development Board and upon
arrival taken into an office. A White clerk placed a form in front of me
and instructed me to sign it. The contents of this document was not
explained to me so I refused to sign my name. The other people also
refused to sign the forms. We were then instructed to again board the
truck to be driven to Kwallobuhle.
At Kwallobuhle the truck stopped at a site where a lot of army tents
had been erected and I was allocated a tent where all my belongings
were off-loaded by the same people. This tent is divided into two
sections. One section is used to store my belongings and the other
section serves as living quarters for me and my family.
I wish to object to this removal in the strongest terms as I have
forcefully been removed. I did not give my consent for the removal.
Physical force was not used on me.
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I am supposed to live in this tent for six days during which period I
must re-build my shack on area allocated for this purpose by the
Kwallobuhle Town Council. I must live in my shack until the Town
Council gives me a house to rent.
I do not wish to live in Kwallobuhle because of the high cost of living.
I now have to pay busfare to go to work where I usually walked to
work. The of renting a house will also be more than what it costed me
to stay in Kabah.30
By 19 July 50 families had been moved to Tyoksville, the area in
Kwallobuhle that was set aside for the relocated families (see map 9.1). It
was on this day that 4 residents brought an urgent application to the
Supreme Court to obtain an order to stop the demolition of shacks. The
case was postponed to 30 July pending the judgment of Justice Kroon on
the case of the 426 squatters - a judgment that was due on 29 July.
Meanwhile negotiations continued, albeit at an informal level. On 23 July
a discussion took place between representatives of the Midland Chamber
of Industries, unions and civics. Besides the schools crisis and industrial
relations matters, the industrialists announced that they had raised money
for the purchase of building materials to improve living conditions in the
emerging Tyoksville. The community and union leaders, however,
responded by saying that the materials should be used to assist those who
wanted to go back to Langa. It was agreed that a list should be compiled of
all those who wanted to return to Langa.
The removal juggernaut ground relentlessly on. By 25 July 500 families
had been moved and the pace continued to speed up. Liberal attempts to
stop it all were brushed aside. On 30 July human rights lawyers and groups
took down 150 affidavits from people still living in Langa who said they
did not want to move. The reasons they gave were that Kwallobuhle was
too far from town thus making transport costs high; rents were higher in
Kwallobuhle; schools were too far for children to walk; political feuding
in Kwallobuhle made it an unpleasant place to live ( more on this last
point in the next section).
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Tjoksvide (Tent Town)
MAP 9.1
Common Usage Names of
Areas In and Around
Kwallobulde
Uitenhage
Source: Riorden, R., "The Events In Kwallobuhle, Sunday 4th January 1987", unpublished mimeo,
22.1.1987.
These efforts, however, made no impact, especially in light of the fact that
Justice Kroon ruled the previous day, 21 July, that all the 426 structures
between 4th and 9th avenue 'be and are hereby declared to be illegal. ...
[and t]hat the Respondents vacate the said area and each Respondent
remove any structure erected or occupied by him in the said area by 15
August, 1986."31 True to form, the South African judiciary came to the
rescue of the Executive and in so doing ensured the overwhelming success
of a two-day mass stayaway that began in Uitenhage the next day. 100% of
african workers and 70% of coloured workers stayed away from unionised
factories in Uitenhage in protest against security force actions against
residents, continued detention of Emergency detainees, the re-registration
of black pupils, and the removal of 426 families from Kabah to
Kwallobuhle.32
The standard procedure for implementing the removal was as follows: the
midnight visit by a police officer or official who instructed the shack
dweller to visit the temporary police station; the shack dweller was then
given a form to sign with no explanation - the form said that the
undersigned was moving voluntarily and that transport was provided by
the authorities on request; the shack dweller would then be given a green
card with a stamp on it; he/she would then also be given 2 bags nails, 500g
of salt, 500g of sugar beans, 500g samp, 200g mielie-rice and a tin of canned
fruit; the shack dweller's goods and family would then be loaded on a
truck and taken to Kwallobuhle; on arrival the shack dweller would be
required to produce the green card to police officers at the site; a stand and
tent would then be allocated to the new arrival with warnings not to start
fires inside the tent; to re-build the shack the KTC offered a loan of R900 to
hire a construction company to build the shack.
Night after night throughout August and into September the trucks,
bulldozers and police vehicles rolled into the shack areas to intimidate,
destroy and remove people against their will. Without a tough and
courageous leadership to give them confidence and voice, the ordinary
shack dwellers chose to dismantle their shacks and move rather than risk
losing everything to the steel jaws of a bulldozer. A survey of 56
households that were moved found that none moved voluntarily and in
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answer to the question "Why did you move to Kwallobuhle?", answered
as follows:
* the 24 hour intimidation by police telling them they "must go" - 33
respondents;
* the loudhailers telling them to move or else - 16 respondents;
* the orders from police/officials to dismantle their shacks or else
they would be demolished for them with no regard for the
breakages - 22 respondents;
* that the area was to be developed as a coloured area - 9 respondents;
* that bulldozers had either demolished their shacks or stopped just
short of them - 3 respondents;
* two respondents said they followed their neighbors.33
In a subsequent survey designed to reveal the subtleties of the removal
process, Riorden distinguished between promises of better services,
threatened force, perceived but not experienced force, and direct
experienced force. He found that 80% of those who were moved early on
in the removal were promised better roads, water facilities, toilets,
schools, clinics, no rental and leasehold rights; but that most people who
were moved later in the process were not given these incentives. 100% of
the sample of 20 households said they were threatened by policemen in
various ways that "you must go" or else their shacks would be
demolished. None of those surveyed were told that they could stay if they
wanted to. With respect to perceived force, 19 households said they saw
police demolishing other people's shacks, 8 saw policemen kicking in the
doors of other people's shacks, 7 saw policemen stoning shacks, and 5 saw
policemen hurting or beating others. As far as direct force was concerned, 2
had their shacks pulled down, 5 had their shacks bulldozed, 5 had their
doors kicked in, 6 had stones thrown at their shacks, none were shot at, 2
were hurt or beaten, and in 5 cases police banged loudly on the walls of the
shack to make them move.34
Despite this mounting evidence, Administrator Barry Erasmus refused to
concede that there was any deviation from his instructions to policemen
and officials involved in executing the removal to avoid force at all costs.
The central core of his view reflected the national security ideology of the
day when he said in a court affidavit:
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"It also appears that one of the main reasons why most of the
residents of the disputed area did not want to move initially was the
intimidation exerted upon them by members of the 'comrades'
organisation who were trying to attain their own political ends in
defiance of the law. ... I submit with respect that the allegations that
the people in the disputed area were moved against their will are
not correct. It would seem that the main motivating factors for the
voluntary move by scores of people (which are still continuing) was
the fact that the danger of intimidation by the 'comrades'
organisation had, to a large extent, been reduced, and the
indisputable fact that the facilities in the new area are superior and
more comfortable than those in the disputed area."35
In one sense Erasmus is correct, without the leadership the community
lost the capacity to comprehend what was happening and, in particular,
what the real alternatives were. Riorden sums up the steps that led to the
eventual elimination of alternative courses of action that finally forced
people to participate in their own removal:
• initially, there were the promises of better services coupled to the
implementation of court orders to demolish certain structures that
were still in the process of being erected - this was done loudly and
publicly;
• the declaration of the State of Emergency followed by detentions
removed the potential for organised community-wide resistance
and ensured that a second level leadership would not easily emerge;
• the "levels of threat [then] rose massively, and the psychological
impact of loudhailers at night, earth moving equipment and a new
police station at the ready, combined with the odd threat with a gun,
the odd threat of physical abuse, the odd emergence of dogs,
throwing of stones onto houses, and the kicking down of doors all
led a demoralised group into total fear";
• whereas 100% of the households surveyed experienced threats of
force and 50% perceived force forced being used against others, only
10% - 25% actually experienced direct force;
• then came the threat that if people chose to move later, they would
not have free transport; and finally
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*	 they signed papers (that they never understood) conceding that they
were moving voluntarily.36
These processes graphically reflect how effective the instruments of power
that were used by the authorities really were. Instead of dealing with the
community as a collective via their leaders, after 'taking out' these leaders
the authorities were able to fragment and isolate individuals and without
using large-scale bodily physical coercive violence, were able to force
people to act individually in ways that they could have resisted
collectively. To this extent, the removal was a remarkable example of what
Steven Lukes defines as the "third dimension of power", namely the use
of symbols and ideology by the powerful to manipulate perceptions of
power relations in a way that averts open conflict while simultaneously
ensuring that the powerless do what the powerful want. 37 This is why
Erasmus could not afford to concede even the slightest deviation from his
rigid construction of events.
By the end of October there were no less than 6000 families in Tyoksville.
Taking advantage of the momentum of intimidation and Emergency-
induced fear, the authorities went beyond removing shack dwellers in
Kabah and turned on the african families living in the coloured area
adjacent to Langa called Blikkiesdorp - one of those 'mixed areas' that
Uitenhage's officialdom had wanted to 'purify' since the 1950s. Squatters
from Despatch's Old Location, and from squatter areas in Port Elizabeth
and Kirkwood were also removed to Tyoksville.
Contrary to the promises made to residents who moved, Tyoksville was
not a fully developed site-and-service scheme. Most residents got water
from motorised water tankers and there was no water-borne sewerage. It
was mid-Winter and rained frequently during the September-October
period. Numerous people found themselves sleeping on the wet ground
because the tents that were provided had no ground sheets. An
"inspection team" of liberal professionals and politicians visited
Tyoksville on 17 October. They issued a report wherein the Doctors on the
team described the area as a "time bomb" and if nothing was done they
feared "disastrous consequences". The report argued that water provision
was inadequate; night soil buckets were not being removed in sufficient
quantities and therefore people were excreting in the bush and emptying
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their buckets there; emergency services were not operating;
communications systems were non-existent; no provision for washing
clothes and person; conditions conducive to the spread of typhoid were
prevalent; the cramped living conditions in the tents facilitated the spread
of tuberculosis and other contagious diseases; spreading gastric diseases
were in danger of fatally infecting children; there were no means to take
people in need to hospita1.38
The removal had devastating economic consequences for the individual
households. A survey of 56 households revealed that 39% had no
household income, 9% earned between RO and R50 per month, 16%
earned between R51 and R100, 11% earned between R101 and R200, 9%
earned between R201 and R300, 16% earned between R301 and R400, and
0% earned above R401. Out of 56 households, only 23% derived income
from someone employed in the formal sector. If these 13 households are
removed from the sample, then what emerges is that 43 households had
an average of R61-60 per month per household.39 With a minimum
living level for households of around R800 per month, the poverty this
statistic reveals is staggering. It is in this light that the effects of the
removal on household assets should be assessed because the goods and
materials that went into building up their crude shack shelters in Langa
represented an investment over time. A local architect estimated that
R100 was needed on average by each household to make good the damage
to materials caused by the removal. 40 One story captures the tragedy:
"One man (elderly) suffered from asthma and was not physically
able to rebuild his home. He is living in a tent in which there are
two beds and the children are sleeping on the wet ground (the tent
has no bottom sheet). All the belongings from their Despatch home
were going to rack and ruin in the rain and sun. One metallic
cupboard which had been bought in August 1986, was rusting
through and they still owe R300 on it'll
On 22 October, Andrew Savage and Rory Riorden - both of the liberal
parliamentary Progressive Federal Party - had a meeting with Barry
Erasmus, Eddie Coetzee and a third official called Basson. For every point
raised by the liberals to demonstrate their opposition to the forced
removal, the officials had an answer that was either a straight denial or a
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long and contorted argument supported by some empirical evidence, e.g.
the fact that people signed affidavits saying they were not removed. 42 As
far as services were concerned, Erasmus was adamant that 1073 sites out of
a total of 6000 were fully serviced, i.e. there were roads, stormwater and
toilets were in the process of being connected to the sewerage pipes.
However, two tenders were going out that would ensure that all 6000 sites
would have waterborne sewerage, a toilet, a wash hand basin, stormwater
drainage, and built gravel roads. In addition, two schools would be built
and would be ready by January and up to 6 health clinics would be erected
as soon as possible.43 However, Erasmus admitted that there were
insufficient sites for all the residents, that not all sites could be sewered
because of inadequate sewerage treatment capacity available to the ICTC,
and that water pressures were too low to enable water to reach those sites
situated higher up the mountain.44
Besides the material hardship that encountered the newly settled
Tyoksville residents, the most devastating consequence of the removal
was the brutal destruction of the rhythms of collective daily survival and
bonds of solidarity that had built up in Langa. In the process of building
Langa themselves, the shack dwellers also built a well integrated
community. The removal, however, dislocated people by settling them
without regard to natural relationships 45 and in so doing transformed
what was a rather self-reliant community into a bunch of disaggregated
individuals dependent on meager state-provided services. From a
developmental point of view, this is the worst possible situation. Zoe
Riorden, a Port Elizabeth-based psychologist, had this to say after a visit:
"Despite considerable anger at having been moved - and indeed,
everyone we saw was most determined that he/she had been
moved against his/her will - no attempts to organise the people
(who are no longer a community in any sense) were apparent.
Clearly, the sheer effort involved in such basic tasks as getting
enough water, or keeping dry, makes any further work beyond the
capability of those we saw. If the intention was to quash community
organisation, this succeeded magnificently. Despair characterised
the conversations; neglect and deprivation characterised the
physical appearance of the dwellers."46
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Nevertheless, all the officials involved and Le Roux were of the view that
the removal was a tremendous success. Le Roux boasted that it was "good
footwork, smart officials, no red tape, and having the law on your side"
that ensured success47
 - these being the values and approach that were
most highly regarded by the "securocrats" that ran the National Security
Management System. In the end, the whole operation cost the taxpayer
R13 487 782.62,48 just R7,5 million less than the cost of upgrading Langa as
estimated by the PLANACT report.
Soon after the removal, the Uitenhage Municipality took control of the
Kabah area and plans were put together to turn the whole of Langa into a
coloured group area.49 Barry Erasmus - who was Uitenhage's Town Clerk
before he became the KTC Administrator - frequently reiterated after the
removal that the removal now made two things possible, namely the
development of Kabah as a coloured area and the transformation of
Kwallobuhle "into a model township for black people, an example for
others to follow".50 Finally, the 1940s vision of T.B. Floyd looked set to
become reality.
But even then, there were individuals who defiantly stood up against the
Orwellian machinations of the KTC and the police. Didi Allah and his
wife Virginia Matiso were living at 246c Sixth Ave and were one of the 426
that contested the KTC application to the court to remove them. They tell
a story that reflects the kind of spirit that must have kept Kabah going for
nearly a century and a half:
"On Tuesday 15 July the Law Enforcement Offices ... came to the
house opposite mine and I heard them discussing removal to
Kwallobuhle. I approach the officers and asked them where people
were expected to go if they demolished their houses. The officers
then grabbed me, gave me a few slaps and said that they were taking
me to their base camp ... . At the base camp I was questioned by a
white officer who asked me 'who are the comrades who are telling
people not to move to Kwallobuhle'. I denied any knowledge of
such 'comrades'. I was then told that I would be moved to
Kwallobuhle. ... I was allowed to take all my property out of the
house; this was loaded onto the truck. My car, which was alongside
the house, was hitched to the back of the truck and the truck left for
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Kwallobuhle taking me with my possessions and my car in tow. ... I
was given a tent and my possessions were unloaded at the tent. I
stayed in the tent until Saturday night when I removed all my
possessions back to my home in Kabah where I am still residing. At
about 9h00 on Sunday ... certain officers ... told me that I must move
myself, my possessions and my home to Kwallobuhle on the truck
provided for that purpose or a bulldozer would be brought to
demolish my home. I was informed by neighbours in the area that
they had been told the same. After this threat a number of people
began demolishing their houses. I did not demolish my house and I
am still residing at the aforesaid address." 51
THE VIOLENCE OF COUNTER-ORGANISATION
At about 5h30 on Sunday 4th January 1987 a group gathered at the house
of Kelman Befile on the corner of Ponana Tini Road and Laurence Vinqi
Drive in an area known as 'Khayelitsha'(see map 9.2). Escorted by the
police, the group marched through Khayelitsha and then dispersed into
smaller groups that spent the rest of the day engaged in an orgy of violence
aimed at the persons and property of leading 'comrades' and activists.52
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Like similar police-supported demonstrations of counter-power in places
like Crossroads in Cape Town, the events of 4th January in Uitenhage hit
national headlines because they provided a very clear example of how the
CRW strategists where implementing their grandiose security strategy that
was premised on the following principle:
"any governing power can defeat any revolutionary movement if it
adapts the revolutionary strategy and principles and applies them in
reverse. [The purpose is] to defeat the revolutionaries with their
own weapons on their own battlefield."53
Given the assumption shared by the security establishment that the
revolutionaries got where they did through coercion, applying this in
reverse meant using the same means but for opposite ends, i.e. to defend
the state rather than overthrow it. Its application in the Kwallobuhle area
just several weeks after the completion of a brutal forced removal
highlighted how determined the security forces really were to bludgeon
Uitenhage's black community into submission. What led up to the 4th
January and how the violence was orchestrated helps reveal the dynamics
of CRW - dynamics that complemented the WHAM strategy that led to
the forced removal and state-driven urban development that has already
been described.
By January, a cauldron of fractious tensions existed in Kwallobuhle that
resulted from the combined impact of the Emergency and removal on the
one hand, and misguided over-zealous oppositional strategies on the
other.
As far as the removal was concerned, Tyoksville was created on the outer
perimeter of Kwallobuhle in the largely unserviced extensions 6, 7 and 8a,
with some of those who were moved living in a serviced area defined as
Extension 4c. These extensions, in turn, surrounded Extension 4 which
were newly constructed houses (built in 1984-85), some of which were
owner-occupier contractor-built houses, i.e. the relatively newly settled
who could afford non-rented housing because they were employed
workers with employer subsidies and guarantees. In other words, over a
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very short period of time, three settlement types were created in close
proximity to one another: about 3700 houses in Extension 4 for stable
employed workers; about 1000 serviced sites in Extension 4c for many
people who moved from Langa before the removal and from other parts
of Kwallobuhle; and then about 6000 sites in Extensions 6, 7 and 8 for very
poor people, many of whom had been forcibly removed from Langa.54
Each of these groups had their own internal dynamics that the security
and local government officials cynically exploited in a bid to recruit allies
for WHAM and to harass oppositional tendencies.
Kelman Befile was once a businessman in Langa where he used to live
and own shops. He was associated with the Peacemakers. Although never
proven in court, hearsay evidence suggests that he killed a youngster he
caught stealing, but with the collusion of the police, he was never
prosecuted. Instead, rough 'people's justice' was meted out by the
amabutho who burnt his shops down and effectively chased him and the
group around him out of Langa - actions that were to be interpreted by
Befile and others as ideologically motivated anti-Africanist attacks. Befile
moved to Extension 4c in 1985 where he got a house and opened some
shops from which he prospered. 55 The houses in this extension were
originally designated for the Langa squatters that the KTC tried to entice
over to Kwallobuhle - when they refused, the houses were allocated by
the KTC to people who suited the patronage interests of the KTC's
Councillors and who were, therefore, not surprisingly uncomfortable
about who would make counter-claims later on the houses they occupied.
Most of the people who got these houses came from Old Kwallobuhle and
were said to be people who wanted to escape from those areas controlled
by the "comrades". There were, however, a significant number of
Volkswagen employees who benefited from employer housing finance
packages that also lived in the area. They occupied contradictory positions:
while they were part of NAAWU whose leadership was increasingly allied
with the UDF camp, in the community they came under attack from
amabutho squads who lumped them together with the AmaAfrika (see
below). This was to have very negative consequences later on.
Befile formed alliances with a motley crew of ex-councillors, out-of-
uniform black policemen, criminals, Africanist elements, disaffected ex-
UDF supporters and unionists who were opposed to mob rule by
368
aggressive youths, 56 all of whom were antipathetic to the "comrades",
amabutho and UDF groupings who had harassed and attacked them in the
past. Since his arrival in IChayelitsha (Extension 4c), he and his group had
been party to ongoing skirmishes with UDF activists living in Old
Kwallobuhle, namely Extensions 1 and 2. However, when the forced
removal from Langa began in earnest in 1986, Befile was faced with the
prospect of an entire community that had alienated him landing up on his
doorstep. As far as many others living in houses in Extension 4c were
concerned, they shared his anxieties because they were well aware of the
politicised nature of the new arrivals. Not surprisingly, he decided to
organise some armed protection for himself.
The security and local government officials were well aware of the danger
that Tyoksville could have become a seething mass of discontent that
could have turned against the entire removal scheme and headed back to
Langa under the banner of a "Return to Langa Campaign" about which
there were already murmerings. Not surprisingly, they actively supported
the formation of a "counter-group" called AmaAfrika. Made up of old
Peacemaker elements, allies of councillors, africanists and alienated
amabutho elements, this group established its "Headquarters" in the heart
of Tyoksville in Sgcawa Street. It formed an alliance with Befile's group
and with active support from the security forces, enforced its authority
through force and patronage - force by way of vigilante rule and patronage
by being seen as the conduit for goodies handed down by the state. Their
main job was to keep the "comrades" out of the way.
Out of the murky shadows of the kind of black politics that CRW-WHAM
strategists 'allowed' to operate during the Emergency, there emerged a
mysterious pro-state Africanist called the Reverend Ebenezer Maqina. He
was the self-proclaimed leader of AmaAfrika and by 1987 he was
headquartered in Port Elizabeth's Court Chambers, the exact same offices
that were the UDF/MACWUSA/Black Sash headquarters during the pre-
Emergency days when these organisations operated from 'above ground'
offices.
Maqina was born in 1937 and was brought up in Port Elizabeth. 57 He
studied to be a teacher but his interest in the traditionalist churches led
him into a movement called the African Independent Churches
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Association which he claims he became the leader of in the early 1970s. It
was in this capacity that he came into contact with the Black
Consciousness Movement (BCM). He fraternised with Steve Biko and
other BCM leaders in such organisations as the Black People's
Convention, but insists that he remained an African ist rather than an
adherent of BC. Although never clear, by this he meant his attachment to
traditional african values and practices - a world view he described as
"traditionalist". By the early 1980s he was identified in Port Elizabeth with
the BC-oriented Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), although he
and AZAPO said he was never a member of this organisation. It was,
however, as a representative of AZAPO in committees trying to resolve
the schools crisis in the mid-1980s that he first came into contact with the
UDF - a contact that was conflictual from the start due to his refusal to
support any kind of boycott action to meet popular demands and to the
fact that intolerant UDF activists and amabutho took it upon themselves
to violently attack him and the large group of AZAPO supporters that
congregated at his house during 1985.
Befile's base in the owner-occupied housing in Khayelitsha formed a link
with Maqina and adopted the ideological framework of his strange brand
of Africanism. In essence, the logic of this framework was as follows: the
real issue is the war for the repossession of the land; until this moment,
people need services which, in turn, must be provided by the local
government; those who use housing and services and the like for their
own political purposes, only make the hardships of the people worse and
this, in turn, induces violent conflict amongst the african people; it is
therefore a "red herring" to worry about local politics. In other words,
Maqina had the remarkable ability to couch a collaborationist anti-
oppositional strategy in an extremely radical and populist language that
connected emotively to land dispossession and the need to prevent
anyone from doing anything that made people's lives more difficult - the
latter included the increasingly resented and interminable school and
consumer boycotts.58
The conditions for intense violent conflict were therefore in place: on the
one hand there were the "comrades" or amabutho who were leaderless
because of the detention of the political leadership and deeply angered and
frustrated by the way they had been targeted during the Emergency. They
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were also embedded in the community that was forcibly removed from
Longa and they were allied to those in Old Kwallobuhle that had fought
running battles with the newly settled groups in Khayelitsha. The
declaration of an indefinite poorly organised consumer boycott in July
1986 to protest against the State of Emergency was coercively enforced by
the amabutho despite dwindling support. In addition, there was also a
more or less indefinite school boycott on with no leaders around to
negotiate an end to it. This, Freddie Magugu and other activists argued,
alienated many who previously supported the UDF organisations in
Uitenhage.59
On the other hand, a growing group of disaffected elements coalesced
around an equally aggressive group that had a radical populist Africanist
ideology that managed to justify collaboration with the authorities to
"minimise immediate hardships" - an ideology that suited those who
benefited from new housing developments and were threatened by the
creation of Tyoksville on their doorsteps. Add in the tacit and overt
support AmaAfrika got from the security forces during the intense
rivalries for the political support of the newly created constituencies in
Kwallobuhle60, and the picture of conflict emerges.
The triggers that led up to the 4th January were twofold. Firstly,
prominent UYCO leader Lindile Mente was shot and killed as he knocked
on the door of his home after returning from work on the night of
Thursday 14th November 1986. 61 Although this triggered a series of
counter-attacks by the amabutho, the most prominent incident was on
31.12.1986 when Befile's car was burnt out and his brother "Kid" abducted
after Kid was stopped by comrades on the road. This was followed by the
brutal public beating in Tyoksville of youths that Befile accused of
abducting Kid, including dragging one of them behind a bakkie through
the township.62
The plan for 4th January was very clear: 63 gather at Befile's house, march
through Khayelitsha to Old Kwallobuhle with a police escort, break up
into groups to hit certain targets while the police patrol the outskirts to
"catch" those that get flushed out. The conspirators were the core
AmaAfrika leadership, the SAP, and municipal police.
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Ntsokolo Moss, a Volkswagen employee who lived on 12 Pilane Ntsiko
Street, Khayelitsha, was woken at 5.15am on Sunday 4th January by a large
crowd armed with sticks. They called on him to accompany them to a
meeting at Befile's place. 64 Another VVV employee, one Bongolozi, was
woken at 3h00 and went around getting others to join the crowd to meet at
Befile's place. When he got there, 4 masked men told him and others to
join the group to "go and clean out old Kwallobuhle". 65 The meeting was
addressed by Mandla Nkonld, another VW employee. He informed the
crowd that they were going to march to Kwallobuhle and "we know what
we want there".66
The group then marched down Ponana Tini Road, collecting more people
and getting bigger along the way. The police in Hippos and trucks hung
around on the outskirts. The march went through Khayelitsha, past
Zamife motors at about 6h30 67 and entered Kwallobuhle at about 7h15.
By this stage, the police were in vehicles at the back of the march and two
Citi Golfs and a van were in front of the march. SAP officers encountered
along the way simply stood by and watched, seemingly unsurprised by
what they saw. The group then split up and different groups headed in
different directions, sometimes directed by policemen standing on
vehicles gesturing to the leaders of the crowd to turn up certain streets.68
As the march wound its way through Khayelitsha, people in Old
Kwallobuhle stood on roofs and cars to see what was happening. News
spread and various activists phoned one another to warn of the oncoming
danger. Most chose to flee out of the township and into the "bush".
However, a helicopter that circled overhead could track the terrified
activists. Mbulelo Mlali of 8 Peta Street and also a VW employee, was one
of those who fled into the bush. But he was quite relieved to come across a
Hippo and 2 landrovers because "it was better to be arrested by the SAP
than killed by the gangs in the streets". 69 Along with others who had been
driven towards the police vehicles by the helicopter, Mlali was taken to
the SAP temporary base where there were police informers (and later
Befile and Kid) that identified people as "comrades" or not. All those
identified as "comrades" were put into one group and sent to the cells,
while the others were allowed to go free.70
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In the meantime, the violent free-for-all across Kwallobuhle continued
throughout the day, with the last assaults taking place at 21h30 that night.
Riorden's statements record 15 distinct attacks, but there were obviously
numerous others. The pattern was similar in most cases: groups of
between 7 and 500 - but mostly 50 - 100 - would converge on a house; the
leaders were invariably identified as AmaAfrika leaders like Befile and
Matshaka; the windows would be smashed after which the contents of the
house would be taken out onto the pavement, smashed with sticks and
axes and then set alight; invariably, the activists who lived in the targeted
houses were either in detention or had already fled thus leaving the rest of
the family to be assaulted, abducted and in at least two instances killed ;
the police would then arrive shortly after to see how it had all gone, after
which they would leave without the slightest indication that they
regarded what had happened as a crime. One black policeman who was
part of a larger group that visited the aftermath of the attack on Sipho
Sotyelelwa's house on 18 Relu Street was heard to say:
"0 ha-ha, we've got this rubbish. Look how beautiful is his house.
It looks beautiful like our houses."71
It was clearly a day for these black policemen to revenge what had
happened to them during and after the attacks on Kinikini nearly two
years earlier. In fact, one member of a group that attacked a house told the
parents of an activist that had fled that if they found him they would kill
him in front of his house, "just like Kinikini".72
On Monday 5th the security police visited a number of the houses that had
been attacked. When they got to Stetch Qhayisani's house (who was a store
keeper who had been detained the previous year), one of them said to
Stetch's wife: "You see, the boycott Stetch started has caused all this. You
must take your clothes and go as these people will return and put a tyre
around your neck."73
According to Ms. Lena Loom, grandmother of a 20 year old boy that was
hacked to death by the vigilantes, one of the Citi Golfs that had led the
march on Sunday 4th was driven by AmaAfrika leaders through the
township's streets on Monday 5th proclaiming through loudhailers that
"there was no more UDF, it was dead, and they were going to take over.
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He claimed that if they can't get the children, they will take the parents
and burn them at the stadium." 74 The haunting images of an armed coup
come to mind, complete with the authoritarian symbolism of the stadium
where victims from the time of the Roman Colosseum to Pinochet's Chile
have been subjected to the cruelty of leaders who physically reinforce
themselves with packed in crowds enthralled with the spectacle of terror
and the power of those who can inflict such pain.
On Tuesday 6th January, the police released a statement saying that the
events in Kwallobuhle had "nothing to do with the unrest whatsoever".
This effectively meant that the press was free to report the events without
reference to the official version put out by the Bureau for Information, the
only agency that was allowed in terms of the Emergency regulations to put
out a report on "unrest incidents". Local policemen and people involved
were also allowed, therefore, to compile their own versions of what
happened and these could be reported without restriction. In short,
"normality" had been restored. Or, in the words of Major Everson of the
SAP: "The marchers felt things had gone on for long enough and wanted
to return to normality". 75 The clear intention was to present the events as
a "political process" whereby a legitimate "community group" (complete
with mass action) decided to "get hold of the troublemakers", as one local
policeman put it. 76 As an exercise in well managed terror, the operation
was clearly a great success. The security forces must have reveled in the
way they had managed to use "the revolutionary strategy and principles"
of the revolutionaries "and applie[d] them in reverse". The fact that the
real leadership that was by then languishing in detention built up
hegemony using very different tactics escaped the unsubtle minds of the
CRW warriors.
CONCLUSION
The linked strategies of detention, removal and counter-organisation
discussed in this chapter were implemented by the local authorities,
security forces and white political leadership in a bid to overcome the
contradictions that pre-Emergency negotiations were attempting to tackle.
These negotiations were beginning to give shape to a new potentially post-
apartheid urban system that international capital, the- trade unions,
community groups, liberal support groups and even certain central
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government Ministries could have lived with. However, the sacrifice of
white support and conceding that "revolutionary groups" should be
officially recognised as legitimate development partners, was the price that
the local state, security forces and reactionary elements in black society
would have had to pay. It was at that stage much too high a price. When
the WHAM-CRW strategies were adopted at national level by the state
and implemented via the State of Emergency in 1986, this provided the
ideal framework for an alliance of forces that wanting to forcibly remove
once and for all the urban vision that was articulated by the Langa anti-
removal movement. It was a framework that empowered them to detain
the negotiators, destroy through relocation the community that had
struggled for this vision, and then to impose through managed terror a
new leadership whose radical apocalyptic discourse and exclusive
Africanism was no threat to a regime that measured its chances of
survival purely in terms of how successful it was in eliminating its
"enemies". As the policeman said, this was "normality".
But the empty contrived quiescence that set in after 4th January 1987 did
not survive very long. By 1989-90, local processes began to intersect with
national transition dynamics that finally culminated in the realisation of
the dreams of generations of African Uitenhagers who had struggled for so
long to secure for themselves the right to a decent way of life on that small
patch of land adjacent to Uitenhage's Central Business District that they
had always known as "Kabah".
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: RETURN TO LANGA
INTRODUCTION
Unlike the bustling shacks that used to surround them, Langa's church
buildings were not destroyed by the bulldozers in 1986. One of them, the
Order of Ethiopia Church, was perched on a hillock on the corner of
Maduna Road and about where 13th Avenue used to be. On 11 August
1991, grassroots activists and rank-and-file members of the Return to
Langa campaign congregated in this Church hall to workshop the
principles and plans that became the basis of one of South Africa's first
community-based development projects, namely the re-development of
Langa. The proposed development had been accepted in principle by the
Uitenhage Municipality (UM) and was to be financed by the state-created
Independent Development Trust (IDT). Unifound, an Urban Foundation-
linked non-profit developer, wanted the community to be a joint partner
in the planning and implementation of the project. The workshop was
called so that the community could take their century-old struggle that
they had waged against all those who had prevented the development of
Langa, into a new phase where they would participate directly in the re-
making and development of their living environment. This marked the
beginning of a new era of development and reconstruction, an era that
would not have been possible if the transition to democracy had not
begun.
In short, the Return to Langa campaign had achieved its goal of returning
the people who were forcibly removed to their rightful place in the city.
This chapter will describe how this happened and provide an analysis of
the local developmental processes that emerged in the context of the
overall transition to democracy that began in February 1990 when F.W. de
Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation movements and the
release of political prisoners.
LIBERALISATION, DEMOCRATISATION AND URBAN TRANSITION
Political science has preoccupied itself with the way power is constituted in
political systems that are, on the whole, fairly stable and durable.
379
Sociologists have been responsible for much of the writing about
revolutionary and social movements that have challenged these systems.
But neither have been particularly good at providing an explanation for
the kinds of non-revolutionary regime transitions that have resulted in
the installation of democratic political systems in South America,
Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and more recently in Africa over the last
three decades. It is only more recently that a new and creative literature on
the nature of "transitions to democracy" has begun to emerge to answer
questions like: Why do incumbent authoritarian regimes agree to
democratisation processes that could potentially dislodge them? Where
transitions did take place, why were they non-revolutionary? Why did
revolutionaries give up their revolutionary strategies and participate in
protracted transitions?1
The new transition literature is essential for any understanding of the
nature of the South African transition for two reasons. Firstly, it was
widely assumed for a very long time that the white minority regime
would never voluntary relinquish power. This has proven to be false.
Secondly, it was also widely assumed that change would only be possible
by way of a revolutionary seizure of power. In reality, since the beginning
of the transition in early 1990, it is clear that change is coming about in a
very different way. The transition literature provides a comparative
knowledge base for understanding what is happening. It has been argued
elsewhere by this author that the South African regime incumbents
concluded during 1989-90 that the costs of preventing the transition were
greater than allowing it to begin. 2 There were essentially six aspects of the
local and global context that gave rise to this strategic conclusion:
*	 the failure of the State of Emergency to both suppress resistance and
install a legitimate moderate pro-system black leadership;
*	 the increasingly powerful international anti-apartheid consensus,
coupled to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, eliminated potential allies in the west that the
regime could have relied on and removed the "red threat" that the
regime had always used to justify its security strategies;
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changes in the balance of power in Southern Africa, including
military defeat in Southern Angola, the independence of Namibia
and an increasing consensus amongst Southern African states that
the region could no longer afford to sustain the armed struggle
against the powerful and brutal South African regime which, in
turn, forced the ANC to become increasingly conciliatory;
deepening economic recession coupled to the conclusions reached
by big business and leading economic planners that a political
settlement was a precondition for resolving the economic crisis;
severe divisions within the white power bloc between 'hard-liners'
and 'soft-liners', with organised business, professionals,
intellectuals and sectors of the state lining up behind the 'soft-
liners';
the effectiveness of the intermediaries who managed to mediate
between the leading regime incumbents and the primary regime
opponents.
After F.W. de Klerk managed to wrest control of the Presidency from hard-
line 'securocrat' P.W. Botha (after the latter suffered a stroke in 1988), the
security establishment lost the control over Executive power that it
enjoyed during the Emergency period. This put in place a decision-making
process that culminated in the February 1990 announcement that the
liberation movements were to be unbanned and political prisoners
released.
Like in all non-revolutionary regime transitions, the essential reason why
regime incumbents agree to allow transitions to begin and why regime
opponents agree to participate in them, is that both conclude that the rules
of the transition are such that they stand to gain more from the outcome
than from prolonged conflict. This, both sides conclude, can best be done
by trying to gain control of the terms of the transition and in so doing
determine the end result. This captures the dynamic that lies at the heart
of the South African transition.
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What is not appreciated in the mushrooming South African transition
literature is how much of the struggle to control the terms of the
transition has revolved around spatial issues. This author has argued via
both case studies and general argument that the intensity of the extremely
complex multifaceted struggles to re-define the form and content of urban
space is intimately tied up with the struggles over the future
constitutional structure of the post-apartheid state.3 The reason for this is
that local government sits at the point of intersection between the urban
system and the constitutional system. It is, therefore, impossible to
restructure the latter without impacting on the former, and vice versa.
The result is that unlike most of the non-revolutionary regime
transitions, the South African transition is not simply a constitutional
transition with the limited goal of creating a political democracy. Because
apartheid was so thoroughly systemic in its application, the South African
transition is, in fact, playing itself out on three levels, namely citizenship,
industrial time and space: the constitutional negotiations are about
citizenship and involve the state and the liberation movements; the
corporatist economic negotiations between the state, organised labour and
capital at national and regional levels are about the control and value of
industrial time; and the myriad local-level negotiations in the towns and
cities of the country are about the form and content of (in particular) urban
space.4 The penetration of the transition dynamic beyond simply the
question of political democracy is due to the complex nature of the anti-
apartheid struggle which did not simply revolve around liberation
movements bent on re-defining citizenship and state form (as was the case
in most African decolonisations), but also involved powerful trade union
movements that systematically focussed on the restructuring and
democratisation of the workplace, as well as coalitions of community-
based organisations that have consistently struggled against race-based
urban controls and generated their own conceptions of urban space.
(Uitenhage provides one of the better known examples of this latter
process.)
Recognising the importance of space in the transition, the state moved
quickly to create a body called the Independent Development Trust (IDT).
The IDT was given R2 billion from public funds and instructed to mount
an ambitious urban development programme. The basic principle was
that the IDT would spend R750 000 of its funds to proidde homeless
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people with a R7500.00 subsidy to purchase a serviced site that they were
supposed to use as a basis for building their own homes. Only those
projects that enjoyed community support qualified for the subsidy.
Although heavily criticized by NGOs and community-based movements
on the grounds that the IDT was only interested in financing a
preconceived product and not, therefore, products that were generated by
the communities themselves, the liberation movements and their allies
decided to participate in the Board and sub-structures of the IDT. This
effectively legitimized the IDT and empowered this newly created
institution to trigger off South Africa's first community-driven
development movement.
The state coupled its investment in urban development to the systematic
removal of urban apartheid from the statute book. Besides much of the
petty apartheid, the central pillars such as the Group Areas Act were
summarily scrapped in 1991-92. Although the massive racially structured
local government machinery was only dismantled towards the end of
1993, it was as early as mid-1990 that the state announced its opposition to
race-based local government.
The scrapping of urban apartheid, however, was no panacea for the urban
poor. This began to become apparent when local community-based
organisations involved in development projects aimed at the urban poor
began to realise that the combined costs of land, services and housing in
inner city areas prohibited for affordability reasons the large-scale
transformation of the urban system. Instead, due to land costs in
particular, IDT subsidies ended up in site-and-service projects located on
the urban periphery. The focus of the struggle, therefore, shifted from race-
based urban controls to the economic benefits of development projects.
Langa once again found itself at the centre of this struggle.
This was the changing national context that faced Uitenhage's local white
and black leadership by 1989-90. It was a context that relayed to them two
messages: urban apartheid was finally dead, and the struggle for
Langa/Kabah was about to recommence, but on very different terms.
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TOYING WITH FREE SETTLEMENT
The transition from urban apartheid to deracialised urbanisation was by
no means direct. For a brief pre-transition moment that lasted from the
end of 1987 into late 1989, the state toyed with a bizarre attempt to apply
consociational principles to urban spatial ordering. The result was the
passing of the Free Settlement Areas Act in 1988. This Act provided for the
creation of "non-group" group areas, i.e. urban spaces that were not
proclaimed to be either coloured, african, Indian or white. Reformists
argued that this was a legislative route to deracialisation because as
communities voluntarily declared themselves "free settlement" areas,
they would also be eligible for non-racial local governments. 5 The
opposite side of this coin was that those who wanted their areas to remain
mono-racial group areas would be allowed to do so.
Like many urban areas that had suffered forced removals (e.g. Cato Manor,
District Six), the Kabah land was unused from the time of the removals in
1986. It could have only been developed if it was re proclaimed either
coloured, Indian or white by the Group Areas Board. Not surprisingly, the
machinery began to grind into motion after the removals, but by the time
the necessary notices were issued in early 1989 announcing that Group
Areas Board hearings were about to take place to determine whether
Kabah should be proclaimed coloured, Indian or white, the Free
Settlement Areas Act of 1988 was already on the statute book. So although
the notices never referred to the area being defined a "free settlement
area" as a fourth option, 6 this was now a legal possibility. More
significantly, although the notion of a 'free settlement area' was conceded
to recognise the de facto 'greying' of a number of inner city areas where
middle class blacks had been allowed to purchase property, it ironically
also provided a legislative loophole for the Return to Langa campaign to
realise its objectives. In other words, like in many other areas of life where
the apartheid system began eating its own tail during the last pre-
transition moments, the legislative framework that would have been
required to reproclaim Kabah either coloured, Indian or white in terms of
Floy-d's 1940s racist dream for Uitenhage, was beginning to crumble and in
so doing created contradictions that were easily exploited.
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The notice called on parties to submit written recommendations by 15
March 1989. The coloured House of Representatives in the national tri-
cameral parliament proposed to the Group Areas Board that the whole
area should be proclaimed coloured. 7 Although initially supported by the
UM, the municipality changed its tune after coming under pressure from
the Midlands Chamber of Industries who, in turn, had been approached by
COSATU unions on the matter. 8 In a letter to the Legal Resources Centre
signed by the Town Secretary of the UM, it is conceded that the possibility
of turning the whole area into a "free settlement area" should be
investigated.9
In a paper that circulated amongst progressive organisations in Uitenhage,
a set of key dilemmas were highlighted. Firstly, although the Return to
Longa campaign wanted the people who were forcibly removed to be
relocated back in Kabah, this could not be done by recommending to the
Group Areas Board that Kabah should be proclaimed African for two
reasons: this would have disadvantaged the coloureds still living in the
area, and it would be "contrary to their organisations' constitutions which
called for the promotion of non-racialism". Nor did they see their way
clear to recommend that it be proclaimed a "free settlement area" because
this would have legitimized state reform policies. Nevertheless, it was
decided to brief human rights lawyers to make representations to the
Group Areas Board - a pragmatic interventionist strategy that Uitenhage's
community and union leadership were very familiar with.10
The Port Elizabeth-based Legal Resources Centre (LRC) was contacted and
requested to coordinate the submissions of the trade unions, church
groups, sports bodies, business associations and community organisations
that represented township constituencies. In essence, the LRC proposed
that Kabah be proclaimed a "free settlement area", a proposal that was
eventually supported by the UM and the Indian Management
Committee.11 In addition, the LRC obtained support for its proposals from
Members of Parliament, the Urban Foundation, and liberal human rights
groups like the Human Rights Trust and Black Sash.12
During the hearings in March, the LRC and Rory Riorden of the Human
Rights Trust led argument in favour of Kabah becoming a "free settlement
385
area". In his final statement, Riorden concluded with the drama that he is
particularly fond of:
"Commissioners, you have Kabah in your hands, but your arms are
in the calabash. All you need do, to get your freedom, is to release
Kabah, and negotiate its future with those who have been born in it,
died in it, been massacred in it, been forced from it, and yet still long
for it."13
In August, the reconstituted Langa Anti-Removals Committee (including
John Gomomo of COSATU) led by the intrepid Weza Made met the
Midlands Chamber of Industries to discuss a joint strategy. Recalling the
mandates and agreements reached during the 1985-86 negotiations, the
meeting quickly reached an agreement on the need to pressurise the
authorities into agreeing that Kabah should be a "free settlement area" and
on the need to draw up a detailed development plan (using the PLANACT
report as a point of departure) that could be put on the table as a basis for
negotiation with the UM. Uppermost in the minds of both Gomomo and
Weza was the danger that Uitenhage may be proceeding with plans to
turn Kabah into a middle class residential area by building houses that
were not affordable to the urban poor. 14 These early concerns about the
new class-based instruments of exclusion available to the UM were to be
confirmed later on when finance became available for development.
In the meantime, the unions and community organisations went into
'campaign mode', complete with mass meetings, press statements,
lobbying and networking. It was the organisational energy that went into
these activities that provided the basis for constituting the Langa
structures into the Langa Development Committee (LDC), the structure
led by Weza Made that was to take the struggle into its next phase - a phase
that brought the word "development" into everyday language and into
the goal statements of every community organisation with a constituency.
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ENTER THE IDT AND DEVELOPERS
Although the Return to Langa Campaign and the LDC were at the
forefront of the various struggles, the organisations that were at the core of
these activities had no experience or knowledge of the highly complex
technical processes involved in bringing to fruition a proper development
project. Nor were there service organisations in the PEU area that could
have provided this kind of support. The first one, the Port Elizabeth-based
Urban Services Group (USG) was established in early 1991 with the
assistance of PLANACT.
So while the social movement mobilised support for a non-racial
community-based development strategy, the UM requested the Urban
Foundation (UF) in February 1991 to assist with the formulation of a
redevelopment plan for Langa. 15 The UF brought in Unifound, a UF
utility company responsible for managing the implementation of UF
development projects. The UM, UF and Unifound officials began meeting
and corresponding intensively from 9th April through to 14th May. At the
end of this process, the UM agreed at a meeting on the 14th May to appoint
Unifound as the developer to coordinate the redevelopment of Langa,
with the UF responsible for managing the community consultation
process. The UF agreed subject to the project receiving widespread
community support and that the development be structured "on a non-
racial basis".16
On 15th May, the day after agreements were reached with the UM, the UF
convened a meeting with representatives of the ANC, Uitenhage
Residents Civic Organisation (URECO), LDC, ANC Youth League,
Kleinhuisies Committee, and Uitenhage and Despatch Traders
Association. 17 The UF informed the representatives of the proposed plans
for the redevelopment of Langa and requested their support for a strategy
that these organisations had no part in formulating, nor adequately
understood. 18 After developing a fully-fledged development plan for
submission to the IDT, the UF sent out letters during May requesting
endorsements for the project from the Uitenhage chapters of the following
organisations: Pan Africanist Congress, Pan Africanist Students
Organisation, Azanian Youth, African Women's Organisation, ANC,
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ANC Women's League, ANC Youth League, South African National
Students Congress, URECO, Tinarha Child Welfare, National Education
Crisis Committee - Uitenhage Branch, Self Help and Resources Exchange,
Legal Resources Centre, COSATU, South African Black Taxi Association,
Kleinhuisies, LDC, Congress of South African Students, Order of Ethiopia,
South African Communist Party, Volkswagen Community Trust, Young
Christian Society, National Olympic Sports Congress, National Union of
Metal Workers of South Africa, Azanian People's Organisation, Ministers
Fraternal. A number of these organisations provided letters of support.19
In line with pre-determined criteria laid down by the IDT, the
UF/Unifound application was for just over R6 million to finance the
construction of 802 serviced sites in a section of Langa located just below
the old formal built houses beyond 22nd Avenue in the old Langa. Each
site was supposed to have waterborne sewerage, a water tap and a water
meter, the bus routes were to be tarred, minor roads were to have gravel
surfaces, stormwater drains were to be installed, and no electricity was
provided. The area included sites for 2 schools and 7 community facilities
of one kind or another. Significantly, the newly developed area was to fall
under the UM and not the Kwallobuhle Town Counci1.20
As far as planning and implementation of the project was concerned,
Unifound proposed that it would put up the development capital for the
servicing of the sites. After construction and occupation, the IDT would
pay off Unifound. After that, Unifound would establish an NGO as a joint
venture with the community organisations that would, in turn, be
responsible for "consolidation", i.e. the construction of housing and social
amenities.21
TOWARDS COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
After the application to the IDT was submitted, the LDC called a workshop
for 8-9th June 1991 to discuss the proposal. The workshop was facilitated by
PLANACT and a representative of the newly formed Urban Services
Group (USG). The workshop began by workshopping a set of
"development principles" which were, in turn, used to evaluate the
Unifound/UF plan and served as a basis for the development of an
alternative plan. The following principles were generated:
388
*	 the whole of Langa must be developed, including the area between
24th and 1st avenues, as well as Lapland, Blikkiesdorp and
Kleinhuisie;
*	 non-racialism;
*	 land for all those who want to return to Langa;
*	 all residents who were forcibly removed from Langa must have the
right to return;
*	 all organisations with a stake in the development of Langa must be
allowed to participate in the project;
*	 their must be full community participation in decision-making
during both the planning and implementation of the development;
*	 the community must have access to professional assistance to
provide educational, training and technical support;
*	 job creation and skills training must be part of all development
projects;
*	 all services and housing must be provided on an affordable basis for
the majority;
*	 the full range of business, community, recreational, sports and
religious facilities must be provided;
*	 the service standards should be as follows:
water-borne sewerage;
water to each site;
tarred roads and pavements;
adequate refuse removal and cleansing;
affordable electricity to each site;
*	 all financial matters must be the shared responsibility of the
community with those in control of finance accountable to the
community;
*
	
Langa must be developed as part of Uitenhage;
*
	 development must build community;
*
	
all development must promote unity.22
The development principles were used as a basis for an assessment of the
plan. The following problems emerged:23
*	 because the people of Langa were dispersed acröss Uitenhage by
forced removals and therefore did not constitute a "community", it
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was felt that this community needed to be reunited as a
precondition for successful development - the consequences of
people getting the sites who had not been removed were seen as
potentially very divisive;
the project-driven approach limited the planning process to the
amount of resources available for the project, rather than allowing
the planning process to reflect the extent of community need as a
basis for a phased approach to meeting this need;
because the project was not located in a larger development strategy
geared to meet a wide range of community needs, it was seen to be
exclusionary and, therefore, contradictory to the commitment to
'community participation', i.e. if the starting point was a general
inclusive development strategy with the 802 sites as the first project,
then a sense of exclusion could have been avoided;
whereas the UF/Unifound were satisfied with community support
for a project the community had no say in formulating, the LDC
was of the view that there should be much greater community
participation in the planning and implementation of the project, as
well as direct control of the project by a properly structured
community-based organisation;
the LDC wanted to ensure that the first phase of the plan was linked
to subsequent phases because it had information that the UM was
planning a middle and upper income residential development for
the area between the proposed UF/Unifound project and the white
suburb of Levyvale, including the construction of a large new road
to separate Langa from Levyvale - a strategy that the LDC regarded
as "another form of apartheid";
there was also concern that only the area to be developed would fall
under the UM, and not the whole of Langa;
as far as the proposed layout plan was concerned, the workshop
observed that it completely contradicted the type of layout that had
previously existed, the community was not consulted on the layout,
and the layout did not locate the proposed schools on the sites
where schools previously existed;
electricity was not provided for;
the existing brick houses needed to be upgraded and there was no
clear link between the proposed site-and-service project and the
upgrading of the existing area.
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The June workshop formulated a strategy that included the following
elements:
• the printing and sending out of an "application form" in the name
of the LDC to all areas where there were people who once lived in
Langa - the application form was supposed to be filled in and
returned to the LDC so that an identifiable "community" could be
constructed to drive the planning and implementation of the
project;
• the slowing down of the UF/Unifound project to fit in with the
plans of the LDC;
• the creation of a Community Development Trust to take control of
the development;
• the acquisition of funds from the IDT to assist the LDC in its efforts
to ensure maximum community participation.
It was on the basis of the above principles that a series of workshops took
place with representatives from all areas where there were people who
wanted to return to Langa.24 Gradually a shared understanding of
development began to emerge as well as a strategic vision for what should
happen to Langa as a whole. This formed the basis for a new plan that
differed substantially from the UF/Unifound plan in the following
respects;
• it was a development plan for the whole of Langa, but starting with
a R6 million project in the area closest to the brick houses;
• the planning concept that was developed was not a monotonous
row concept as proposed by the UF/Unifound, but rather a
community concept built around open public court yards, cul de
sacs, pedestrian access corridors and user-friendly yard spaces that
could be used in various ways depending on affordability levels;
the creation of a Community Development Trust as the primary
development vehicle that was, in turn, accountable to a broad
community development forum inclusive of all the political,
union and community organisations;
the establishment of a joint project team comprised of a Unifound
project manager and a community liaison officer appointed by the
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LDC to handle the community organising process, with the latter
(like the former) paid out of the projects funds.
These were the essential elements of the kind of community-driven
development projects that mushroomed across the country during the
1991-92 period. They built on the culture of self-organisation within civil
society, but accepted the necessity for development partnerships with
private and public sector bodies to ensure there was the necessary capacity
for effective delivery.
WHITE RESISTANCE, CAPITALIST PRESSURE
After much negotiation, the UF/Unifound accepted the LDC's new
development strategy and undertook to sell it to the IDT and the UM. The
IDT accepted the new concept, but the UM found numerous reasons for
delaying its decision. Its main concern was the way the LDC wanted to link
phase 1 to future phases in a way that undercut plans to create a buffer
strip of middle and upper income housing between Levyvale and the site-
and-service area.
The imminent redevelopment of Kabah triggered reactionary responses in
Uitenhage's white community. Although the UM was by no means a
strong supporter of the development, it was under heavy pressure from
Volkswagen, the Midlands Chamber of Industries and the alliance of
business interests represented on the Eastern Cape board of the UF. No
such pressures were of concern to the racist white rate payers whose urban
imagination had been molded by generations of race-based urban
planning. The conflict between pro- and anti-development camps
dominated the election campaigns of National Party and Conservative
Party candidates that contested a by-election for a UM Council seat on 13
November 1991. Much to the consternation of the NP, the CP's Coen
Potgieter won the election. This resulted in a 50-50 split in the Council, i.e.
out of 10 councillors, 5 were NP and 5 were CP, with the Mayor having the
casting vote. At that stage, the Mayor was NP.
The 13 November by-election was the second one that had increased the
size of the Conservative Party caucus in the UM, with-the first having
taken place in May. Substantially buoyed by their growing electoral
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support, the CP went on the offensive and in so doing split the NP caucus
between those who perceived the Kabah development as the source of
their downfall as a party and those who were still open to business
pressure. Eventually, on 25 November four CP councillors managed to call
a special council meeting to debate the matter. The motion put to the
council by the CP stated that the project area should not be transferred to
fall under UM's jurisdiction, a separate structure plan for the whole area
should be developed in conjunction with the Kwallobuhle Town
Council, and the proposed Unifound/LDC agreement should not be
signed. At the end of the debate, 7 voted in favour of terminating the
development project and 3 voted against the motion,25 i.e. 2 NP
councillors supported the CP position.
The UM decision hit nation-wide headlines because it provided very early
on in the transition a clear insight into the contradiction between the
continued existence of racially structured local government and the
initiation of non-racial community-driven development. It also brought
down onto the UM the full weight of the IDT and central government
politicians and officials. Business also mobilized pressure to complement
the mass action campaigns that community and union organisations
began putting together. The most powerful weapon available to the black
community was, of course, the land invasion. Although the UM decision
caused political temperatures to rise, the onset of the festive season in
December provided a much needed breathing space. It was clear to all that
the UM decision was by no means the final word on the matter. In
particular, NP councillors began to realise that an uncontrolled land
invasion would be more of a headache than a controlled development
project. The spectre of Langa in the mid-1980s loomed large in their
imaginations.
Matters came to a head early in the new year. Following demands by black
leaders to meet the full Council of the UM, an historic meeting took place
in the Council Chamber between a delegation led by Weza Made which
included representatives from the ANC, PAC and AZAPO, and the NP
and CP members of the Council. After nearly breaking down at the outset
because the CP representatives refused to speak English, the meeting
proceeded with Weza Made addressing the Council on the consequences
of its decision to oppose the development project. After heated debate, it
393
was resolved that another special meeting of the UM would take place
where the matter would be discussed again. By all accounts, besides being
the first meeting of its kind in Uitenhage, this meeting also changed the
minds of the 2 key NP councillors.
On the 7th February, a CP-convened mass meeting attended by 278 white
ratepayers voted in favour of a motion calling on the UM to stop the
Kabah development. Only 10 people at the meeting voted against the
motion. One of the demands of this meeting was for a local referendum
on the Langa development amongst whites. Then, on the 8th, a special
council meeting took place that reaffirmed the original decision to
approve the proposed Unifound/LDC project. This time the decision went
in favour of the proposed development, thanks to the pressure that was
brought to bear on those NP councillors that voted against the
development in November. 26 The Council agreed, however, to hold a
referendum.
An application to the Supreme Court by the Uitenhage Ratepayers'
Association to get a court ruling restraining the UM from proceeding was
dismissed with costs by the Court on 26 February.27
On 4 March, Uitenhage's white ratepayers went to the polls to vote for or
against the development of Langa - probably the last time they were to be
afforded the opportunity to have a say in whether they wanted apartheid
or not. In an advert in the local newspapers placed by the Midlands
Chamber of Industries, Uitenhage Sakekamer and Uitenhage Chamber of
Commerce, the case for and against the development was laid out for
prospective voters to "weigh up":
*	 a vote against would invite unfavorable international attention and
block foreign investment, trigger land invasions, undermine the
sincerity of the UM, cause unprecedented violence, initiate
consumer boycotts and strikes; whereas
*	 a vote for the development would promote development that
would benefit all, eliminate uncontrolled squatting, initiate the
development of a new township, and the promote goodwill.
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The advert ended off by warning that in the case of a vote against the
development "all citizens will lose", whereas in the event of a vote for the
development "all citizens will win".
In the event, in a 14,1% poll, 1624 voted against the development, while
205 voted in favour.28
The full council of the UM met at 17h00 on 5 March 1992 to consider two
motions: one that recommended that the Langa project should not go
ahead, and the other that it should go ahead. In both cases, 5 voted in
favour and 5 voted against both motions. Mayor Cronje, therefore, was
required to exercise his right to cast his casting vote which he did in
favour of the motion that called for the implementation of the project.29
The Administrator gave his approval for the project in a letter to the UM
dated 31 March 1992.30
THE PROJECT BEGINS
In accordance with its approach, the LDC sent out "applications for
participation in the Langa development project" between August and
December 1991. Just over 2000 applications were returned from many of
the areas where members of the Langa "Diaspora" (as it was called) lived.
In addition, 104 applications were received from shack dwellers who were
still living in Langa - people who had either refused to move or who had
already moved back. These 104 were given privileged access to the project
by being granted sites on application. The rest were invited to a large mass
meeting on 17 December 1991 at Thembani Stadium in Langa. All the
applications were put into a large barrel donated by Volkswagen and two
children were selected to draw out the applications. About 700 were drawn
which, together with the 104, made up the project participants. This was
the group that was to participate in the planning and implementation of
the project.
Eventually, after extensive negotiations, the linked back-to-back
agreements were in place. The Land Availability Agreement and the
Design and Construction Agreement entered into between Unifound and
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UM on the 4 December 1991 and 7 February 1992 respectively could now be
implemented. An agreement with the IDT on the terms of the capital
subsidy was concluded and Unifound entered into an agreement with the
newly created multi-stakeholder Uitenhage Development Forum (UDF),
the all-party consensus forum that effectively represented "the
community" as a whole. Weza Made, the chief organiser of both the LDC
and the UDF, was appointed the Community Liaison Officer for the
project and given an office on-site alongside the office of the Unifound
Project Manager.
The contractors began construction in April 1992 and the first sites began
to be completed in November/December 1992. The first occupants
occupied their sites in December 1992, with the rest following during the
first months of 1993. By the end of 1993 90% of the sites were occupied.
NEGOTIATING THE NEW URBAN MEANING
As argued at the outset of this chapter, urban transition is intimately
bound up with political and social transition. The fact that it was an urban
development project rather than constitutional restructuring that brought
Uitenhage's black leadership face-to-face for the first time with the elected
white leadership was not simply a coincidence. Apartheid was premised
on spatial separation of race groups and in so doing "imagined
communities" (to use Benedict Anderson's words) were created that
underpinned the racially exclusive democracy. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the non-racial challenge to apartheid was inevitably resisted
by "imagined communities" whose interests lay in defending the urban
system that guaranteed their privileges. But national and local processes
were afoot that were steadily undermining these interests. For like during
the previous decade when race no longer guaranteed white workers a
privileged place in the workplace, race was being removed by both
resistance and national transition as the primary organising principle of
urban spatial ordering. This, however, did not automatically guarantee
access for the urban poor to the urban system. In fact, local officials soon
realised that class-based planning systems could prove to be effective
instruments for protecting at least certain aspects of the apartheid urban
form. The leaders of the social movement, however, were wise to these
tactics and quickly adjusted to this new threat to their hard-won access by
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presenting a vision of a future Uitenhage that disenfranchised poor and
working people had struggled for for over a century. In this sense,
therefore, what was only to be enshrined when Uitenhage's first non-
racial municipality was established in 1994 was effectively won on the
dusty barren slopes of Kabah nearly two years earlier. A new urban
meaning had asserted itself.
CONCLUSION
The return to Kabah/Langa represents the qualitative change in the urban
system that this thesis has attempted to explain using systems theory. As
the assertion of a new urban meaning forged through the struggles waged
by the urban social movements over the years, it marked the beginning of
a new set of interactions and transactions within Uitenhage's local urban
system around the definition and construction of urban function and
form to reflect the new post-apartheid urban meaning that had been
achieved.
The return to Langa, however, cannot simply be explained in terms the
impact of national constitutional transition and urban policy change. At
the simplest level, this kind of explanation would be incapable of
explaining why it was Langa that the community returned to rather than
some other space. Rather than accept the functionalist explanations that
now abound in post-transition South Africa ("now that the government
has changed, everything else will change"), the preceding chapters have
attempted to weave together an analysis of a complex set of interactions
and transactions between the elements of Uitenhage's urban system. Over
time and through space these interactions and transactions at multiple
local and non-local levels have cumulatively reshaped the terms and
subjects of the local urban politics of Uitenhage. Although it would have
been impossible to analyse every one of the complex interactions and
transactions that contributed to the changing dynamic of Uitenhage's
urban system, I am confident that the chapters have addressed the main
ones. The result is what was intended at the outset when in the
introduction to the thesis it was proposed that the research focus should
operate at two analytical levels: an analysis of the interactions and
transactions between the elements of the system and an analysis of the
qualitative changes in the dynamic of the urban system as a whole (that
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are, of course, more than simply the sum product of the changes in the
elements of the system.) Each chapter and the chain of evidence that links
the chapters together both individually and severally contribute to the
evolution of the explanations of the events required to justify this
statement. To this extent the case study research strategy has proven to be
an invaluable basis for this explanation building approach.
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